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ABSTRACT
In the Shadow of China: Autonomy Movements and Local Government Responses in Hong
Kong
by
Jessica Mahlbacher
Advisor: Julie George
In the past few years, Hong Kong, a Special Administrative Region of the People’s
Republic of China, has had formidable autonomy movements that have managed to force the
territory’s Chief Executive to withdraw legislation that would have allowed extradition to other
parts of China. Often the federalism literature investigates contentious relationships between a
regional government and a central government. However, in Hong Kong, the local government
often relies on the Chinese state and local elite are largely integrationist in orientation. What
conditions empower grassroots forces to influence the local government’s implementation of
autonomy from central government institutions? While scholars have found cases of massmobilized autonomy promotion, there have been fewer empirical studies of the intermediate
factors that lead mass movements to be successful in forcing a local government to preserve
autonomy.
In this dissertation, I examine four cases of grassroots mobilization aiming to stop the local
government from giving up policy autonomy to the central government between 1997 and 2019,
the Right of Abode Movement; the Anti-Article 23 Movement; the Umbrella Movement; and the
Anti-Extradition Movement. My findings are based off of 15 months of fieldwork, including
participant observations and 81 interviews, as well as extensive archival work. I demonstrate that
there are three resources that contribute to strengthening the position of grassroots forces vis-à-vis
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the local government. Grassroots forces are empowered to pressure the local government when
they have a high degree of internal unity and access to Western government support. The local
government is more vulnerable to grassroots forces when it lacks elite cohesion. I contend that
interactions at the subnational, national, and international level facilitate changes in the three
resources. Grassroots unity is influenced by the local and central government’s use of cooptation
and coercion; Western government support is driven by the grassroots coalition’s cultivation of
international linkage and the government’s domestic interests; and declining elite cohesion occurs
because of the local government’s reliance on central government institutions to resolve elite
disputes.
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Introduction:
Autonomy and Grassroots Movements in Hong Kong

The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) presents a particularly
fascinating case of regional autonomy within a larger state. The territory has greater autonomy
than the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) other special administrative region, Macau, and
China’s five ethnic autonomous regions, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Tibet, Ningxia, and Guangxi.
While Hong Kong is part of the PRC, the territory has its own currency, membership to
international economic associations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), and
immigration apparatus. The local government also has independent financial resources and is not
directly taxed by the Chinese state. The territory even sends a small team to the Olympics, separate
from the official Chinese team. 1
However, in June of 2020, the PRC leadership adopted a new National Security Law for
Hong Kong. This new legislation unilaterally imposed new restrictions on secession, subversion,
terrorism, and “colluding with a foreign country or external elements.”2 These restrictions included
harsher sentences, a parallel court system that limited access to public proceedings and trial by
jury, and reduced access to elected office for Hong Kong residents. The new law also increased
the PRC’s supervision over Hong Kong’s leader, the Chief Executive, imposing a new PRC-run

1

If someone from Hong Kong wins the gold medal, the Hong Kong flag is raised, but the Chinese national anthem
is played.
2
The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region. The National People’s Congress Standing Committee of the People’s Republic of China,
G.N. (E) 72 of 2020 (2020), https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/doc/hk/a406/eng_translation_(a406)_en.pdf
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agency that would oversee the local government’s actions regarding national security run by a top
official within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).3
This new law marked a sharp departure from how the PRC leadership had previously
handled the region’s governance. When the PRC government negotiated Hong Kong’s return to
Chinese sovereignty with Great Britain in 1984, they pledged to extend to the region fifty years of
“one country, two systems” starting in 1997. Hong Kong citizens would keep their more pluralistic
political and capitalist economic institutions and be in charge of administering the territory. This
promise included independent judicial adjudication, freedom of the press, and the ability to elect
certain political officials. The region was to have a high degree of autonomy in their affairs in all
areas but defense and foreign policy. These assurances were further solidified through the Basic
Law, Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, and embedded in China’s national constitution.
As former President Jiang Zemin famously put it in 1989, the “well water does not intrude
into the river water.” Hong Kong’s system could not, and should not, blend with that of Mainland
China. This quote was originally a warning not to interfere in Mainland politics following massive
protests in the territory championing student activists for democracy in Tiananmen Square.
However, the quote also demonstrated the PRC leadership’s commitment to maintaining local
autonomy and separation between the two political systems.
Before 2020, the PRC government had primarily refrained from imposing laws from above.
Instead, they either delegated the implementation of desired policies to the HKSAR government
or waited for the local administration to make a request of the PRC apparatus themselves. 4

3

The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security, National People’s Congress
Standing Committee
4
Between 2005 and 2017, the PRC central authorities had only directly imposed new regulations a total of three
times. The PRC leadership extended national legislation regarding judicial immunity for foreign banks in 2005, and
law regarding the national anthem in 2017, to Hong Kong. In 2016, the PRC issued an interpretation of Hong
Kong’s mini-constitution that changed how officials could take oaths of office (Zhu and Chen 2019).
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Integration between Hong Kong and the PRC had proceeded steadily over the past 20 years but
mainly with the HKSAR government and the local elite’s acquiescence.
The new national security legislation sparked an international outcry and jeopardized Hong
Kong’s status as an international financial hub. Over 200 legislators from 23 countries condemned
the law as it was being developed (SCMP May 24th 2020).5 After the PRC officials imposed the
law, the United States ended its special trade agreement within Hong Kong under the US Hong
Kong America Act of 1992.67 Both the European Union and the United States imposed sanctions
on China (Norman and Marson 2020; United States Department of the Treasury 2020). Several
countries, including the United States, Britain, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada, all suspended
their extradition treaties with Hong Kong (Tiezzi 2020). Considering that this new law constituted
a severe policy shift with immense international repercussions, why did PRC authorities
implement the new security law?
The new, more repressive policy resulted from a series of rollicking grassroots autonomy
movements in Hong Kong that culminated in the explosive Anti-Extradition Movement of 20192020. The protests were against legislation that would have allowed for extradition from Hong
Kong to Mainland China. They were the largest in Hong Kong’s post-colonial period, with
participation in some direct actions reaching heights of over a million.89 The demands went far
5

All South China Morning Post articles are referred to as “SCMP” in the author-date references throughout the
piece.
6
“Executive Order 13936 of July 14th, 2020, On Hong Kong Normalization,” Federal Register, title 3
(2020):43413-43417, https://www.federal register.gov/documents/2020/07/17/2020-15646/the-presidents-executiveorder-on-hong-kong-normalization.
7
The US-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 allowed Hong Kong exports to be subjected to lower tariffs and a separate
customs framework. Hong Kong also had access to sensitive technologies that the PRC did not have access to. As
discussed in chapter 2, pages 99-100, one of the conditions of maintaining this preferential treatment was that Hong
Kong continues to exhibit a high degree of autonomy.
8
The amendment to the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance (FOO) would have allowed extradition to any country the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region did not already have an extradition treaty with, including China, but
China became the legislature’s focus in the arguments within the legislature and in public debate.
9
This number is the organizer’s Civil Human Rights Front’s estimation. The Hong Kong police department put their
estimate of the march at 240,000 (Hong Kong Free Press June 19th, 2019).
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beyond the withdrawal of a legislative amendment that would allow extradition to Mainland China.
Demonstrators demanded universal suffrage and decried police violence.10
Most strikingly, the protests had several ethnic separatist features. Hong Kongers held
events designed to educate Mainland Chinese people about the protests and ask them to join. At
the same time, however, they also held protests about how Mainland Chinese people hurt local
businesses and acted vulgar in public.11 They defaced national symbols in both HKSAR and PRC
government buildings. Protesters even chanted, “Liberate Hong Kong, revolution in our times”
and created a new “national” anthem for themselves, “Glory to Hong Kong.” On the one hand, the
movement was about protecting and expanding the political liberties and autonomy from the
central government, but it also raised the stakes considerably through overt separatist claims,
leading the PRC leadership to step in.

The Puzzle
The struggles in Hong Kong over autonomy present several features that defy the
expectation of the literature on federalism, regimes, and social movements. Frequently when
scholars of federalism examine movements for autonomy, they find powerful local government
actors and the elite pushing against the central government. In Hong Kong, the PRC leadership
was not responding to intransigent government actors or economic elite, but rather grassroots
movement activity. The goals of the local government and the central government have often been

10

An electoral college of 1200 people elects the Chief Executive. While geographical constituencies elect half of the
Legislative Council, the other half is elected by "functional constituencies" based mainly on Hong Kong's economic
sectors. See chapter 2, pages #-#
11
For instance, in July, activists held a protest against “parallel traders,” Mainland Chinese citizens entering Hong
Kong to buy cheap goods in bulk, claiming these actions hurt local businesses. They also protested against Mainland
women who danced “provocatively” in public parks claiming it was detrimental to children and the social
environment.
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aligned. The wealthiest members of Hong Kong’s economic elite also supported further integration
with China, having significant investments on the Mainland. Mobilization for autonomy from the
central government in Hong Kong has often been a bottom-up affair.
Another unexpected feature of Hong Kong grassroots autonomy movements, such as the
Anti-Extradition Movement, is that they triumphed despite having little institutional power and
few resources. Prior to the Anti-Extradition Movement, new restrictions on participation in
elections and increasing prosecutions had deprived grassroots forces of the means of fighting
through institutional channels and drained them of monetary resources. Furthermore, there were
deep divisions and resentments between movement participants. Scholars of social movements,
particularly in authoritarian contexts, emphasize the importance of having strong organization,
resource mobilization, and unity in facilitating movement success (Tilly 2004; Lust-okar 2004;
Tarrow 2011). However, despite their limited monetary resources and fragmentation before the
Anti-Extradition Movement, grassroots forces compelled the Hong Kong Chief Executive to
withdraw the legislation.
What factors empower grassroots forces to pressure local governments to maintain their
autonomy from the central government? A historical “birds-eye” perspective on Hong Kong
illuminates that the most recent struggle is just one in a series of grassroots attempts to force the
local government to protect the region’s autonomy from the central government. There has been
significant variation in the outcomes of movements since the Handover, and as the National
Security Law indicates, in some circumstances, grassroots forces can launch formidable challenges
to the power of central government authorities over regional administrations.

5

Argument
In this dissertation, I find that changes in particular resources strengthened the grassroots
forces’ position and made the local government’s Chief Executive more susceptible to grassroots
pressure. The shifts in these resources compelled the Chief Executive to change their policy
implementation on autonomy from central government institutions. Grassroots forces could
effectively pressure the Chief Executive when they had high degrees of internal unity and support
from Western government officials. The Chief Executive was more vulnerable to challenges from
grassroots forces when they lacked cohesion within their coalition and experienced elite
fragmentation. I further demonstrate that changes in four factors corresponded to the constellation
of resources that allowed grassroots forces to triumph. First, changes in grassroots forces’ cohesion
were influenced by shifting government strategies regarding cooptation and coercion. Variation in
Western government officials’ support for grassroots forces was affected by two factors,
grassroots’ cultivation of international linkages to government officials and the foreign officials’
domestic interests. Finally, changes in elite cohesion were products of the iterative impact of the
local government’s reliance on central government officials to resolve intra-elite disputes.
Internal solidarity among grassroots forces bolstered their ability to pressure the local
government in three ways. Cohesion helped grassroots forces unify their messaging and policy
goals. Unity also positively impacted movement strategy, helping grassroots forces plan actions in
advance and adjust tactics to respond to the local government’s actions. Finally, internal unity
improved grassroots forces’ engagement in bargaining processes with the local government.
Support from Western government officials was crucial to grassroots success because it
amplified their messages and puts pressure on the local government. Western government
statements legitimized grassroots’ efforts in the region. More importantly, the local government

6

relied on resources associated with Western countries, and the prospect of losing access to those
goods and services changed the local government’s calculus.
The absence of elite cohesion made the local government more vulnerable to grassroots
pressure for three reasons. The local government often needs elite support to implement changes
in autonomy policy, depending on the regime's institutional structure. Elite cohesion also bolstered
the local government’s message among the public in the same manner that solidarity and Western
support did for grassroots forces. Finally, elite defection provided crucial resources to grassroots
forces that augmented their ability to challenge the local government.
Unity among grassroots forces was affected by how the local government used cooptation
versus coercive strategies. Cooptation strategies were often able to successfully divide coalition
forces, limiting their effectiveness in pursuing policy changes. However, when the local
government used coercive tactics unity among grassroots forces increased considerably.
Repressive measures provoked higher grassroots solidarity when the coercive measures were seen
as collective, affecting the majority of the grassroots coalition. In grassroots movements, even the
perceived threat of future coercion through policy changes could inspire increased unity.
The second resource that empowered Hong Kong grassroots forces, support from Western
government officials for grassroots demands, was influenced by grassroots cultivation of
international linkages on the one hand and domestic interests of foreign government officials on
the other. Grassroots forces had to travel internationally and build up connections to foreign
officials to elicit support. When grassroots forces did not actively seek foreign government
officials' backing through overseas visits, they were less likely to receive as much help. At the
same time, Western government officials would often base whether they championed grassroots
forces on their domestic interests. When the Hong Kong government pursued policies that affected
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foreign countries’ interests and constituents, they were more vocal in their rebukes. However,
foreign governments would often minimize their commentary if it hurt their relationship with
China at a critical juncture that affected their desired policy goals.
Finally, the absence of the resource of cohesion among the Chief Executive’s elite coalition
made the local government more vulnerable to pressure. Changes in elite cohesion were shaped
by the degree to which the Chief Executive and their coalition relied on the central government to
solve intra-elite disputes and crises. At the time of the Handover in 1997, few coordinating
institutions could help develop solidarity among Hong Kong elite factions and navigate the
governing coalition’s divergent interests. Instead, local Hong Kong officials and elite supporters
would directly appeal to the PRC government authorities in hopes of overriding the policies of
other members. While there were instances where PRC officials were able to successfully mediate
conflicts, over time, the behavior increased the friction among the Hong Kong government's
coalition and occasionally led to elite defection.

Contributions
This dissertation makes theoretical contributions, bridges literature on the Hong Kong case,
and fills an empirical gap in the autonomy literature. Theoretically, I provide insights that advance
scholarship on federalism, regime formation, and contentious politics. My research helps unpack
concepts of autonomy to better account for local officials’ interactions with multiple levels of
governance. I also respond to the literature on international linkages, suggesting caveats that affect
how linkage to Western countries influences mobilization in hybrid and authoritarian settings.
Finally, I delineate how strategic interactions between mass actors and governments change
incentives to form alliances in hybrid and authoritarian settings. This dissertation also offers two
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crucial correctives to the literature on the Hong Kong case. My within-case approach demonstrates
that the loss of autonomy in Hong Kong from central government institutions has not been linear
nor always imposed by PRC authorities. Moreover, I reconceptualize early post-colonial grassroots
movements frequently categorized as democracy movements as autonomy movements. Finally,
my work empirically advances the literature on federalism by providing a rich account of
intermediate factors that determine conditions enabling grassroots movements to affect autonomy
policy in the Hong Kong case.
Theoretical Contributions
This dissertation offers insights that strengthen our understanding of federalism, regime
formation, and contentious politics. I augment understandings of autonomy promotion in the
federalist literature by framing the local government’s autonomy as a multi-level game, in which
they are negotiating between sub-national, national, and international forces. My work also
responds to studies of international linkage, suggesting condition factors on when international
linkages are likely to be beneficial to grassroots forces. Finally, this dissertation contributes toward
a strategic interactive perspective on alliance dynamics within movements in hybrid and
authoritarian contexts.
I offer a more precise conceptualization of local government autonomy that contributes to
the study of federalism. The literature on federalism has primarily focused on a dynamic between
actors at two levels, that of the local government and the central government. However, rival elite
and mass publics within internal institutional configurations and international actors, such as
corporations and foreign governments, can exert pressure on the local government. As Hechter
(2000) pointed out, the central government can be a source of protection for the local government
from both internal and international demands. In the Hong Kong case, the local government was
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largely integrationist in its orientation, reliant on the PRC government to help manage crises
arising from subnational institutional structures, such as the court or the legislature. Nevertheless,
strong autonomy movements have arisen in Hong Kong despite the relationship between PRC
authorities and Hong Kong government officials.
This study views pressures on the local government through the lens of Putnam’s (1988)
multi-level game to sharpen our understanding of autonomy. Local governments have to respond
to three different levels of governing institutions: the subnational, the national, and the
international (1988). Accordingly, I define autonomy as being relational, policy independence
without constraint from one set of governing institutions at three different levels. This definition
allows for variation between a local government's autonomy from central government,
subnational, and international institutions.
In adding to our understanding of the demands local governments face, my work also
further refines the mechanisms that allow grassroots forces to utilize international linkages to
pressure domestic government actors. Analysts of regime transition have demonstrated that
international linkages to Western countries can affect regime formation and even force the
government to make concessions to grassroots actors (Bunce and Wolchik 2010; Levitsky and
Way 2010). This study builds on their findings by suggesting that international support is more
likely to occur when it is in the interests of the foreign government officials in question. Therefore,
Western support for grassroots activities is more variable than other scholarship on the subject has
suggested.
In addition to addressing the various literature on engagement across government
structures, this dissertation uses the Hong Kong case to understand how strategic interaction within
social movements contributes to whether alliances intensify or become more tenuous. For
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grassroots forces to successfully impact policy, they need to strengthen the bond among the
organizations within their coalition and create relationships with Western government officials.
For the local government to withstand grassroots pressure, they must maintain cohesion with elite
allies. Incentives to act in concert with other groups are, therefore, essential to understanding
overall movement success. Throughout the dissertation, I explore how engagement with
opponents, with other allies, and between levels of governance shape incentives to collaborate.
Autonomy and Regime in the Hong Kong Case
In addition to making theoretical contributions, my work makes important interjections
into the scholarship on the Hong Kong case. This disseration traces changes in temporal variation
in the local government’s autonomy from central government institutions, highlighting that the
loss of autonomy in the territory has not been linear. Moreover, my case selection re-contextualizes
key movements from the early Handover period, bridging analysis on regime formation and
federalism in the Hong Kong literature.
The scholarship on Hong Kong often flattens changes in local autonomy from the central
government. Many analyses envision Hong Kong as steadily, linearly losing autonomy or
articulate top-down mechanisms for how the central government controls the region (Goodstadt
2000; Zhu 2019). Variation in the relationship between the local government and the parent-state
in the post-colonial period is also overlooked because it is more common for authors to compare
the situation with that of the colonial regime12 or with the autonomy of other regions in China’s
periphery, such as Macau or Taiwan. 13 This dissertation, therefore, further develops our
knowledge of the Hong Kong case by exploring the variation in local government autonomy from
the central government over time. I demonstrate that the loss of autonomy from central government
12
13

For instance, see Preston 2016 and So 2018
Two prominent examples are M.K Chan 2003 and Lo 2008 M. K. Chan 2003 and Lo 2008)
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institutions has fluctuated and is not always an imposition from the PRC leadership within my
empirical chapters.
Moreover, this dissertation bridges the literature on regime formation and federalism in the
Hong Kong case by demonstrating that multiple movements categorized as movements for
democracy can be seen as movements for autonomy. A newer body of work has begun to blossom,
explaining the rise of ethnic separatist claims and demands for further autonomy in the form of
“localist” activism in Hong Kong.14 However, this scholarship's primary focus is on explaining
the ascendency of localist identification after the Umbrella Movement. Few analyses draw
connections between contemporary localist activities and the grassroots movements of postcolonial Hong Kong’s first decade, such as the Anti-Article 23 Movement in 2003. This movement
has been studied and categorized as a democracy movement, but its main objective was opposing
the imposition of national security legislation, which would have changed the relationship between
the region and the parent state. My case selection of two movements from the early Handover
period and two more contemporary movements will therefore provide historical context and a more
nuanced understanding of the variation in outcomes of state-society relations regarding autonomy.
Empirical Contribution
This study contributes to filling a critical empirical gap in the analysis of intermediate
factors that determine the impact of mass mobilization on outcomes of autonomy policy. The
scholarship on federalism often examines conditions under which autonomy is extracted from an
unwilling central government by a recalcitrant local governmental elite. Nevertheless, scholars
have pointed to empirical cases of autonomy movements that have occurred at the grassroots level
despite the elite and the local government officials' preferences. There has been little systematic
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work on the mechanisms that produce changes in autonomy under those circumstances
(Whitmeyer 2002). This case study helps unpack variation in success among grassroots
movements for autonomy through its rich empirical evidence of how a trio of factors - grassroots
unity, international support, and elite cohesion - can increase their likelihood for success.

Organization of the Work
The dissertation offers an account of the variation of grassroots success in affecting the
local government of Hong Kong’s implementation of autonomy from the central PRC authorities.
The first chapter explains the theoretical framework and methodology for my argument. The
second provides historical contexts for the Hong Kong case. In my four empirical chapters, I
highlight changes in resources that strengthened grassroots forces and weakened the local
government’s ability to withstand pressure in four case studies of grassroots movements between
1997 and 2019. I then summarize my findings across the cases in the concluding seventh chapter.
Here is a brief summary of the chapters.
The first chapter delineates the theoretical underpinnings and the empirical strategies of
this dissertation. Building off a definition of autonomy that differentiates sub-national, national,
and international levels, I examine how the literature on federalism, regime structure, and social
movements inform my argument regarding the importance of coalitional resources for influencing
local government behavior. I then elucidate the strategies I employed to validate this theory,
including fourteen months of fieldwork and extensive archival research.
The second chapter delves into interactions between the colonial government and societal
actors under British rule. I trace out how elite cohesion, grassroots solidarity, and international
linkages affected the colonial government’s autonomy from Britain during colonial rule. Finally,
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this chapter compares and contrasts the PRC leadership’s engineering of the post-colonial progovernment coalition and their approach to grassroots forces with that of the colonial ruling
coalition.
The next four chapters are the empirical chapters that examine grassroots mobilization
episodes to protect the local government's autonomy from central government institutions over
time. The first two chapters juxtapose an episode where grassroots forces failed to stop the Chief
Executive from limiting autonomy with one where grassroots forces were triumphant in the early
Handover period. Chapter three unpacks three stages of the Right of Abode Movement that
occurred between 1997-1999, in the immediate aftermath of the Handover. This episode highlights
how changing Western government interests and limited cohesion among the grassroots coalition
contributed to movement failure. Chapter four then examines two stages of the victorious AntiArticle 23 Movement, between 2002-2003. This movement demonstrates how critical the absence
of elite cohesion can be to making the local government vulnerable to pressure; the defection
within the Chief Executive’s coalition forced him to withdraw national security legislation.
Chapters five and six investigates two more contemporary movements with divergent
outcomes. Chapter 5 looks at the Umbrella Movement, which took place between 2013-2015.
Strife within the grassroots coalition marred the movement, and Western governments' foreign
policy goals necessitated a stable relationship with China, limiting the grassroots ability to pressure
the Hong Kong Chief Executive. In contrast, chapter six examines the Anti-Extradition Movement,
where grassroots forces were able to maintain high levels of solidarity and elicit support from
Western governments concerned that the changes in extradition legislation would affect their
citizens. This episode also featured elite fragmentation on multiple fronts, making it more difficult
for the Chief Executive to quell public pressure.
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The seventh chapter reviews the study's main arguments and compares them with rival
explanations of why grassroots mobilization varies in influencing local government policies
toward autonomy. I specifically engage with the role of nationalism, economic grievance, and
changes in media structure in explaining the success or failure across all four movements for
autonomy in Hong Kong. The chapter also lays out this study’s implications for our understanding
of federalism, regimes, and contentions politics more generally, as well as Hong Kong’s current
trajectory.
This dissertation offers an empirically-rich exploration of a crucial case of autonomy
promotion that calls into question the federalism literature's assumptions and allows us to develop
a more nuanced, accurate understanding of the nature of autonomy. Through making novel
theoretical connections, my case study allows us to see that autonomy involves interactions at the
subnational, national, and international levels. In the Hong Kong case, fighting for autonomy to
implement policy from one set of actors often entails limiting autonomy from another set of actors.
Most accounts of autonomy focus on the tug of war between local and central governments, but as
I demonstrate in the Hong Kong case, these parties can align against rivals internal to the local
polity and international forces. Moreover, my study highlights how grassroots forces can mobilize
for autonomy from central government institutions, even when the local government champions
further integration, by calling upon actors at the international level.
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Chapter 1
Grassroots Mobilization for Autonomy:
Theoretical Framework and Methodology
Autonomy is often examined as subnational arrangements that provide local officials with
policy independence from other authorities within the state (Wolff 2013). Many scholars have
focused on the tensions between local and central governments over distribution of power
(Treisman 1997; George 2008), but subnational governments also face pressure from subnational
actors and international actors as well (Hechter 2000). The local government can even rely on the
central government to fend off challenges from these actors. In cases where local government
officials do not wish to increase their autonomy from the central government because of the
protection it provides, can changes in autonomy still be achieved? While Whitmeyer (2002)
demonstrates that there are empirical cases where grassroots mobilization has been able to
forcefully advocate for autonomy from central government institutions, we need to better account
for the intermediate factors that allow them to do so.
This chapter will proceed as follows. I first redefine autonomy to account for pressures
local governments face at both the subnational and international level. I then examine the regimes,
federalism, and social movements literature to establish the grounds for the factors that empower
grassroots mobilization vis-à-vis local government officials. The concluding section of this chapter
outlines my research strategies for confirming my argument.
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Mapping Out Autonomy
Definitions of autonomy highlight a local government’s ability to implement aspects of
policy independently, while still existing within the state’s borders and legal jurisdiction. While
there can be tension between the central and local government over this devolution of authority,
the local government can actually rely on the central government to deal with challenges both
internal to the polity and externally from the international sphere.
In reality, local officials face pressure from not only the central government, but also from
subnational elite factions and mass populations as well as international actors. Subnational
institutional structures can empower different factions within the polity that then can influence
how local government officials make policy. These officials may likewise depend on international
actors for support in maintaining their policy independence from the central government, making
them vulnerable to those actors’ agendas. Since the local government has to juggle interests at the
subnational, national, and international level, the local government’s autonomy should be thought
of as relational: it is formal and informal institutional arrangements that give local officials the
ability to implement policies independent of an institution or set of institutions. Based on this
definition, there are three types of local government autonomies, autonomy from subnational
institutions,

autonomy

from

central

government

institutions,

and

autonomy

from

international/foreign institutions.
Autonomy and the Relationship Between the Central and Local Governments
Definitions of regime autonomy under conditions of federalism often involve
conceptualization of power that involves a “zero-sum” relationship between the local and central
governments. Wolff (2013) describes territorial autonomy within a larger state as subnational
institutional arrangements that provide the ability to independently “exercise public policy
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functions” to a local government in a territorially delimited region. Ghai (2013) further explicates
that autonomy enables “a region to exercise substantial self-government without assuming all of
the functions of the state” (11). The subnational institutional arrangements Wolff refers to as being
the basis of autonomy are within, and subject to, the legal code of a single state (2013). Scholars
of federalism have argued, however, that the highest claim for autonomy a local government could
make would be for complete separation from the state, ending the central government’s jurisdiction
over the territorial region (Bunce 1997).
Since an extreme form of autonomy can be seen as separatism, some scholars of autonomy
have measured the concept through the degree to which arrangements threaten the central
government (Treisman 1997; George 2009). For instance, George (2009) delineates regional
government claims into low, middle, and high level threats to the central government. She reasons
that cultural policy independence, such as “control over local schooling”, is a “low level” threat to
the central government, as opposed to economic or administrative claims, such as more control
over tax revenue (George 2009). Cultural policy independence does not target the critical basis of
the central government’s power, such as its extractive capacity.
Sources of Internal and External Pressure on the Local Government
While George (2009) and Treisman (1997) look at autonomy under conditions where it has
to be extracted from an unwilling, or at the very least reluctant, central government, Hechter (2000)
demonstrates that the local government often relies on the central government for its authority.
Historically, the reasons behind the incorporation of disparate territories into states entailed
providing regional authorities with protection from potential challengers. Hechter (2000) observes
two underlying reasons for state formation among groups, either coercion or voluntary agreement.
In the former, the group is forced to become a part of the state, after which the central government
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is more likely to install a leader that is trustworthy. Even if the leader is of the same cultural
background as the population they are ruling over, they still rely on the central government to
maintain their control over the population and ward off internal rivals. Voluntary agreement to join
in the state, on the other hand, is based on the local government’s desire to avoid predation from
rival groups and promote societal order. In this case, the local government is also reliant on the
central government to protect against external challenges. Therefore, local governments can work
in tandem with the central government to withstand pressures from both within the polity and
within the international sphere.
Gerring et al (2011) argue that the central government also benefits from allowing the local
government a degree of policy-making independence. Ruling directly requires discharging more
resources than indirect rule. Where there are already state-like institutions in place and the local
government shares the center’s goals, regions are more likely to be granted greater policy-making
latitude (Gerring et al 2011).
While Hechter draws our attention to the fact that local government officials can face
internal challenges from the polity that necessitate dependence on central authorities, Geddes
(1990) stresses institutional structures within the polity create variations in mass pressure on local
officials. Geddes (1990) examines the individual interests of government officials in Brazil,
delineating the differences in behavior between Brazilian presidents and members of the
legislature. Presidents who faced term limits had to rely on mass support and therefore were more
interested in accommodating popular demands. Politicians in the legislature, on the other hand,
relied on local patronage to ensure that they could win re-election campaigns at the provincial
level. They therefore had little interest in pursuing popular policies, since they would have depleted
sources of patronage that were the basis of elite support (Geddes 1990).
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Geddes’ case study points out that, depending on the subnational institutional structure,
different sets of aggregated interests within the polity can affect the way local government officials
carry out policy-making (1990). While institutional arrangements can create the space for
independent policy-making action, officials may not build on, and may even weaken these
arrangements, depending on the incentive structures they face. Schock (2005) makes a similar
point, contending that all governments have “dependency relations”, sources of extraction and
support for officials that help them maintain power over the population. The local government has
to provide policy or economic benefits to their “dependency relations” to continue to be able to
rule; they therefore cannot make policy completely independent of these interests (2005).
Just as the local government can be beholden to the central government or key factions
within the polity, it can also be bound to external actors for either extraction or protection, which
can limit its ability to make policy independent of other authorities. In her examination of Mexico,
Hamilton (1982) demonstrates that economic dependence on foreign powers limits the
government’s policy-making autonomy. Weyland makes a parallel observation about policy
implementation in Latin America, arguing that governments became much more dependent on
international capital markets and trade in the 1990s (2004). Many trade agreements had clauses
regarding democracy and maintenance of representative institutions (Weyland 2004).
Moreover, foreign governments and international organizations push for autonomy in the
form of subnational institutional arrangements in other states. Ghai highlights cases such as Alto
Adige (South Tyrol), a territory in Italy that Austria also claimed (2013). Following World War
II, the territory was granted autonomy from the central government. Similar arrangements were
made for Danzig, due to competing claims by both Germany and Poland.
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Owen (2002) argues that great international powers will intervene in the domestic
institutions of smaller states, influencing their power distribution, to either expand their influence
or ensure ideologically like-minded leaders are in charge. Therefore, should government officials
within smaller, weaker states depart from a particular policy agenda, their hold on power may be
threatened and they could be replaced by a more ideologically aligned administration. The same
logic applies to local governments granted subnational policy independence through international
backing; they will have to implement policy with an eye to the interests of foreign powers.
Distinguishing Sovereignty and Autonomy
While the concepts of autonomy and sovereignty share similar components, they examine
the authority of different sets of actors. Krasner (1999) highlights that sovereignty has been used
multiple ways, both to refer to the “exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a
given territory” and to the internal ability of a “formal organization of political authority within
the state” to “exercise effective control within the border of their own polity” (4). In both cases,
sovereignty refers to the ability of the central governing authorities to exert control and withstand
rivals in both the international and domestic realms. This logic becomes clear when Krasner
delineates how states can have some forms of sovereignty and not others, describing how Somalia
had international legal sovereignty but could not “exercise control over what is going on within
their own territory” (Krasner 1999, 4).
Both concepts are similar in that they investigate governing officials’ ability to act
independently, but autonomy refers to the ability of local government officials to exert themselves
in policy-making. Sovereignty refers to the central government’s ability to control the polity, the
extreme of which would be an authoritarian unitary state where it could exert control without any
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interference. Certainly, however, an increase of autonomy for the local government would imply
a degree of declining sovereignty for the central government.
A Relational Typology of Autonomy
Synthesizing these insights, we can see local governments afforded independent policy
making arrangements as juggling the interests of actors at a few levels beyond center-periphery
relations. As Geddes points out, local government officials may face pressure and incentives from
mass populations and local elites within their polity due to the subnational institutional structure.
In the international realm, they can face pressure from international corporations and great powers
that may be sources of extraction or support for their position vis-à-vis the central government.
Putnam’s (1988) concept of a multi-level game, in which foreign policy-makers must
negotiate the interests of domestic constituents with those of international actors, can help unpack
these dynamics. In examining conditions where subnational governments are granted a degree of
policy independence, there are three nested concentric circles of governance. There is the
subnational state-society level at its core, where the local government faces internal pressure; the
national level between the local government and the central government; and finally, there is the
international level, where both the local government and the central government face pressure from
foreign governments, international governance organizations, and corporations.
Investigating the concentric circles of governance allow for incorporating similar
observations to those made by Krasner regarding sovereignty: local government officials may have
higher degrees of autonomy from some institutions and not others, just as the central government
can have a high degree of domestic sovereignty, but not Westphalian sovereignty. A local
government could have a high degree of autonomy from international governance organizations,
but a low degree of autonomy from subnational institutions, such as a legislature. Likewise, they
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could have a high degree of autonomy from the central government and a low degree of autonomy
from foreign governments that help them achieve that autonomy from central government
institutions.
This dissertation therefore broadens Wolff’s definition of autonomy, subnational
institutional arrangements that provide a local government the capacity to independently exercise
public policy functions in a territorial region, since pressure on policymaking goes beyond the
center-periphery relationship. Within this piece, autonomy is the degree to which formal and
informal institutional arrangements allow local government officials to implement policy without
interference from another institution or set of institutions. While autonomy asserts singularity of
action, it is, in fact, a concept that is inherently relational. In other words, autonomy should be
discussed in terms of “autonomy from” a given set of institutions.
I therefore categorize the autonomy of local governments based on three broad sets of
actors according to Putnam’s logic, local government autonomy from subnational institutions,
local government autonomy from central government institutions, and local government autonomy
from international/foreign institutions. Figure 1.1 summarizes this typology. The local
government’s autonomy from subnational institutions reflects the degree to which local
government officials can implement policy without being restrained by factions operating in
institutions such as the subnational judiciary, legislature, bureaucracy, or electoral procedures.
The local government’s autonomy from the central government institutions illustrates the degree
to which the local government can implement policy without being restrained by governance at
the national level, including the national executive, legislative, and judicial branches, as well as
national party and bureaucratic structures. Finally, the local government’s autonomy from
international/foreign institutions entails the local government’s ability to implement policy without
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being restrained by the institutions of foreign governments, international organizations, or
transnational corporations.
Employing a relational typology of autonomy provides a strategy to help scrutinize
changes in the local government’s autonomy with greater precision than merely examining the
whole, which would not clearly reveal the complexity of underlying political processes. While
some scholars have focused on autonomy as being unwillingly extracted from the central
government, others have demonstrated both why the local government may rely on the central
government and why the local government might willingly delegate authority. The local
government’s reliance on the central government can be a result of pressures from both within the
polity as well as from the international sphere. Subnational institutional structures can incentivize

Figure 1.1: A Relational Typology of Local Government
Autonomy

Autonomy from
International/Foreign
Institutions

•Ability of the national government to
implement policy without pressure from
international institutions, such as foreign
governments, international organizations,
and transnatioanl corporations.

Autonomy from Central
Government Institutions

•Ability of the local government to
implement policy without pressure from
the central governing authorities,
including the national executive,
legislative, and judicial branches

Autonomy from
Subnational Institutions

•Ability of government officials to
implement policy without pressure from
societal forces operating in legislatures,
judiciaries, and the bureaucracy,
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local government officials to build on or weaken the policy-making independence they may have
achieved from the central government in the past. At the same time, the local government may
actually have achieved policy independence through reliance on international actors. If so, they
might be beholden to those interests to maintain their autonomy from central government
institutions. This typology allows us to explore the ways in which the local government may have
a high degree of autonomy from one set of institutions, but a low degree of autonomy from another
set of institutions, as well as how autonomies from different sets of institutions interact.

Autonomy from Central Government Institutions and Mass Mobilization
This project identifies factors that bolster grassroots forces’ position and enervates the local
government during grassroots mobilization, enabling grassroots forces to obtain their desired
policies from the local government regarding autonomy from central government institutions.
Many analysts of federalism have contributed insights regarding influences on local government
behavior toward autonomy from central governing authorities. Two of the most vital insights are
that subnational structures provide resources that can help local elite expand their power-base,
and local officials often seek to maintain, if not maximize, their power. Yet, these theories fail to
consider that the local government can require assistance from the central government to ward off
challenges from other levels of governance. Therefore, local government officials may be
unwilling to challenge actors representing the parent state, and only do so when faced with
significant internal or external pressure. Their behavior, therefore, can depend on the pressure they
face from the subnational polity, including mass mobilization. While scholars have demonstrated
that popular mobilization affects the local government’s pursuit of autonomy from central
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government institutions, further study of the mechanisms that empower or disempower mass
mobilization is required.
Incentives of Local Government Officials
Beginning in the 1990s, scholars debated the extent to which subnational institutional
arrangements relieved or exacerbated tensions in multi-ethnic societies in post-colonial and postSoviet contexts, leading scholars to engage with local government officials’ behavior toward
central governing authorities (Gurr 1994; Roeder 1994; Treisman 1997; Nordquist 1998; Bunce
1999; Hechter 2000; Cornell 2002; Brancati 2008; McGarry and O’Leary 2009; Wolff 2013;
Siroky and Cuffe 2014; Anderson 2015). Their work highlighted autonomy, the degree to which
the subnational government can implement policy in a given territory free of national authorities
within the state, as an explanatory factor in variation in ethnic conflict. There are two important
arguments arising from this debate on the role of federal structures and ethnic conflict, however,
that contribute to understanding the local government’s behavior toward protection of autonomy
from central government institutions. The first contention is that subnational government status
affords local government officials with the space to build a separate base of power from the central
government and the second is that subnational government officials seek to preserve, if not expand,
their power.
Institutional structures that devolve power to subnational governments provide economic,
ideational, and legitimation resources to local government officials. These resources allow
subnational government officials to challenge the central government. For instance, Bunce
demonstrates how the federal structure of the Soviet Union weakened the centralized party
apparatus. Control over economic resources empowered lower-level cadre and leaders within the
republics (1999).
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In addition to providing local government officials with economic resources that strengthen
their position, devolution of power to local administrations may provide these officials with
ideational resources as well. Roeder (2007) argues that successful separatist projects resulting in
nation-state apparatuses originated from “segmented states,” in which territory and population are
divided into separate jurisdictions that “gives that population that purportedly is indigenous to each
jurisdiction a distinct political status” (10). Segmented states make it possible for local elites to
establish “political-identity hegemony”, limiting competing identities and alternative nation-state
projects.
Cornell (2002) argues that subnational decision-making structures, such as legislatures,
legitimize local governing officials by granting them leadership positions within these institutions.
“The position of leadership of an autonomous region, having a relatively strong base on which to
stand, is therefore institutionalized in a manner that the leadership of a regular popular national
movement cannot be” (Cornell 2002). For instance, in the case of Abkhazia, while Abkhaz did not
have demographic strength, they dominated representation in both the republican parliament as
well as ministerial and local communist party leadership during the Soviet period. Their leadership
in these institutions allowed them significant regional control and influence over central
government decision-making (Cornell 2002).
The scholarship on ethnic federalism also suggests, however, that local government
officials are power-maximizers, that seek to preserve, and in some cases opportunistically expand,
their power. For instance, Treisman maintains that local government officials will seek to advance
their policy-making autonomy when they have bargaining power. He measures bargaining power
in ethnic regions within Russia in terms of the wealth, resources, and size of the region. These
factors “affect both their perceived viability as separate entities and their ability to withstand
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central pressure and impose economic costs during negotiation” (Treisman 1997). Leaders of
regions with more bargaining power were more likely to be separatist (Treisman 1997, 239). Those
that depended on central transfers for regional spending were more cautious.
Like Treisman, Hechter (2000) asserts that “indirect rule is the outcome of a bargain
between the central ruler and his agent, the local authority”; but he sees the bargain as one that has
already been negotiated and settled in most instances (29). The local government will only seek
to maintain its current level of power because of the central government’s ability to provide
protection from both internal rivals as well as international challengers. If the central government
no longer provides credible protection from subnational and international challenges, either by
imposing more direct rule or breaking down, then regional leaders will mobilize to protect their
control over their territory (Hechter 2000).
While Hechter highlights the internal and external challenges local leadership may face,
causing them to enter into partnership with the state, he fails to account for conditions that would
cause the local officials to accept new terms from the central government that may require giving
up more power. He sees the process as being a bargain between the two sets of actors, but he
assumes that if the central government changes the terms of the arrangement, the local government
will not comply. Yet, since the local government accepts the relationship to avoid external and
internal threats, they might need added protection from the central government should threats
increase from these other parties, and therefore be willing to give up a certain amount of
institutional power to the central government for their defense.
In other words, while local government officials may seek to maintain their influential
positions, it is important to remember, as the previous section pointed out, that they are not only
contending with one set of actors, but rather several at multiple levels of governance. They have
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to contend with actors in subnational institutions, national institutions, and international
institutions. Therefore, they can seek to maintain the majority of their power from actors at one
level of governance through acquiescence to actors at another level of governance. Local
government interest in expanding or contracting their autonomy from central government
institutions therefore depends on the pressures they are facing at these multiple levels of
governance.
Popular Mobilization and Variation in Autonomy Promotion
Given that local government officials may make decisions regarding autonomy from
central government institutions based on pressure from actors within and external to the polity,
pressure from subnational societal actors should be examined. There is not as much understanding
of how mass populations at the subnational level can influence local government officials to
increase or decrease autonomy from central government institutions. More scholarship has
concentrated on elite machinations due to their capacity to marshal resources to mobilize mass
populations. Elites possessed access and control over vital methods of disseminating and framing
claims, such as literature and media (Anderson 1983; Snyder 2000; Straus 2008). Wilkinson
highlights the way in which government officials can manipulate police performance in order to
mobilize voters (2006). Other authors emphasize the government officials’ ability to tailor masseducation to disseminate narratives that suit their political agenda (Gellner 1983; King 2001; Zhao
2004; Wang 2012).
Where popular mobilization is investigated, studies focus on explanations of changes in
mass sentiment (Elkin and Sides 2007; Siroky and Cuffe 2014; Lepic 2017). These studies reveal
more about the efficacy of elite machinations in changing mass sentiment. They do not really look
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at bottom-up processes through which grassroots mobilization might affect the local government’s
actions regarding its relationship with central government institutions.
Scholars have found cases, however, where local government officials have been unable
to mobilize their local population against the central government. Munoz and Guinjoan (2013)
find that changes in Catalonian news coverage and campaign staff had less of an effect on voting
for pro-independence referenda than longer running traditions of participation and pre-existing
sentiment within a municipality. Ritualization of participation in separatist activities mobilized
people in the long term, but could not account for more immediate mobilization (Muñoz and
Guinjoan 2013).
Whitmeyer goes further, contending that mobilization for autonomy from the central
government institutions has occurred in spite of elite demographic preferences (2002). In the 20th
century, the central authoritarian government used “extraordinary powers” to promote Spanish
nationalism and eradicate Basque nationalism. The regional government officials took the side of
the local government as opposed to Basque nationalists ((Whitmeyer 2002).
The assumption about the relationship between elite narratives and popular sentiment are
based on two methodological errors (Whitmeyer 2002). There is very little attention given to
negative cases where the same mechanisms elites utilized in successful cases fail to produce similar
results (Whitmeyer 2002). Moreover, scholars have employed post hoc ergo propter hoc logic; in
positive cases, elites are nationalistic or promote nationalism before ordinary people express
nationalist sentiment. Therefore, scholars assume that there is a causal linkage between the two,
elite machinations cause the observed popular nationalism. Political entrepreneurs may be
responding to mass desire for increased autonomy from central government institutions, rather
than provoking the demand for it.
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Thus, local governments face demands from both within the polity and from the central
government. This tug of war over policy implementation has primarily been examined as one
between central government officials and local government officials, or occasionally, as one in
which the local government teams up with the central government in order to wrest control from
subnational institutions and rival societal groups. As Whitmeyer demonstrates, there are cases
where popular mobilization can force the local government officials to try to increase its autonomy
from the central government institutions. While Whitmeyer elucidated historical examples of
popular movements impacting autonomy, he did not investigate factors regarding how and why
popular movements were able to influence local government decision-making. The factors that
allow popular mobilization to pressure local government officials into pursuing these objectives
need to be examined in order to fully understand variation in autonomy from central government
institutions.
Subnational institutional structures provide resources to local government officials to
expand their autonomy from central government institutions but maintaining their power may
mean local reliance on central government institutions for financial resources and protection from
potential rivals. The local government faces pressures from actors at multiple levels of
government, and that pressure can influence whether they uphold or weaken their autonomy from
central government institutions. Therefore, subnational pressure, such as mass mobilization, needs
to be investigated as affecting the behavior of local government officials toward autonomy. Mass
mobilization has impacted autonomy from central government institutions, occasionally even in
the face of contrary elite interests. The next section connects insights from the literatures on ethnic
federalism, regimes, and social movements to show how interactions between the local
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government’s autonomy from subnational institutions, central government institutions, and
international/foreign institutions empower or disempower grassroots forces.

Subnational and International Pressure on Local Government Behavior
In the previous section, we surveyed important findings from the ethnic federalism
literature that local government officials have both resources to advance their autonomy from
central government institutions and a desire to maintain, or even expand their power. At the same
time, however, local government officials can face both subnational and international challenges
that necessitate dependence on the central government. The local government faces demands from
actors at multiple level of governance, and this pressure then determines whether they uphold or
weaken their autonomy from the central government.
There are three prominent challenges to local officials’ governance identified by the
literature on regimes, ethnic federalism, and social movements that can change the resources
available to the local government and grassroots forces, thereby affecting the local government’s
behavior toward the authorities of the parent state. The challenge of managing intra-elite tension
among the ruling coalition creates prospects for elite fragmentation and defection, making the local
government more vulnerable to pressure. Strategic choices in managing dissent can impact the
strength of the grassroots coalition’s unity in addressing the local government. Finally, local
governments also face confrontations with international actors who may try to protect and assist
grassroots forces in their attacks on local government behavior.

Pressure from Subnational Institutions:
Authoritarian Power-Sharing and Changes in Elite Cohesion
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Local governments in authoritarian systems need to maintain elite cohesion to ensure
insulation from popular mobilization, but interactions with the central government authorities can
limit their ability to keep their coalition unified. Scholars of ethnic federalism have reasoned that
it is harder to coalesce national and local elite in democratic systems. However, the regime
literature has demonstrated that elite cohesion is just as tricky to sustain in authoritarian systems.
Scholars of authoritarian and hybrid regimes have established that creating institutions where all
elite factions have a stake can harmonize divergent interests and help navigate intra-elite disputes
(Brownlee 2007; Gandhi 2008; Svolik 2012). Their conclusions suggest that the same mechanisms
that produce solidarity at one level of governance can produce ruptures between the elite at another
level. Rather than focusing on tensions between center and periphery elite, we need to turn our
attention to how the central government’s ability to arbitrate between local elite factions affect
subnational elite cohesion. If the local government can rely on the central government to act as an
arbiter, they are less likely to build up subnational institutions that allow power-sharing and control
since they can utilize national institutions to overrule other elite factions. This dynamic can
facilitate elite fragmentation and defection in the long run, leaving them vulnerable to grassroots
pressure for increased autonomy from central government institutions.
Analyses of federalism have highlighted the challenge of sustaining elite cohesion between
national and local elite. As previously discussed, the literature on ethnic conflict suggests that
subnational institutional structures can create opportunities and resources for local elites to push
for more power vis-à-vis a central government authority. Regional elites are able to develop statelike apparatuses at the local level that make it easier to separate from the central governing
authority. They can also gain financial resources, develop leadership and name recognition, and
curate local media’s dissemination of identity and propaganda.
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Brancati (2008) has stipulated that ensuring elite cohesion between central and periphery
leadership should be more onerous in democratic settings, as opposed to more authoritarian ones.
Democratic regimes have institutional components that scholars have tied to secessionism, such
as regional parties. Brancati contends that regional parties contribute to pushes for increased
autonomy and conflict by “creating regional identities, supporting legislation harmful to ethnic
minorities and other regions of the a country, and, ultimately, mobilizing groups to engage in ethnic
secessionism” (2008, 60). Decentralization, in and of itself, does not lead to a push for increased
secessionism or autonomy, it is really the possibility of policy control at the local level through
promoting regional identities in elections that incentivizes this behavior (Brancati 2008).
Not only do democratic regimes provide more opportunities and incentives for pursuing
autonomy from central government institutions, but authoritarian regimes also have greater
capacity for repression and coercion than democratic ones. The British government shut down the
Northern Irish assembly at times when the Irish Republican Army refused to disarm, but this tactic
could only be utilized temporarily (Brancati 2008). On the other hand, Aelen (2006) demonstrates
that in Ethiopia, which has a more authoritarian structure, the ruling party could blur the line
between the party and the bureaucracy. If citizens vote for regional or ethnic parties instead of
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), they would “lose the benefits and
services they have the right to obtain from the public administration” (Aalen 2006, 251).
Furthermore, when the national ruling party EPRDF lost in 2005, the successful party leadership
in the election was imprisoned and charged with treason (Aalen 2006).
Yet while the threat of force ultimately undergirds authoritarian structures, elite cohesion
is necessary to ensure the stability of the regime. As Bueno de Mesquita et al (2002) observed,
even in an autocratic system, the leader needs a “winning coalition” to rule. Svolik (2012)
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identifies authoritarian power-sharing, or the power relations between the ruler and their inner
circle, as one of the main challenges within an authoritarian regime. The majority of dictators have
left power through the machinations of regime insiders, rather than mass uprisings (Svolik 2012).
Additionally, elite fragmentation makes the local government more vulnerable to
grassroots pressure. Grassroots forces can elicit support from elite defectors, which can be critical
to movement success in curtailing policy implementation (O’Brien and Li 2006; Brownlee 2007).
Therefore, institutions that engender elite trust and negotiation are critical to whether or not elite
fragmentation in favor of grassroots’ demands take place.
Svolik (2012) maintains that there are two elements that make power-sharing between the
authoritarian ruler and their inner circle difficult: the opportunism of the dictator and the secrecy
among elite. The dictator is only constrained when the inner elite can credibly threaten rebellion.
The threat of rebellion is not enough for stable elite relationships, however; the elite inner circle
and the authoritarian dictator have a difficult time creating trust based on the prevalence of secrecy.
The ruler and their inner circle lack an independent party to enforce agreements, creating the
potential for destabilization and overthrow due to limited trust between the parties (Svolik 2012).
Authoritarian leaders and their inner circle create political organizations such as parties,
cabinets, and legislatures that facilitate communication and transparency among regime actors
(Svolik 2012, Brownlee 2008, Slater 2010, Gandhi 2008). Brownlee argues that strong party
organizations in authoritarian countries act as spaces for the negotiation among elites that represent
different societal groups (2008). Svolik (2012), Brownlee (2008), and Slater (2010) all emphasize
institutions as increasing the durability of the regime. Furthermore, when elite see their future
career and fortunes tied to the success of the current leadership, they are more likely to remain
loyal and supportive of the regime (Svolik 2012; Brownlee 2008).
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Pressure for increased autonomy from central government institutions can be strengthened
because the center-periphery relationship may render mechanisms for elite power-sharing at the
subnational level ineffective. Local governments with autonomous arrangements have to navigate
elite power-sharing on two levels, both with the central government and subnational elite. Party
institutions, legislatures, and cabinets may not perform the same function under these
circumstances, since Svolik (2012) was exploring authoritarian power-sharing at a single level of
government. In cases where the local government is dependent on the central government, the
latter can act as a third party arbiter, and negotiate in cases of elite conflict, since elites rely on the
patronage of the central government to ensure their control over society. Since the central
government can perform this role, it is far less likely that the subnational regime will build or
invest in new institutional structures to solve disputes among elite factions and will instead
empower the central government to perform that role.
Therefore, in contrast to democratic systems, the center and peripheral leadership may have
an accord, but intra-elite conflict at the subnational level can threaten elite cohesion. In the long
run, the local government’s appeals to the central government can increase the likelihood of elite
fragmentation over time, as members of the elite that lose the dispute will be alienated from the
coalition. Brownlee (2007) describes how political parties lengthen the time horizon for elite
interests; even if they are not immediately able to achieve their aims, there are future rounds of
party negotiations that might allow them to succeed. The more the local government resolves
disputes utilizing the central government as a third party arbiter over subnational institutions, the
greater likelihood that some segments of the elite will continually lose out and no longer see loyalty
to the coalition as being in their interest.
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Local governments in authoritarian systems have to maintain elite cohesion to ensure their
capacity to resist popular pressure for autonomy promotion. In hybrid and authoritarian systems,
regime insiders have often played a critical role in creating instability and provided crucial
resources to mass challengers. While the structure of democratic regimes can lead to fissures
between the center and periphery elite, in authoritarian systems with autonomous regions,
subnational elite friction can be a more severe threat to elite unity. Svolik surmises that powersharing institutions that ensure the regime’s longevity are set up due to the lack of a third-party
arbiter in authoritarian settings. However, subnational government officials can utilize the central
government to resolve disputes without investing in institutions that appease elite interests. The
iterative impact of the local government’s reliance on national institutions is the alienation of elite
factions that cannot achieve their goals through subnational institutions, leading to increased
fragmentation. This friction leaves the local government more vulnerable to grassroots pressure.
Pressure From Subnational Institutions:
Authoritarian Control and Unity in Mass Mobilization
In addition to the problem of managing elite conflict, authoritarian regimes also face
difficulties managing their populations. While there is less pluralistic space for popular expression
of desire for change in the level of autonomy from central government institutions, scholars have
shown that citizens in authoritarian regimes are not necessarily quiescent. Repression produces
information asymmetries, which leave the authoritarian government unprepared to deal with mass
movements. Moreover, high levels of collective repression can increase the unity of grassroots
forces. Cooptation strategies such as the development of subnational institutions, including
legislatures, parties, and elections can help the government gain crucial information about possible
opposition to the regime and divide grassroots forces, thereby enervating their ability to exert
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pressure against the government. The local government’s choice in responding to grassroots
opposition with either repression or cooptation will thereby impact the strength of grassroots forces
by changing the quality of the alliance: when the local government uses cooptation, the grassroots
forces will have a weaker alliance; when officials use less cooptation and more collectively
repressive strategies, grassroots forces will have a stronger alliance.
Svolik (2012) insists that the government faces challenges regarding control, managing the
population while excluding the majority from power, despite more limited opportunities for public
participation in an authoritarian regime. A fundamental component of this challenge is that by
relying on repression and surveillance to remain in power, the regime has made it difficult to
ascertain information about threats to their rule from the population. Ethnographic work such as
that of Scott and Wedeen (1985; 1999) have demonstrated that compliance does not necessarily
mean submission to the regime. Citizens engage in small acts of resistance akin to foot dragging
and continually develop new repertoires to undermine regime activity that threatens them, even if
they are unwilling to rise up against the regime. Moreover, Beissinger (2002) reveals how events
such as public demonstrations can be structuring, changing identification among societal actors in
a relatively compressed period of time that may threaten a regime that had otherwise appeared
quite stable.
Not only is repression insufficient to sustain control over a population, but the
characteristics of coercion can affect the regime’s ability to withstand challenges (Boudreau 2004;
Davenport 2015; Blaydes 2018). Davenport (2015) highlights how “covert repression,” such as
surveillance and infiltration, can be more successful at dividing and enervating grassroots
movements more than either “overt repression,” such as arrests and raids, or “severe repression,”
such as large-scale violence against the movement. While the latter two can weaken social
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movement forces, the effect is temporary (Davenport 2015). Blaydes (2018) on the other hand,
emphasizes the importance of the way governments’ target violence when using higher levels of
repression. She demonstrates when the government uses a high level of repression against a
collective, individuals feel they share a “linked fate” with other group members, increasing
solidarity among the opposition and encouraging renewed dedication to fighting the government
(Blaydes 2018, 14).
Many scholars have asserted that co-optation strategies serve as an alternative to
repression, allowing the government better access to information (Wintrobe 1998; Magaloni 2006,
Gandhi 2006; Svolik 2012; Hale 2014). Barraclough defines co-optation as the “absorption into
the regime of individual opponents in order to contain or eliminate both their motivation and
capacity to oppose” (1985, 308). Gandhi’s work demonstrates that including members of the
opposition in formal institutions can help keep the government apprised of important grievances
that may spur anti-regime activity (2006). Svolik maintains that political parties can co-opt
segments of the population through career opportunities, facilitating more consistent flows of
information as opposed to one time pay-offs (2012).
In addition to helping non-democratic regimes navigate difficulties in obtaining
information regarding mass sentiment, Lust-Okar contends that through coopting sections of the
opposition with positions in a legislature or on the cabinet, the government can divide the
opposition, decreasing the likelihood of effective grassroots mobilization (2004). By creating a
“good” and a “bad” opposition, one of which has access to positions of power (however limited)
and one of which does not, creates resentments among groups struggling over scarce resources.
Moreover, the government can taint those with access as being accommodating of autocratic
arrangements and those that do not as too extreme.
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Many scholars of both comparative democratization and social movements hold that unity
of opposition forces is vital to grassroots mobilization generating sustained pressure on the
government in hybrid and authoritarian settings (Sing 2004; Tilly 2006; Lust-okar 2004; Mcfaul
2005; Cavatorta 2009; Bunce and Wolchik 2010). As Tilly highlights, unity among the opposition
increases the ability of opposition actors to clearly communicate to their supporters and target
audience (Tilly 2006). Unity among the opposition also creates frame alignment, or “the linkage
of individual and social movement organization… activities, goals, and ideology are congruent
and complementary” (Snow et al. 1986, 464). Frame alignment creates the conditions for having
a stronger collective identity, which also facilitates successful movement mobilization (Dufour
and Giraud 2007).
Consequently, changes in government officials’ strategy regarding cooptation and
repression have effects on the power of grassroots mobilization regarding autonomy from central
government institutions. Utilizing cooptation strategies can create discord among grassroots
forces, diminishing their capacity to influence the local government. More repressive strategies
that affect the majority will help unify the opposition, creating better conditions for mass
mobilization, and thereby empowering them to pressure the local government in policy disputes.
As with the discussion of elite interests and authoritarian power-sharing in the previous
section, while there may be greater pluralistic space for popular demands for greater autonomy
from the central government in democratic settings, authoritarian regimes still face problems
controlling the population (Svolik 2012). The literature on authoritarian regimes and social
movements argue that populations in authoritarian regimes can harbor resistance to the local
government’s agenda, and repression can make it difficult for the local government to anticipate
potential challenges. Moreover, the quality of the repression can increase the likelihood of societal
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pressure; collective repression can motivate members of the opposition to act more cohesively and
strengthen their resolve. Officials need to coopt opposition and potential challengers through
institutions such as legislatures, elections, and parties to help eliminate information asymmetry
and divide grassroots forces. Grassroots forces are more effective when they are unified in
challenging government institutions. Therefore, when the local government changes from using
more cooptation-based to repressive strategies, they increase the likelihood of grassroots unity,
and thereby augment the likelihood of their success in exerting pressure successfully to change
government behavior.
International Institutional Pressure:
International Linkages and Support for Grassroots Movements
Many scholars within the ethnic federalism literature and the regime transitions literature
have argued that international linkages can empower subnational populations against a central
authority. While the former strand of scholarship focuses on the way international connections can
empower local elite, the latter highlights the effects of international connections to popular
movements. Yet authors from both literatures have also underscored that the actions of
international actors vary, demonstrating that we need to take international actors’ interests into
account. Western governments have shifted in their support or condemnation of authoritarian
regimes based on their domestic interests. Accordingly, Western governments are most likely to
support grassroots mobilization when the local government’s policy efforts regarding autonomy
from central government institutions affect the interests of their constituents or their foreign policy
goals.
Many scholars within the ethnic federalism literature have asserted that subnational groups
can be empowered by both resources from, and cultural ties to, parties outside of the state. King

41

(2001) argues that external government actors can provide crucial military and economic resources
to ethnic regions. While his work illuminates dynamics of de-facto sovereignty in post-Soviet
space, the logic of his argument has implications for autonomy from central government
institutions as well. He finds that the resources external states provide to ethnic separatist regions
not only increase the power of separatist elite vis-à-vis the central apparatus, but they also change
the interests of central government officials. These officials can benefit from the legal ambiguity
in central-periphery relations, garnering rents from goods and services traveling between the
territories (King 2001).
Brubaker (1996) on the other hand, emphasizes how cultural connections to populations
in other territories help ethnic minorities assert themselves against a central governing authority.
Identity ties between the subnational ethnic minority and external populations are malleable;
cultural and political elite within the minority could forge the relationship with external states
(Brubaker 1996). Through this relationship, foreign states could provide visas that allowed
minorities to exit or attempt to pressure the state-in-question’s policies, thereby affecting the
political power of the ethnic minority group and their potential for self-government.
Building on Brubaker’s framework, Jenne (2007) argues that governments do not always
advocate on behalf of co-ethnics within other states. Third parties “generally do not intervene to
‘rescue’ their co-ethnics, but rather to serve their own geopolitical interests- to gain valuable
territory or access to oil or water” (Jenne 2007, 43). Therefore, representatives of ethnic minority
groups can only rely on external government champions when it benefits the latter.
King and Brubaker’s description of the role of international linkages demonstrate how
declining autonomy from international institutions can actually bolster autonomy from central
government institutions. Jenne notes that the interests of foreign government actors are important
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to understanding when and how autonomy from central government institutions can be increased,
since foreign governments only provide support when it suits their interests. All three describe the
way international conditions affect elite behavior. Yet, it stands to reason that external actors can
focus their support on mass-level interests as well.
Scholars within the regime transition literature have directly interrogated connections
between international linkages and mass mobilization. International linkages empower popular
movements by both raising the cost of repression (Weyland 2004; Wong 2012; Levitsky and Way
2010) and providing resources to mobilizing organizations (Tarrow 2011; Bunce and Wolchik
2011). Analyses of international linkages have honed in specifically on connections to Western
countries as empowering mass mobilization in hybrid and authoritarian contexts (Levitsky and
Way 2010; V. Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Weyland 2004).
Levitsky and Way (2010) contend that when there are extensive linkages between Western
countries and a hybrid regime, crackdowns on popular dissent are more likely to make international
news, leading to greater pressure being placed on the government, such as economic sanctions or
declining resources from the international community. The cost of repression therefore encourages
rulers to concede rather than crackdown if faced with forceful opposition challenges.
Weyland (2004) and Wong (2012) also argue that authoritarian and hybrid regimes face
economic costs to repressing grassroots activities and increasing non-democratic coercion. Wong
notes that increased capital mobility across the globe creates new challenges for authoritarian and
hybrid regimes, as rivals and dissenters can “exit” by moving their assets abroad (2012). Weyland
(2004) notes that following the Cold War, many Latin American governments felt pressured to
maintain the formal institutions of democracy in order to encourage capital investment. In both

43

cases, the government will allow grassroots mobilization because it fears losing crucial sources of
funding if it does not accommodate popular interests.
Furthermore, the social movements and regime transition literature also argue international
linkages provide invaluable resources and strategies for opposition groups. Tarrow (2011) points
out that resources and ideas provided by international actors, such as transnational nongovernmental organizations, can help diminish resource asymmetries between government-allied
actors and their challengers. Bunce and Wolchik’s study of divergent electoral outcomes in PostSoviet space from 2000 to 2006 underscored the importance of the opposition being able to employ
innovative, well-organized, and sophisticated plans in order to defeat competitive authoritarian
leaders (2010).
The analysis of international linkage and foreign support for popular mobilization would
be enriched by incorporating the insights of the ethnic federalism scholarship. Particular attention
should be paid to Jenne’s assertion regarding the importance of international actors’ interests in
intervening to support foreign subnational groups. Just as international incentives could change
the behavior of national and local government officials, the need for resources and allies could
influence the behavior of foreign government officials.
Considering that Weyland, Levitsky and Way, and Bunce and Wolchik all highlight
linkage with Western actors specifically, it is important to take into account periods where Western
actors chose to limit their pressure on repressive regimes to pursue important goals. During the
Cold War, the United States government supported authoritarian allies, such as Pinochet in Chile,
to bolster anti-communism in the Global South (Huntington 1992; Weyland 2004). While the end
of the Cold War promoted an interest in pluralism abroad (Weyland 2004; Bunce and Wolchik
2010), by the 2010s, Western interest in democracy promotion has declined due to expensive
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interventions in the Middle East and domestic political gridlock (Cooley 2015; Diamond 2016).
Changes in Western priorities therefore can affect the degree to which these states are willing to
put pressure on hybrid and authoritarian regimes.
Therefore, Western government officials are most likely to act on the behalf of popular
movements when either their constituents’ interests are at stake or it facilitates foreign policy goals.
If the local government is seeking to implement policy that would weaken autonomy from central
government institutions and that policy would affect the Western government’s international
policy goals or those of its constituents, Western government officials are more likely to support
grassroots efforts and place pressure on the local government. On the other hand, if the local
government’s policies do not affect Western governments’ interests or those of their constituents,
Western officials are less likely to come to the aid of grassroots actors.
The ethnic federalism literature demonstrates how international linkages can empower
subnational elite actors in a quest for autonomy from central government institutions both by
providing resources and through cultural ties. International linkages can even act as incentives for
the central government to support subnational institutions gaining more power. As Jenne points
out, however, even in cases where there are cultural ties between a foreign state and an ethnic
minority, the government of that state will only seek to protect that ethnic minority in cases where
it benefits them materially. The literature on regime transition demonstrates that just as ethnic
subnational elite can benefit from international linkages, popular movements in authoritarian
settings can as well, particularly in cases of linkage to Western countries. Combining the
observations that have been made across the literatures, we can infer that grassroots efforts will be
able to gain Western international support, and therefore be more successful in impacting local
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government policies toward autonomy, when those policies affect Western governments’
constituents and goals.

The Empowerment of Grassroots Forces over Local Government Actors in
Autonomy Struggles
I view contention between grassroots forces and local government officials through a
bargaining framework commonly used to investigate autonomy. For grassroots forces to change
the status quo, the distribution of particular kinds of resources between grassroots challengers and
the local government need to shift in favor of the former party. Grassroots forces need to be
empowered by high internal unity and support from foreign governments, while the local
government needs to be weakened by declining elite cohesion. The change in resources that fortify
grassroots forces and makes local governments more vulnerable to pressure are influenced by four
factors at the subnational, national, and international level: 1) the local government’s use of
cooptation or repressive strategies in confronting the grassroots activities; 2) grassroots cultivation
of international linkages; 3) the domestic interests of foreign government officials; and, 4) the local
government’s reliance on the central government to solve elite disputes.
Bargaining approaches help us disentangle the factors that facilitate grassroots efforts to
pressure local government officials to protect, rather than weaken, autonomy from central
government institutions. Exploring center-periphery relations as a bargain has enabled scholars to
demonstrate how changes in strategy and resources affect the choices of local and central
government actors (Treisman 1997; Hechter 2000; Jenne 2007). The same bargaining logic
regarding strategy and resources that has been applied to center-periphery relations can be
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harnessed to understand dynamics between grassroots organizations and local government
officials contending with one another over autonomy from central government institutions.
Particularly in authoritarian settings, where grassroots forces have fewer pluralistic outlets
to advance their goals and face greater likelihood of repression, grassroots forces need a
constellation of resources that simultaneously empowers their position and enervates that of the
local government to force the latter party to make concessions. This dissertation contends that
grassroots’ solidarity and Western governmental support strengthen grassroots forces, and that the
weakening of elite cohesion impairs the local government’s ability to withstand challenges. This
configuration of resources results in greater likelihood that grassroots’ pressure will successfully
change the local government’s implementation of autonomy from central government institutions.
The internal unity and Western government support that empowers grassroots forces and
the elite fragmentation that enervates the local government in autonomy policy disputes arise from
factors affected by local the government’s and grassroots forces’ interactions at the subnational,
national, and international level. Table 1.1 demonstrates how the factors of 1) the government use
of cooptation versus coercion; 2) grassroots cultivation of international linkages; 3) Western
government’s domestic interests; and 4) the local governments reliance on the central government
to resolve elite disputes, correspond to particular resources that change the relative positions of
grassroots forces and local government officials. The first factor, whether the local government
employs more coercive or cooptative strategies, influences the degree of unity among grassroots
forces. Grassroots organizations are much more likely to remain unified if they believe they will
face increased repression, particularly if the repression affects the collective, or the majority of
grassroots organizations. When the local government employs strategies to coopt elements of
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Table 1.1: Resources that Influence the Relative Strength of Grassroots
Forces and Local Government Actors

Actors

Resources that
Impact Position

Factors that Influence Variation in the
Level of Resources

Grassroots
Coalition

Internal Unity Among
Grassroots Forces

•

The local government decreases the use of
cooptation and increases the use of
repression

Grassroots
Coalition

Western Government
Support

•

Grassroots organizations build and
maintain ties to foreign government
officials

• The local government’s proposed policies
impact the constituents or foreign policy
goals of foreign government actors
Local Government Elite Cohesion

•

Local government chooses to rely on the
central government to solve conflicts
within their elite coalition

grassroots roots forces, including access to limited elected positions, appointments, and
government funding, grassroots forces are more likely to be divided.
Changes in two factors affect changes in second resource that bolster’s grassroots forces
ability to pressure the local government into changing its policy toward autonomy from the central
government, support from Western government officials. The first factor is the degree to which
grassroots forces pursue international linkage with Western government officials. Creating
linkages involves traveling to Western countries and meeting with foreign officials, as well as
targeting officials through direct actions and statements. Second, Western officials are more likely
to issue more consistent public support when their domestic interests coincide with the grassroots’
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agenda. Foreign governments are most likely to champion grassroots activities when their
constituents are affected by the local government’s policy proposals.
The degree to which elite are unified or fragmented, thereby affecting the local
government’s ability to withstand grassroots challenges, is shaped by patterns of the local
government’s reliance on the central government to resolve elite disputes. This factor can have
contrary effects: in the short term, the central government can successfully mediate and hold the
elite coalition together. The central government’s role as an arbiter, however, has an iterative
impact over time. Elite inability to rely on subnational institutions in repeated instances of crisis
limit elite investment in the local government’s coalition, causing elite fragmentation and
defection. The local government can lure subnational elite back into their coalition for a time, but
the elites’ weak bargaining power with the local government (which can rely on central
government-backing) and previous experiences limit their trust in their ability to negotiate with
local officials. For these reasons, the threat of elite defection compounds, though there can be
periods where disputes are resolved temporarily.
The position of grassroots forces are strongest when they have the ability to rely on Western
government support and are able to maintain unity, and the local government is weakened by a
dearth of elite cohesion. However, partial success in pressuring the local government can be
achieved, with only some of these resources being present. If foreign government officials express
public support for grassroots forces’ objectives, the local government may make some concessions
in their policy toward autonomy from central government institutions. Likewise, low levels of elite
cohesion in the absence of Western government officials’ support can elicit some concessions
from the local government, so long as grassroots forces are able to maintain their unity. Grassroots
unity alone, however, will not trigger a change in the local government’s behavior.
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Methodology:
I examine the explanatory power of this argument through a qualitative study of withincase variation in the success of grassroots mobilization in changing local government
implementation of autonomy in the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong. I treat Hong
Kong as a crucial case in examining autonomy promotion. Utilizing process-tracing, I analyze four
episodes between 1997-2019, two of which were failures, while the other two were successes.
The Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong in the People’s Republic of China serves
as a crucial case for examining conditions that empower grassroots efforts to ensure autonomy
from central government institutions. Gerring (2002) describes a crucial case as being a case where
on “all dimensions except the dimensions of theoretical interest, is predicted not to achieve a
certain outcome, and yet it does so” (115). Crucial cases therefore serve as a “most difficult test”
for the argument (Gerring 2002). Hong Kong represents a “most difficult” test for the argument
because there are several factors that would seem to limit the ability to mobilize toward autonomy
within the case. The literature often ties increased autonomy from central government institutions
to diminished state capacity (Bunce 1999; George 2008), elite interests, and democratic or
democratizing regime configurations (Brancati 2008). Yet in the case of Hong Kong, grassroots
efforts have succeeded in preserving the region’s autonomy from the Mainland despite having a
strong parent state, elite interests that coincided with decreased autonomy from central government
institutions, and a more authoritarian parent state structure.
Moreover, in the Hong Kong case, grassroots efforts have been successful at defending the
local government’s ability to make policy choices independent of the central government both
during periods of increased pluralism, such as the movement to stop Article 23 Legislation in 2003
regarding secession, treason, and theft of state secrets, as well as during periods of decreased
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pluralism, such as the Anti-Extradition Movement of 2019. Prior to 2017, the opposition in the
Legislative Council would have been able to veto legislation that sought to institutionalize
constitutional changes to the Basic Law as well as filibuster unpopular legislation based on the
number of seats they possessed in the legislature. Following the disqualification of the six
legislators in 2016 and 2017, however, the opposition lost the numbers required to formally resist
any legislation proposed by the government. Despite the diminished space for pluralism, activists
were able to sustain high mobilization of the population, with public marches of over 500,000 for
six months, leading to the stalling and withdrawal of the extradition legislation.
Confirmation within a crucial case design is dependent on “risky predictions,” or a theory
that is elaborated as “highly precise and determinate, and thus unlikely to be explainable by other
causal factors” (Gerring 2002, 118). Gerring states “that the strength of the test is the extraordinary
fit between the theory and the set of facts found in a single case, and the corresponding lack of fit
between other theories and the set of facts” (2002, 118). To ensure that the theory fits the facts
within the Hong Kong case, I will process-trace within-case temporal variation in local
government response to grassroots efforts to stop said government from ceding policy autonomy
from the Mainland.
Within-case process-tracing is appropriate for scrutinizing factors that connect proposed
explanatory factors that contribute to changes in the phenomena under examination (Mahoney
2007, 232). Furthermore, process-tracing within-case helps to validate factors through exploring
them in the case from the “beginning to the end of the story” (Bennett and Elman 2006). Withincase comparison also helps to ensure variation in the main study factor (Collier 1993; Gerring
2004).

Finally, it helps to rule out rival explanations. Bennett and Elman contend that

demonstrating the inadequacy of rival accounts to explain the variation in the phenomena can
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“increase the confidence” (2006, 460).
To start at the “beginning of the story,” I will trace grassroots activities aimed at increasing
autonomy from central government institutions following the 1997 Handover to Chinese
sovereignty through 2019. The initial date was chosen because it was when the Basic Law, Hong
Kong’s mini-constitution, went into effect, providing the primary basis for the local government’s
relationship with the Mainland. I chose to cover over a twenty-year period in order to show the
way in which decisions made by the local government that initially limited autonomy from the
central government in some instances had the unintended consequence of later empowering
grassroots actors to object to those limitations. Moreover, the 2019 Anti-Extradition Movement
represents one of the highest points of grassroots mobilization since the 1997 Handover.
In examining variation in the phenomenon, I seek to explain, the local government’s
protection or weakening of autonomy from central government institutions, I focused on how the
Hong Kong Chief Executive’s administration changed the interpretation and implementation of
the Basic Law. The Basic Law outlines the relationship between branches of the government and
the perspective policy domains of the local and central government. Changes in the interpretation
and implementation of the Basic Law in turn affect when, and under what conditions, the
government can make policy decisions independently of central government institutions. I only
looked at cases where the Hong Kong Chief Executive wanted to implement policies regarding the
Basic Law that would have reduced autonomy from central government institutions. Doing so
allows me to more directly investigate changes in grassroots forces’ ability to pressure the local
government.
I have conducted a purposive sampling of episodes in which grassroots forces tried to
influence the Hong Kong Chief Executive’s implementation of the Basic Law regarding autonomy
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from central government institutions. While grassroots activities are often thought of as those of
the “poor, labor, or working class,” Batliwala (2002) states that grassroots can be used as a relative
term, to indicate “those who are most severely affected in terms of material conditions of their
daily lives” (396). While I include middle class organizations within the Hong Kong grassroots
movement coalitions, such as political parties, professional organizations, and formal civil society
organizations, they are collaborating with working class associations, and are groups that are often
vulnerable to the HK government’s changes in policy. The terminology of these actors as
grassroots forces emphasize the difference in power between the organizations involved in
pressuring the government and the dominant elite in Hong Kong society (Batliwala 2002).
I also analyzed both grassroots forces’ institutionalize repertoires in conjunction with their
contentious activities. As Jasper (2015) notes, movement participants often engage with their
opponents across a wide range of “arenas,” from street protests, to court cases, and elections. In
examining grassroots movements in Hong Kong, I therefore included in my research grassroots
collaborations that were working toward the same goal and that employ non-institutionalized
methods in their repertoire, such as protests, boycotts, hunger strikes, and occupations.
To identify episodes, I am following the guidelines set out by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly
(2009), creating “uniform units of observation”, since interactions between grassroots forces and
the local government varied in both length and character (285). I start the episode when the Chief
Executive’s administration announced their plan to implement a policy related to the Basic Law
in a way that changed autonomy from central government institutions. I end the episode when the
Chief Executive withdrew, amended, or successfully implemented the policy. These parameters
were also chosen because grassroots forces’ ability to influence the local government’s policy
implementation is being scrutinized.
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Table 1.2 identifies all of the episodes that are being examined, the variation in the
outcomes of grassroots’ efforts, and the level of the resources that are theorized to change the
strength of both grassroots force’s ability to exert pressure and the local government’s ability to
withstand pressure. Within the twenty-two year period under consideration, the following episodes
are being examined, the Right of Abode Movement from 1997-1999; the Anti-Article 23
Movement from 2004-2003; the Umbrella Movement of 2013-2015; and the Anti-Extradition
Protests of 2019. These episodes were chosen for two reasons. First, they allow me augment my
crucial case design with a most-similar case design sensibility, and therefore add to my ability to
rule out rival explanations (Przeworski and Teune 1970). Both the Right of Abode Movement and
the Anti-Article 23 Movement took place in the early Handover period, under the same Chief
Executive, and yet there was variation in the outcomes. Likewise, the Umbrella Movement and the
Anti-Extradition Movement represent two cases with different outcomes, but they involved similar
time-frames and the same PRC leadership. Moreover, by choosing cases in the early Handover
and more contemporary periods, I can fully explore the iterative impacts that occur when the local
government relies on the central government to act as an arbiter in resolving intra-elite tensions.
The basis for process-tracing the intervening factors between grassroots forces and the
local government’s protection or weakening of autonomy from central government institutions is
fieldwork conducted over fifteen months between April of 2016 and August of 2019 and archival
research of both government documents as well as news media between 1995 and 2019. The
fieldwork included 81 semi-structured interviews conducted through snowball sampling
techniques with former members of the Hong Kong government, current and former Legislative
Councilors and District Councilors, members of opposition political parties, activists, protest
participants, members of civil society organizations, members of non-governmental organizations,
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Table 1.2: Variation in Grassroots’ and the Chief Executive’s
Resources During Hong Kong Autonomy Movements

Episode

Right of
Abode
Movement
1997-1999
Anti-Article
23 Movement
2002-2003
The Umbrella
Movement of
2013-2015

The
Amendment
of the Fugitive
Ordinance
2019

Support from
Western
Government
Officials

Unity Within
Grassroots
Coalition

Elite Cohesion
Fragmentation
Within CE’s
Coalition

Grassroots’
Success or
Failure in
Affecting CE
Behavior

Low

Moderate

High

Failure

High

High

Low

Success

Failure
Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

High

High

Low

Success

academics, and lawyers. Interviews were conducted in English and typically lasted between an
hour to two hours.15 During interviews, participants discussed grassroots movement strategies,
networks, and resources; government procedures for handling Mainland relations, elite tension,
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As a former British colony, a substantial percentage of the population is proficient in English, particularly collegeeducated individuals and those in higher socioeconomic classes.
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and mass contention; as well as factors that affected both elite and opposition cohesion. Interviews
provided crucial data for my analysis, since many government records in Hong Kong are sealed
for thirty years past their authorship.
Additionally, during my fieldwork I performed ethnographic participant observations of
activist meetings, rallies, protest marches, events for three different elections, and trials in 2016,
2018, and 2019 for this research. I took notes and photographs during these aspects of my research
to help document my experiences. These exercises allowed me to discern changes in mass
mobilization over a four-year period, as well as the causes of changes in opposition unity and
strategy. They also assisted me in tracing out the differences in the way the government approached
grassroots mobilization over time, since I was able to discern modifications in policing, legal
persecutions, covert coercion, and local officials’ behavior toward protesters.
In addition to speaking to former members of the government, I created an archive of 1600
press releases, speeches, and media sessions from the Office of the Chief Executive of Hong Kong,
between 1997 and 2019. I also examined publicly available research and meeting minutes from
the Legislative Council digital archives, as well as statements and press releases from both the
Chief Secretary’s Office (the second highest position in the Hong Kong government), the Secretary
for Justice, the Secretary for Security, and the Office of Constitutional and Mainland Affair’s
website.
Finally, I also examined English-language news media dating back to 1995. While all of
these articles were in English, they represented different viewpoints on Hong Kong’s political
situation. While the South China Morning Post was an independent news site through the early
2010s, it was bought by Jack Ma, a Mainland Chinese businessman and Chinese Communist Party
Member, and has since become more associated with a moderate pro-PRC government
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perspective. Finally, Hong Kong Free Press is a news organization that developed following the
Umbrella Movement in 2015 and heavily leans towards supporting grassroots activism against the
government.
In cases where participants asked that their comments serve as “background” or off the
record information for my dissertation, I was able to verify their insights through news and archival
materials.16 Many of the elite tensions, if not defections, were well documented in the media since
Hong Kong has freedom of press in the Basic Law. I also confirmed interviewee insights regarding
international linkages through participant observations of protests and public speaking events,
media reports, activist’s Twitter and Facebook pages, and consulting archival materials from the
United States, Canadian, and United Kingdom government’s websites. In addition to looking at
these documents, I also examined the number of meetings between members of the Hong Kong
government and officials from the U.S., Canada, England, Japan, and Taiwan.
Measurement of Outcomes, Grassroots’ and Local Government’s Resources, and Key Factors
To confirm my argument, I needed to measure changes in the local government’s
implementation of the Basic Law with regards to autonomy from central government institutions,
the three resources theorized to contribute to changes in both the grassroots forces and the local
government’s strength, and the four factors that contribute to variation in those resources. To
measure changes in local government’s decision-making regarding the Basic Law, I focused on
the behavior of the Chief Executive and their administration. The Chief Executive is the head of
the executive branch in Hong Kong and has considerable power over creating legislation,
implementing policies, and controlling government appointments. I utilized the Chief Executive’s
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In some cases, particularly those regarding government officials handling of elite tensions and international
linkages, my participants asked that their comments be “off the record” and not appear in this work. Some
participants still held positions that required a continued amicable relationship with government officials.
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annual Policy Address as well as initial policy announcements for the piece of legislation as a
baseline for their initial intention regarding implementation. In each case, the assumption was
made that the Chief Executive wanted to implement the legislation; therefore, withdrawal of the
legislation was considered to have been an instance of grassroots forces successfully changing
local government decision-making. Where the Chief Executive was able to implement the policy,
grassroots efforts have failed.
The change in the first resource empowers grassroots forces, unity among grassroots
organizations, was measured through multifaceted indicators. Interview participants were asked to
assess grassroots coalitions’ unity during different episodes. While conducting my participant
observations, I took notes on which groups and activists showed up to support one another in their
activities. I also looked at the number of collaborations between grassroots coalitions and the
strength or weakness of coordinating platforms that were meant to bind these groups together.
Finally, I also looked at public statements and media materials where grassroots organizations
talked about each other. Opposition political parties and grassroots organizations were more
transparent and open to media outlets. Press personnel often had difficulty getting interviews with
government officials during grassroots mobilization, so the perspectives of members of grassroots
organizations are well documented in the local media.
The factor I theorize influenced the level of grassroots unity, change win the local
government’s use of cooptation and repression, involves multi-faceted processes, but can be seen
as being on a continuum, whether members of grassroots organizations receive inducements or
punishments for their behavior toward the government. Cooptation was in part measured based on
Gandhi’s (2008) description whether grassroots organizations are able to participate in Legislative
Council and District Council elections as well as access government institutions. I also looked at
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conditions around how grassroots organizations are allowed to raise money: in Hong Kong, the
local government can allow or refuse to allow organizations to register and open up bank accounts.
They also control grassroots organizations’ ability to fundraising at public events and their access
to government funds for development and educational projects. Corporations that had contracts
with the local government would also sometimes be more generous to certain political parties and
other organizations that were favored by the government at the time. Cooptation also entails
whether or not requests grassroots organizations make of the government are fulfilled or not;
participants reported that whether or not the government responded to requests that were made on
behalf of citizens depended, to a certain degree, on government favor.
Changes in repression were measured by the expansion of prohibition and criminalization
of grassroots activities, as well the number of, and the nature of, charges the Department of Justice
brought against members of grassroots organizations for mass mobilization activities.
Additionally, I looked at violence and intimidation conducted against both public demonstrations
and individual members of grassroots organizations, particularly in cases where the perpetrators
were either never found or only given light sentencing. Grassroots organizations have to apply for
a letter of no objection to hold public events, so I also looked at changes in how letters were granted
or denied to those groups. Finally, I also looked at threats to employment, visa denials, and threats
to family members.
To measure the second resource theorized to bolster the grassroots’ position, Western,
government support for grassroots forces, I looked at a few different indicators. The highest level
of support for grassroots organizations would be to directly threaten the local government if it did
not amend its policy with changes in long-standing policy toward the Hong Kong government and
deprived the Hong Kong government of economic resources. More moderate forms of support
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could come in the form of provisions to grassroots mobilization through government-affiliated
organizations, statements urging the local government to listen to, or not harm, grassroots
organizations, introducing legislation in support of grassroots forces, and symbolic gestures
lauding members of grassroots organizations. The lowest form of support would be inquiries and
investigations documenting claims made by grassroots organizations. While inquiries and
investigations do not make a public claim on local government officials, they still indicate that
foreign governments are taking note of their actions. All of these activities raise the status of
grassroots organizations in their efforts to pressure the local government.
The first factor that affect Western government officials’ support for grassroots forces is
the grassroots cultivation of international linkages to Western government officials. This factor
was measured through the frequency and quality of meetings grassroots officials had with
members of executive or legislative branch of foreign governments. I also looked at the number
of statements made by grassroots forces that were directed at the same government officials they
had meetings with. During participant observations, I also examined the degree to which the
protests were aimed at Western audiences through the use of flags, posters, direct action locations,
or direct messaging to international actors.
I focused mostly on connections to American, Canadian, British, and European officials.
Levitsky and Way (2010) argue that ties to powerful Western foreign governments are the most
important for changing the behavior of government officials. Hong Kong’s status as a former
British colony also meant that there were many people capable of lobbying government officials
in English as well. I also looked at, however, meetings and connections with Taiwanese officials
and Japanese officials, based on observations during my fieldwork that Hong Kong grassroots
organizations often reached out to politicians from these two countries as well in the 2010s.
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The second factor that affected the degree of Western government support was whether the
local government’s policy affected the foreign government’s constituents and foreign policy goals.
I looked at if the legislation was applied to, and would curtail the liberties of, individuals with
American, Canadian, British, or European citizenship. I looked specifically at whether these
groups were affected since I theorized that both factors needed to be in place for Western
government officials to provide coalitional resources to grassroots forces. I looked at whether
individuals from these groups had contacted foreign government officials and lobbied for them to
act in these cases as well. I also looked at the policy priorities of the American, Canadian, British,
and European governments as conveyed by their foreign ministries during each of the episodes
examined in this dissertation.
The change in the final resource, elite cohesion, affected the strength of the local
government. I measured this resource by first establishing the elite coalition as citizens who are on
the Election Committee for the Chief Executive, serve on Hong Kong government advisory boards,
or have served in a high position of authority in the Hong Kong government. Elite cohesion was
measured by the degree to which members of the coalition advocated for the administration’s
preferred policies, publicly defended the administration, and appeared at events supporting the
administration. Declining unity occurred when multiple members of the coalition made repeated
public comments criticizing the Chief Executive’s narratives, their messaging differed
substantially from the administration’s, or when they failed to come to the aid of the Chief
Executive’s administration during a crisis period. The lowest level of cohesion, defection,
involved direct support of grassroots forces, acting directly against the local government’s
mandate, or actively taking part in grassroots’ activity. This behavior is treated as elite defection
even if the person returns to the Chief Executive’s coalition.
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The factor that led to change in elite cohesion was the degree to which the local
government’s relied on the central government to act as a mediator in intra-elite conflict. While
elite relationships within authoritarian settings are difficult to fully investigate due to the lack of
transparency in the regime, I was able to verify instances through interviews with former
government officials and coalition members where tensions were resolved through reliance on the
Chinese government, as opposed to through the subnational institutional structures. These involve
instances where the final resolution involved support from central government officials. While
participants did not always describe incidences where there was tension, they did describe the need
to work around certain factions to pursue the outcome that they wanted. I was often able to confirm
tensions through press accounts in the South China Morning Post archives. I was also able to
document both the timing and content of meetings between Hong Kong elite and PRC officials
through press archives and Hong Kong government press releases.

Conclusion:
By examining the local government’s behavior toward their policy independence from the
central government authorities through a typology of autonomy from subnational institutions,
autonomy from central government institutions, and autonomy from international/foreign
institutions, we can account for the pressures local officials face at multiple levels of governance.
This insight helps to explain why local government officials, while power-maximizers, may turn
to the central government, and even be willing to give up some policy independence, to stave off
threats from both subnational and international actors. Subnational actors, such as grassroots
organizations, may be pushing for increased autonomy from central government institutions, rather
than the local government.
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Grassroots forces are empowered to pressure the local government when their coalition is
unified and the have access to a high degree of support from Western governments and the local
government has diminished cohesion among elite supporters. These resources are affected by local
the government’s and grassroots interactions with both subnational institutions and international
institutions. If the local government uses repression instead of cooptation to deal with grassroots
organizations, the latter will be able to increase internal unity, strengthening their ability to exert
pressure. If their policy affects the interests of foreign government officials, and those officials
have ties to grassroots organizations, they are likely to put pressure on the local government to
change their policy. Finally, where the local government relies on the central government instead
of subnational institutions to deal with elite conflict, they are likely to limit cohesion within their
coalition, increasing their vulnerability to grassroots pressure.
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Chapter 2
Interactions Between the Colonial Administration and
Grassroots Forces Over Autonomy
During the colonial period, from 1840 through 1997, many of the largest grassroots
movements were anti-colonial in nature. They did not differentiate the British colonial government
from the United Kingdom’s parent state. Yet these movements had varied impacts on the autonomy
of the colonial government from both subnational institutions, such as the Legislative Council, and
the British parent state. In examining key movements, such as the 1925-1926 Canton-Hong Kong
Strike, the 1967 Riots, and the Tiananmen Square Protests, there are three resources that emerge
as influential in determining whether or not grassroots movements are able to achieve concessions
from the colonial government and limit that government’s autonomy from subnational institutions.
The most important resource at the colonial government’s disposal was its durable alliance with
the local Chinese merchant class. When the colonial government’s alliance with economic elite
declined in the 1950s and 1960s, and again in the 1980s, the colonial government was forced to
grant concessions to grassroots movements. Grassroots forces were further empowered to achieve
more when they had higher levels of internal cohesion and international support.
The relative success of the colonial government in managing grassroots pressure led the
People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) leadership to replicate the colonial structure in the years
leading up to the return to Chinese sovereignty, 1984 through 1997. This chapter delineates how
the PRC leadership’s policies in the 1984- 1997 period shaped factors that affected resources at
both the post-colonial Hong Kong Chief Executive’s (CE) and its grassroots interlocutors’
disposal. These factors were the local government’s reliance on PRC central government
institutions over subnational Hong Kong institutions; grassroots cultivation of international
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linkages; the interests of foreign government officials; and the local government’s use of
cooptation versus repression.
The PRC leadership’s efforts to structurally insulate the replacement for the governor, the
Chief Executive (CE), made it more difficult to resolve elite disputes in Hong Kong without central
government support. During the colonial period, the governor’s administration overlapped
extensively with the Legislative Council, (LegCo) and (ExCo), allowing him to act as the main
arbiter among elite factions. Both the British and PRC administrations, however, pushed for a more
fragmented LegCo and constrained the development of political parties in the 1980s, for fear of
creating a countervailing power to the CE. These policies had the unintended consequence of
depriving the CE of unifying institutional structures. The lack of synergistic institutions proved
particularly challenging because the post-colonial governing coalition contained both supporters
of the former colonial regime and long-time leftist opponents.
The coming change in sovereignty also transformed which outside actors Hong Kong
grassroots forces targeted for support as well as Western actors’ domestic incentives to respond to
grassroots’ entreaties. Given the anti-imperial claims of many 19th and 20th century movements
during the colonial era, grassroots forces cultivated relationships with Chinese organizations and
governing bodies. Yet the tensions among Chinese political organizations, particularly between
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomingtang (KMT), affected the degree to which
officials’ mobilized support for Hong Kong grassroots’ movements. Following the signing of
treaty to hand sovereignty from Britain to China, pro-democracy grassroots forces in Hong Kong
sought support from Western governments. These governments were supportive of pro-democracy
forces in the late 1980s and early 1990s because of fears of mass immigration from Hong Kong
following the PRC’s repression of the Tiananmen Square Protests.
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Finally, changes in the PRC leadership’s use of cooptation versus repressive strategies to
manage contestation had an effect on the unity of pro-democracy grassroots forces in the early
1990s. The colonial administration was able to utilize cooptation strategies to divide grassroots
forces for the majority of British rule. While the colonial administration had used repression
against grassroots forces, movement escalation of violence had limited unity among grassroots
actors. The PRC government planned to use similar cooptation techniques to the colonial
administration with the leaders of pro-democracy grassroots forces in Hong Kong, but the
Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 made them hesitant to coopt these actors. The decline in
cooptation strategies and pro-democracy forces fears of Tiananmen-style violence in Hong Kong
helped unify pro-democracy grassroots forces in their efforts to pressure the colonial government
for greater democratization prior to the Handover in 1997.

The 19th Century: Colonial Autonomy and Coalition with Local Business Elite
Britain had acquired Hong Kong through a series of treaties between 1842 and 1899. The
British annexed Hong Kong Island from the Qing Dynasty following the Opium War with the
Treaty of Nanking in 1842. After the second Opium War, they also acquired Kowloon in the
Convention of Peking in 1860. In 1898, they leased the New Territories from the Qing Dynasty
rent-free for 99 years with the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong Territory. This lease
not only granted Britain the ability to rule the area to the north of Kowloon, but all 235 of the
adjacent islands.
In the early colonial period, the Hong Kong governor was able to rule more autonomously
from both the parent state of Britain and subnational forces, because of their coalition with the
Chinese merchant class. By the 1860s, the colonial government decided to forge a symbiotic
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partnership with the Chinese merchant class because they were some of the preeminent holders of
wealth in Hong Kong and a key source of revenue for the colony. The economic prosperity
facilitated by Chinese merchant elite encouraged the British government to grant the Hong Kong
governor a significant degree of leeway. Moreover, Chinese merchant classes helped the colonial
administration navigate subnational challenges. For instance, they provided social welfare
institutions that coopted the local Chinese working classes. This partnership was beneficial to the
Chinese merchant class as well because it also helped them defend themselves from both internal
pressure from the Chinese working classes and external claims from the Chinese state.
Colonial Government Structure and the British Merchant Elite
The actual colonial administration in the 19th century was relatively small and personalized
due to British budgetary constraints. The governor played a presiding role over most of the
governance institutions (Hase 2008; Sinn 2003). As the executive, he was able to “make and enact
laws and ordinances”, to appoint all commissioners, ministers, and judges of the colony, as wells
as review and amend legal punishments (Hase 2008; Legislative Council Library 2011). While
the charter called for a Legislative Council and an Executive Council to provide advice to the
governor, the latter controlled appointments to both institutions.
The composition of the supporting Legislative Council (LegCo) and the Executive Council
overlapped significantly with the colonial government, enabling coordination across the
institutions. LegCo was initially made up of three official members of the colonial government,
with the governor serving as its president. While the number of Unofficial Members would grow
over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, the governor retained his position as President of the
Legislative Council until the Patten Administration in 1992 (Legislative Council Commission
2016). Similarly, the other institutions the governor was to consult with, the Executive Council,
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also had an overlapping structure, containing the heads of the most important ministries in the
colonial administration, including the colonial secretary, the attorney general, the secretary for
Chinese affairs, and the Commander for British Forces Overseas.
Given the initial commercial justifications for the colony, however, prominent international
banking and trading interests were given some ability to influence and steer the government’s
policy (Bickers 2013). The colony was initially designed to serve as a much needed port for British
mercantile pursuits in China and Southeast Asia (Tsang 1997; Bickers 2013).17 Wealthy traders
had lobbied for a port to get around the Chinese “Cohong” system, the Chinese government’s
sanctioned traders (Chan 1991).18 British mercantile interests were therefore represented in the
Executive Council. By the turn of the 19th century, representatives of the British business
community secured unofficial membership on the Legislative Council as well (The Legislative
Council).
Development of Grassroots Forces in 19th Century Hong Kong
The limited nature of the early colonial government led to a chasm between European
colonists and the Chinese majority. Few colonial officials could actually speak Cantonese or
Mandarin, making it more difficult to interact with the Chinese population. 19 The Chinese
population also grew to exponentially outnumber the British expatriates in the early colonial
period. By 1860, the expatriates residing in Hong Kong had grown to 2000, while the Chinese
population had grown to nearly 90,000. The dearth of expatriates to staff government positions led
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To this end, Hong Kong’s governor also served as Superintendent of Trade, directing five British consular
establishments in south and east China (Bickers 2013).
18
Most of Cohongs only traded with the British East India Company through the 1830s and were forbidden from
trafficking opium (Chan 1991).
19
A substantial number of the police officers at this time were either British ex-police, ex-soldiers, and Indians,
transferred to support the colony. Over twenty years after the formation of the colony, there was only a small
number of Chinese police (Lethbridge 1971).
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the colonial government to focus on provision of public order and taxation. Therefore, Chinese
inhabitants rarely interacted with the British outside of the police forces in the early colonial period
(Tsang 2007).
The Chinese locals predominantly organized and managed their own affairs due to the
government’s lack of capacity, leading to a thriving civil society that provided governance, as well
as economic and security goods for the community. Neighborhood associations, known as
kaifongs, were organized as early as 1851 (Lui et al. 2005). One of the most common types of
kaifongs, temple organizations, became the prominent organizations of de-facto governance and
commercial arbitration among the local population (Tsang 2007; Lethbridge 1971). Merchants also
started their own guilds and trade associations (Lui et al. 2005). The Chinese merchants,
shopkeepers, and kaifong leaders even set up structures to provide security to Chinese commercial
and residential sectors, because the local police force were viewed as being too corrupt and
incapable of providing it.20
Lower class grassroots organizing was haphazard and directed against the merchant class,
rather than against the colonial government. There were few incentives or platforms that could
unify grassroots labor activism in the second half of the 19th century. The Chinese coolie class,
who were manual day-laborers, were often divided by dialect and frequently competed with each
other for work opportunities (Tsai 1993). Both coolies and artisans were further divided by sector,
forming guilds for tailors, carpenters, masons, and coopers. These divisions led most strikes to be
sector specific against smaller sets of employers, rather than attacking the government apparatus
(Tsai 1993).
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The District Watch forces would remain in place with the colonial government’s blessing until after World War II
(Lui et al. 2005).
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The Qing Dynasty did attempt to draft both Chinese merchant and lower socio-economic
classes in Hong Kong into their anti-imperial struggles with other foreign powers. For its part, the
Qing Dynasty on the mainland never accepted its loss of sovereignty over the territory and would
occasionally try to tax and exert influence over the local Chinese (Chan 1993). These exhortations
were not primarily directed against the British (Chan 1993). For instance, in 1884, a strike broke
out among shipyard workers over the Sino-French War, with the workers supporting the Chinese
government (Chan 1993).
The new Chinese business elite had to maintain a relationship with the Qing empire but
were also fearful of retribution by the Chinese state. One of the ways the Chinese merchant classes
conveyed their power over the local community was through wearing the traditional “mandarin”
official robes of the Chinese empire, reinforcing notions of Qing governance and culture (Sinn
2003, Law 2009). Moreover, the Qing Empire still officially decreed that emigration from the
empire was punishable by death and viewed Chinese emigrants to Hong Kong as “collaborators”
(Sinn 2003). Given China’s proximity, the local elite had family and clan ties, as well as business
and property assets, that could be vulnerable to Mainland officials’ sanction (Sinn 2003, 85). To
protect these ties and their livelihoods, Hong Kong Chinese elite in the 19th and early 20th century
often purchased honors from the Chinese government and had their children sit for the Chinese
civil service exam. In return, the Chinese government referred to them as members of the gentry
class.
The Colonial-Local Partnership and Resistance to Internal and External Pressures
While the initial period of colonial rule may have allowed for bottom-up civil society
institutions to arise, the ascendant Hong Kong merchant class’ agenda came to be shaped by, and
aligned with, a significant portion of the British imperial agenda. The British ensured that the
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portions of Chinese society that grew wealthy in Hong Kong would predominantly owe their
success to the largess of the colonial government. Colonial administrators provided land grants to
local allies in the Opium War; monopolies to local Chinese merchants and contractors for farming,
opium, and salt production; and distributed licenses to sell liquor and tobacco (Law 2009; Carroll
2005). These monopolies and licenses helped to create a Chinese business elite who had to rely
on the colonial government for their continued fortunes.
Local Chinese who could assist in the economic activities of the British empire also
accumulated land and wealth, changing their social position. “Compradors” helped Western
Europeans navigate the local languages, customs, and business conditions (Hui 1999). Over the
course of the nineteenth century the compradors became indispensable to the largest colonial
companies in China and therefore were also among the wealthiest men in the whole territory
(Carroll 2005). Moreover, as segments of the local Chinese population grew richer, they invested
heavily in, and became more dependent on, Western capital (Tsai 1993). Prominent local Chinese
merchants were shareholders in European companies and relied on Western services such as
shipping, banking, insurance, and industrial equipment for their services (Chan 1993). Even
Chinese native banks needed to rely on foreign financial institutions in business transactions such
as loans (Chan 1993).
By the late 1860s, after the second Opium war, British colonial leadership and the new
wealthy Hong Kong business elite formed a tentative coalition due to their shared goals and
interests in the imperial project (Sinn 2003; Carroll 2005; Law 2009; Tsai 1993; Chan 1991). The
Chinese merchant class saw its partnership with the local colonial government as a way to both
fend off challenges from local grassroots labor forces and the Chinese imperial government.
Chinese elite would utilize the British colonial administration on occasion to defend them against
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Qing officials in Canton, the closest Chinese province (Tsai 1993). In 1893, Chinese merchants
petitioned the Hong Kong government to increase the level of flogging and banishment as well as
degrade the quality of prisons to encourage obedience from working class Chinese (Tsai 1993).
Moreover, the colonial administration saw partnering with the local merchant elite as vital
to bolstering the local government’s autonomy from the British central government in London.
The Letters Patent articulated that the British crown retained the right to both make and strike
down ordinances for the colony (Legislative Council Commission 2016). In reality, however,
interference from Britain depended primarily on the state of the economy. As long as the colony
could financially support itself, colonies could delay or hinder directives from the central
government or even press for changes in their own fundamental structure (Bickers 2013).
By the late 1860s, local Chinese elite became important sources of revenue through their
purchase of land within the colony. The colonial government claimed ownership over the land,
and chose to lease, rather than sell it. There were also duties on leases that needed to be renewed
(Cullen 2013). By the 1880s, Chinese trading and business elite were the dominant owners of real
estate and contributed over 90% of the colony’s revenue (Sinn 2003). Local Chinese’ contributions
to revenue therefore became an important linchpin in securing the colonial government’s
autonomy from the parent state.
Moreover, the parent-state of Britain protected the colonial administration from internal
challenges by European merchants because of Hong Kong’s commercial success. The rise of the
Chinese merchant class was a source of competition to European merchant elites, leading them to
appeal to the British parent-state to increase pluralism for Europeans in Hong Kong’s Legislative
Council and Executive Council in 1894 (Tsai 1993). The British parent-state refused to impose
more pluralistic institutions on the colonial government due to the colony’s overall financial
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success (Tsai).21 The British government’s refusal to impose greater pluralism reinforced the Hong
Kong government’s role as the main arbiter among the European and merchant elite, compelling
these factions to work through subnational institutions that remained under the colonial
government’s control.
The British colonial government also relied on the local Hong Kong Chinese merchant elite
to mollify other sources of internal pressure through providing sources of cooptation. Officials
allowed wealthy Chinese elite to set up local philanthropic and social welfare institutions, such as
the Tung Wah Hospital. These organizations provided economic and social welfare goods to the
population, thereby allowing them to act as intermediaries on the Hong Kong government’s behalf
in the 1870s through early 1900s (Sinn 2003; Law 2009). Essentially, through Chinese elite
provision of social services, the Hong Kong government could provide linkage and legitimacy to
the colonial state without expanding its budgetary obligations (Fong 2013).
By 1880, the Hong Kong merchant elite were more formally able to enter the colonial
administration and solidify their partnership with the government through their connections to the
Chinese philanthropic and civil society organizations of the 1860s and 1870s. One of the Tung
Wah Hospital’s founders was made Justice of the Peace and then given a spot on the Legislative
Council in 1880 (Sinn 2003). The District Watch Committee became a formal advisory board to
the Hong Kong government; typically seen as the “Chinese Executive Council”, since it provided
analysis and tried to compel compliance with the government’s policies (Chan 1991).
The partnership between the Hong Kong merchant class and the colonial government in
the second half of the 19th century helped the colonial government navigate pressures from both
external and internal groups. The colonial government was able to use the partnership with the
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The colonial government did try to appease Europeans, however, by imposing regulations regarding where
Chinese inhabitants could reside which contributed to de facto segregation (Carroll 2005, Chan 1991)
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Hong Kong merchant elite to strengthen its autonomy from the British parent state. The wealth of
the Hong Kong merchant class also helped to dispel pressure from European merchants and coopt
working class forces through the indirect provision of social welfare.
Key factors contributed to the strength of the alliance between the colonial government and
the Hong Kong merchant elite, which in turn strengthened the autonomy of the colonial
government from both internal and external actors. The British government supported the
autonomy of the colonial government, forcing European elite to work through the LegCo and ExCo
to achieve their goals. These subnational institutions were under the control of the governor, which
allowed him to negotiate between rival interests and resolve disputes. Grassroots labor activists
had clear linkages to Mainland anti-imperialist movements, but these linkages facilitated
movement action against the merchant elite and other imperial powers, rather than the colonial
government. Merchant elite’s fear of both the Chinese state and the local working class solidified
their interest in an alliance with the colonial government. Finally, the high levels of cooptation
through merchant-controlled social services and the sectoral nature of labor disputes led to
fragmented movement activity, limiting the pressure grassroots forces could exert on the colonial
administration.

The Early 20th Century: Colonial Autonomy and Coalition with Local
Merchant Elite
In the early 20th century, the coalition of the colonial government and its European and
Chinese merchant elite supporters continued to strengthen, allowing the government to weather
increasingly robust challenges from grassroots forces and maintain its autonomy from subnational,
national, and international challenges during this period. While grassroots forces initially focused
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on international actors, they increasingly turned their attention toward the colonial government,
diverging from the patterns of contention in the 19th century. Grassroots forces were originally
more unified due to middle class merchant’s desire to compete with foreign companies, but
ultimately the monetary incentives underpinning the unified movement led to fragmentation when
the Canton-Hong Kong Strike of 1925 created an economic crisis for the colony. International
linkages to Mainland Chinese organizations also intensified movement activity, but when the
alliance between Mainland organizations broke down, their support for grassroots forces
diminished. The Hong Kong Chinese merchant elite supported the Hong Kong government
because the colonial government backed their efforts to modernize China. During the 1925 Strike,
Chinese economic elite both pacified the general population in Hong Kong and negotiated an end
to the movement with authorities in Mainland China.
Increasing Unity Among Grassroots Anti-Imperialist Movements
In the early 20th century, grassroots mobilization of working class and middle class forces
in Hong Kong became even more anti-imperialist and anti-Western in nature (Tsai 1993). At first,
however, their efforts were against the policies of imperial powers, rather than against the Hong
Kong administration, limiting their direct threat to the colonial government. One of the triggers for
growth in anti-imperial grassroots activity was the American government’s prohibition on Chinese
laborers through multiple exclusion acts starting in 1882 (Tsai 1993). The movement was most
active among student groups, teachers, journalists, manufacturers, and intelligentsia. Following
the renewal of the 1884 American Exclusion Act, business leaders in the Mainland called for a
boycott of Chinese goods, which led to the Anti-American Boycott of 1905 in both the Mainland
and Hong Kong. While colonial law forbade formal boycotts, Hong Kong Chinese limited their
consumption of American products (Tsai 1993).
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Middle class merchants had been ambivalent about participating in the Anti-American
Boycott of 1905, but their support for anti-Western imperialism movements grew over the course
of the first decade of the 20th century. The Anti-Japanese Boycott of 1908 broke out because of
Japanese smuggling activity in Mainland China. Middle class merchants supported the movement
through their guild organizations because they were concerned about competition with Japanese
businesses in Hong Kong, facilitating more unified movement activity among grassroots forces.
The stronger coalition helped the movement last over nine months (Tsai 1993).
Neither the Anti-American Boycott of 1905 nor the Anti-Japanese Boycott of 1908 targeted
the colonial administration directly, but anti-imperial movements at times spilt over into anticolonial government behavior. During the Anti-Japanese Boycott, in November of 1908, Japanese
goods arriving in Hong Kong sparked a riot. The colonial government initially banished
participants, including prominent merchants, from Hong Kong. The forceful response of the
government led to ire against the British. Frustration with the British was exacerbated when a
Chinese passenger was kicked to death on a British steamer, further cementing the connection
between anti-imperial sentiment and anti-colonial government sentiment (Tsai 1993)
Chinese International Linkages and Anti-Imperial Movement Activity
The anti-imperialist grassroots mobilizations of the early 20th century made the Chinese
working class in Hong Kong more sympathetic to the growing communist movement in China,
creating linkage that allowed Hong Kong grassroots actors to put significant pressure on the Hong
Kong government. Some of the earliest recruits to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) cause in
China were from the colony’s labor movement in the 1920s. A group of Hong Kong teachers
organized the first CPP-affiliated organization, the Chinese Socialist Youth League, Hong Kong
Special Branch in 1923 (Loh 2010).
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Collaboration between Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong grassroots forces led to the
largest strike in Hong Kong’s history in 1925. The CCP, Kuomintang (KMT), and union leaders
all called for a boycott in South China following an altercation between British forces and Chinese
protesters in Shanghai in which several protesters were killed and injured. They wanted to ensure
that movement activity took place in Hong Kong, since it was the most famous British colony.
Chinese students, workers, shopkeepers, and even the public tram employees took part in the
strike. Many went up to Canton to picket against British repression (Loh 2010).
The result of the 1925 strike and boycott was a major financial crisis in Hong Kong, which
ultimately divided the unity among grassroots forces along class lines. Many small and mediumsized Chinese businesses as well as native banks were devastated by the strike (Carroll 2005).
While working class unions supported the movement, the cost proved to be too great among the
middle class (Carroll 2005).
The divergence between middle class and working class interests in Hong Kong was not
only a result of the fallout from the riot, but the split in the Kuomintang and the Chinese
Communist Party. In 1927, following the Chiang Kai-shek’s ascension as the leader of the KMT,
the organization decided to end its alliance with the CCP and massacred their forces in Shanghai,
leading many to flee. While links between the Chinese Communist Party and the working class
persisted, the Chinese merchant class maintained their relationship with the KMT-led Canton
government, concerned about another strike (Loh 2010). The KMT, for its part, became more
conciliatory toward the British in an effort to concentrate on dismantling the CCP.
Local Merchant Alliance with Colonial Administration
While grassroots activity was primarily anti-imperial, many among the Chinese merchant
elite championed foreign forces as allies in modernizing China, limiting the prospects for elite
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defection against the colonial government in the early 20th century. Pro-imperial sentiment was
facilitated by the growth of a newer generation of businessmen, professionals, and intelligentsia
who had been predominantly educated in the West and championed Western ideals (Tsai 1993).
The newer generation, while aligned with the British government, advocated for reform on the
Mainland after the Qing Dynasty’s defeat in both the Sino-French War and the Sino-Japanese War.
Tsai (1993) dubs the Chinese pro-Western faction’s nationalism in Hong Kong “collaborationist
patriotism”, because it was loyal to the colonial government and sought to utilize foreign powers
to affect what they saw as needed change in the country they ultimately identified as belonging to.
Hong Kong became a base for Chinese revolutionaries aiming to overthrow the Qing Dynasty,
including Sun Yat Sen, by the early 20th century (Preston 2016).
The colonial government, for its part, supported Hong Kong elite efforts to generate
revolutionary change in China in the hopes of creating a friendlier neighbor to its north (Chung
1998). Hong Kong Chinese merchant elite and the colonial government wanted to facilitate a plot
during the Boxer Rebellion to take over two provinces in the south of China. Worrying about
creating an international incident, however, London stepped in and vetoed this endeavor (Tsai
1993; Chung 1998).22 Following the fall of the Qing Empire and the start of the Republic, the
Hong Kong government would repeatedly try to undermine the British policy of acknowledging
the government in Beijing in favor of supporting the rival KMT governments favored by
supporters of Sun-Yat Sen in Hong Kong (Chung 1998). The Hong Kong Chinese merchant elite
could only rely on the Hong Kong government to help it pursue its aims of Chinese modernization,
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The Hong Kong colonial government wanted to ensure a friend neighbor to their north (Chung 1998).
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rather than that of the parent state. Therefore, the colonial government remained the desired arbiter
among elite factions in the early 20th century.
Preservation of Colonial Autonomy
Believing that they could work with imperial powers to facilitate modernization and
political change in China, the collaborationist patriotic Hong Kong merchant elite protected the
colonial government from grassroots anti-imperialist activities, bolstering its autonomy. The Tung
Wah Hospital resisted calls to participate in the Anti-American Boycott of 1905. During the strike
and boycott of 1925, merchant elite helped dissipate public support for the movement. They set up
a Counter Propaganda Bureau which published leaflets and newspapers not only in Hong Kong,
but in North America, Australia, and Southeast Asia as well (Carroll 2005). They argued for an
alliance of both the Chinese middle class and the upper class with the Hong Kong government.
Moreover, they helped negotiate with the KMT government in Canton to end the movement
(Carroll 2005). All of these actions helped the colonial government avoid concessions to grassroots
forces in the region.
The alignment between the Chinese and European merchant elite classes and the colonial
government’s interests continued to bolster the colonial government’s autonomy from Britain at
the same time. Chan (1991) gives a striking example of this dynamic: in 1908, Parliament
instructed the governor to close all opium houses. The European merchant classes who benefitted
from opium sales organized against the immediate closing of the opium houses. The Hong Kong
government itself did not want to implement the decision because it would hurt their revenue.
Chinese merchants, while recognizing the deleterious effects on the Chinese community, chose to
support European merchants and the Hong Kong government, declaring it dangerous to the
territory’s revenue streams. In the end, the colonial government chose to allow opium consumption
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and purchasing to continue, and by 1914 opened their own business selling opium to Chinese
residents (Chan 1991).
During early 20th century, the local government was once again able to cultivate high levels
of elite unity. The Hong Kong government remained the main arbiter among elite demographics,
which played a crucial role in cementing elite cohesion. The Hong Kong Chinese elite had to
appeal to the local government for support, unable to receive favor for their modernization goals
from the British parent state. This high level of elite cohesion helped the colonial government
navigate the 1925 boycott and strike, ultimately leading the colonial government to not make
concessions to the movement. Their alliance also continued to support the colonial government’s
autonomy from the British parent state.
In contrast to the earlier period, the colonial government faced more direct pressure from
anti-imperialist grassroots forces, but this pressure waned after 1925 due changes in international
linkages and internal solidarity within the grassroots coalition. Hong Kong grassroots forces built
up linkages with Chinese Mainland organizations in the 1920s. When the CCP and the KMT were
collaborating, the deepened linkage with Hong Kong grassroots forces helped produce powerful
pressure on the Hong Kong government. International linkages diminished because of the schism
between the CCP and the KMT, which no longer had similar goals toward the British government.
Collaboration within the movement became weaker because the severity of the economic crisis
resulting from the strike, leading to friction between the middle class and other factions within
the movement.
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Mid-20th Century: Declining Autonomy and Changing Coalition Structure
The Hong Kong government’s autonomy declined in the 1960s and early 1970s due to its
flagging coalition and the strengthening of grassroots pressure on the administration. The Hong
Kong government was unable to police elite tensions because it could not supervise informal
Chinese operations in the colony; officials grew suspicious of traditional merchant allies; and a
new economic elite emerged changing the coalitions’ dynamics. Grassroots forces, on the other
hand, were not as influenced by cooptation due to support from linkages to the Chinese Communist
Party. The expanded resources of grassroots forces and the diminished assets of the colonial
government led to effective mass mobilization in 1967. As a result, the colonial government
experienced decreased autonomy from both the subnational and central government institutions
and had to make concessions to grassroots forces.
This pressure dissipated, however, because of further changes in coalitional resources.
Unity among grassroots forces diminished and the domestic interests on the Mainland changed,
limiting support for left-wing grassroots forces. While the riots and their aftermath marked a low
point in Hong Kong’s autonomy from the central government, the development of new social
forces in the colony fortified the local government’s power vis-à-vis coalition partners. By the end
of the 1970s, the Hong Kong government had built a relatively stable coalition and could assert
itself against grassroots forces and the British government in the implementation of policies.
Diminished Role of Colonial Government as an Arbiter
Whereas the Hong Kong government had been able to act as an arbiter between elite
disputes in the 19th and early 20th century, the Cold War era made it more difficult for them to
fulfill this role. Following the end of the Chinese civil war in 1949 and the founding of the People’s
Republic of China, the new CCP government held that Hong Kong was within its sovereignty.
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They did not attempt, however, to forcefully take back Hong Kong at that time. In fact, the Chinese
Mainland provided Hong Kong with much needed access to water and agricultural products
throughout the territory’s post-1949 colonial tenure (Sing 2004).
The PRC government’s main reason for allowing Britain to rule Hong Kong after World
War II was the state’s relative economic weakness. China suffered from trade imbalances and
widespread poverty. Moreover, the United States launched a trade embargo against China because
of their involvement in the Korean War, further limiting the country’s access to much needed
capital investment and trade. Maintaining Hong Kong as a wealthier British colony provided the
Chinese with resources incorporation would not (Sing 2004).23 Moreover, the Chinese government
owned numerous businesses in Hong Kong by the 1960s which also provided revenue for the
Mainland (Loh 2010).
However, there was no formal diplomatic institution in Hong Kong that represented
Chinese interests to the British. The Chinese government was not allowed to set up a Foreign
Affairs Envoy’s Office. Chinese officials therefore had to use the Xinhua News Agency as a “store
front” for communist operations in Hong Kong (Loh 2010).
The lack of a formal diplomatic institution limited the Hong Kong colonial government’s
power to act as a third party negotiator between Britain and China and to police the relationship
between Chinese informal networks and elite circles within the territory in the midcentury (Loh
2010). Where the local government had been able to conduct formal negotiations with the Canton
government under Kuomintang control in the strike of 1925, they were now unable to interface

23

Sing notes that “in addition to visible trade, remittances, and mailing of parcels of clothes and foodstuffs by Hong
Kong Chinese to relatives and friends in Mainland China between 1950 and 1976 have been estimated to be worth
US $2.4 billion. Hong Kong visitors to China spent another US$973 million between 1961 and 1976” (2004, 34).
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with the Chinese administration in the same way. Their inability to police elite interactions
diminished their capacity to maintain a strong elite coalition.
The Enervation of Colonial Coalition with Local Business Elite
The colonial government’s ability to maintain its coalition was further damaged by
suspicion of their traditional Chinese merchant elite allies arising from World War II. During the
Japanese occupation of Hong Kong from December 1941 to August 1945, the Japanese recruited
the same local Chinese business leaders to help rule Hong Kong that had been the key partners to
the British colonial government (Carroll 2005). Following the return to British rule in 1945,
Chinese business leaders were not allowed to return to their positions as Unofficial Members of
LegCo (Carroll 2005). Trust between the Hong Kong government and their long-standing allies
had been badly shaken, particularly with the more active assertions of sovereignty made by the
Chinese government.
The colonial government also began to support a new economic elite demographic,
industrialists and manufacturers, enlarging the colonial coalition and weakening the traditional
business elite’s ability to intercede with grassroots forces (Scott 1989; King 1975). Many of the
refugees from Mainland China had been from the manufacturing and industrial centers in
Shanghai. They opened up factories in Hong Kong. The manufacturing boom was buffeted by the
explosion in population in Hong Kong, which lead to the availability of cheap labor (Scott 1989).
By the 1960s, the British included the new wealthy industrialists into the Executive Council and
the Legislative Council of Hong Kong (King 1975). The empowerment of the new coalition forces
further diminished the ability of the merchant class to mitigate grassroots movements, as the
industrialists did not have the same ties to philanthropy organizations that the merchant elite of the
19th and early 20th century did.
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Strengthening of Grassroots Forces
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continued to build up its connections to grassroots
civil society in Hong Kong after the split with the KMT, strengthening grassroots ability to
pressure the government over time. In 1948, the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions (FTU)
was formed with the explicit purpose of uniting “all Hong Kong workers in support of the
communist cause” as well as counteracting pro-business unions (Loh 2010).
These new CCP affiliated organizations were able to provide social services to grassroots
populations, decreasing the effectiveness of cooptation mechanisms provided through the local
Hong Kong business elite. The lack of cooptation made it easier to unify grassroots forces. FTU
was able to attract members through free education for the children of workers, as well as free
medical services. The British colonial government did not offer universal primary or secondary
school, providing an opportunity for Communist-run schools to step in and fill the void (Loh 2010,
Cheung 2009). While there were only twenty Communist-affiliated schools in 1960, there were an
estimated 1263 unregistered union-sponsored schools with connections to the party. By 1962,
90,000 workers were affiliated with FTU (Loh 2010).
At the same time, however, mass refugee migration from Mainland China into Hong Kong
hindered both the CPP and the Hong Kong business elite’s ability to fully exert influence over the
population. Hong Kong’s population doubled between 1949 and 1965, from 1.86 million to 3.625
million, because of refugees fleeing the Mainland (Loh 2010). Most of the Chinese movements
leading to mass migration had affected formerly middle and upper classes in Chinese society,
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creating a virulent strained of anti-communism within Hong Kong that was more supportive of the
KMT-run Republic of China (ROC) (Lam 2004). 24
These mass migrations created new groups that were opposed to leftist-grassroots
organizing, limiting the CCP-aligned movement’s ability and incentive to focus on pressuring the
local government. Labor unions were split into leftist, CCP-aligned forces and rightist, ROCaligned factions. Republic of China forces operated covertly in Hong Kong throughout the Cold
War and ran multiple press outlets. When rightist labor unions launched direct actions to negotiate
better conditions for workers, leftist press organizations derided their agenda; the same pattern
existed for leftist union actions, limiting the overall unity and capacity of labor in post-war Hong
Kong (Chan 2003; Lam 2004).
The 1968 Riots and Apex of Grassroots Pressure
While grassroots forces still contained some divisions between the CCP and the ROC, the
riots of the 1960s marked the high point of left wing, Chinese Communist Party-organized activism
in Hong Kong and placed substantial pressure on the Hong Kong government. The Hong Kong
government, for its part, was enervated by its declining capacity to control its elite coalition and
its inability to rely on Hong Kong Chinese elite to provide cooptation. Left-wing forces in Hong
Kong were able to utilize their coalitional allies that they had developed over the past twenty years
to attempt to launch a revolution in Hong Kong, now referred to as the Riots of 1967 (Loh 2010).
The Hong Kong government’s repressive response to the movement created increased
unity among leftist grassroots forces at first. The colonial government initially responded to the
riots by imposing a curfew, raiding leftist organizations, including unions, newspapers, and
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The KMT controlled the island of Taiwan following World War II. After losing the Chinese Civil War, the KMT
set up the Republic of China in the territory, claiming to be the rightful administration over all of China. They were
recognized as such by Western powers through the 1970s and operated China’s seat in the United Nations.
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schools, and making mass arrests. These actions added to the sense of collective threat, which led
to a variety of different labor, education, and business organizations forming the Anti-Persecution
Struggle Committee (Cheung 2009).
The support among moderate grassroots forces weakened when the Anti-Persecution
Struggle Committee, began to escalate the violence in their strategies, planting bombs around the
city (Loh 2010). Just as in the 1925 strikes, the consequences of movement activity outweighed
the benefits of participation. The threat of repression from the colonial government toward the
population had also dissipated, depleting the feeling of collective threat among the coalition
(Cheung 2009).
Moreover, as with the 1925 Movement, changes in politics on the Mainland altered the
approach toward defending grassroots activity in Hong Kong. During the Cultural Revolution,
members of the Red Guard in nearby Guangdong had promoted the movement in Hong Kong, but
Zhou Enlai was able to convince Mao Zedong that the Chinese economy was suffering too much
as a result of these activities. China therefore diminished its support of the 1968 riots, quickening
the decline of anti-colonial government activities (Cheung 2009; Loh 2010).
Leftist grassroots organizing diminished considerably in Hong Kong after the riots. Once
the Hong Kong government managed to quell the riots, they launched a campaign to root-out CCP
organizations throughout Hong Kong. While the FTU and many of the CCP-aligned schools
remained open, on the whole, CCP networks were decimated by the Hong Kong government (Loh
2010). Moreover, the violence of the protests marginalized leftist forces from mainstream Hong
Kong society. This process was dual in nature: not only did public opinion turn against leftist
forces, but grassroots leftist forces developed a “siege mentality” that existed long after the
Handover, when they would become allies of the post-colonial government (Cheung 2009, 3).
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Changes in Autonomy From Subnational and National Institutions
With ties to the Chinese business elite classes enervated by the Japanese occupation and
heightened fears of the long-standing ties between activism on the Mainland and in Hong Kong,
the colonial government began to increase pluralism, limiting its autonomy from subnational
institutions by the 1950s. In 1952, only two of the thirteen Urban Council members were chosen
through elections. Just four years later, thirty percent of the Council, eight out of twenty-two
members, were elected (Scott 1989).
The administration began to allow more Hong Kong Chinese into the civil service. In the
pre-World War II era, there had been half-hearted attempts to include Chinese inhabitants in the
low-level of the civil service (Tsang 1997). Following World War II, however, the local
government began actively trying to recruit cadets and administrative officers in the civil service
among the Chinese population.25 By 1961, it became a general policy to “not appoint expatriate
officers to the permanent establishment ‘unless there appears to be no possibility of Chinese with
the appropriate qualifications being available in the next few years’” (Tsang 2007, 120).
Following the riots of 1967, the colonial government made further concessions to
grassroots forces. They created the Independent Commission Against Corruption. They also made
the LegCo more representative. By 1970, Chinese Unofficial Members comprised 84% of the
Unofficial Members of the Legislative Council (King 1975). City District Offices were also
developed to increase the penetration of society and keep the government apprised of grassroots
developments (Scott 1989).
The riots also spurred the Hong Kong government to make drastic improvements to the
provision of social welfare, including education, public housing and labor rights (Scott 1989,
At the same time, Tsang (2007) notes that half of all of the Administrative Officers were expected to be
expatriates until the 1980s.
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Cheung 2009, Pepper 2008, Loh 2010). The colonial government introduced nine-years of
compulsory education. Primary education for all students was free by 1972. They also reduced
maximum working hours a week for women and young people to 48 hours by 1971 (Cheung 2009).
Public assistance schemes were introduced in 1971, along with a ten year housing program in
1973, which dramatically expanded access to public housing (Scott 1989, Cheung 2009).
Not only did the reforms demonstrate a weakening of the colonial government’s autonomy
from subnational institutions, but many of the reforms of the 1970s marked a decline in the local
government’s autonomy from national institutions as well. The expansion of social welfare was
pushed by the British government under the direction of the Labour Party (Cheung 2009). Through
the 1960s, the Legislative Council and Executive Council had resisted the introduction of social
reforms, as they were detrimental to the manufacturing sector’s access to cheap labor (Scott 1989,
Cheung 2009).
Shifting Coalition Partners to Bolster Autonomy
The reforms of the 1970s created powerful new groups in the colonial government’s
coalition. The Hong Kong government was able to effectively coopt a group of indigenous
villagers in the New Territories, the Heung Yee Kuk, that could trace their ancestry in the region
to 1899. In 1971, the Heung Yee Kuk had threatened to mobilize ten thousand villagers to march
on the Governor’s House (Goo 2014). The government created the “Small House Policy”, which
allowed male descendants to apply to the government for a tract of land at a concessionary rate
to build a three story house (Goo 2014). The discounts on property were enormous; indigenous
villagers paid as little as 0.6 million Hong Kong Dollars (HKD) for a site that is worth 2 million
on the market (Goo 2014). This move, similar to the 19th century allotments of land and licenses
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to local Chinese elite, created a powerful ally for the colonial administration in subduing sections
of the public.
The colonial government also reshaped the civil service to further coopt members of the
middle class. The civil service nearly doubled in size between 1959 and the early 1970s, moving
from 45,000 to 84,500; 95% of those were local Chinese.26 By the 1970s, the government became
the largest employer in Hong Kong. The expansion of the bureaucracy served as a mechanism for
“assimilating the potential ‘discontented’ into the governing machinery” (King 1975, 428). Civil
servants were also socialized to take pride in being “politically neutral” (Lam 2005).
The colonial government’s change in policies helped to mitigate and co-opt grassroots
forces and weaken the position of the Hong Kong government’s coalition partners vis-à-vis the
local government. The weakening of coalition partners, such as Hong Kong’s Chinese business
elite, involved the empowerment of new demographics, including the civil service and the Heung
Yee Kuk. These steps elevated the Hong Kong government’s autonomy from subnational
institutions once more, enabling them to implement policy and deal with challenges from
grassroots forces.
Within the post-World War II period, we can once again observe that changes in elite
cohesion impacted the ability of the colonial government to withstand grassroots pressure, and that
their success in maintaining elite solidarity was tied to their capacity to serve as the primary arbiter
among elite factions. Whereas the colonial government had been able to act as an arbiter between
elite factions in 19th century, Britain’s heightened concerns about Chinese claims on sovereignty
prevented the colonial government from managing Chinese informal influence among its elite
circles. The Hong Kong colonial government’s ability to manage elite tension was further harmed
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King (1975) further remarked that in the 1970s, this translated to one in fifty persons in Hong Kong being
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by tensions with traditional allies and the emergence of new economic elite. When the local
government was able to clamp down on CCP influence and rebalance their coalition with new
partnerships, they once again were able to manage elite tensions, thereby increasing their ability
to maintain autonomy from subnational institutions.
Furthermore, changes in grassroots forces’ resources in the 1960s were products of Chinese
domestic interests and the colonial government’s implementation of cooptation policies. Just as
the split between the KMT and the CCP had limited grassroots pressure after the 1925 CantonHong Kong Strike, the CCP’s and KMT’s continued conflict prevented labor organizations from
coalescing to pressure the government. While the Red Guard had favored the 1967 riots, the
Chinese government decided to stop backing the riots once they realized the impact the Cultural
Revolution was having on the Chinese economy. In contrast to previous periods, Hong Kong
Chinese merchant elite were not able to coopt grassroots forces, both because of their diminished
status and the CCP’s efforts to provide goods and services. This helped strengthen the FTU and
unify leftist grassroots forces. The early repression of movement activity also facilitated unity.
At the same time, there were factors that limited grassroots’ unity that departed from the
earlier pattern of previous periods. Similar to the 1925 movement, the high cost of grassroots
activity eventually led to fragmentation of grassroots forces. The difference in the 1960s was the
limitations mass migration put on unifying grassroots activities. Many new immigrants were
sympathetic to the ROC rather than the CCP. Following the 1967 riots, the majority of leftist forces
had been decimated, leaving more ROC-aligned grassroots forces in place.
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Transition to the Handover: Rise of the Pro-China Integrationist Government
Coalition and Pro-Democracy Grassroots Forces
Once the PRC government initiated the process of reclaiming Hong Kong, they decided to
replicate the colonial system in many ways, particularly by creating an executive-dominated
system aligned with the powerful economic elite actors in the community. Unlike the Hong Kong
colonial government, however, the coalition they built was much broader and more fragmented,
designed to insulate the executive from subnational institutions. The Chinese government also
veered from the colonial cooptation of grassroots forces following the high levels of mobilization
during and after the Tiananmen Square Movement of 1989.
During the Tiananmen Square democracy movement in Mainland China, pro-democracy
forces were able to unify and develop international linkages to Western powers. The perceived
threat of coercion arising from the Chinese government’s handling of Tiananmen led to increased
unity. Pro-democratic forces reached out to foreign governments and the Chinese diaspora about
the Tiananmen Square Incident and framed the narrative to a large extent. Foreign governments
responded with policies that sought to strengthen both pro-democracy actors and Hong Kong’s
autonomy from the central government.
Since the Chinese leadership had incorporated the business coalitions into their policy
circles, the colonial government found that it needed new allies to pass policies. They ended up
forming a coalition with pro-democratic grassroots activists in the early 1990s. The Hong Kong
government passed electoral reform that allowed grassroots activists to win the majority of seats
in the 1995 election for LegCo. The colonial administration also empowered pro-democracy
grassroots forces to ensure that Hong Kong maintained a significant degree of autonomy from the
Chinese government after the return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997.
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Handover Proceedings and The Promise of Autonomy
The PRC leadership initiated plans regarding the return of the territory following the end
of the Maoist period and the initiation of the “Open Door” policy (Ching 2010). The British and
the Chinese agreed to a thirteen year handover process with the Sino-British Joint Declaration in
1984, since the lease on the New Territories ended in 1997. The declaration guaranteed that Hong
Kong would keep its capitalist institutions, civil liberties, and general way of life till 2047, an
approach that was labeled “One Country, Two Systems.” Deng suggested a formulation of this
approach in 1979: “‘China has a consistent policy: sovereignty over Hong Kong belonged to
China. But Hong Kong has her own special status… When the two sides [Britain and China]
discuss the question, China will respect the special status of Hong Kong’” (Ching 2010). By
pursuing “One Country, Two Systems” in Hong Kong, Deng’s government hoped to ensure a
smooth transition and limit the possibility of capital flight from the territory (Ching 2010).
The Chinese government’s commitment to the “One Country, Two System” principle was
reinforced by the hope that it would entice Taiwan to peacefully allow resumption of sovereignty
as well. Chiang Kai-Shek, who had retreated to, and ruled over, Taiwan since the Chinese Civil
War, had died in 1975, leaving his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, to assume the presidency in 1978. The
PRC leadership saw Chiang Ching-kuo as the last person with enough prestige to help facilitate a
peaceful resolution to the conflict with Taipei, and thus were invested in maintaining stability in
their relationship with Taiwan (Pepper 2008).27 An unfettered Hong Kong could demonstrate to
Taiwan that they could continue to have a high degree of autonomy and capitalist institutions under
CCP rule (Pepper 2008).
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The agreement stated that Hong Kong would have a high degree of autonomy in all matters
except for foreign affairs and national defense. Despite this clause, Hong Kong would be able to
act as a free port and a separate customs territory, thereby keeping its status as an international
financial center. The Sino-British Joint Declaration further expounded that the territory would have
independent legislative and judicial power, maintain independent finances untaxed by the PRC
government, and that all government bodies would be comprised of local inhabitants. Colonial
employees could remain in place following the Handover, and the overall social and economic
system would remain in place for 50 years (The Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal 2007).
The Sino-British Joint Declaration also served to bind both the PRC government and the
Hong Kong government to international agreements and international governance institutions. The
Sino-British Declaration also stipulated that Hong Kong would continue to be a party to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), as well as international labor conventions as it
had under colonial rule (Chan 1996).28 Moreover, the inclusion of the ICCPR meant that Hong
Kong would periodically had to report to the United Nations on the implementation of these
rights. 29 China also chose to register the treaty at the United Nations to ensure international
endorsement of the treaty.
Creating an Integrationist Coalition and a Powerful Chief Executive
The PRC leadership sought to recreate what they perceived to be the colonial structure by
designing a strong executive with a supporting coalition that could never become too powerful to
threaten the executive’s power. Interviews with members of the contemporary integrationist
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The ICCPR and the ICESCR were adopted under resolution 2200 by the United Nations General Assembly. In
1976, the United Kingdom ratified the ICCPR and ICESCR and extended it to Hong Kong (Chan 1996).
29
The United Kingdom submitted reports on Hong Kong to the HRC in 1978, 1988, 1991, and 1995.
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coalition that were involved in the Handover suggest that the Chinese government sought to
replicate both the colonial structure and the colonial government’s coalition:
We thought, you see the Basic Law was drafted from the mid 1980s through 1990. Uh,
when they were drafting the Basic Law, everyone believed that Hong Kong had the perfect
system, because Hong Kong had been doing very well. And so, they said, “let us keep
everything unchanged.” So, what we now see in the Basic Law, in chapter 4 of the Basic
Law, is actually a copy of what was in practice in Hong Kong, during the 1980s.30

To that end, China made sure that within the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s post-Handover miniconstitution, the territory would be executive-led, as it was during the colonial administration
(Cheng 2001; Lau and Kuan 2000). Under the Basic Law, the Chief Executive was both in charge
of over-seeing policy implementation and introducing significant legislation into the LegCo. The
legislature could only introduce bills relating to the government’s policies with prior consent from
the CE. Legislators were not allowed to introduce bills involving public expenditure (Legislative
Council Secretariat 2018).31 Furthermore, the CE could dismiss LegCo.32
The Chinese government also sought to coopt local business elite through continuing many
aspects of British colonial rule (Ortmann 2015; Fong 2016; Cheung 2010; Goodstadt 2000).
Members of the business elite and the Heung Yee Kuk were given places on the 59 members Basic
Law Drafting Committee. Twenty-three Hong Kong representatives were invited to participate;
the other 36 participants were Mainland Chinese. Moreover, similar to the colonial period,
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Interview 72
Furthermore, the President of the Legislative Council could block private member bills, but could not block the
Chief Executive’s bills (Legislative Council Secretariat 2018).
32
Basic Law. Art. 70 states that the CE can dissolve the LegCo, but that the legislature must be reconstituted within
three months through elections in accordance with the Basic Law.
31
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business leaders have always made up the majority on the three appointed primary policy-making
bodies, the Executive Council, the Commission on Strategic Development, and the Central Policy
Unit, under the CE’s leadership (Fong 2013). Business leaders were also assured places in the
central government bodies, including the five new bodies to deal with Hong Kong affairs
(Goodstadt 2000).
Once the PRC leadership began the Open Door Policy in the late 1970s, local Hong Kong
Chinese business elite pursued integration with the Mainland officials even without pressure from
the government. The rapid industrialization of the 1970s in Hong Kong had led to labor shortages,
increases in wages, and escalating housing movements (So 2011). To survive export-oriented
competition, they needed to find “an abundant supply of cheap labor force… and a large supply of
land”, which the Mainland provided (So 2011, 105). By 1991, around 20,000 Hong Kong
garments, plastics, textiles and electronic factories had been relocated to the Guangdong province
(So 2011).
At the same time, Beijing sought to ensure that long-time leftist allies of the Chinese
government dating back to the 1967 riots were a part of the future government coalition. These
groups including the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions (FTU), who had been the initiators
of the 1967 riots. FTU was represented in the Basic Law Drafting Committee (Chan 2009). Beijing
also empowered individuals that served in Mainland government bodies in the 1970s through
1990s, such as the Guangdong People’s Political Consultative Conference and the Fujian People’s
Political Consultative Conference.33 Thus, within the future government coalition were both leftist
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For instance, Jasper Tsang Yok-Sing, the future leader of the leftist party, Democratic Alliance for the Betterment
of Hong Kong (DAB), was appointed to be a member of the Guangdong provincial committee of the Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in 1976. He became a member of the CPPCC’s national
committee in 1993 (China Daily 2011).
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and more conservative, pro-business interests with vastly different economic policy preferences
(Chan 2009).
Apart from the differing interests and relationships to the colonial regime within the
burgeoning coalition of the future Hong Kong government, connections were further impaired by
efforts to keep strong political parties from forming through the development of functional
constituencies. Both the British and Chinese governments did not want a politically party to
dominate the LegCo, and therefore be able to “use the veto powers at the legislature’s disposal to
‘blackmail’ the executive or to bring about stalemate in the legislature” (Lau and Kuan 2000, 707).
The colonial regime therefore designed the electoral system to disempower political parties.
Instead of supporting the development of political party seats, the colonial government
extended the corporatist strategies of the state to include more professional and business elites
through what were called “ functional constituency seats” in the LegCo (Scott 1989; Ma 2016).
These seats represented economic and professional sectors, thereby limiting the incentive to form
political parties based on class interests. 34 The structure of voting within the functional
constituencies differed, further dividing interests. For instance, while professional functional
constituencies, including the Medical and Legal sectors, allowed individual votes by people in the
profession to determine the representatives, others, such as the Financial functional constituency,
were chosen by corporate entities such as licensed banks. The practice of allowing only designated
organizations and corporations to choose representatives served to further strengthen the alliance
between the business ruling elite and the Hong Kong government.
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The first functional constituencies represented sectors that were both associated with both upper and middle class
professions; there were two industrial seats, two commercial seats, two labor seats, and then one seat each for the
legal, medical, engineering, education, social services, and architectural seats (Ngok 2016)
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One of the differences overlooked in the Chinese and British authorities’ plan, however, was
that up through the 1980s, the Governor had been the president of LegCo. Following the Handover,
the Chief Executive would not preside over the legislature. This development meant that there was
no overlap between the two branches of government, as there had been prior to the early 1990s,
limiting coordination among elite factions.
Grassroots Forces and the Tiananmen Square Movement
The PRC government initially sought to also coopt pro-democracy grassroots leaders with
positions in key government bodies but became concerned about the strength of these forces and
their advocacy for change in the Mainland regime. Many of the first political parties in Hong Kong
were formed by grassroots groups that had pro-democratic and anti-communist components. For
instance, a key leader at the time was Martin Lee, the son of a former KMT general who had
escaped to Hong Kong after the Chinese Civil War. There were three main pro-democratic political
organizations that ran candidates for elections in the 1980s. While the three groups collaborated,
they did not share resources in the 1988 elections and were all relatively small with few members
(Cheng 2001).
The PRC leadership initially sought to replicate the cooptation of grassroots organizations by
including a few members of the pro-democracy grassroots organizations in the planning for the
Handover. Both Martin Lee, a lawyer and democratic activist, and Szeto Wah, one of the founders
of the Professional Teachers’ Union, had been included in the Basic Law Drafting Committee.
Xinhua News Agency, the official diplomatic outlet in Hong Kong, also reached out to have
discussions with pro-democracy groups.
The dynamics between Hong Kong grassroots movements and the Chinese government
were altered, however, by the Tiananmen Square Incident of June 4th, 1989, and the subsequent
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protests in Hong Kong. Democracy activists had been very invested in the Beijing movement (Sing
2004; Cheng 2011). Mainland activists had come to Hong Kong to raise funds for the Beijing
student protests and Hong Kong residents had sent up tents for the pro-democracy occupation of
Tiananmen Square. Hong Kong democracy forces formed a collaborative platform, the Hong
Kong Alliance for Patriotic Democratic Movements of China, which coordinated over 200 groups,
including middle class professional associations, pro-democratic parties, unions, student groups,
human rights organizations, and religious groups. The Alliance organized the largest peaceful
demonstration Hong Kong had ever witnessed, one million participants, on May 21st of 1989
(Cheng 2011).
The incident caused PRC officials to fundamentally shift their view of Hong Kong,
according to Cheng (2011). Hong Kong was labeled a “counter-revolutionary base.” Jiang Zemin
warned Hong Kong that the “well water should not interfere with the river water” (Cheng 2011,
182). “One Country, Two Systems” did not only mean that Mainland would not intrude on the
territory’s autonomy, but that the region must not meddle in national affairs (Cheng 2011). They
also inserted Article 23 into the Basic Law as a result of the Tiananmen Square Incident, ordering
Hong Kong to pass legislation criminalizing alliances with foreign organizations, treason, sedition,
secession, divulging official secrets, and subversion (Cheng 2011).
Relations between Hong Kong pro-democracy forces and PRC authorities chilled
considerably, ending attempts at cooptation for the early 1990s. Both of the pro-democracy
activists resigned from the Basic Law Drafting Committee. Official contacts with the Xinhua News
Agency ended (Cheng 2011). PRC officials accused pro-democracy forces of “ ‘collusion with
foreign forces,’ i.e., the American and British imperialist forces as well as the reactionary forces
in Taiwan” to topple the Chinese Communist regime (Cheng 2011, 186).
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Following the Chinese Communist Party leadership’s repressive measures to put down the
pro-democracy protests on the Mainland, Hong Kong pro-democracy mobilization became more
unified (Cheng 2001; Sing 2004). They worked to shape international opinion about the
Tiananmen Square Movement internationally, particularly among overseas Chinese diaspora.
They also coordinated operation Yellowbird, which helped smuggle democracy activists out of
Mainland China (Cheng 2011). In the winter of 1989, members of the three major political parties
formed the United Democrats of Hong Kong, intending it to be the sole pro-democratic party (Sing
2004; Cheng 2001).
The pro-democracy grassroots’ appeals to the international community resulted in
legislative and governmental responses from Western governments. Part of the reason foreign
powers reacted so strongly was that they hoped to prevent sudden emigration flows from Hong
Kong to Western countries (Nossal 1997). Canada became outspoken in support of
democratization for Hong Kong prior to the Handover. In the early 1990s, they provided expertise
in running elections and access to information legislation. Over the objections of the PRC
government, they supported Hong Kong Governor Chris Patten’s 1992 democratic reform package
that introduced more geographically elected seats into the legislature (Nossal 1997).
The United States Congress passed the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992. This
act guaranteed that Hong Kong would be treated as a “separate territory in trade and economic
matters”, and that the United States should continue to grant Hong Kong most favored-nation
status. Additionally, the U.S. would support the territory’s access to sensitive technology,
investment, and increase cultural ties between the two territories. The act stipulated that it would
be nullified if the President determined that “Hong Kong is not sufficiently autonomous to justify
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treatment under a U.S. law different from that accorded China.”35 The PRC government had to
honor the autonomy of the region. Under these provisions, the Secretary of State would be
required, through 2000, to inform Congress on Hong Kong’s transition under Chinese sovereignty,
and a section of this report was to discuss the development of democratic institutions (Nossal
1997).
The Colonial Government’s Reaction
The unity among grassroots activists and political parties produced several concessions from
the Hong Kong government, including a timetable for democratization of Hong Kong in the early
summer of 1989. In May, the Executive and Legislative Councils decided that half of the seats in
the Legislative Council should be chosen by direct election in 1997, with the Chief Executive and
the legislature being picked by universal suffrage in 2003 (Cheng 2011). The colonial government
agreed to changing the number of directly elected seats in the Legislative Council from 10 to 20
for 1991 (Cheng 2001).
Despite these developments, in a secret meeting between the Chinese and the British
governments, both parties agreed to a more moderate arrangement. They settled on a formula for
the composition of the 1995 Legislative Council, with 20 out of the 60 members of the Legislature
being directly elected (Lau 1998). This Legislative Council would serve as a “through-train”,
serving both before and after the 1997 Handover.
Changing leadership within Britain, and within Hong Kong, however, led to a further
expansion of suffrage in the early 1990s and the additional empowerment of pro-democracy
grassroots forces. Britain appointed conservative politician Chris Patten to be the final governor
of Hong Kong. Patten introduced reforms that lowered the age of voting from 21 to 18 years of
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age; created nine new functional constituency representatives that would expand suffrage to
“include the entire working population”; and, put members of the directly-elected District Boards
in the organization that chose the Election Committee seats (Lau 1998, 6). These reforms would
greatly increase the power of the pro-democracy grassroots forces in the legislature.
According to some scholars, Britain government’s motives for expanding pluralism further
was to increase the autonomy of the region from China following the Handover (Cheng 2001; Lau
1998). After the colonial governments’ discussions with Deng Xiaoping, universal suffrage was
expanded for district-level positions in 1980, before the British knew exactly what the
arrangements for the territory would be. Britain had slowed the pace of democratization to
accommodate China in the late 1980s after the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration.
Between the Tiananmen Square Incident and conservative business classes’ growing loyalty to the
Chinese government, however, the British were becoming convinced that the only way to empower
the autonomy of the region vis-à-vis the central government was to empower anti-Communist and
pro-democratic forces in Hong Kong (Lau 1998).
The British government was also influenced by international reactions to Tiananmen
Square and the threat of “brain drain.” Following the Tiananmen Incident, one-third of the Hong
Kong’s households planned to emigrate out of the city. Plans to leave were particularly high
among professionals, entrepreneurs, and manufacturers. Polls found that 64% of professionals,
executives and entrepreneurs had decided to emigrate, while 75% of manufacturers were either
leaving or planning to leave (Cheng 2011).
Relations between the colonial government and Chinese officials broke down because of
Chris Patten’s reforms (Lau 1998). Prior to the reforms, Chinee authorities expected to be able to
utilize “united front work” to ensure that at least 70%, or twenty-one of the functional constituency

101

seats, a few of the democratically elected seats, and all of the ten Election Committee seats were
controlled by legislators approved of by the PRC government (Cheng 2001). This control over the
legislature was no longer guaranteed under the new pluralistic conditions of the 1995 elections.
PRC authorities therefore backed away from its promise of the “through train”, announcing that
the 1995 LegCo would be dissolved following the Handover and a Provisional Legislative Council
would be set up. Negotiations with the British and colonial governments became icy, and Chinese
officials decided to work through the Preliminary Work Committee and then the Preparatory
Committee (both composed only of Mainland and Hong Kong members) to prepare Hong Kong’s
post-Handover government (Lau 1998).
Between the initiation of the Preparatory Committee, increasing defection from probusiness conservatives, and the increasing number of elected seats in the Legislative Council, the
British colonial administration was forced to rely on pro-democracy legislators, now known as the
Pan-Democratic Camp, in order to pass legislation by 1995. The government would align with
the Liberal Party, a moderate pro-Business party within the integrationist coalition, or the PanDemocratic Camp, depending on the issue (Cheng 2001). Following their success in both the 1991
and 1995 elections, pro-democracy forces rose in stature in society, significantly raising their
prestige and ability to organize, as well as their resources before the Handover (Lau 1998).36
The loss of traditional allies to Chinese forces planning the Handover, along with united
grassroots and international pressure, led the Hong Kong government to expand pluralism in the
early 1990s. While the Hong Kong government experienced a loss of autonomy because of the
defection of many of its original coalition partners, it was able to utilize a partnership with
grassroots forces to achieve policy aims. The colonial government’s behavior was meant to bolster
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the post-colonial government’s autonomy from central government institutions, but their actions
encouraged the Chinese government to limit it further through a Provisional Legislative Council
chosen by integrationist forces aligned with the PRC leadership’s interests.
In comparing the factors that facilitated changes in the resources available to the colonial
government, the inability to act as an arbiter among local elite weakened their coalition’s cohesion.
In the 19th century, Britain had made it clear to local European elite that the colonial government
was the final arbiter of elite disputes by rejecting changes to the Legislative Council. Now,
however, the colonial government had to deal with another center of power elites could appeal to,
the Chinese government. The gravitational force of the inevitability of Chinese sovereignty made
it difficult for the colonial government to keep local elite in its orbit.
As with the 1925 strikes, grassroots forces were more successful when appealing to
international linkages. Grassroots forces worked hard to connect with both Chinese diaspora and
foreign government officials. In this case, Western countries supported Hong Kong’s prodemocracy movement due to their concern about the domestic impact mass migration from the
territory would have on their constituencies, as well as a desire to maintain Hong Kong’s role as
an international financial center.
Similar to the strengthening of leftist forces during the 1950s and 1960s, the decrease in
cooptation and increasing fears of coercion amplified unity among grassroots forces. Following
the pro-democracy coalition’s engagement with Tiananmen Square activists in 1989, the Chinese
government limited cooptation strategies toward pro-democracy groups. While pro-democracy
activists in Hong Kong did not experience repression, the crackdown in Tiananmen raised the
specter of coercion, leading them to form a unified political party and strengthen their international
efforts.
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Conclusion
Through a historical comparison of state- society interactions during the colonial period,
we can see that the distribution of the resources of elite cohesion, international support, and played
a large role in the autonomy of the colonial government from both subnational and national
institutions. The most critical resource for the Hong Kong government in the colonial period was
having a strong, cohesive relationship with local elite supporters. The support of the Chinese
merchant class in the 19th century helped ensure the colonial government’s autonomy from the
British government and subnational challengers. During the 1925 anti-imperial strike and boycott,
the Chinese merchant elite were invaluable at marshalling public support for the colonial
government and bargaining with Chinese authorities. When the colonial government’s coalition
weakened during the 1950s and 1960s, and allies defected to support the Chinese government’s
objectives during the Handover transition from 1984-1997, they were more likely to have to make
concessions to grassroots forces and experience periods of decreased autonomy from subnational
institutions.
Likewise, grassroots forces were more powerful when they had access to international
allies and could maintain internal cohesion. While most of the prominent grassroots movements
were anti-imperialist in nature, Hong Kong grassroots forces were able to receive critical help from
Chinese officials, including the CCP and the KMT. When these organizations were invested in
Hong Kong grassroots movements, they were able to exert more pressure on the local government.
Grassroots forces experienced higher levels of unity prior to the 1925 strike and the 1967-1968
riots, allowing them to exert far more pressure than they were able to in the 19th century.
The historical comparison also illustrates the development of the four factors that
contributed to shifts in the distribution of resources between the colonial government and
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grassroots challengers in post-colonial Hong Kong: 1) the local government’s reliance on the
central government; 2) grassroots cultivation of international linkages; 3) the domestic interests of
foreign powers; and 4) the government’s use of cooptation and repression. The comparison also
elucidates how their importance was magnified over time. The colonial government was not reliant
on the British parent state once it was able to amass revenue from increasingly wealthy Chinese
merchants in the territory during the 19th century. The governor also was allowed to arbitrate
among elite disputes by the British government. Once the return to Chinese sovereignty was
secured, however, the colonial government was no longer the final arbiter among Hong Kong elite
factions, these factions now had another power center to play off the colonial administration. This
dynamic led to enervation of the colonial government’s elite coalition and widespread defection
to the Chinese government’s integrationist alliance.
While the Chinese government sought to ensure the allegiance of the local Hong Kong
elite, they also sought to prevent the formation of strong institutional ties that might form a
counterbalance to the Chief Executive in the post-colonial government. They discouraged the
development of parties and created barriers to elite cohesion through functional constituencies.
Moreover, their coalition consisted of parties who had divergent interests across the economic
spectrum.
These barriers between factions would make it difficult for the Hong Kong government
administration to corral integrationist forces without the help of the central government due to the
lack of a unifying institution. From the start of the colonial period, the governor had significant
power over the Legislative Council and the Executive Council through their power of appointment.
There was substantial overlap between the three institutions, since the governor was also the
President of the LegCo through the 1980s. Starting in the Patten Administration not only was the
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Legislative Council President picked from among the legislators themselves, but the governor did
not choose any of the members of the Legislative Council. The disconnect between local
government institutions and the fragmented nature of the Hong Kong elite institutional structure
would lead to reliance on the Chinese government as a third party arbiter.
The historical analysis also provides the basis for the importance of the two factors that
facilitate foreign support for grassroots activities. Grassroots forces were able to gain support from
Western governments following the Tiananmen Square demonstrations by reaching out to the
Chinese diaspora and Western government officials. Many grassroots movements prior to this
period were anti-imperialist, limiting the utility of international linkages outside of Chinese
organizations.
There is also clear precedent for the factor contributing to international support for
grassroots forces, variation in the domestic interests of foreign officials. The CCP and ROC did
not support the union work of grassroots forces sponsored by the other party against the colonial
government. Moreover, the Chinese government stopped supporting leftist forces during the 1968
riots because of concerns for the Chinese domestic economy. This behavior was echoed by
Western governments, who began to support pro-democracy forces in Hong Kong amid concerns
of mass immigration to Western countries.
Finally, the colonial governments use of cooptation and control played a large role in
managing grassroots challenges. The colonial government was able to coopt grassroots forces
through its alliance with the Chinese merchant class in the 19th century. Chinese merchants ran
philanthropic organizations that provided social welfare goods to the population. When the CCP
offered social goods and services to grassroots forces in the 1950s and 1960s, the power of
cooptation diminished, creating a higher degree of unity and strengthening organizations like the
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FTU. The government was forced to directly expand its cooptation efforts through the civil service
and the Heung Yee Kuk.
Grassroots forces increased their solidarity after the colonial administration’s use of force
on certain occasions. The banishment of anti-imperialist activists in the 1900s and the initial
violence toward leftist grassroots organizations in 1967 both spurred higher levels of mobilization.
The colonial government was only able to employ force successfully in the 1968 riots to dispel
actors linked to the CCP after the protesters became increasingly violent themselves, planting
bombs around the city. The escalation of violence among the protesters led to a decline in cohesion
among grassroots forces.
The PRC government decided to limit cooptation of pro-democracy grassroots forces
because of their involvement in the Tiananmen protests. While no repression was used directly
against Hong Kong protesters, the violence in Tiananmen created the perception of the possibility
of increased coercion in Hong Kong. This combination of declining cooptation and the threat of
coercion created more unity among grassroots forces in 1989 and 1990, leading them to form the
United Democrats and to amplify their efforts abroad.
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Chapter 3
Grassroots Failure in the Right to Abode Movement
What factors strengthen or weaken the perspective positions of grassroots movements visà-vis a local government in contesting the level of autonomy from central government institutions?
Within days of the Handover from British sovereignty, grassroots forces and the local Chief
Executive (CE) became embroiled in a dispute over Hong Kong’s autonomy from the People’s
Republic of China’s (PRC) central government institutions in the “Right of Abode” Movement.
The movement took place over a period of two years, from July of 1997 through July of 1999.
Over the course of the Right of Abode case, the local government weakened autonomy from central
government institutions by tying decisions about citizenship to PRC institutions and weakening
the authority of the judiciary. In the end, grassroots forces were not successful in curtailing the
CE’s policy, though they were able to achieve minor concessions.
While the Right of Abode Movement ultimately qualifies as a case where grassroots forces
failed to achieve their policy objectives, we can observe variation in their ability to extract
concessions from the CE’s administration at key junctures of the movement. While grassroots
forces failed to influence the Chief Executive’s policies the first period, from July of 1997 through
December of 1998, they did have some success in early 1999. This period of victory allowed some
concessions, though overall, grassroots forces were unable to stop the Chief Executive’s policies
in the final phase of the movement only a few months later, in May and June of 1999.
Changes in grassroots failure or success in obtaining concessions correspond to
fluctuations in key resources available to both the grassroots coalition and the Chief Executive’s
coalition. For most of the Right of Abode Movement, grassroots forces struggled to elicit
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statements of support from Western officials and maintain unity within their coalition. The Chief
Executive was able to preserve cohesion in his coalition despite differing interests among elite
factions, helping him ward off grassroots challenges. Only in the second stage of the movement,
in the early months of 1999, was the situation reversed. During this period, grassroots forces’
position was stronger; they had the backing of Western government officials and were able to act
cohesively against the Chief Executive. Correspondingly, the Chief Executives’ coalition failed to
rally around a common strategy with which to engage grassroots forces, leading ultimately to the
administration making concessions.
Specific factors helped ensure the presence or absence of resources that empowered either
grassroots forces or the Chief Executive. Grassroots forces were only able to garner support from
Western government officials when they cultivated linkages with those authorities and when it was
in the domestic interest of Western countries to pressure the Hong Kong Chief Executive. The
unity among grassroots forces depended both on electoral incentives and whether the Chief
Executive’s administration could coopt factions of the grassroots coalition. The cohesion of the
Chief Executive’s coalition was impacted by its reliance on the PRC apparatus to mediate disputes
within its coalition. While the PRC apparatus was able to support the resolution of disputes within
the coalition for much of the movement, strengthening the Chief Executive’s position, there were
instances where dependence on the PRC made it difficult for the CE’s alliance to act cohesively.
The chapter first describes the positions of both the grassroots forces and the Chief
Executive at the time of the Handover in 1997. I then explore the policy context of the Right of
Abode Movement, elucidating why Chief Executive wanted to change the level of autonomy over
citizenship policy. The majority of the chapter presents the case study, describing changes in the
Chief Executive’s response to grassroots forces’ efforts at three points in the movement. Within
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each stage, I highlight the role of key resources in changing the relative strength of grassroots
forces vis-à-vis the CE. I also analyze the factors that contribute to the presence or absence of those
resources. The final section compares whether alternative factors contribute to explaining the
changes in the Chief Executive’s behavior during the Right of Abode Movement in order to assess
the strength of the argument presented in this chapter.

The 1997 Context
In the first year after the Handover, autonomy from central government institutions was
ambiguous. The PRC government leadership had decided to limit the policy independence of
legislative institutions. At the same time, the Chief Executive was granted a high degree of policy
independence. The temporary limitations placed on the autonomy of the legislature also bolstered
the position of the Chief Executive in contending with grassroots forces.
The autonomy of the Hong Kong Legislative Council from central government institutions
was weakened for the first year of post-colonial rule because of the tensions between China and
Britain over Governor Patten’s electoral reforms. The PRC government leadership had decided to
not let the 1995 Legislative Council continue operating through the transition, instead instituting
a temporary Provisional Legislative Council that would operate for nearly a year after the
Handover to Chinese sovereignty.37 Members of the Provisional Legislative Council were chosen
by a 400-person electoral college that was heavily influenced by PRC authorities.38
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See chapter 2, pages 100-102 for why Patten’s electoral reforms led the PRC government to institute a Provisional
Legislative Council after the 1997 Handover.
38
The majority of the Selection Committee for both the Chief Executive and the Provisional Legislative Council,
300 out of the 400 members, were chosen by the Preparatory Committee. While the Selection Committee was
composed entirely of Hong Kong residents, the Preparatory Committee was composed of 96 Hong Kong residents
and 56 Mainland Chinese residents. All members of the Preparatory Committee were appointed by the Chinese
government’s central leadership and the chairman of the committee was a Chinese official.
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While the legislature’s autonomy was diminished, the executive branch of the Hong Kong
government was able to operate with a relatively high degree of autonomy from the central
government. Chinese authorities granted the Chief Executive a great deal of latitude in
implementing “one country two systems.” Multiple interviewees all expressed that they felt the
central government respected Hong Kong’s autonomy and trusted the CE in the management of
internal affairs during this period. 39 Cheung (2007) and So (2011) also argue that Beijing had a
more hands-off policy toward Hong Kong during the first years of post-colonial rule, despite the
instillation of the Provisional Council.
In the first year after the Handover, grassroots forces had less capacity to pressure the Chief
Executive through representative institutions than during the early 1990s colonial period. The
implementation of the Provisional Legislative Council meant that many pro-democratic
politicians, who had taken part in the 1989 Tiananmen protests in Hong Kong and had been elected
to the 1995 legislature, lost their seats. They could not run for office again until May of 1998.
Overall, prior to the Right of Abode Movement, the Chief Executive was positioned to
pursue a policy agenda without interference from the PRC leadership or grassroots forces. The
PRC leadership was inclined to delegate significant authority to the CE. Grassroots forces lacked
their previous hold on representative institutions, limiting their ability to influence the CE’s
policies.

The Case: The Right of Abode Movement
The Right of Abode Movement is one of the first cases where the Hong Kong Chief
Executive and grassroots forces clashed over the former’s attempt to embark on an integrationist
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policy vis-à-vis Mainland China. The policy issue at stake was a constitutional question regarding
which governmental entity had the ability to define who a permanent resident would be (who
would have the “right of abode”) in post-colonial Hong Kong. The first Chief Executive, Tung
Chee Hwa, advocated that Mainland PRC authorities had the right to decide which Chinese citizens
were eligible for permanent residency in Hong Kong. As the Tung administration began creating
its policy, a constitutional struggle ensued as grassroots organizations mobilized to reject what
they interpreted as a violation of the autonomy of Hong Kong from central government institutions.
Within the three stages of the Right of Abode Movement, grassroots forces often failed to
influence the Tung administration. Table 3.1 demonstrates the changes in the relevant resources
available to both grassroots forces and the Chief Executive. Grassroots forces were unable to
maintain consistent support from Western government officials and unity within their coalition,
while the Chief Executive’s integrationist coalition maintained its cohesion despite internal
challenges. Grassroots forces were unable to garner international backing because of insufficient
connections to Western officials and changes in the domestic interests of Western countries.
Electoral competition and the Tung administration’s use of cooptation strategies often impeded
cohesion within the grassroots coalition.
However, as Table 3.1 showcases, there was a brief period where grassroots forces were
able to elicit Western support and maintain internal unity. Within this short window, Western
officials viewed pressure on the CE as being in their domestic interests and the government’s
cooptation strategies were not as relevant. Their bolstered resources allowed them to constrain the
Tung administration’s approach temporarily. Ultimately, however, the Tung administration’s
ability to appeal to the PRC authorities and maintain the integrationist coalition helped them
counter grassroots’ efforts.
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Table 3.1: Variation in Grassroots’ and the Chief Executive’s Resources
During the Three Stages of the Right of Abode Movement
Stage of Right
of Abode
Movement

Support from
Western
Government
Officials

Unity
Within
Grassroots
Coalition

Unity
Within
CE’s
Coalition

Grassroots’
Success or
Failure in
Affecting CE
Behavior

Low

Moderate

High

Failure

High

High

Low

Success

Low

Moderate

Moderate

Failure

Stage 1: July
1997-December
1998

Stage 2: January
1999- March 1999

Stage 3: May
1999-July 1999

The Policy Issue
The restoration of Chinese jurisdiction over Hong Kong changed the nature and
requirements of citizenship in the region, potentially expanding residency to hundreds of thousands
living in the Mainland. Under Basic Law Article 24, not only could Chinese citizens who had
resided in Hong Kong for a continuous period of seven years be Hong Kong residents, but their
children would be permanent residents as well, even if they were not born in the territory. This
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development marked a departure from the British Nationality Act of 1981, where individuals were
only able to claim British Dependent Territories Citizen Status if they were both born in the
territory and had a parent who was settled in there as well (Kam-Yee and Kim-Ming 2006).40
The reason why the new mini-constitution expanded residency so drastically was that many
Hong Kong residents, particularly men, had spouses and families that lived across the border in
Mainland China.41 Under colonial rule, the British and the Chinese government had negotiated the
number of “one-way” permits, which presented Chinese people an opportunity to live and work in
Hong Kong; “two-way permits,” where the individual had to return to Mainland China following
the end of the visa period; and tourist visas. By the end of 1993, up to 75 one-way permits were
granted a day, with 10 of those permits going to the spouses of Hong Kong residents, and fifteen
to their children (SCMP October 14th 1993).
The Hong Kong colonial government feared that there would be a deluge of individuals
arriving in the territory following the 1997 Handover. The restrictions on entry would fall away
immediately and progeny of Hong Kong residents would automatically become permanent
residents themselves. In 1993, they projected the total number to be between 70,000 to 100,000,
(SCMP December 26th 1993). The Hong Kong colonial government under the Patten
administration tried to address a massive influx of new residents by negotiating with the PRC
government to 1) raise the number of one-way permits; 2) to increase the portion of visas for
spouses and children of Hong Kong permanent residents; and 3) to create consistent definitions
around who would obtain the right of abode in 1997.

40

Hong Kong Chinese residents could only obtain British Dependent Territories Citizen status at the time following
the Joint Declaration in 1984, though in 1985 the British created British Overseas Citizenship, which entitled the
individual to consular protection but not the right of abode (White 1987).
41
Hong Kong encouraged labor migration through the General Labour Importation Scheme from 1989 through
1995, and the Special Labour Importation Scheme in 1990 to finish the airport (Kam-Yee and Kim-Ming 2006).
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Negotiations stalled, however, as the relationship between the PRC government and the
Patten administration soured over the electoral reforms of the early 1990s.42 In 1994, the Hong
Kong and Macau Affairs Office stated that there was no possibility of the British and the Chinese
agreeing on the definition of permanent residents before the Handover. The issue would be handled
by the Provisional Legislative Council following the transition (SCMP December 11th, 1994).
The Preparatory Committee of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
National People’s Congress (NPC), comprised of both Hong Kong and PRC officials, made
decisions regarding what should be the basis for Hong Kong permanent residency under the Basic
Law. The Preparatory Committee restricted residency to children whose parents were permanent
residents at the time of the child’s birth. The committee explicitly excluded “illegal immigrants,
overstayers, or people residing temporarily in Hong Kong.”43 The co-convener of the Preliminary
Work Committee also announced that Hong Kong would follow China’s policy of only allowing
legitimate children into Hong Kong as well (SCMP September 4, 1994).
These decisions could not be implemented until after the Handover. The colonial governor
insisted that the British-led Legislative Council was the primary legislative body until July 1st. At
the time of the Handover, only the colonial regulations and the Basic Law were in effect, leaving
ambiguity about who could be a citizen.
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See chapter 2 pages 115 for more details regarding the tensions between the British and the Chinese in the early
1990s.

43

National People’s Congress, Preparatory Committee for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, “The
Opinions of the Preparatory Committee for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the National People's
Congress on the Implementation of Article 24(2) of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
of the People's Republic of China,” Fourth Plenary Meeting, Adopted April 10th, 1996,”
https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr98-99/english/hc/papers/roa-e.pdf
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Grassroots activists and families of right of abode seekers immediately used this
opportunity to press their claims. Legal groups such as the Bar Association, saw this situation as a
primary opportunity to ensure the judicial autonomy of the courts. They wanted the Court of Final
Appeal (the CFA) to interpret the Basic Law based on the original wording and intent, rather than
that of the Preparatory Work Committee.44

Stage 1: Government and Grassroots Interactions, 1997-1998
Initially, the Tung administration sought to empower PRC officials to control
determination of citizenship within the region by tying permanent residency status for people born
in the Mainland to the Chinese one-way permit system. During this stage, the Tung administration
implemented the Amendment to the Immigration Ordinance and sought to defend the changes in
the legislation in court. In their legal arguments, the Tung administration argued that Article 22
and Article 24 of the Basic Law should be interpreted together, thereby giving PRC authorities
more control over the immigration apparatus. Grassroots forces, on the other hand, sought to
invalidate the changes to the Immigration Ordinance through both court challenges and mass sitins. They argued that Article 24 of the Basic Law should be interpreted literally, thereby giving
the Hong Kong local authorities the right to determine citizenship. Grassroots forces failed to stop
the Chief Executive from implementing this policy in the 1997-1998 period.
The Local Government’s Implementation of Autonomy in Response to Grassroots Forces
During the initial phase of the Right of Abode Movement, grassroots forces were able to
extract few concessions from the Tung administration. The administration passed legislation that
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empowered PRC officials to determine which Mainland Chinese citizens were eligible for Hong
Kong permanent residency. The CE did delay the repatriation of some right of abode claimants,
allowing them to fight for residency in the courts. Ultimately, however, despite grassroots activism
and court filings, the CE continued to pursue a policy that gave further control to PRC officials
over access to citizenship in the region.
The Tung administration asked the Provisional Legislative Council to pass legislation
regarding immigration on July 9th of 1997. The Amendment of the Immigration Ordinance (No.
5) contained provisions that limited the ability of Mainland children of permanent residents to
reside in Hong Kong, primarily by tying their access to do so to the PRC’s Public Security
apparatus. Mainland children had to obtain a valid one-way permit from the PRC authorities. They
then had to apply for the certificate of entitlement from the Hong Kong government while in the
Mainland in order to be lawfully permitted into Hong Kong.45 The bill would also be retro-active,
applicable from July 1st, 1997 (SCMP July 9th 1997)
The Tung administration did decide, however, to suspend repatriation for children who had
at least one Hong Kong permanent resident parent in response to grassroots protests (SCMP July
4th 1997). Initially, the Tung administration had planned on immediately deporting over 1000
children who were in Hong Kong at the time of the Handover. They decided to allow the families
to stay while challenging the right of abode legislation in the courts.
At the same time, the Chief Executive’s administration did not change their overall policy
implementation or their insistence that PRC officials should have significant control over
determining eligibility for Hong Kong residency among Mainland citizens. The administration
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Illegitimate children and those whose parents gained residency after their birth were not qualified to become
permanent residents at all.
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focused on institutionalizing the certificates of entitlement, granting them to 20,000 Mainlandborn children. Within the first six months of the post-colonial government, 10,000 children had
been reunited with their Hong Kong relatives (SCMP January 22nd, 1998). In court, attorneys for
the Tung administration also insisted in 1997 and 1998 that Article 24 needed to be considered in
conjunction with Article 22 of the Basic Law, which states that
for entry into the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, people from other parts of
China must apply for approval. Among them, the number of persons who enter the Region
for the purpose of settlement shall be determined by the competent authorities of the
Central People’s Government after consulting the government of the region.
The government of Hong Kong was in the position of “respecting and acknowledging the laws of
the sovereign” (SCMP, September 23rd 1997).
Overall, grassroots forces were not able to achieve many concessions from the Chief
Executive during this period. The Tung administration introduced and implemented legislation
that gave the PRC considerable authority over determining when and how Mainland-born children
of Hong Kong residents could live in the HKSAR. They did allow over a thousand children to stay
in the region and pursue their court cases against the right of abode legislation. Yet the Chief
Executive did not change their overall policy nor their stance on giving over authority to PRC
officials.

Grassroots and the Chief Executive’s Resources During the First Stage
Grassroots forces had trouble obtaining support from foreign government officials and
maintaining unity within their coalition, while the integrationist coalition remained cohesive. The
dearth of international support for grassroots forces can be attributed to foreign officials’
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perception they did not have a direct stake in the Right of Abode issue. Grassroots forces faced
trouble collaborating because of both electoral incentives and the Tung administration’s ability to
coopt some of the families claiming the right of abode for their children. While factionalism also
existed in integrationist circles, the Chief Executive was able to rely on PRC officials to preserve
the coalition.
Grassroots’ Level: Limited Western Support
During the initial stage of the Right of Abode Movement, grassroots forces were not able
to amass significant international pressure on the Hong Kong government over the right of abode
policy. While international organizations spoke out against the changes to the Immigration
Ordinance, Western foreign government officials did not publicly address the issue in meetings
with Tung Chee Hwa. They instead focused on pressuring the CE on other policy areas, such as
democratic elections.
Grassroots forces did receive some international support from foreign non-governmental
organizations and international organizations, who attempted to put pressure on the Tung
administration over the right of abode policy. The Human Rights Commission submitted a onehundred-page document to the United Nations detailing how instances like the right of abode
policy demonstrated the CE’s lack of commitment to the International Convention of Civil and
Political Rights (the ICCPR) (SCMP February 27th, 1998). In May of 1998, the Washington D.C.based National Democratic Institute lambasted the Hong Kong government as demonstrating “’a
troubling lack of commitment’ to the rule of law despite the Mainland's hands-off approach”
(SCMP May 8th, 1998).
Statements by these organizations did not translate into Western government officials
putting direct pressure on the Hong Kong government. Western officials prioritized the upcoming
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Legislative Council elections instead. For instance, when Tung Chee Hwa visited the United States
for the first time as Chief Executive in September of 1997, Senator Kerry did not bring up the
Right of Abode Movement. Rather, he assured reporters that he and the other Senators wanted to
ensure that the electoral process moves “as rapidly as possible towards universal suffrage, and that
the constituencies will be adequately represented with a broad enough base of electoral support to
give value to the democratic process.”46
The Role of International Linkages and the Western Officials’ Domestic Interests
Grassroots efforts to cultivate linkages to Western government officials declined after the
Handover, and they did not link the right of abode issue to Western interests. Despite efforts to
connect with international actors, grassroots forces did not make trips to meet with Western leaders
over the right of abode conflict. Grassroots forces initially framed the Right of Abode Movement
as an internal policy struggle, rather than suggesting there were consequences for foreigners
operating in the region. The lack of alignment between Western officials and grassroots forces'
interests and goals ultimately limited the strength of partnerships with international allies during
this stage of the Right of Abode Movement.
In the run up to the Handover to Chinese sovereignty, there were many attempts to cultivate
relationships with international actors and foreign governments. Establishing linkage often meant
not only directing claims at foreign officials, but also making direct contact with them through
trips to Western countries. Martin Lee of the Democratic Party, for example, had employed an
American who would eventually become the Director of Global Initiatives for Human Rights
Watch in New York City. This American also had extensive connections to Republican circles in
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The Government of the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong, “Chief Executive’s Remarks after Meeting
Senate Members,”September 10th, 1997, https://www.info.gov.hk/isd/news/sep97/910-rem.htm

120

Washington D.C.47 They remained in close contact since the 1980s. His networking with human
rights organizations helped him make several trips to the United States and Britain prior to the
Handover to solidify friendly ties with government officials. In April of 1997, just three months
prior to the Handover, Lee met with President Bill Clinton, Vice President Al Gore, and the
Secretary of State (Erlanger 1997). 48
One of the first actions grassroots organizations specifically took regarding the Right of
Abode challenge was to reach out to their international networks, but they were unable to make
visits to Western countries to meet with foreign officials during this time period. The Society for
Community Organization, religious groups, and human rights associations appealed to over 500
religious and human rights associations overseas for assistance (SCMP July 26th, 1997). Local
chapters of international organizations sought to persuade their larger bodies of the serious
repercussions for Hong Kong’s autonomy from central government institutions and the resultant
consequences for human rights. For instance, local members of Justice, the International
Commission of Jurists, which had observer status at the United Nations, spoke out against the
legislation (SCMP July 9th, 1997). Despite these efforts to connect with international actors, the
inability to travel to meet with foreign officials limited their capacity to strengthen international
linkages.
Grassroots actors also reflected in interviews that foreign governments only acted on their
behalf if it was in their interests.49 One organizer explained the way grassroots forces thought about
trying to elicit foreign support for protecting the local government’s autonomy as follows: “What
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Lee did not have a formal meeting with Bill Clinton, rather, the President “dropped by” for 25 minutes out of the
45 minutes of the Vice President’s scheduled meeting with the Hong Kong legislator (Erlanger 1997).
49
Interviews 41, 64, 73
48
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you try to do is to tell them where their interest lies, it is for them to make their decision at the end
of the day.”50
Archives from statements made by both domestic grassroots forces and international nongovernmental organizations indicate that the issue was framed as a domestic struggle rather than
having international ramifications for other countries in 1997 and 1998. For instance, Justice
declared “The Basic Law is our guarantee of fundamental rights and freedoms. These rights are
not subject to the demands of expediency; they cannot be given and removed at will” (SCMP .
The Society for Community Organization framed the CE’s actions in a similar manner, “These
children are entitled to live in Hong Kong. I'm shocked to find I'm living in a society where the
Government can turn black into white within a week” (SCMP July 11th 1997). In both quotes
organizations appealing to international bodies framed the issue as being one about preserving the
rights of Hong Kong residents.
Overall grassroots forces were unsuccessful at garnering support from Western officials
because of insufficient linkage to Western leaders and the fact that the legislation was viewed as
predominantly affecting Hong Kong residents. While grassroots forces took steps to reach out to
international actors, they were unable to take the same steps they had in the pre-Handover period
and make trips to Western countries. Domestic and international organizations also framed the
issue as affecting the rights of Hong Kong residents, rather than the interests of Western countries.
Grassroots Level: Moderate Internal Cohesion
Grassroots forces were unable to maintain high degrees of unity throughout 1997 and 1998,
limiting their ability to influence the Chief Executive’s policies. At the beginning of the movement,
a broad coalition was able to launch a series of actions to try and pressure the Tung administration.
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Gradually, however, pro-democratic parties stopped vocally supporting families affected by the
legislation. Friction among affected families also hindered the effectiveness of grassroots’ court
strategies aimed at countering the Tung administration’s policies.
During the initiation of the Right of Abode Movement in July of 1997, there was solidarity
among grassroots forces directly associated with the right of abode claimants and the prodemocratic, opposition political parties that made up the Pan-Democratic Camp. The grassroots
forces associated with the families of right of abode claimants that initially spearheaded the
movement were parent associations of Mainland children that would be eligible for citizenship; an
organization that worked specifically with Mainland immigrants, the Society for Community
Organization; lawyers’ organizations, such as the Hong Kong Bar Association; and religious
groups, such as the Catholic Church. These forces launched a series of sit-ins and court cases
immediately following the Handover in July of 1997 (SCMP July 4th 1997). The Pan-Democratic
Camp supported these organizations publicly at first. For instance, in October of 1997, a member
of the Citizens Party spoke out in an op-ed in the South China Morning Post against the Tung
administration and the Provisional Legislative Council, emphasizing the retrospective aspect of
the law’s implementation, “Not only did the immigration law passed by the provisional legislature
on July 10th of this year strip the children in this case of their right of abode that had been vested
under the Basic Law on July 1st, but it made them criminals” (SCMP October 20th 1997).
Yet, by early 1998, unity between the Pan-Democratic Camp parties and the grassroots
forces associated with right of abode claimants waned. Instead of making arguments in favor of
allowing all Mainland children with a Hong Kong parent to be permanent residents, they contended
that the more authoritarian nature of the Hong Kong regime led to higher levels of Mainland
immigration. For instance, one Democratic Party member remarked that the social consequences
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of the right of abode formulation was "entirely a result of the exclusion of Hong Kong officials
from the Basic Law's drafting process" (SCMP April 3rd, 1998). He essentially argued that if the
process had been more democratic, they could have excluded Mainland immigrants, such as the
children in question, in the first place.
Moreover, there was some discord even among right of abode claimants themselves. For
instance, families of four of right of abode claimants dropped their cases against the Hong Kong
government in November of 1997, despite the wishes of grassroots organizations like the Society
for Community Organization. The failure of these cases alleviated some of the pressure on the
Hong Kong government. Those cases would have been easier to win than some of the other suits,
because they filed their claims for residency before Tung’s policy was implemented on July 10th,
1997 (SCMP November 19th, 1997). It was assumed that the court would strike down the
retroactive portion of the Tung administration’s policy.
While grassroots forces were initially unified in fighting the CE’s policy on the right of
abode, fissures started appearing in the coalition within months of the movement’s initiation. PanDemocratic Camp political parties stopped speaking out against the policy itself. Even right of
abode claimants experienced conflict, as a few key families dropped lawsuits that would have
helped the larger population in the movement.
The Impact of Electoral Incentives and Cooptation
Cohesion among grassroots forces waned because of the electoral structure for Legislative
Council seats and the Tung administration’s ability to coopt right of abode claimants. A lot of
grassroots organizations had overlapping networks and ties that should have facilitated intracoalition unity, but the Pan-Democratic Camp parties had to compete with each other for seats in
the legislature. The need to amass votes for the 1998 election and high degrees of anti-Mainland

124

sentiment caused a lot of politicians to distance themselves from right of abode claimants. At the
same time, the Tung administration could choose which families to advance or drop repatriation
claims against, allowing them to create divisions among the participants in the court cases
organized by grassroots forces.
Within Hong Kong, there were high levels of inter-personal ties between opposition prodemocracy political parties and other grassroots organizations in the late 1990s, which could have
facilitated unity. There was even overlapping leadership between political parties and other
grassroots organizations. Political party leaders were also often close confidants and had longstanding relationships with the heads of professional organizations, human rights groups, and
student organizations, in part due to the fact that they had started out as activists themselves.51 For
instance, Szeto Wah, a leader of the Democratic Party in the 1990s, was also a founding member
of the Professional Teachers’ Union, and the leader of the Hong Kong Alliance for Patriotic
Democratic Movements in China.
Yet despite overlapping membership and close personal connections, electoral incentives
caused conflicts of interest within the grassroots’ coalition. Many activist collectives decided to
form political parties because of the unique opportunities for monetary and organizational
resources elected offices provided. Members of the Pan-Democratic Camp political parties could
run for elections for both the Legislative Council (LegCo) and the District Council. In 1998, the
salary for a member of the Legislative Council was around 97,038 USD a year and they could hire
fellow activists as staff for their office. LegCo representatives also had access to 157,038 USD
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Many key members of the Democratic Party had been activists in the 1980s and instrumental in the 1989
Tiananmen Square protests. Moreover, many political parties recruit from student organizations such as the Hong
Kong Federation of Students
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for “office operation” and 22,418.6 USD for “entertainment and travel expenses.”5253 Political
parties often used these resources in movement activities against the Tung administration, printing
flyers, banners, and other materials for marches or rallies.
These resources also allowed activists to continue political challenges to the Tung
administration and the PRC leadership full-time. There were few unencumbered monetary
resources available to grassroots forces within Hong Kong, leading other grassroots organizations
to be more conscribed in their speech toward the Chief Executive than political parties in the late
1990s. Many grassroots religious and migrant organizations had access to government committee
positions and funding for social service projects that limited the kinds of critiques they were willing
to make against the Hong Kong government (Chan 2005).54 Moreover, professional associations,
such as unions and the Bar Association, depended on access to government officials for their
livelihood because they were in more direct contact with government agencies (Ma 2007).
Yet obtaining elected office was highly competitive. There were very few seats in the
Legislative Council that the Pan-Democratic Camp political parties could acquire. There were only
twenty geographical constituency seats in 1998, with the other forty comprised of functional
constituency seats and seats chosen by the Election Committee. The latter two types of legislative
seats were difficult for the Pan-Democratic Camp to obtain because they were chosen mainly by
affiliates of the integrationist coalition (Baum 2001). Only a few functional constituency seats,
such as those elected by medical and legal professionals, were competitive. 55 Thus, PanDemocratic political parties were never able to control more than a third of the LegCo seats.56
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The Administrative Wing of the Chief Secretary for Administration’s Office, “Renumeration Package for
Members of the HKSAR Legislative Council”, Legislative Council Paper No. AS 147/99-00 (6), February 2000,
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For example, religious organizations ran many of primary and secondary schools in Hong Kong
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For more information about the construction of the functional constituencies, see chapter 2 pages # through #
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The Pan-Democratic Camp won 20 out of 60 seats in 1998 and 21 out of 60 in 2000.
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Additionally, the proportional representation system for the five geographic constituencies
meant that the Pan-Democratic Camp was often competing directly against other coalition
members in party lists for seats in LegCo (Baum 2001). Often only one or two people from each
party list could get elected in each of the five districts. Competition, as opposed to collaboration,
between political parties was also incentivized because they could not share either revenue from
positions in LegCo nor from fundraising for elections.57 Overall, the high level of competition for
the small number of available seats could affect political parties’ ability to coordinate with other
grassroots organizations.
Prejudice against Mainland immigrants was high enough that political parties within the
Pan-Democratic Camp began to fear losing the Legislative Council elections of 1998 if they
focused on supporting right of abode claimants. Discrimination against Mainland immigrants
dated back to the 1980s; many middle class Hong Kongers saw Chinese immigrants as poor, illmannered, and less educated (So 2011). Even after the Handover, Mainland immigrants were still
regarded as feeding off of, rather than contributing to, Hong Kong society. For instance, in spring
of 1998, a group of high schoolers sent this letter to the South China Morning Post:
We are shocked by the constant demands from some shameless immigrants. These
immigrants come to Hong Kong and contribute nothing, yet they take our tax
money…They are parasites inflicting damage on our society (SCMP November 29th
1998).

An interviewee with the Hong Kong Justice and Peace Commission reported that while
members of the Pan-Democratic Camp party, the Democratic Party, had initially supported right
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of abode claimants and privately agreed with her work on their behalf, they felt they could not win
the elections and vigorously support their cause.58 An employee with the Society for Community
Organization also complained that legislators distanced themselves from Mainland immigrants as
elections neared, "Mainland immigrants are like poison for them in elections. Who's going to risk
losing… votes by standing on their side?" (SCMP November 29th 1998).
Additionally, the Hong Kong government was able to coopt right of abode claimants,
which weakened the cohesion among participants in legal actions. While the Tung administration
had asserted that PRC officials should have control over which Mainland residents come to Hong
Kong to stay as a permanent resident, the administration had authority over repatriations. The four
right of abode families that dropped their suit in November of 1997 did so because the Immigration
Department offered to stop the repatriation proceedings. The children in question would be
allowed to stay indefinitely (SCMP November 19th 1997).
Unity among grassroots forces during the 1997-1998 period of the Right of Abode
Movement was inhibited by electoral incentives and the Hong Kong government’s cooptation
strategies. The high level of competition between political parties for elected office limited their
ability to act cohesively with other grassroots institutions. Political parties had to appeal to the
majority of voters and anti-Mainlander sentiment was prevalent. Despite the common interest in
defeating the Tung administration’s changes to immigration policy, the families of Mainland-born
children were divided through cooptation. The Tung administration chose to not pursue
repatriation in certain cases to weaken the ability of grassroots forces to win through the courts.
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The Elite Level: Elite Cohesion in the Integrationist Camp
The CE was able to rely on his integrationist coalition to fast-track the changes to the
Immigration Ordinance with few problems. The Provisional Legislative Council acquiesced to the
Tung administration’s request to pass the bill in one sitting. Legislators overwhelmingly approved
the bill after just seven hours of debate (SCMP July 10th 1997).
There were few public objections to the bill from integrationist legislators. Some
independent and Liberal Party legislators objected to the fact that the bill would apply
retroactively, dating back to July 1st. One Liberal Party member stated that “The Government had
not played a fair game in making the bill retrospective…There must be a piece of law already in
existence before you can abide by it” (SCMP July 10th, 1997b). The Liberal Party continued to
decry this aspect of the bill as the legislation made its way through the court system. Overall,
however, integrationist politicians did not object to permanent residency being tied to obtaining a
certificate of entitlement and the PRC’s daily one-way permit quota. The integrationist faction
remained largely supportive of the Tung administration’s policy throughout 1997 and 1998.
The cohesion within the CE’s policy circles made it more difficult for grassroots forces to
fend off changes to the Immigration Ordinance that empowered PRC officials. Integrationist
LegCo representatives overwhelmingly agreed to the bill and allowed it to be rushed through the
legislature. While a few factions voiced concerns about the retrospective nature of the legislation,
none decried the overall policy shift granting more control to PRC authorities.
The Role of China as an Arbiter
Both the Chief Executive and the rest of the integrationist coalition were able to navigate
tensions through appeals to PRC authorities. The ability of the PRC officials to act as an arbiter
between factions of the integrationist camp helped maintain cohesion during the Right of Abode
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Movement in 1997 and 1998. Three overarching factors contributed to PRC authorities becoming
the main arbiters in disputes within the Hong Kong integrationist coalition during this period, 1)
the lack of a primary unitary institution to resolve intra-elite disputes; 2) the contradictory interests
within the coalitions; and 3) the fact that many members had closer ties to the PRC government
than to other members of the integrationist coalition.
There was no single unifying institution to tie integrationist elite factions together within
Hong Kong. The political structure of the region did not allow for a ruling party that could mediate
elite interests (Ma 2007; Lau and Kuan 2002). Under the Chief Executive Election Ordinance, the
CE is not allowed to be a member of a political party.59 Yet at the same time, the local Chinese
Communist Party was not allowed to operate openly in Hong Kong either, meaning that the central
government’s unifying institution could also not be used forthrightly to navigate intra-elite
tensions. Under the Sino-British Joint Declaration, Hong Kong was to keep its system of
government for 50 years, and therefore, could not operate under communist rule. While certain
key figures in government and the legislature were rumored to be party members, they were not
allowed to publicly state their membership.
In addition to lacking a ruling party, the Chief Executive’s cabinet institution, the Executive
Council (ExCo), could not act as a full coordinating body at the time of the Handover.60 The
Executive Council evaluated policy and took collective responsibility for selling that policy to the
public. Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa was able to place many of his supporters on the first
Executive Council, but political parties, the dominant groups in the legislature, did not have
representation within it. Moreover, the Executive Council rarely directly lobbied the Legislative
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Council regarding policy-making. This arrangement created further information-sharing and
coordination problems within the integrationist coalition.
There were also contradictory interests within the integrationist camp. For instance,
multiple integrationist parties were forced to compete for votes to obtain seats in the Legislative
Council, exacerbating divergent interests within the coalition over time. Following the Handover,
all of the integrationist parties were incorporated into the Provisional Legislative Council through
an electoral college process. In 1998, the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong
(the DAB), a leftist party, ran for elections in the more democratically-elected geographic
constituencies, while the Liberal Party and the Hong Kong Progressive Alliance, both pro-business
conservative parties, obtained seats through the election committee or the sector-based functional
constituency seats in the Legislative Council. These functional constituency and election
committee seats were going to be decreased in 2000 and 2004, at which point elected
representatives would make up half of LegCo. This development would mean that the Liberal
Party and the Hong Kong Progressive Alliance would have to compete in genuine elections in the
long run. If all pro-government parties maintained exactly the same platform supporting the
government, they would likely limit their chances at getting elected.
Integrationist forces were also primarily linked through their connections to the Mainland
and the PRC central government authorities rather through local institutions, which also put PRC
officials in a good position to resolve intra-coalition conflicts. In 1997, many members of the
integrationist coalition in Hong Kong were reliant on, or had been appointed by the central
government, including the Chief Executive. Tung Chee Hwa was chosen to be Chief Executive
because the Chinese Communist Party leadership trusted him, given his long-standing connections
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to PRC officials, particularly to President Jiang Zemin’s faction. Tung had very little connection
to Hong Kong’s political apparatus prior to his appointment.61
Even the local business community, which had been a stalwart supporter of the previous
colonial administration, had been co-opted to join the pro-China integrationist camp by the PRC
leadership.. They were incorporated into Hong Kong’s Election Committee, which actually gave
them power over the Chief Executive (Goodstadt 2000; Wong 2012). Prominent business leaders
were also given positions on national government institutions, such as the National People’s
Congress (the NPC) and local advisory boards. 62 While members of the NPC were formally
supposed to convey Hong Kong’s opinion on national legislation to the PRC leadership, in
practice, members of the NPC would threaten to take a political crisis in Hong Kong back to the
NPC Standing Committee to be resolved.
One way PRC leadership managed elite conflict within Hong Kong was through the Xinhua
News Agency, later renamed the Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region. The Xinhua News Agency coordinated a number of societal
associations that acted in tandem with other integrationist coalition forces. These organizations
included women’s organizations, athletic associations, unions, and groups for the elderly (Loh
2010). These groups helped to voice public support for Tung’s policies and rally integrationist
politicians.
PRC authorities could also act as arbiters within the integrationist camp through
“summons.” Interviewees remarked on how members of the government’s coalition could be
summoned, sometimes to dinner locally, other times even to Beijing, for a dressing down of their
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behavior.63 Members of the local government’s integrationist coalition could be called by PRC
officials for not supporting the Chief Executive or another member of the coalition and for failing
to be hard enough on opposition politicians or media figures.64
Throughout 1997 and 1998, the integrationist camp was able to rely on the PRC
leadership’s position as an arbiter to manage conflicts between the integrationist camp. The Chief
Executive and elite factions became dependent on PRC authorities to moderate tensions because
there were no unifying institution such as ruling political party or council that contained the
entirety of the coalition. Moreover, integrationist factions had divergent interests and often had
strong pre-existing relationships with PRC authorities.

Stage 2: Grassroots Forces and the Government Following Court Decision

The Court of Final Appeals (CFA) expanded the policy battle between grassroots forces
and the Tung administration in January of 1999. Not only did they declare that the Tung
administration could not give Mainland authorities more control over determining Hong Kong
citizenship, but they asserted their own autonomy in interpreting the Basic Law from the NPCSC.
The PRC leadership therefore put pressure on the Chief Executive to resolve the CFA’s assertion
regarding their authority over the region.
In contrast to the 1997-1998 period, however, grassroots forces were able keep both the
Tung administration and the PRC leadership from immediately over-riding the decision. Their
achievement in the early months of 1999 was tied to stronger statements from international
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officials and higher levels of intra-coalition unity. The Tung administration was also in a weaker
position to fight off challenges from grassroots forces, as factions of the integrationist coalition
failed to maintain united messaging in responding to the CFA’s decision.

Court Expansion of Autonomy Claims
After a year and a half of litigation in the courts, the CFA not only struck down the Tung
Chee Hwa administration’s changes to the Immigration Ordinance but asserted the power of the
local courts to interpret the Basic Law over the NPCSC. Their ruling expanded the debate about
the parameters of the autonomy of regional institutions from central government authorities. The
CFA found that the amendment to the Immigration Ordinance did not follow the categories
articulated in Article 24 of the Basic Law. Therefore, any person whose parents were Hong Kong
permanent residents were also permanent residents, regardless of when their parent had received
permanent residency, the marital status of the parent, or whether they entered Hong Kong illegally
prior to the Handover. Article 22 of the Basic Law, which granted Mainland authorities the ability
to control immigration into Hong Kong, was not applicable since the applicants were not “people
from other parts of China. They are permanent residents of this part of China.”65
The CFA grounded this decision in their power to interpret the Basic Law under Article
158 of the Basic Law, asserting the prerogative of the local courts in policy areas under Hong
Kong’s autonomy. While the CFA was vested with the power of final adjudication, “the power of
interpretation” was “vested in the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.” Yet
Article 158 could be read as deferring to the Final Court of Appeals in internal matters, “The
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress shall authorize the courts of the Hong

65

Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration. 2 HKCFA 4 (CFA 1999) , 112.

134

Kong Special Administrative Region to interpret on their own, in adjudicating cases, the provisions
of this Law which are within the autonomy of the Region.” The Hong Kong courts only needed to
consult the NPCSC regarding affairs which were under the Central People’s Government’s
jurisdiction, concerning the relationship between the central government and the region.
The Court went one step further, however, asserting that they had the right to examine
whether legislative acts of the National People’s Congress or its Standing Committee were
“consistent with the Basic Law and to declare them to be invalid if found to be inconsistent.”66
The Courts could invalidate central government legislation if it did not conform to the Basic Law.
This assertion gave them the ability to limit the political exercise of the PRC central government
within the region.
The PRC leadership expressed immediate outrage with the Court of Final Appeal’s
judgement, particularly regarding its ability to rectify the interpretation of the NPCSC. Multiple
PRC government agencies accused the CFA of both violating the constitution of the People’s
Republic of China, as well as the Basic Law (SCMP February 14th, 1999). That NPCSC threatened
to implement an interpretation of the Basic Law to overturn the court’s ruling. There was therefore
considerable pressure on the local government to immediately minimize, if not completely reject,
the CFA’s verdict and its implications.

The Chief Executive’s Implementation of Autonomy in Response to Grassroots Forces
During this stage of the Right of Abode Movement, the Chief Executive made concessions
to grassroots forces. The Tung administration did not seek to immediately overturn the ruling and
even took public steps indicating that it planned to implement the CFA’s decision. They only
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sought to correct the aspects of the CFA’s ruling most objectionable to the PRC leadership, the
assertion that the CFA could overrule NPCSC decisions.
Initially, members of the Tung administration indicated that they would likely uphold the
decision, though with some reluctance. A top member of the administration, the Chief Secretary,
set up a special task force to plan for implementing the CFA’s decision (The Government of the
Special Administrative Region 1999). The Secretary for Justice also confirmed the
administration’s plan to implement the decision, declaring “We respect the independence of the
Judiciary. The court ruling is legally valid” (SCMP February 11th, 1999). The Chief Executive
himself was more tepid in his response, remarking "The issue is that the 'one country, two systems'
implementation is an unprecedented historic enterprise and a new situation is bound to arise…I
have every confidence we will find the way forward.”67
After a few weeks, the Tung administration decided not to ask the CFA to reconsider their
verdict. They only asked for a clarification on the section of the decision where the CFA declared
that it could examine whether the NPCSC decisions complied with the Basic Law (SCMP February
27th, 1999).68 In a unanimous statement on February 26th of 1999, the justices wrote that they
accepted the ability of the NPCSC to make interpretations of the Basic Law under Article 158, and
that they would have to follow those interpretations (Chen 1999).
Two days later, the National People’s Congress’ Commission of Legal Affairs announced
that the CFA had taken the “necessary step” and affirmed that the NPCSC was the highest organ
of state power (SCMP February 28th, 1999). The CFA’s verdict stood for the moment, allowing
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the court the power to interpret the Basic Law when it came to areas under Hong Kong’s autonomy,
so long as they did not contradict the NPCSC’s overall authority.

Grassroots and the Chief Executive’s Resources After the CFA Decision
During this period, key factors influenced the resources at both grassroots forces’ and the
Tung administration’s disposal. Foreign government officials were responsive to grassroots’
entreaties because they believed there may be economic consequences from the erosion of the rule
of law in Hong Kong. Without the pressure of upcoming elections, grassroots political parties were
more vocally supportive of the efforts of religious, migrant, and legal groups to uphold the CFA’s
decision. At the same time, the Tung administration’s coalition experienced difficulties
coordinating because of their dependence on the PRC leadership to act as an arbiter. The reliance
on PRC officials and institutions meant there were limited avenues to include political parties in
strategizing a response to the CFA’s verdict.
Grassroots Level: Increased International Support
In contrast to the 1997-1998 period, grassroots forces were empowered by support from
Western government officials during this stage of the movement. Both the American and British
governments made statements defending the CFA within two weeks of the decision. On February
12th, the U.S. Department of State issued a strongly worded statement against the possibility of the
PRC leadership’s interference with the CFA, "Any attempt to undermine the independent authority
of the court would be a matter of concern for the US and many other governments that have
interests in Hong Kong" (SCMP February 12th, 1999). The British consulate stated that the ruling
“was ‘reaffirmation of Hong Kong’s autonomy in judicial matters.’” Any move to “restrict the
powers of the courts would be of grave concern” (SCMP February 10th, 1999).
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Despite initial hostility, the PRC leadership chose not to issue an NPCSC interpretation
over-riding the CFA’s decision. At first, the PRC’s Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman rebuked the
outcries of the British and American governments. They stated that “The ruling by Hong Kong's
Court of Final Appeal on Mainland children and other related issues are truly the internal affairs
of China, which brooks no interference from any other country" (SCMP February 12th, 1999). Yet
the Jiang administration decided to resist solving the issue through PRC institutions at that point
in time.
Changes in Western Government Officials’ Perception of their Interests
Grassroots forces were able to procure more support from Western countries because of
two factors. First, in contrast to the 1997-1998 period, they emphasized the potential impact of
overturning the CFA’s decision on international interests. Domestic organizations within Western
countries also lobbied officials to protect their interests in the region.
Politicians from the Pan-Democratic Camp pushed back against the central government’s
threat to issue an NPCSC interpretation by framing the issue as having international consequences.
They warned that Western countries would not be able to trust the judicial independence of Hong
Kong (SCMP February 8th, 1999b). One Democratic Party legislator retorted "Do we throw the
Court of Final Appeal's reputation into the litter bin simply because of one ruling they (mainland
officials) dislike? If so, the price we have to pay will be extremely high, to the extent we can't
afford it" (SCMP February 8th, 1999b).
Western domestic organizations also lobbied officials to put pressure on the Tung
administration to force them to respect the CFA decision. For instance, the American Chamber of
Commerce defended the CFA, echoing the framing of Pan-Democratic Camp politicians. They
worried that trying to invalidate the decision would have negative effects on economic transactions
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and therefore harm the bilateral trade relations with the United States. “Any attempt to overturn
the Court of Final Appeal's decision, or a period of prolonged uncertainty over the controversy,
could potentially undermine international confidence in the SAR's legal and judicial
independence" (SCMP February 12th, 1999b).
In contrast to 1997 through 1998, grassroots appeals to the international community elicited
a response from Western governments. This response was based on the perception that the CFA’s
decision affected the economic interests of domestic groups in Western countries. Grassroots
forces took care to use framing that indicated international actors could be affected by the
legislation. Organizations such as the American Chamber of Commerce also lobbied their
governments to protect Hong Kong’s legal and judicial independence.
Grassroots Level: Heightened Unity within the Coalition
Politicians in the Pan-Democratic Camp were able to coordinate with grassroots
organizations associated with right of abode claimants more cohesively in the wake of the CFA
verdict. Within less than a week of the ruling, a number of Mainland immigrants who claimed the
right of abode under the Court of Final Appeal’s ruling began a 16-day sit-in in front of the Central
Government Offices (SCMP February 21st 1999). The Hong Kong Justice and Peace Commission,
a group of social workers, and the Society for Community Organization took part in the sit-in and
provided supplies to participants (SCMP February 15th 1999). While Pan-Democratic Camp
politicians did not participate in the sit-in, the Democratic Party did assist protesters with legal
claims. The Democratic Party helped contact central government authorities to ensure that any
protesters who were sent back to the Mainland would not face retribution and assisted protesters
in filing court claims to avoid deportation (SCMP February 8th 1999a; February 13th, 1999).
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Pan-Democratic Camp parties also showed solidarity with grassroots efforts by defending
the Court of Final Appeal publicly and calling on international linkages to defend judicial
independence. The Democratic Party’s chairman, Martin Lee, declared that "This unanimous
ruling of the Court of Final Appeal preserves the high degree of judicial autonomy that was
promised to Hong Kong" (SCMP January 30th, 1999). Within the Legislative Council, politicians
in the Pan-Democratic Camp pushed for implementation of the decision and a timeline for
approving Mainland-born claimants’ permanent residency.
The Absence of Electoral Pressure and Cooptation:
The factors that led to fissures among the grassroots coalition in the 1997-1998 period,
electoral pressures and Tung administration’s ability to coopt factions, were absent during the first
few months of 1999. Without electoral incentives, grassroots political parties were able to work in
tandem with other organizations, increasing the strength of the grassroots coalition in pressuring
the CE. The next District Council elections would not be held until November of 1999, and the
next Legislative Council elections were the following year, 2000. Pan-Democratic Camp political
parties therefore felt less pressure to respond to existing anti-Mainland sentiment within the
population.
Moreover, the CFA’s ruling was so expansive that right of abode claimants were not as
vulnerable to cooptation. Organizations working with families of right of abode claimants assumed
that the decision would be implemented, and therefore, all of claimants would be eligible for Hong
Kong permanent residency.69 There was therefore little incentive for families to stop working with
grassroots lawyers and organizations to pressure the Tung administration.

69

Interview 45

140

Elite Level: Fissures in the Integrationist Coalition
Following the Court of Final Appeal’s decision, there was public disagreement among
several factions of the integrationist coalition about how the Tung administration should proceed.
There were disagreements among representatives of Mainland institutions, members of the
Executive Council, and integrationist political parties. These differences made it difficult to come
up with a unified policy in response to the CFA and grassroots pressure.
Members of Mainland representative institutions publicly disputed how to respond to the
CFA’s decision. NPC delegates told the local press that there were divisions among their numbers
about whether or not to bring the issue to the annual plenum of the National People’s Congress
(SCMP February 26th 1999; March 8th 1999). Some representatives argued that the Tung
administration should request an interpretation of the Basic Law from the NPCSC to resolve the
crisis. Members of the Basic Law Committee on the NPCSC also voiced contrasting opinions on
how the government should proceed.70 For instance, while one Basic Law Committee Member
advocated for an interpretation of the Basic Law by the NPCSC, another cautioned that "Any
attempt by the NPC to correct, override, or reinterpret the articles could seriously damage Hong
Kong's autonomy” (SCMP May 3rd 1999).
Members of Hong Kong subnational institutions likewise voiced incongruous reactions to
the CFA’s decision. One member of the Executive Council lambasted the CFA’s decision as a big
problem, stating, “It gave people the impression the Court of Final Appeal has gone beyond its
jurisdiction, even the NPC” (SCMP February 8th, 1999). Yet some integrationist political party
members in the Legislative Council rejected either an attempt by the Tung administration or the
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PRC leadership to interfere with the CFA’s decision. For instance, a prominent leader of the DAB
commented on a radio program that "A re-interpretation would amount to overturning the decision
of the Court of Final Appeal and would infringe on the power of final adjudication of the SAR”
(SCMP February 22nd, 1999).
The internal debate among integrationist forces flourished, making it difficult to create a
coalition-wide hardline against the CFA’s decision. Grassroots forces were given the opportunity
to determine the parameters of the debate. The inability to control the parameters of the debate and
lack of cohesion constrained what the Tung administration could do in the immediate aftermath of
the CFA’s decision.
The Dependence on Chinese Authorities
While integrationist factions’ reliance on PRC officials and institutions had helped navigate
intra-elite conflict in 1997 and 1998, in this instance, it created a vacuum that led to discordant
approaches to the crisis. The Tung administration delayed making formal decisions about how to
respond to the CFA’s decision because they wanted to conduct in-person meetings with PRC
officials beforehand. The Secretary for Justice was only able to meet with PRC officials two weeks
after the CFA’s decision (SCMP February 11th, 1999). While subnational institutions were
consulted, there was no clear guidelines for integrationist factions to follow. The absence of clear
signals from the Tung administration for two weeks led to a plethora of conflicting stances among
and within integrationist factions.
The mitigated outcome at this juncture demonstrates the importance of the grassroots
forces superior resources in January and February of 1999. Grassroots forces had support from
foreign officials and were able to maintain cohesion within their coalition. The Chief Executive’s
coalition, however, issued discordant statements in response to the CFA decision, making it
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difficult to counter grassroots forces in that moment. This outcome was different from the 1997
through 1998 period because domestic organizations convinced Western governments to advocate
on behalf of the CFA. The end of the electoral cycle and right of abode court cases also limited
incentives to defect among grassroots forces. Finally, while the PRC leadership had been helpful
in maintaining the integrationist coalition in the previous period, the Tung administration’s desire
to consult them first before crafting a full response to the CFA decision led to conflicting
messaging among the integrationist coalition.

Stage 3: The Chief Executive Attempts to Request an NPC Interpretation

In May of 1999, the Chief Executive decided to appeal part of the ruling made by the CFA
by asking for an interpretation of Basic Law Articles 22 and 24 from the NPCSC, claiming that
the number of new residents the decision allowed would become a crisis for the territory. The Tung
administration’s strategy limited local judicial institutions’ autonomy from both the Chief
Executive and the NPCSC. Prior to 1999, the CFA was the only Hong Kong institution that had
the authority to ask for an interpretation from the NPCSC. During this stage of the movement,
grassroots forces were unsuccessful in affecting the Chief Executive’s policy plans.

The Local Government’s Implementation of Autonomy in Response to Grassroots Forces
The Tung administration decided to solve both the immigration quandary and assertion of
judicial autonomy arising out of the CFA decision by requesting the NPCSC to interpret both
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Articles 22 and Article 24 of the Basic Law.71 Through this strategy, the CE was able to expand
their power vis-à-vis the local courts. Article 158 of the Basic Law stated that it was the CFA,
rather than LegCo or the office of the CE, that could ask for an interpretation of the Basic Law.
The Tung administration was essentially limiting the courts’ power to strike down legislation
through accessing the NPCSC.
At the same time, this strategy expanded the power of the NPCSC. Since there would now
be two Hong Kong institutions that could ask for an interpretation, the likelihood of their
influencing the implementation of policy in the territory had increased. Grassroots forces therefore
viewed the Tung administration’s request for an interpretation of the Basic Law as limiting the
autonomy of subnational institutions from the central government authorities.
Despite grassroots forces’ efforts, the Tung administration successfully requested an
interpretation from the NPCSC. They continued to insist, as they had in the 1997-1998 court cases,
that the CE was unable to act autonomously in determining which Mainland citizens could be
Hong Kong permanent residents. The Secretary for Justice argued to a group of legislators on
protesting the Tung Admnistration’s actions on June 14th, 1999, that if, as the Preparatory
Committee suggested in 1996, Article 22 and Article 24 were linked, then it would fall under the
domain of the central authorities and require the interpretation of the NPCSC. “Hong Kong does
not have the autonomy to solve the current problem, unless the Court of Final Appeal were to
change its interpretation” (Margaret Ng Papers file SJO 5047/2/4C).
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Members of the Tung Chee Hwa administration felt the central government was helping
them with the challenge posed by the potential influx of migrants, rather than pressuring the local
government to reinforce the former’s sovereignty.
In the circumstances of that time, and I was part of the decision-making process, we didn’t
really think there was any other alternative. Because we couldn’t afford the social unrest
and the disquiet that would be created within the community with this sudden number
coming across…Beijing shared our concern, they listened to our case, and they thought the
case was valid.72

Furthermore, members of the administration felt that turning to the NPCSC would not ultimately
change the power of the central government vis-à-vis the local government, “We felt they were
being very guarded, they realized it would create a lack of confidence, they realized it would create
a lack of certainty, so they still use it very sparingly.”73
Grassroots forces were able to maintain some small concessions from the Tung
administration that they had won in the CFA’s January 1999 decision. The NPCSC’s interpretation
held that Mainland-born children were only Hong Kong permanent residents if their parents were
Hong Kong permanent residents at the time of their birth, and that they could only enter Hong
Kong with the permission and documentation of provincial authorities. The claimants in the Court
of Final Appeal’s decision, however, would be able to stay in Hong Kong.74 Moreover, children
born outside of wedlock to Hong Kong permanent residents would still be eligible for residency.
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The Tung administration also made a concession in allowing, “persons who arrived in Hong Kong
between July 1, 1997 and January 29, 1999, and had claimed the right of abode, to have their status
as permanent residents verified in accordance with the CFA decision.75”
Overall, however, grassroots forces failed to restrain the Tung administration from
enervating the autonomy of subnational institutions from central government institutions during
this stage. The Tung administration had further empowered the Public Security Bureaus to
determine Hong Kong residency policy. Likewise, the NPCSC had bolstered ability to overturn
CFA judgments.

Grassroots and the Chief Executive’s Resources During the NPCSC Request
Grassroots force’s resources faded by May of 1999, putting them in a weak position to
contest the Chief Executive’s strategy. They lost critical support from Western government
officials and had difficulty maintaining unity within their coalition. For its part, the Tung
administration was able to maintain the integrationist coalition throughout the movement despite
intra-elite tensions.
The decline in grassroots forces’ resources was due to four factors. Western government
forces stopped defending the CFA’s decision for two reasons: the attenuation in connections
between them and Hong Kong grassroots forces, as well as the changes in their domestic interests.
The cohesion among grassroots forces dwindled due to both the Pan-Democratic Camp parties’
electoral concerns and the Tung administration’s use of cooptation.
While the integrationist coalition was able to resolve tensions within the camp, there were
clear signs of strain. It was difficult to disseminate strategies to all Hong Kong elite factions and
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inculcate a sense of shared interest without a local unifying institution. The Hong Kong
government’s need to wait for signals from the PRC leadership created a vacuum in which
integrationist factions developed divergent messaging in response to crises. Integrationist parties
believed the incongruence between their statements and the eventual PRC approved strategies of
the Tung administration’s hurt their chances in upcoming elections. This dynamic nearly caused a
split in the coalition following the Chief Executive’s formal request for an interpretation from the
NPCSC.
Grassroots Level: Declining Western Government Support
Despite outcry from international organizations, Western government officials did not
place significant pressure on the Chief Executive to stop his plan to pursue an NPCSC decision.
Two legal international organizations, the American-based Lawyers Committee for Human Rights
and the International Bar Association, claimed that Hong Kong’s rule of law was at stake and that
the Tung administration’s request for an interpretation from the NPCSC “would undermine the
authority of the Court of Final Appeal as the court of final adjudication” (SCMP May 29th, 1999 ;
May 26th, 1999).76 The New York-based Human Rights Watch also testified before the Senate’s
Foreign Relations Committee regarding the issue (SCMP July 5th, 1999).
Government leaders in the United States and Europe did not make direct statements against
the Tung administration. For instance, the departing U.S. envoy in Hong Kong stated that "We are
probably not prepared to make a judgment based on a single case.” (SCMP June 24th 1999). While
he expressed concern regarding the rule of law, he did not directly say the Tung administration
should desist in their plan.
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Likewise, the British government decided to remain silent in the early summer of 1999
when the Chief Executive requested the NPCSC interpretation (SCMP May 23rd 1999). It was only
after the NPCSC issued the interpretation that the British government expressed concern regarding
judicial independence. In their bi-annual report, the Foreign Office stated that it was “concerned…
about the authority and standing of the (Court of Final Appeal), the independence of the judicial
system and the robustness of the rule of law” surmising that it was possible … “the SAR
Government might resort again to interpretation in future” (SCMP July 23rd 1999). Even with this
statement, however, the Foreign Office did not directly criticize the Tung administration, lauding
the Chief Executive for reiterating his commitment to the rule of law.
Despite strong statements by Western government officials in February of 1999, Western
governments did not place pressure on the Chief Executive in May or June, when the Tung
administration decided to request an interpretation from the NPCSC. International organizations
tried to build support for Western government action, but the U.S. advocated a “wait and see”
approach. British officials did not issue any statement on the case at all, choosing to wait until
after the NPCSC had issued the interpretation.
Western Government Officials Prioritize their Relationship with China
Two factors contributed to the lack of assistance grassroots forces received from Western
government officials. First, grassroots forces did not cultivate international linkages to the same
degree they had prior to the Handover, limiting the effectiveness of their appeals. Moreover,
foreign organizations that had lobbied their governments’ on grassroots forces’ behalf changed
their priorities to advocating for China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). The
change in these organizations’ demands limited Western government officials’ incentives to speak
out against the Chief Executive’s policies.
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Grassroots forces continued to appeal to international officials during this stage of the Right
of Abode Movement. Human Rights Monitor announced that it planned to tell the United Nations
that the Tung administration had violated the Sino-British Joint Declaration as well as the ICCPR
written into the Basic Law. Hong Kong would have to report its progress regarding the ICCPR in
2000 (SCMP June 28th, 1999).
While they appealed to international actors, grassroots’ cultivation of international linkage
was still lower than it had been in the pre-Handover period, making it hard to contradict the Tung
administration’s explanations to the international community. In contrast to early 1997, when
grassroots leadership had gone to Western countries to advocate for their policy preferences,
grassroots forces did not make trips to Western countries during the Chief Executive’s public
campaign advocating for an NPCSC interpretation. 77 The Tung administration, on the other hand,
sent the Chief Secretary to Canada and the United States to sooth any concern Western officials
may have had regarding the policy (SCMP May 23rd 1999). It was only after the NPCSC had
handed down its decision that grassroots forces were able to travel to Europe and the United States
to explain the consequences of the interpretation for Hong Kong’s judicial autonomy.78
Moreover, priorities among domestic American groups active in Hong Kong had changed
by early summer of 1999, preventing the US government from issuing more than cautionary
statements. While the American Chamber of Commerce had initially lobbied the U.S. government
to defend the Court of Final Appeal’s autonomy, they were now more concerned with ensuring
China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). The American Chamber of Commerce
lobbied Washington to try and speed up negotiations on China’s behalf (SCMP May 4th, 1999).
The President of the American Chamber of Commerce, James Felton, emphasized that “we are
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running out of time. And the longer it drags on, the bigger the risk that it will not happen” (SCMP
May 4th, 1999).
The negotiations regarding the WTO were made more fraught because of the frayed U.S.Sino relations following NATO’s accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on May
7th, 1999.79 The bombing happened the day after the Tung administration suggested asking for an
interpretation from the NPCSC. Both government officials and key constituencies who operated
in Hong Kong were too pre-occupied with handling sensitive Sino-US dynamics during the Chief
Executive’s attempt to persuade the public to accept overruling the Court of Final Appeal.
Grassroots forces’ inability to procure international support was a result of attenuated
efforts to bolster connections to foreign officials and changes in Western governments’ priorities.
While grassroots forces’ appealed to international actors, visits to meet with Western officials in
person did not occur until after the NPCSC’s decision. Furthermore, the NATO bombing of the
Chinese embassy in Belgrade escalated U.S.-Sino tensions at a time when domestic groups wanted
to push for a successful negotiation to China’s entry into the WTO. Domestic groups that had
previously supported grassroots efforts to protect Hong Kong’s autonomy therefore switched to
emphasizing WTO negotiations instead, limiting the overall international support Hong Kong
grassroots forces received.
Grassroots Level: Divergent Priorities in the Grassroots Coalition
Despite the temporary cohesion within the grassroots coalition in January and February of
1999, grassroots forces once again faced divergent interests by May of that year. Members of PanDemocratic Camp political parties once again distanced themselves from right of abode claimants.
Among the families of claimants themselves, there were tensions that made it more difficult to
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launch further successful court challenges. The disunity among grassroots forces decreased their
overall ability to place enough pressure on the Tung administration to stop the request to the
NPCSC for an interpretation of the Basic Law.
The Pan-Democratic Camp political parties began to shift away from fully supporting right
of abode claimants and the religious, human rights, and migrant groups assisting them. The latter
organizations continued to argue that the CFA decision should be upheld and all persons with
parents that were Hong Kong permanent residents should be allowed to become citizens of the
territory. In contrast, Pan-Democratic Camp political parties only helped individual right of abode
claimants with legal representation and access to schooling during this period.80
Publicly, Pan-Democratic Camp political parties advocated that the Tung administration
amend the Basic Law to make certain Mainland-born persons ineligible for Hong Kong
citizenship. They contended this approach would support Hong Kong’s judicial autonomy,
whereas seeking an NPCSC interpretation would weaken the standing of the Court of Final Appeal
(SCMP May 1st 1999). The concession that Mainland-born children could be barred through a
Basic Law amendment created discordant framing among grassroots forces, limiting their ability
to influence the public in the run up to the local government’s solicitation of an interpretation by
PRC authorities.
Grassroots forces also had a difficult time fighting the implementation of the NPCSC
decision because of tensions among parent associations for right of abode claimants. The disunity
among the parent associations made it daunting to pursue further court challenges to limit the scope
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of the NPCSC interpretation and the Tung administration’s actions. One lawyer assisting right of
abode claimants explained that
The children who came to Hong Kong at different times, were looking at different chances
of success. And so, whether you should say, shall we say, just let’s take the group who
have the best chance. Let’s deal with this group first, so at least they will have the right of
abode. And then we can deal with the other groups. Or we could deal with the whole group
together, which means that the argument would lose its strength. So, there is always the
group that says ‘we should split’ and the group that says ‘no, we should hang together’…
They have common interests, but also have conflicting interests. It was very, very sad.81

In a parallel to the 1997-1998 period, grassroots forces struggled to maintain cohesive
pressure on the Tung administration. Pan-Democratic Camp political parties once again advocated
for measures that would reduce right of abode claimant’s ability to become Hong Kong permanent
residents. The parents of Mainland-born children also could not resolve their internal disputes,
making further court challenges on their behalf less likely to be fruitful as well.
The Tung Administration’s Ability to Employ Electoral Interests and Cooptation
The Tung administration was able to dismantle the strong grassroots cohesion that existed
in early February 1999 following the Court of Final Appeal’s verdict through two strategies. The
government’s first strategy was to inflame anti-Mainland sentiment, which triggered PanDemocratic Camp political parties’ electoral concerns. The second strategy was to coopt a portion
of the right of abode claimants by offering select groups access to citizenship.
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The government inflamed anti-Mainland sentiment through a survey that claimed a deluge
of immigrants would move to Hong Kong if the CFA’s decision was upheld. The Chief Secretary
set up a task force in conjunction with the Mainland authorities to assess the exact number of
potential Mainland residents that might apply for permanent residency under the CFA’s guidelines.
The Tung administration’s presented the results of the survey at the end of April 1999, framing
the situation as an immigration crisis that would create unprecedented upheaval. They announced
that 1.67 million people would be allowed to become permanent residents, claiming that nearly
700,000 people would immediately be eligible for permanent residency and that over another
900,000 would be eligible as the “second generation”, after their parents became Hong Kong
residents (SCMP April 29th 1999). One million, six hundred and seventy thousand people was
about one-fifth the size of the SARs population at the time.
The Tung administration threatened that allowing the entry of these individuals would lead
to a profound socioeconomic crisis. The Acting Chief Secretary for Administration, warned that
accepting all of the potential new permanent residents would cost $710 billion Hong Kong Dollars
(HKD) over the next 10 years (SCMP May 7th 1999). Interviewees recounted the stark picture
government discourse painted:
The whole Hong Kong economic system would break down, there would not be enough
space for them to live. If all of them have to go to the hospital, the hospital system will
collapse. If all of them apply for social assistance, there would be a heavy financial burden
for Hong Kong society. If they all go to school, the whole system will collapse. They were
exaggerating the figures and exaggerating everything.82
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A functional constituency representative on the Legislative Council both before and after
the Handover refuted the government’s new figures as a political strategy to scare Hong Kong
residents. She claimed figures previously given by the civil service from 1995 through 1997 were
much lower. “This question was regularly asked, and we were given different estimations. And
the estimations were never over 30 thousand. … So, this figure of 1.67 million was created in May
of 1999 (or April).” 83 The same interviewee also highlighted the prejudicial way the survey
assumed that Mainland families were hiding multiple illegitimate children because of the social
shame associated with the phenomenon:
So, they use a kind of multiplier. For every illegitimate child who was reported they
multiplied by four or five… But this is how there was overwhelming numbers. So, if you
have 500,000 legitimate children according to the survey, they would add to it about a
million who were illegitimate.84

In interviews, government officials and members of the civil service involved with the
proceedings claimed that the numbers were correct and based on data dating back to before the
Handover.85
We collectively looked at what the implications were as to the best guestimate as to the
numbers that are likely to come and the strain and pressure that they would exert on local
services. And we came to the conclusion we simply could not cope… and we would be
flooded (social services, health services, education services) all would come under
considerable strain. 86
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Whether the government’s claims regarding a mass onslaught of new Mainland immigrants
were true or false, it succeeded in changing public sentiment toward the CFA’s decision. The
government was effectively able to create a “public scare”, increasing fears of what an influx of
new Mainland immigrants would mean for the region. 87 In May, the Hong Kong Policy Research
Institute conducted a poll that found only 16.2% of respondents thought the Court of Final Appeal
ruling should be upheld (SCMP May 1st, 1999). While members of the Pan-Democratic Camp
brought in experts to LegCo to discuss the problems with the Tung administration’s claims, by
June, Chinese University of Hong Kong conducted a poll that found 75% of respondents thought
the Court of Final Appeals’ decision was wrong (Poon 2002). 88
This change in mass sentiment caused the Pan-Democratic Camp political parties to shift
away from fully supporting right of abode claimants and the grassroots organizations assisting
them. They grew concerned about the effect public support of right of abode claimants would have
on the District Council elections of fall 1999. One interviewee noted that “Democrats always have
to face dual pressure on the right of abode issue. On the one hand, they have to face very ground
level people who are worried [about Mainland immigration]…” while on the other hand, “there
were constituents whose children were affected by the Hong Kong government’s decision.”89
While elections influenced the framing and activities of grassroots political parties, other
Right of Abode claimants were coopted through their dependence on the local government for
access to citizenship. The Tung administration once again sought to limit the possibility of future
court challenges by grassroots forces through cooptation of particular groups of families seeking
the right of abode in Hong Kong. The CE allowed approximately 3700, out of the tens of thousands
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of potential right of abode holders, to stay (Office of the Chief Executive June 26th, 1999).
Therefore, these families chose not to participate in court cases because they feared losing their
access to Hong Kong permanent residency. These actions created tensions among right of abode
claimants, making it difficult for grassroots forces to pursue court cases in a unified manner.

The Elite Level: The Integrationist Coalition’s Cohesion is Maintained
The Tung administration was able to preserve their coalition, helping them fend off
challenges from grassroots forces. Integrationist political parties that had previously argued the
CFA’s decision should be upheld rallied behind the Chief Executive, endorsing the request for an
NPCSC interpretation. There was one case of elite defection, but that incident was quickly resolved
within a matter of days.
Shortly after the CE announced plans to request an interpretation from the NPCSC, two
integrationist political parties, the DAB and the Liberal Party, both changed their stances to echo
that of the Tung administration. For instance, the DAB leader who had previously stated that an
NPCSC interpretation “Would infringe on the power of final adjudication of the SAR” in February
completely shifted his stance by May. He now contended that “We have to respect the fact that the
Basic Law is a Chinese law, which allows the NPC and its Standing Committee to enact and
interpret laws” (SCMP February 22nd, 1999; May 7th, 1999).
Yet while other members of the Liberal Party amended their views to match the Tung
administration’s stance, its founder, who was also NPC delegate, Allen Lee Peng Fei, refused. To
protest the CE’s request for a NPCSC interpretation, Lee publicly announced that he was quitting
the Liberal Party. The very next day, he began to air the dirty laundry of the integrationist coalition,
highlighting the lack of coordination within the camp and his frustration with the position of
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political parties within governance circles. He derided the Executive Council, “How come up to
now – two years after the establishment of the SAR – I haven’t seen a single meeting formally
conducted by the ExCo members with the legislature? What are they doing?” (SCMP May 24th,
1999). Similarly, Lee stated that Tung faced “tremendous resistance” from the civil service,
indicating that they had also failed to facilitate collaboration with other members of the camp
(SCMP May 24th, 1999).
Within a little more than a week, however, Lee returned to the party. The Liberal Party
begged Lee to return, worried about the effects on the District Council elections that autumn. Lee
was the only party member who had won a geographic seat in 1995 (SCMP June 3rd, 1999). He
hinted, however, that he would leave if the party did not follow his advice in the future.
Most of the integrationist coalition immediately fell in line with the Tung administration’s
decision to seek an interpretation from the NPCSC. Even political parties that had outright rejected
an idea of overriding the CFA now argued the Chief Executive was justified. There was a case of
defection, but while it was embarrassing, it was quickly resolved. The unity within the
integrationist camp not only created more cohesion in messaging during this period but allowed
the Tung administration to concentrate on responding to grassroots challenges rather than
appeasing its own coalition during this stage of the movement.
The Role of China and the Lack of a Coordinating Platform
While the Chief Executive was able to maintain his coalition during this stage of the Right
of Abode Movement, it is worth exploring why there was a near defection following the Tung
administration’s request for the NPCSC to issue an interpretation of the Basic Law. The
integrationist camp lacked a unifying subnational institution which all factions could belong too.
Instead, as described earlier in the chapter, the integrationist coalition depended on their
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connections to the PRC apparatus to coordinate and resolve disputes. The absence of a
coordinating platform and the reliance on PRC leadership, however, created conflicts for political
parties that relied on popular support, which led to the temporary defection of a leading political
party figure.
The lack of a central coordinating institution at the local level made it difficult for
integrationist political parties to position themselves and win elections. While the Chief Executive
was not allowed to have a political party, integrationist parties within the government’s coalition
did not feel that the institutional structure allowed them to fully identify with the government. As
one integrationist party leader put it,
We’ve long found ourselves in a very difficult situation, because, on the one hand, it is not
our government… We don’t form the government… So, well, let me put it this way: when
the government comes up with a really popular policy, then the government doesn’t have
to worry about support. It has general support, even the opposition side, well they cannot
reject a popular proposal. Now it is only when the government wants to push ahead with a
very controversial proposal that it wants our support. And we know very well, if we stand
behind the government, we are going to lose some of [the electoral] support next time. And
so, this is a predicament.90

The Tung administration’s reliance on PRC leadership in this case made it difficult for
integrationist political parties to sync their reactions to that of the Chief Executive, creating
anxieties about upcoming elections. As mentioned previously, the Tung administration did not
publicly indicate that they would reverse the CFA decision in February of 1999. They only signaled
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that they would seek an interpretation from the NPCSC in May. By that point in time, members of
integrationist political parties had made statements suggesting that the CFA ruling should be
upheld. Integrationist political parties found themselves having to reverse public statements they
had previously made regarding the CFA decision. These actions further highlighted their awkward
stance within the integrationist coalition: they could neither fully claim to be in the inner circle of
government policy nor could they obtain votes by acting as a check on the government’s power.
These concerns led the Liberal Party leader, Allen Lee Peng Fei, to temporarily defect from
the integrationist camp. Lee had feared that the party’s image was being tarnished by aligning with
the government’s position too closely (SCMP June 3rd, 1999). They had not won any popularly
elected seats in the 1998 election and the proportion of appointed seats was only going to diminish.
In the end, Lee returned to the party because of electoral concerns, as he had been the only
popularly elected leader in a previous election. But the fundamental structure created challenges
for integrationist parties navigating their relationship to the Chief Executive and popular electoral
pressures.
Within a few short months, grassroots forces’ previous resources were enervated, making
it more challenging for them to stop the Tung administration’s actions regarding autonomy in the
summer of 1999. While Western government officials had pressured the Tung administration to
respect the CFA’s decision only a few months before, their critiques of the CE were muted in May
and June. Grassroots forces were unable to make trips to Western countries to strengthen their
connections to foreign officials and domestic groups within Western countries lobbied their
administrations to focus on China’s entry into the WTO. The bombing of the Chinese embassy in
Belgrade made it even more critical for the US to focus on ameliorating the Sino-U.S. relationship.
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Grassroots forces also once again found themselves unable to unify as they had in the 19971998 period, as electoral concerns came to the fore, and the Tung administration regained its ability
to coopt families of right of abode claimants. The Tung administration also implemented the
NPCSC’s decision in a way that they could coopt certain families of Mainland-born children,
thereby ensuring the best test cases for future legal action would not enter the court room. Unable
to agree on a plan of action, the collective power of right of abode claimants dwindled.
The Chief Executive was in a stronger position during this period. The Tung administration
was able to consolidate the integrationist coalition behind the request for an NPCSC interpretation,
despite the divergent stances many parties had taken only a few months before. While one Liberal
Party leader defected from the coalition, he was quickly brought back into the fold. The incident
demonstrated that while reliance on the PRC apparatus could help solidify the integrationist
coalition, it could also create communication problems and divergent interests. The lack of a
unifying institution resulted in some factions finding it politically difficult to align themselves too
closely with the Tung administration. Integrationist political parties were put in a position of
having to change publicly-made statements once the Chief Executive had decided on a strategy
with the PRC leadership’s endorsement. These actions made competition in elections more
difficult, increasing tensions and the likelihood of defection in the integrationist camp.

Comparing Rival Explanations of Movement Success
There are three possible alternative factors that could play a potentially more important role
in explaining the outcomes in the different stages of this case, economic decline, anti-Mainland
sentiment, and media framing of the policy issue. These factors all address changes in mobilization
activity, which is expected to then affect the government’s perception of public pressure. While
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mobilization is an important facet of movement success, this dissertation argues that mobilization
does not in and of itself lead the government to make concessions to grassroots forces; international
pressure, grassroots solidarity, and intra-elite friction are often crucial as well.
The Right of Abode Movement took place during an economic downturn, the Asian Financial
Crisis. The Tung administration argued fiercely during the Right of Abode Movement that
allowing 1.67 million immigrants into the territory would lead to a collapse in services. Thus,
while the government maintained its popularity through asking for an interpretation, it was
promoting economic grievance. Interviewees did not, however, draw a connection between
economic grievance and the Right of Abode issue.91
Another possible factor in mobilizing the population is anti-Mainland sentiment. The
government stoked anti-Mainlander sentiment in the Right of Abode Movement to increase the
popularity of the NPCSC interpretation, contributing to its overall success. By publicly declaring
that 1.67 million Mainland migrants would be coming to Hong Kong, they were able to turn the
public against the Court of Final Appeal’s decision.
Yet in this case, stoking anti-Mainland sentiment was effective because it divided grassroots
forces and made it harder for political parties to publicly support right of abode claimants.
Legislators instead had to advocate for an amendment to the Basic Law, which departed from the
framing of religious, migrant, and human rights groups before the government sought the
interpretation. Anti-Mainland sentiment is important in this case in that it made electoral incentives
more potent, but the electoral incentives are a priori and more salient.
Few scholars have argued that the media played an important role in curtailing the ability of
grassroots organizations to influence policies during the Right of Abode incident. There is,
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however, some evidence from interviews that it had an effect. According to a participant, local
media negatively portrayed Mainland immigrants as poorly educated and dim-witted. An activist
working with right of abode claimants explained:
The media said that the right of abode people were stupid, they were coming from China.
They don’t even understand what happened in the court, but when they see the lawyer
smile, they think that they won. They have victory. When the lawyer looks upset, they think
that they lose.92

Yet there was variation in grassroots’ ability to achieve concessions even within a period
of a few months. This change in outcomes is better explained by the fluctuation in key resources
available to both the grassroots and Tung’s administration. Grassroots forces briefly had the
backing of Western government leadership and were able to unify in January and February of
1999, resulting in temporary protection for the CFA’s decision.

Conclusion
Ultimately, grassroots forces were not able to compel the Chief Executive to protect
autonomy from central government institutions in defining citizenship or by defending the local
judiciary’s rulings. Through carefully tracing interactions between the grassroots coalition and the
Chief Executive’s integrationist coalition, we can observe that grassroots forces were able to
achieve some concessions when they had support from Western government officials and
maintained high solidarity, while the CE’s coalition was weakened through an inability to unify.
Grassroots forces were able to keep the Tung administration from immediately rejecting the Court
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of Final Appeal’s verdict in February of 1999, because integrationist coalition members and
Western government officials also voiced support for protecting the court, and grassroots forces
were more unified in exerting pressure against the Chief Executive. They were also able to expand
access to permanent residency to illegitimate Mainland-born children of Hong Kong residents and
claimants who arrived before January 1999.
Comparing and contrasting interactions over time between the two coalitions further
reveals that key factors contributed to the strengthening or weakening of resources that affected
the position of both grassroots forces and the Chief Executive’s administration. Two factors
contributed to the relative inability of grassroots forces to elicit Western government support, the
degree to which grassroots forces cultivated linkages with foreign officials and the domestic
interests of Western countries. Grassroots forces did attempt to engage Western government
officials, hoping to elicit pressure on the Tung administration. They did not make trips to Western
countries regarding the right of abode issue, however, and at first framed the policy as a domestic
concern. In January and February of 1999, foreign governments pushed back against the PRC
leadership’s calls for the court to change its verdict and supported the efforts of grassroots forces.
This brief backing of grassroots forces occurred because domestic groups, such as the American
Chamber of Commerce, framed the issue as affecting broader economic interests. Domestic
interests in the CFA decision waned as the same groups became more concerned with the China’s
entry into the WTO. The NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade made the US-Sino
relationship more fraught, causing Western countries to focus even more energy on the WTO as
opposed to the CE’s actions toward the CFA and NPCSC.
Unity within the grassroots coalition was influenced by electoral incentives and the local
government’s ability to coopt factions of the coalition. Pan-Democratic Camp political parties
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exhibited variation in their support for right of abode claimants because of electoral concerns. As
elections grew nearer, Pan-Democratic Camp politicians made statements that advocated
restrictions on the ability of Mainland-born citizens to become Hong Kong residents, because of
high levels of anti-Mainland sentiment. During periods when they did not need to preference
electioneering, the Pan-Democratic Camp defended right of abode claimants’ interests more
vigorously.
Moreover, the Tung administration was able to divide the organizations associated with the
families of right of abode claimants through cooptation. The Tung administration co-opted
segments of the population seeking the right of abode by giving citizenship to a small percentage
of claimants in order to limit the likelihood of successful court outcomes. Immediately after the
CFA announced their decision, the Tung administration lost their ability to use citizenship to
weaken the alliance among right of abode claimants, since the ruling allowed all parties to become
Hong Kong permanent residents. Following the NPCSC decision, however, the Tung
administration was once again able to use their power over citizenship to create divisions between
Right of Abode claimants and limit the likelihood of grassroots forces obtaining successful
outcome through the courts.
The Tung administration’s position, on the other hand, was bolstered by the preservation
of the cohesion within the integrationist coalition. This cohesion was a product of the coalition’s
ability to rely on PRC authorities to mediate tensions within the camp in the absence of a unifying
institution at the local level. The CE was able to rally integrationist forces to pass the Immigration
Ordinance within a matter of days after the Handover, and no elite factions questioned the
substance of the legislation.
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There were side effects to PRC officials acting as arbiters among the local coalition,
however, that caused some tensions at critical junctures in the Right of Abode Movement. The
Tung Chee Hwa Administration’s desire to wait for guidance from Mainland officials led to public
disputes among the integrationist coalition regarding the CFA’s decision, allowing grassroots
forces more control over the framing of the issue. There was also one case of temporary elite
defection after the local government decided to ask for an interpretation, during which a member
of the Liberal Party sought to hurt the integrationist coalition by highlighting the internal tensions.
The absence of a unifying institution, and the reliance on the PRC to act as an arbiter affected the
electoral interests of integrationist political parties, who found themselves having to reverse their
previous stances in the final stage of the Right of Abode Movement.
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Chapter 4
Grassroots Triumph in the Anti-Article 23 Movement
The Anti-Article 23 Movement from September 2002 through July of 2003 presents a
particularly intriguing case to examine conditions that empower grassroots forces. The Chief
Executive was under considerably more pressure to implement national security laws than they
were during the Right of Abode Movement. Under Article 23 of the Basic Law, the Hong Kong
government was bound to pass legislation that would prohibit secession, treason, sedition,
subversion, foreign ties to political organizations, and theft of state secrets. Yet grassroots forces
succeeded in compelling the Tung administration to shelve the bill. For nearly two decades, no
subsequent Chief Executive attempted to implement the Article 23 legislation. What factors
empowered grassroots forces to compel the Tung administration to withdraw the legislation and
preserve autonomy from central government institutions, despite the PRC leadership’s pressure to
enact it?
Grassroots forces were able to amass considerable pressure on the Tung administration
through eliciting Western government support and maintaining a high degree of unity. Following
the largest protests in Hong Kong since 1989, members of integrationist coalition defected. The
lack of cohesion within the integrationist camp kept the Tung administration from having the votes
necessary to pass the legislation.
The empowerment of grassroots forces through international support and internal unity
depended on key factors. Grassroots forces were able to achieve international support when they
cultivated linkages to Western government officials and when these officials viewed the legislation
as affecting their interests. During the movement, the latter factor was more important; Western
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governments statements on the Article 23 legislation varied with their domestic interests. They
even supported the Chief Executive during the spring of 2003. The unity within the grassroots
coalition was shaped by their anticipation of increased coercion and the Tung administration’s
decision not to employ cooptation strategies. All grassroots organizations believed that they would
face more repression as a result of the Article 23 legislation, leading to greater collaboration among
movement factions.
The changes in cohesion among the integrationist coalition resulted from the dynamics
between the coalition and the PRC apparatus. The Tung administration continued to rely on the
PRC in attempting to create cohesion among its integrationist coalition. While the PRC
leadership’s assistance did provide some benefits to the integrationist coalition, it also had iterative
effects that created ambiguity around which level of leadership had the final authority in a crisis
situation.
The chapter first describes the changes in the positions of both the grassroots forces and
the Chief Executive in the period leading up to the Anti-Article 23 Movement. This section
demonstrates the relative strengths of the Tung administration in comparison to grassroots forces.
I then explain the context of the Article 23 legislation and why the PRC leadership was so insistent
that the Chief Executive pass the legislation. The chapter then examines the Anti-Article 23
Movement case. I divide the movement into two distinct stages to evaluate how the variation in
international support, grassroots unity, and the elite coalition’s unity affected the Chief Executive’s
policy implementation. This section also analyzes factors that contribute to the presence or absence
of resources that empowered one party vis-à-vis another. The final section compares the
explanatory power of the theory presented in this chapter with that of alternative factors, including
economic grievance, anti-Mainland sentiment, and media framing.
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The 2002 Context
The Chief Executive had taken steps to both solidify his control over the integrationist
coalition and the Hong Kong government apparatus prior to attempting to implement Article 23
legislation. Tung Chee Hwa decided to run for a second term as Chief Executive and made reform
of the government structure a key aspect of his campaign in early 2002. That summer, the Tung
administration implemented the Principal Official Accountability System (POAS).
The Principal Official Accountability System (POAS) was designed to empower the Chief
Executive in managing the civil service and turning the Executive Council into a more effective
coordinating institution. Civil servants would have to leave the civil service before becoming
political appointees, with the exception of the Secretary for the Civil Service. The CE was allowed
to nominate all of the department heads and bureau chiefs. Principal Officials would be
“accountable to the Chief Executive for the success or failure of matters” within their policy
portfolios and would “accept total responsibility and… may have to step down for serious policy
failures relating to their portfolios.”93 The Chief Executive could fire them at any time without
“cause or compensation.”94
The Executive Council was also transformed into a more inclusive coordinating platform,
including both the newly appointed department heads and key members of political parties that
operated in the Legislative Council. James Tien, of the Liberal Party, and Jasper Tsang of the
DAB, were included as non-official members in ExCo. While both the Liberal Party and the DAB
still faced electoral pressures, inclusion on ExCo allowed them to signal involvement in
government for more popular legislation. Moreover, it gave the parties increased access and input
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into government strategies, enabling them to avoid public turnabouts that could hurt their chances
in elections.
The POAS also demonstrated, however, the Chief Executive’s continued interest in
pursuing integrationist policies. While the CE nominated the heads of departments, they would be
appointed by the PRC leadership (Cheung 2003).95 This move gave the PRC an additional power
that was not listed in the Basic Law. According to Article 48(5), the power to appoint and nominate
principal officials outside of the civil service rested with the CE (Cheung 2003).
While grassroots forces had more access to formal institutions than they did in the
immediate Handover period, they were still not able to stop the passage of integrationist policies
through the Legislative Council. By 2000, twenty-four of the sixty seats in the LegCo were chosen
by popular geographic constituency elections. Half of the sixty seats were determined through
functional constituencies, and the remaining six through an electoral college. Grassroots forces
still found themselves unable to access most of the functional constituency and electoral college
seats, since they were controlled by small-circle elections of predominantly integrationist circles.
Pan-Democratic Camp political parties were therefore only able to amass 21 seats. Having a third
of the seats made it difficult for grassroots forces to block the passing of legislation through the
Legislative Council.
Prior to the Anti-Article 23 Movement, the Chief Executive remained committed to
integrationist policies. Through his pursuit of these policies, he was able to strengthen his control
over the Hong Kong government apparatus and attempt to centralize the integrationist coalition
under the POAS system. These changes made it easier to implement his policy agenda. The Tung
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administration’s ability to pursue integrationist policies was further fortified because grassroots
forces still lacked the ability to utilize the Legislative Council to block integrationist policies.

The Case: The Anti-Article 23 Movement
The Tung administration sought to implement a policy proposal on national security that
would have weakened autonomy from central government institutions. This policy was mandated
by the Basic Law, under Article 23. The bill would have banned organizations in Hong Kong that
were associated with Mainland groups deemed public security threats by the central government,
granting the PRC administration more control over curtailing associational life within Hong Kong.
Moreover, the proposal would have decreased the transparency of interactions between the PRC
and Chief Executive’s administration, thereby making it harder to evaluation the region’s
autonomy from the central government. Grassroots forces fought to mitigate, if not completely
stop, the Tung administration’s policy implementation of this legislation.
While grassroots forces were able to amass high levels of international support and
maintain cohesion during both the public consultation and the legislative process for the Article
23 bill, they were only able to garner concessions from the Chief Executive in the second stage of
the movement. Table 4.1 demonstrates how changes international support and unity in both
coalitions correspond to grassroots’ success in the two stages of the movement. The key change
the table elucidates is in the level of the integrationist coalition’s cohesion. The Chief Executive’s
coalition had suffered a defection in the fall of 2002 but was able to rally together by December of
that year, helping the Tung administration resist pressure from grassroots forces. By July of 2003,
however, defections within the integrationist coalition increased to such an extent that the Chief
Executive was forced to suspend the legislation.
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Table 4.1: Variation in Grassroots’ and the Chief Executive’s Resources
During the Two Stages of the Anti-Article 23 Movement
Stage of AntiArticle 23
Movement

Stage 1:
September 2002January 2003
Stage 2: February
2003- July 2003

Support from
Western
Government
Officials

Unity
Within
Grassroots
Coalition

Unity
Within
CE’s
Coalition

Grassroots’
Success or
Failure in
Affecting CE
Behavior

High

High

Moderate

Failure

High

High

Low

Success

The Policy Issue
Both the Basic Law and the PRC leadership mandated that the Tung administration
implement Article 23, creating tremendous pressure to pass legislation on national security. Within
the Basic Law, under Article 23, the Hong Kong government was charged with enacting laws “to
prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People’s
Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from
conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of
the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies.” Article 23
stipulated, however, that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) would be
allowed to enact these laws on their own and these regulations could differ from those of the
Mainland.
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While many of the requirements for Article 23 were already covered by colonial statutes
that remained after the Handover, several of the ordinances needed to be updated to reflect the
change in sovereignty. The Crimes Ordinance directly dealt with treason and sedition and there
was an Official State Secret Ordinance as well. However, in the Crimes Ordinance, treason was
defined in relation to the British Monarch as late as 2002.96 Even where the British Queen was not
directly mentioned, the absence of the Mainland government from regulation was problematic.
Officials realized that the wording of the State Secrets Ordinance, which did not directly mention
the People’s Republic of China, meant that there was “no law to penalize theft of secrets from the
Chinese military” (SCMP March 4th, 2000).
Additionally, as Hong Kong integrated into Mainland China, the PRC leadership became
progressively more concerned about organizations that were seen as challenging the Chinese
Communist Party’s (the CCP) authority gathering supporters in Hong Kong. The liberties written
into the Basic Law allowed them to operate more freely in the region than the rest of Mainland,
China. For instance, the Falun Gong, a spiritual group that had been banned in Mainland China
since organizing a 10,000-person protest in Tiananmen Square in 1999, was creating new converts
in the region. One former government official stated that
The Falun Gong was definitely a trigger point for Beijing, because the Falun Gong caught
Beijing totally unaware and unprepared. They were actually shocked at the ability of the
Falun Gong to gather together so many people. That really frightened them. 97
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PRC officials in Beijing publicly warned the Falun Gong against trying to turn Hong Kong into a
center for subversion and the Liaison Office in Hong Kong made similar threats SCMP February
10th 2001).
In spite of mounting concerns, for nearly five years, the PRC leadership did not pressure
the Chief Executive on the issue of Article 23. Unlike provisions related to elections in the region,
Article 23 did not mention a specific time table for enactment (South China Morning Post February
9th, 2000). Only in February of 2002 did the PRC leadership in Beijing make it clear to the Tung
administration that the HKSAR should begin the process of enacting Article 23 (SCMP February
28th, 2002).
The Tung administration’s proposed Article 23 legislation went further to limit the region’s
autonomy from central government institutions than was strictly called for by the Basic Law. These
new limitations were necessary to address the PRC leadership’s concerns regarding the operation
of Mainland organizations within Hong Kong that had not been covered in the Basic Law’s original
wording. In September of 2002, the government released a 58-page public consultation document
on the proposed Article 23 legislation. Whereas Article 23 referred to groups with connections to
foreign organizations, the consultation document stipulated that groups “affiliated with a Mainland
organization” which PRC authorities condemned “on the ground that it endangers national
security” would be illegal.”98 Since the local government would find it difficult to ascertain what
constituted a national security threat in making the decision to proscribe a group, the Secretary for
Security would “defer to the decision of the Central Authorities based on the comprehensive
information that it possesses.”99
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Additionally, the Hong Kong government indicated the Official States Secret Ordinance
would be amended to make unlawful disclosure of “information relating to relations between the
Central Authorities of the PRC and the HKSAR” illegal, decreasing the transparency regarding
the relationship between the Chief Executive and PRC leadership.100 While this topic had also not
been listed in Article 23, the Security Bureau reasoned that prior to the Handover, information
regarding the Hong Kong and Mainland relationship had been protected by the State Secret
Ordinance under “international relations.” 101 Therefore, putting the adjustment into Article 23
legislation did not qualify as stepping beyond existing regulations.
The consultation document not only indicated that the PRC’s authority would increase, but
the control of the local government would also be enlarged through mounting police investigatory
powers and by expanding the Hong Kong government’s jurisdiction internationally. Under
contemporary law, the Hong Kong police would only be able to enter private property without a
warrant to prevent a crime. The Tung administration sought to allow for warrantless searches and
seizures during investigations for all offenses under Article 23.102
The Chief Executive also used the principle of objective territoriality, which held that
jurisdiction should be where “the result or effects of the crime are sustained” to expand its
reach.”103 For the offenses of treason. secession, sedition, and subversion, the government claimed
jurisdiction over all Hong Kong permanent residents, including non-Chinese permanent residents
that were foreign nationals, anywhere in the world. In the case of secession, subversion, and
sedition, non-residents could be charged if their actions had an effect on Hong Kong.104
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While Article 23 was originally designed to prevent Hong Kong organizations from both
committing national security offenses and coordinating too closely with foreign organizations, the
PRC leadership wanted the Chief Executive to address the contemporary security threats facing
the CCP. The Tung administration therefore laid out Article 23 legislation that not only penalized
connections to foreign organizations, but also banned Mainland organizations. Additionally, they
took steps to ensure the Chief Executive’s ability to police the population’s adherence to the
national security policies by creating additional grounds for warrantless searches and expanding
the Hong Kong government’s jurisdiction regarding Article 23 violations.

Stage 1: The Public Consultation, September of 2002 through January of 2003
In the fall of 2002, the Chief Executive released a public consultation document and invited
the public to voice their disapproval or support for the bill. Grassroots forces failed to achieve
many concessions from the Chief Executive during the initial public consultation in the fall and
winter of 2002. Grassroots forces hoped to achieve several goals during the public consultation.
First off, they hoped to ensure that the local government apparatus, as opposed to the PRC
officials, decided which organizations should be banned under the Article 23 law. They also hoped
to limit warrantless searches and create a “public interest” caveat for violating the Official Secret
Ordinance. One of their main concerns was not being able to see the exact wording of the bill
through a white bill; without the exact wording it was difficult to assess how it would be
implemented.
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The Local Government’s Implementation of Autonomy in Response to Grassroots Forces
Interactions between grassroots forces and the Tung administration did not significantly
alter many of the Chief Executives’ proposals for the implementation of Article 23. One of the few
concessions the administration offered was to remove clauses regarding seditious publications
(SCMP January 29th, 2003). The CE continued to advocate for a version of Article 23 that went
beyond what was mandated in the initial wording within the Basic Law, strengthening both the
PRC authorities’ control over the region and the Chief Executive’s power over the Hong Kong
population. The proposals for searches without a warrant, criminalizing ties to outlawed Mainland
organizations, and strengthening of the Official Secrets Ordinance remained in the bill (SCMP
January 29th, 2003).
Where the Chief Executive did offer concessions, they were primarily aimed at assuaging
the concerns of foreign governments. The Tung administration issued a “clarification” on January
28th, 2003, that foreign nationals who possessed Hong Kong permanent residency would not be
charged with treason under the new regulations. “Within the territorial boundaries of the HKSAR,
the offence will only apply to Chinese nationals. The extra-territorial application of the offence
will be limited to Chinese citizens who are permanent residents of the HKSAR” (The Government
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 2003c).
The Tung administration and the integrationist coalition tried to respond to high levels of
grassroots mobilization through a public relations campaign. In January of 2003, the government
tried to diminish perception of controversy over Article 23 legislation through its interpretation of
the 97,000 submissions regarding the proposals. The government announced that 86.7% of the
organizations that had submitted to the consultation agreed with the proposals, while 76.3% of
individuals sending in form letters also agreed (The Government of the Hong Kong Special
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Administrative Region 2002). The Survey Office mischaracterized the submissions of several
prominent groups that had been vociferously outspoken against the proposals. The Bar Association
and the Falun Gong were classified as “not containing views explicitly supportive or opposed” to
the proposed legislation (SCMP January 29th, 2003).105
Overall, the Chief Executive’s behavior did not change significantly in response to
grassroots pressure. The majority of the public consultation’s proposals would appear in the Chief
Executive’s bill to be tabled within the Legislative Council. Instead, the Tung administration
attempted to weaken grassroots’ resources through targeting concessions at foreign governments.
The Tung administration also sought to create the public image that the bill was popular, to
minimize grassroots mobilization.

Grassroots and the Chief Executive’s Resources During the Public Consultation
Grassroots forces were in a relatively strong position to pressure the Tung administration,
since they were able to elicit criticism of the Article 23 legislation from Western government
officials and maintain a high degree of unity within their coalition. The Chief Executive’s coalition
had to deal with a prominent defection that undermined their position, but they were able to
maintain a degree of cohesion through the end of the public consultation. This cohesion helped
them weather the first stage of the Anti-Article 23 Movement without giving ground to grassroots
forces.
Grassroots forces were able to garner international support because of two factors. They
were able to build significant pressure from Western government officials against the Tung
administration because they proactively sought linkages to foreign officials by making multiple
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trips to Western countries. Moreover, the legislation affected the domestic populations of foreign
countries. The public consultation document indicated that the Article 23 bill would pertain to
residents of foreign nationality and could apply outside of the region.
Grassroots forces were able to maintain a high degree of internal unity because they
perceived the Article 23 legislation to threaten higher levels of coercion going forward. Political
parties, human rights groups, religious organizations, and professional associations were all fearful
of the criminal charges, investigations, and fines outlined in the public consultation documents.
Shared concerns facilitated the coalition forming a coordinating platform and planning joint
actions.
The Tung administration’s coalition was impacted by the conflict over implementing the
POA system. The integrationist’s coalition’s reliance on PRC authorities to resolve conflicts made
it challenging to fix disputes involving the civil service without implementing structural changes.
These alterations led to the expulsion and defection of a former leader within the integrationist
coalition to the grassroots’ alliance. At the same time, the modifications the CE made to the
administration did help facilitate the resilience the coalition exhibited at the end of the first stage
of the movement. Their cohesion enabled them to withstand grassroots’ mobilization through
January of 2003.
Grassroots Level: Strong Western Support
Western government officials resolutely championed grassroots forces objectives in the
first stage of the Anti-Article 23 Movement. International warnings surrounding the
implementation of Article 23 had started in the years leading up to the CE’s attempt to codify it.
During the public consultation, Western government officials not only expressed concerns about
the legislation, but they echoed specific grassroots critiques regarding how the Tung administration
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was conducting the public consultation. This mirroring of grassroots language further
demonstrates Western governments’ support for grassroots forces during this stage of the
movement.
Many international organizations and actors expressed an intense degree of concern
regarding the Chief Executive’s plan to implement Article 23 legislation. International scrutiny of
the Chief Executive’s policies regarding Article 23 legislation was so strong that it began prior to
the government’s announcement of the public consultation document. International organizations
dismissed the need for the legislation in 2001 and 2002. In February of 2001, a visiting U.N.
Human Rights Committee member asked the Hong Kong Human Rights Committee to keep the
committee apprised of the government’s actions regarding Article 23 legislation (SCMP February
8th, 2001).
During the public consultation, multiple Western governments spoke out against the
proposed legislation. For instance, the British government declared that “the Joint Declaration with
China provides that the SAR government shall protect rights and freedoms” (SCMP November
20th, 2002). The comment insinuated that in the proposal’s current formulation, it failed to
preserve the promised liberties of the Sino-British Joint Declaration.
Moreover, some Western governments echoed specific grassroots’ requests and frames
when addressing the Tung administration. Grassroots forces criticized the Tung administration for
not releasing a “white bill,” or a bill that that gave the exact phrasing of the proposed legislation,
during the public consultation. They argued that the public could not evaluate the bill without
seeing the full language. An American State Department spokesman stated, "We believe there
should be an opportunity for the fullest possible consultation on the draft legislation; effective
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consultation and public confidence requires the early release of the actual language for public
deliberation” (SCMP November 23rd, 2002).
The Tung administration faced heightened criticism from international organizations and
Western governments during the public consultation on the Article 23 legislation. International
interest in the legislation was so heightened that it started before other countries had even seen the
public consultation document. Not only did Western officials attempt to pressure the Chief
Executive to remove aspects of the legislation, but they also echoed specific critiques lodged by
grassroots forces.
Increased Linkages and The Effect of the Policy on Foreign Nationals
Western governments’ statements against the Tung Administration’s proposals and their
willingness to echo grassroots’ concerns was a product of two factors. Grassroots forces deepened
their linkage to Western officials by making multiple trips abroad in the fall of 2002. These trips
helped them dispel the Tung administration’s framing of their plan to implement Article 23. The
proposals also indicated that Western countries’ domestic populations could be impacted by the
legislation, creating further grounds for Western governments to take the side of grassroots forces
in the preliminary stage of the movement. Domestic constituents operating in Hong Kong also
spurred Western government officials into action against the legislation.
The Tung administration tried to convince foreign governments that the proposed Article
23 legislation was in line with international standards for national security legislation. Officials
took a trip to the United States in the fall to explain the proposal to US government officials. The
government also paid David Pannick, a British lawyer who had argued over 50 cases in the House
of Lords and 20 before the European Court of Human Rights, to examine the Article 23 legislation.
Pannick found “nothing objectionable” in the consultation document, stating that “the rights
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conferred by Articles 27 and 39, and by the ICCPR, are not absolute. They require a balance
between the interests of the individual and other interests, that is the interests of others and the
interests of society” (Pannick 2002, 2).
Cultivating international linkages with Western officials, particularly through visits to
Western countries, was important to countering the Chief Executive’s framing of the Article 23
Legislation. Over the fall of 2002, grassroots forces took trips to the United States and Europe to
meet with Western officials. In October, representatives of the Pan-Democratic Camp political
party, the Democratic Party, and a leader from the Human Rights Monitor traveled the United
States and met with members of Congress to discuss the Article 23 legislation (SCMP October
20th, 2002). In Europe, Democratic Party members met with and lobbied former governor Chris
Patten, who was now the External Affairs Commissioner of the European Union. Patten’s interest
in the legacy of his governorship helped provide meetings with the secretary-general of the
European parliament and the chairwoman of a delegation for relations with China (SCMP
November 13th, 2002). Grassroots organizations were also able to speak to government authorities
in the UK and United Nations officials (SCMP November 13th, 2002).
During their meetings with Western officials, grassroots forces took pains to explain that
the legislation affected the citizens of Western countries. Foreign nationals, including British,
European, and US nationals, could be charged with crimes under Article 23. Any Hong Kong
permanent resident, even those of foreign nationality could be charged with treason, secession,
sedition or subversion. 106 Moreover, in cases of treason, sedition, and supporting proscribed
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Mainland organizations, the government was asserting its right to prosecute Hong Kong permanent
residents outside of its borders.107
The potential consequences for their domestic populations spurred foreign governments to
issue warnings regarding the Tung administration’s proposals. Immediately after meeting with
grassroots forces, the British Parliament took up a debate on the Tung administration’s proposals.
This debate was the first of its kind since the Handover (SCMP November 20th, 2002).
International business associations also lobbied their governments and the Tung
administration in an effort to amend the legislation. They were also concerned about the fact that
the public consultation document indicated foreign nationals could be charged with violating the
law. For instance, the International Chamber of Commerce-Hong Kong, argued against this aspect
of the Article 23 legislation:
The harmonious and cosmopolitan environment so closely tied to the Hong Kong way of
life will be changed, and most of the freedoms enjoyed will be caged … Knowledge or
skills, which are the great assets to Hong Kong's future, may be lost as many working in
Hong Kong possess foreign passports as well permanent residency (SCMP January 3rd
2003).

Both grassroots’ cultivation of international linkages, and the domestic interests of foreign
government officials were important to grassroots forces generating Western support during the
public consultation. They were able to obtain meetings with officials to provide a rebuttal to the
Tung administrations’ framing of the issue. Western governments also spoke out against the
legislation because it affected their interests; the public consultation document indicated that
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foreign nationals could be charged with violating the law. International business organizations also
lobbied both Western governments and the Chief Executive to amend the legislation, further
incentivizing Western officials to decry the Tung Administration’s proposals.
Grassroots Level: Intensified Unity
Grassroots forces were able to maintain relatively high levels of cohesion throughout the
public consultation from September through January of 2003. Over the course of four months,
grassroots forces were able to build a coordinating platform that was able to proactively plan joint
direct actions months in advance and allow for greater mobilization. The high level of mobilization
produced greater public awareness, leading to more mass engagement with the public consultation
process and greater pressure on the Tung administration.
One indication of high levels of unity among grassroots forces was the creation and
maintenance of what would become a long-standing coordination platform, the Civil Human
Rights Front (CHRF). Shortly after the government’s announcement, over fifty human rights,
migrant, democracy, and religious groups created the platform. The groups had not originally
planned to create a longstanding organization, but a temporary collaborative platform for
upcoming anti-discrimination legislation. 108 Once the government promulgated the Article 23
public consultation document, participants decided to start a working group for the legislation,
which became the basis for the CHRF. This coordinating platform eventually incorporated
members of the Pan-Democratic Camp political parties and the Hong Kong Journalists’
Association as well.
While coordination among grassroots organizations was relatively high, there were still
organizations and individuals that pursued different strategies. For instance, members of the Bar
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Association and legal scholars banded together to form the Article 23 Concern Group.109 This
organization held press conferences, published pamphlets about the components of Article 23, and
wrote editorials on the matter from the fall of 2002 through the summer of 2003. While they did
not closely collaborate with CHRF, they did participate in actions organized by the latter
organization.
Through having a coordinating platform and bolstered unity, grassroots forces were able
to amplify their mobilization levels through holding joint actions and planning activities further in
advance. For instance, in October and November of 2002, when protests against Article 23
legislation were hosted by individual groups, turnout was miniscule. Only 20 people showed up to
a protest organized by the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of
China on November 23 (SCMP November 23, 2002). Yet when CHRF, political parties, journalist
associations, and religious organizations planned a march for a month later, on December 15th,
they were able to get over 60,000 people to attend. This number was a remarkable feat, considering
they had expected only 5000 participants (SCMP December, 16th 2002).
The scale of the protest on December 15th caught public attention, creating a multiplier
effect for mobilization. Within less than two weeks of the protest, the Security Bureau reported
that it had gone from receiving 18,000 submissions to 90,000 submissions on the legislation (The
Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 2002; SCMP December 23rd,
2002). No other public consultation had received as widespread participation since the Handover
(SCMP January 13th, 2003).
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The Threat of Coercion
Grassroots forces perceived the Article 23 legislation as boding increased coercion for
many of their members, which fostered unity within the coalition. A number of organizations had
linkages to Mainland organizations. Several members of the political parties that comprised the
Pan-Democratic Camp, including the Democratic Party and Frontier, had members that were a part
of the organization called Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of
China. The organization had been formed following Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989 and had
supported the democratic movement on the Mainland and Chinese activists ever since.
Religious organizations also felt they could be targeted by the legislation. The Falun Gong
often protested and sought to publicize the condition of practitioners in Mainland China. Hong
Kong Christian organizations, particularly the Catholic Church, also had connections to Mainland
Chinese organizations.110 The Chinese government did not accept the authority of the Vatican to
appoint bishops in Mainland China, instead appointing their own state-sanctioned clergy. As a
result, millions of Catholics practiced in “underground churches.” The Diocese of Hong Kong had
a lot of connections to, and provided support for, these underground churches.111
Professional organizations also faced the possibility of increased coercion. The
consultation document’s wording worried press organizations, like the Hong Kong Journalists’
Association (HKJA) and the Foreign Correspondents Club, as well as academics and members of
the Professional Teachers Union (PTU). Both the sections on sedition and the Official Secrets
Ordinance had no allowances for individuals to publish unlawful materials in the public interest,
potentially putting them in danger of violating the law (South China Morning Post November 7th,
2002). Academics and the PTU were apprehensive that under the proposals, discussing political
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and social movements, ethnic minorities in Mainland China or Taiwan, or civic education, could
leave them vulnerable to censure (SCMP November 16th, 2002).
The breadth of the Article 23 legislation convinced many grassroots organizations that they
could be subject to future coercion. Political parties and religious organizations were worried about
their connections to Mainland China. Professional organizations feared that the policies on sedition
and subversion would affect their work. This apprehension of repression outweighed divergent
interests among the grassroots coalition, enabling them to work in tandem during the public
consultation.
Elite Level: Defections and Resilience in the Coalition
In the initial stage of the Anti-Article 23 Movement, the Chief Executive was only able to
rely on a moderate level of cohesion within the integrationist coalition. The Tung administration
suffered a defection from a former prominent member of their camp. This defection undermined
their narratives regarding the format of the public consultation. The rest of the integrationist
coalition remained relatively steadfast. Despite a few concerns about the economic consequences
of the bill, the majority of members of the integrationist camp supported the administration’s
decisions and rallied around the CE following the December 15th march. The cohesion among the
majority of the coalition produced high levels of counter-mobilization. The Tung administration
used this counter-mobilization to dismiss claims by grassroots forces and reject calls for
concessions.
During the public consultation, there was one high level defection from the integrationist
coalition. The former Chief Secretary under the Tung administration, Anson Chan, made public
statements supporting grassroots objectives in November of 2002. The Chief Secretary is the
highest position under the Chief Executive in the Hong Kong executive branch. Chan had retired
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from the position the year before, in 2001. The former Chief Secretary gave speeches to
international audiences (SCMP November 14th,

2002). Though diplomatic, she publicly

undermined the Tung administration by calling for a white bill on the Article 23 legislation that
would specify the language for public scrutiny, as advocated by grassroots forces (SCMP
November 14th, 2002). Chan’s defection was permanent, she continued to support grassroots
forces at later stages of the Anti-Article 23 Movement, as well as in future movements throughout
the 2000s and 2010s.
One integrationist legislator within the Legislative Council broke with the Chief Executive
and echoed Chan’s calls for a white paper. In December of 2002, the banking sector’s functional
constituency legislator advocated for a white bill in meetings with the Security Secretary (SCMP
December 3rd, 2002; December 18th, 2002; February 12th, 2003). He accused the CE of polarizing
society by not releasing a white paper " He should produce a white paper bill and not leave people
to guess and say trust me' - that is not right" (SCMP December 18th, 2002).
However, the majority of the integrationist camp rallied behind the Tung administration in
the face of grassroots mobilization. Twenty-seven pro-government organizations formed the Hong
Kong Coalition for National Security Legislation and held a rally the week after the December 15th
protest (SCMP December 22nd, 2002). Despite the objections of the one pro-business functional
constituency representative, most pro-business factions attended, including the Liberal Party and
the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce (SCMP December 17th, 2002). Over 40,000
people attended the rally, slightly less than the participants at the grassroots rally the week before.
This level of mobilization allowed the Tung administration to describe mobilization as even on
either side of the issue (SCMP December 23rd, 2002b).
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Overall, The Tung administration’s position was hurt during the public consultation by
elite defection. The former Chief Secretary had been a key figure in the administration for almost
the entirety of the Chief Executive’s tenure, making her remarks regarding the implementation of
the Article 23 persuasive. At the same time, however, the rest of the integrationist coalition was
able to remain united, resulting in high counter-mobilization in the face of grassroots pressure.
The Role of China as a Third Party Arbiter
Elite defection from, and the resilience of, the integrationist coalition can both be explained
by the implementation of the Principle Official Accountability (POA) system. The reliance of the
majority of the integrationist coalition on the PRC authorities to resolve internal disputes made it
impossible to rectify tensions with the faction of the coalition that had the least connection to the
PRC apparatus, the civil servants. To resolve this clash, the Chief Secretary had to be expelled
from the alliance and the structure of the civil service and Executive Council amended to give the
CE and PRC leadership more authority over appointments. While the reorganization created elite
defection, the resulting Executive Council structure coming out of the POA system did provide a
means of harmonizing elite interests in the fall of 2002.
As explored in the previous chapter, the integrationist coalition was bound through their
mutual connections to the PRC apparatus.112 Yet many senior civil servants, including the Chief
Secretary and the majority of Tung’s department heads, had served both in the colonial and the
post-colonial era. They did not have as many connections to the PRC administration and had preestablished traditions arising from the period of British rule. Their “core values” emphasized that
they we7re not politicians, despite the fact that their duties included making public speeches
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explaining government policies and answering questions in the Legislative Council. They were to
implement policies with neutral competence and protect that neutrality (Lam 2005).
The lack of connection between civil service and the PRC leadership made it difficult to
resolve tensions within the integrationist camp related to their performance. Integrationist officials,
particularly members of the Executive Council from the business community, were inclined to
believe that policy failures were the civil servants’ fault and stoked Tung’s grievance at the
political neutrality of the civil service (Lo 2008). One former legislator declared that their service
under the British colonial rule was proof of their incompetence, “By definition, the British don’t
want smart civil servants.”113 He also viewed their interests as being separate from those of the
rest of the integrationist coalition.114 Civil servants also felt like they were treated with suspicion
and resented being seen as disloyal, believing that other members of the integrationist camp
misunderstood the nature of their neutrality.115 One civil servant remarked that,
You know, they called us a very bad name which roughly translated into English would be
the ‘bastards of the remnants of the colonial regime.’ That was the name they had given to
all of the civil servants who had straddled the 1997 [Handover]. They don’t care whether
we make a contribution or not. They just don’t think we are loyal enough, and we will not
do what we are told.116
Tensions arose between the Chief Secretary, Anson Chan, and Chief Executive Tung over
the degree to which civil servants were to remain politically neutral or provide support for the CE’s
policies. Tung saw his Chief Secretary as the main obstacle to reforming the civil service. One
integrationist former lawmaker explained that
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Because everyone else was a civil servant in the government except for the top, and Anson
[Chan] kept reminding the top that civil servants should be politically neutral, and by that
she meant ‘don’t make us, as civil servants, go to the public to sell your political ideas.
That’s not for us to do.’ Tung very soon realized that ‘I am the only one in the government
that is supposed to have the capacity, to have the legitimacy to carry out any political
task.’117

Considering that connections to the PRC did not offer a means of mediating the dispute,
the Chief Executive implemented the POA system in part to expel his Chief Secretary from the
integrationist coalition, and thereby gain more leverage over the rest of the administration.118 The
PRC leadership supported his actions. The POA system also put PRC authorities in a position to
ensure influence over future civil servants, since they had the power to approve or reject top
appointments.
The POA system ameliorated some of the tensions within the integrationist camp. Prior to
the implementation of the POA system, problems within the integrationist coalition became so
tense that the PRC’s President openly called for increased unity under the leadership of the Chief
Executive in 2000. “Tycoons, top officials, professionals and others” were to “rally behind Mr.
Tung and support his work” (SCMP December 21st, 2000).
With the POA system, both top civil servants and political parties were included in the
Executive Council, allowing the body to act as a pseudo unifying institution for elite factions,
harmonizing elite interests. Some civil servants believed that their inclusion in the Executive
Council and their more direct accountability to the CE would instill in them a greater need to serve
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the public. 119 Inclusion in the ExCo also allowed integrationist political parties to signal their
involvement with the government for more popular legislation.120 Moreover, it gave the parties
increased access and input into government strategies, enabling them to avoid public turnabouts
that could hurt in elections.
The reliance on PRC authorities to resolve disputes made it difficult to resolve tensions
with the civil service, who had served under the British colonial administration. Fixing the
situation therefore required reorganization of the administration under the POA system, which
sidelined a leading figure in the Tung administration. This incident created the conditions for a
prominent elite defection, but also provided a basis for unifying other factions in the coalition. In
spite of a few objections to the process of the public consultation, the integrationist elite were able
to rally around the administration to support the legislation in December of 2002.
Interactions Between Resources:
The changes in the resources available to the CE and to grassroots resources interacted
during the first stage of the Anti-Article 23 Movement. While most of the integrationist camp
remained unified, the moderate decline in the decline in elite cohesion amplified grassroots
resource of support from Western government officials. To a more limited extent, grassroots
forces’ ability to amass Western backing was a source of strain on the unity within the
integrationist coalition, though ultimately, the alliance held. Finally, grassroots forces’ internal
solidarity also had a positive effect on their ability to garner international support.
The defection of the former Chief Secretary helped to elicit further support from Western
governments. Having served in both the colonial administration and Tung’s administration, Chan
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had extensive connections to foreign policy circles. These relationships made her criticisms of the
way the Tung administration attempted to enact Article 23 all the more potent.
In the initial stage of the Anti-Article 23 Movement, Western support for grassroots forces
did create some pressure on some integrationist factionsFor instance, the banking sector functional
constituency legislator voiced support for a grassroots’ demand, that the CE release a white bill
for the Article 23 legislation (SCMP December 3rd, 2002). Publicly, the legislator warned that
more than ten foreign banks, including those from the US, UK, France, and Germany, expressed
concerns about the proposal (SCMP December 3rd, 2002). He faced pressure from elite in the
business sector to challenge the CE’s conduct of the public consultation (SCMP December 3rd,
2002). During this period, however, none of the other pro-business political parties or
organizations spoke out in favor of a white bill.
The high degree of unity among grassroots forces bolstered their ability to connect with
Western government officials. Both Pan-Democratic Camp politicians and civil society
organization leaders traveled to Western countries together to advocate against the legislation. As
mentioned in chapter 3, prior to the Handover, Democratic Party leaders had traveled by
themselves to meet with US government officials.121 In the fall of 2002, a Democratic Party leader
traveled with head of the Human Rights Monitor to meet with US and European authorities (SCMP
October 20th, 2002). The collaboration in reaching out to Western linkages allowed them to book
more public speaking engagements while in the United States, deepening their connections to
policy circles (SCMP October 20th, 2002).
Overall, throughout the first stage of the Anti-Article 23 Movement, grassroots forces were
able to amass resources that allowed them to exert pressure against the Chief Executive. However,
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the relative cohesion among integrationist forces enabled the CE to resist making concessions.
Grassroots forces were able to elicit international objections to aspects of the legislation and
jointly-mobilized direct actions with tens of thousands of participants. Furthermore, the defection
of a prominent former member of the integrationist camp further bolstered the grassroots’ position.
This defection embarrassed the Chief Executive’s administration and heightening international
outcry against the legislation. Despite these challenges, the integrationist coalition maintained a
degree of unity, overcoming concerns about the legislation’s economic effects and organizing a
successful counter-mobilization event in response to grassroots activity. Instead of offering
grassroots forces concessions, the CE attempted to eliminate international pressure in their revision
to the Article 23 proposal.

Stage 2: The Article 23 Legislative Process
Over the course of the spring of 2003, the Tung administration tabled the Article 23 bill.
The legislation was similar to that of the public consultation document of the previous fall. Despite
originally having enough votes to pass the legislation, by early July the Chief Executive had to
suspend the bill. A few months after that, the bill was withdrawn. Grassroots forces were ultimately
able to keep the Chief Executive from enacting Article 23 legislation in July of 2003.

The Local Government’s Implementation of Autonomy in Response to Grassroots Forces
The second stage of the Article 23 Movement resulted in changes in the Tung
administration’s implementation of autonomy policy following interactions between the Chief
Executive and grassroots forces. For nearly five months during the legislative process, the Chief
Executive did not offer concessions to grassroots forces. Following the July 1st March, the CE
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expressed a willingness to grant concessions, but shortly thereafter was forced to withdraw the
bill. The Chief Executive voiced hope that the Article 23 legislation could be restarted the rest of
the summer, but by September of 2003, he was forced to withdraw the bill entirely.
For the first six months of 2003, while the Article 23 legislation was being scrutinized by
the Legislative Council, the Chief Executive did not offer major concessions to grassroots forces.
The Tung administration only started addressing some of the major concerns of grassroots
organizations following the July 1st March. On July 5th, the Tung administration announced that
three measures would be changed in the bill. The administration would delete both the banning of
Hong Kong associations connected with Mainland organizations and the provisions for warrantless
searches in emergency investigations. They also planned to add an amendment that would allow a
“public interest” defense for unlawful disclosure under the Official Secrets Ordinance.122
However, within less than a week, on July 7th, the Tung administration suspended the
legislative perusal of Article 23 legislation entirely. This announcement came immediately after
the integrationist party leader, James Tien, resigned from the Executive Council and declared that
his party could not support the legislation. The Chief Executive tied the suspension of the bill to
the defection in his press statement, “In light of the position of the Liberal Party, we have decided,
after detailed deliberations, to defer the resumption of the second reading of the Bill” (The
Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 2003g).
The Chief Executive still publicly vowed, however, to try to implement the Article 23
legislation. In multiple statements to the press throughout July, the Tung administration insisted
that “Hong Kong has an undeniable constitutional duty to enact laws to protect national security”
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(The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 2003e; 2003g).123 The Chief
Executive announced that his administration would relaunch a public consultation, “since many of
our citizens still do not understand the contents” of the legislation (The Government of the Special
Administrative Region of Hong Kong 2003d).
The Chief Executive finally withdrew the Article 23 legislation on September 5th, 2003,
nearly two months after the LegCo suspended consideration of the bill. His announcement still
indicated that he wished to pursue Article 23 legislation at a later date, reiterating that “Enacting
the legislation under Article 23 is… not only a constitutional duty that the HKSAR must fulfil, but
also a civic duty of the people of Hong Kong” (The Government of the Special Administrative
Region of Hong Kong 2003d). The Chief Executive announced that he would have his Security
Bureau set up a special working group to review legislative work on the national security bill (The
Government of the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong 2003d). Yet neither the Tung
administration, nor the two subsequent administrations, attempted to implement Article 23
legislation again.

Grassroots and the Chief Executive’s Resources During the Tabling of Article 23
The prolonged refusal of the Tung administration to grant concessions, as well as the
subsequent attempts to revive the legislation, demonstrates that it was the culmination of
international outcry, grassroots unity in mobilization, and elite fissures that finally led to the Chief
Executive’s change in stance. Prior to Western government censures in June and the July 1st March,
the Tung administration had not offered significant amendments to grassroots forces. In contrast
to the public consultation, the Tung administration was not able to hold their coalition together to
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counter grassroots mobilization. The Chief Executive’s suspension of the bill occurred
immediately after the Liberal Party declared that it would not vote for the current Article 23
legislation, even with the Chief Executive’s amendments.
Support from Western government officials fluctuated over the first six months of 2003
because of changes in the interests of Western governments. The Chief Executive was at first
successful at engendering good will in the early spring. Western governments returned to
defending grassroots forces following the SARS epidemic because they perceived the
implementation of Article 23 as a threat to their own security.
Grassroots forces were able to maintain coalitional unity because of the continued threat
of coercion in the Article 23 bill. The Chief Executive did not try to coopt specific segments of
grassroots forces through ameliorating aspects of the legislation. As a result, grassroots forces
maintained their collective platform, enabling them to mobilize the July 1st March.
The Tung administration’s coalition could not remain unified in the face grassroots
pressure because of the iterative impact of the CE’s utilization of PRC authorities to resolve intraelite tensions. Despite the inclusion of more factions of the integrationist camp in the Executive
Council, previous mediation efforts by the PRC apparatus created ambiguity around who was the
final authority in a crisis. While Tung sought to resolve the situation through the Executive
Council, members of the coalition went to Beijing for guidance, leading to the elite defection that
ultimately made it impossible to pass the legislation.
Grassroots Level: Western Officials Retreat and Renew Support
International outcry against the Article 23 legislation changed considerably while the
Legislative Council was considering the Tung administration’s bill. In the early months of 2003,
Western government officials refused to confront the Chief Executive despite meetings with
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grassroots forces. By June of 2003, however, leadership of multiple Western governments were
calling for the Article 23 legislation to be withdrawn. High profile statements from Western
officials, particularly the United States, helped to mobilize participation in the July 1st March.
In contrast to their vocal criticism of the Article 23 proposals during the public
consultation, Western government officials demurred from issuing strong statements despite
grassroots entreaties in the early months of 2003. In one instance, members of the Democratic
Party met with the European Parliament vice-president along with other parliament members in
April. They could only extract promises to make private statements to China at the time (SCMP
April 1st, 2003). Rather than pressuring the Chief Executive, the European Commission assured
the Tung administration that the EU's basic policy was “to trust the HKSAR Government on
matters relating to Article 23 of the Basic Law” (The Government of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region 2003a).
The United States and the United Kingdom also resisted making forceful claims against
the Tung administration over the Article 23 legislation in early 2003. The U.S. State Department’s
annual United States-Hong Kong Policy Act Report focused heavily on the implications of Article
23, but the tone was relatively neutral. Rather suggesting that the bill compromised the United
States-Hong Kong Policy Act or harmed United States interests in the region, they alluded to the
fact that the legislation had created internal tensions.124 As late as May 17th, the United State
Consul-General espoused confidence in the Hong Kong government and stated that the matter was
for Hong Kong people to decide (SCMP May 17th, 2003). Similarly, in March of 2003, the British
Foreign Office Minister approved of the draft bill put forward by the government in March as
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being in full accord with “One Country, Two Systems” and Hong Kong’s commitment to the
ICCPR (The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 2003b).
By the end of June, however, Western government officials began to issue even stronger
statements against the Tung administration than they had during the public consultation. The US
House of Representatives passed a non-binding resolution urging Hong Kong to scrap the bill
entirely and immediately hold elections (SCMP June 28th, 2003). The White House also stepped
in, admonishing the Chief Executive and PRC leadership to withdraw the bill, as it would "reduce
the basic human freedoms of the people of Hong Kong" (SCMP June 28th, 2003).
Many Western countries voiced concerns about the legislation around the same time
period. On June 30th, one night before the sixth anniversary of the Handover, Britain issued a
forcefully worded statement that rebuked the proposed legislation. They declared it was
inconsistent with the “one country, two systems” principle ( SCMP June 27th, 2003). The European
Union, Canada, and Australia also all made statements against the bill that summer.
International outcry became a mobilizing argument for grassroots forces to encourage
participation in the July 1st March. The timing of their support, the end of June, coincided with
both voting on the bill and the July 1st March CHRF organized. Apple Daily, a newspaper
company that actively took part in advertising for the march, highlighted U.S. disapproval of the
bill, making it the headline of their newspaper two out of the last ten days before march (Wong
2015).125
The SARS Outbreak and Western Interests
Western support for the grassroots coalition shifted with the interests of foreign
government officials in 2003. As with the public consultation period, grassroots efforts to court
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foreign officials remained high. Yet during the early months of 2003, Western governments were
placated by the Hong Kong government’s concessions. They only became more vociferous in
their attacks of the Article 23 legislation after the SARS outbreak. The circumstances of the
outbreak led Western officials to view Hong Kong’s liberal information environment as critical to
their domestic security interests.
During the second stage of the Anti-Article 23 Movement, grassroots forces continued to
attempt to cultivate international linkages with Western government officials. Grassroots political
party members, human rights groups, and independent legislators made at least two sets of trips to
Europe and North America between February and May (SCMP June 12th 2003). Meetings between
grassroots forces and Western government officials, however, failed to result in support for
grassroots objectives in the early months of 2003.
The timing of Western governments’ waning support for grassroots forces was consistent
with the Tung administration’s changes in the legislation regarding foreign nationals. Tabled
legislation had ensured that foreign nationals, even those with HKSAR permanent residency,
would not be tried with treason. Moreover, extra-territorial application of the legislation only
applied to Chinese nationals. The legislation, therefore, no longer posed a threat to the domestic
constituencies of Western governments.
International receptivity to grassroots’ entreaties changed, however, following the PRC
government and the Tung administration’s handling of the SARS outbreak. While public health
officials had been alerted to the developing situation by January 2003, there was a publicity
blackout regarding the SARS infection over Chinese New Year, as families traveled across the
country to celebrate the holiday. The Implementing Regulations on the State Secrets Law
stipulated that any occurrence of infectious diseases should be classified as a state secret before
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they are “announced by the Ministry of Health or organs authorized by the Ministry” (Huang
2004). The Ministry of Health informed the World Health Organization about the local outbreak
in January but did not inform them of how widespread SARS had become in China until the
beginning of April (Huang 2004).
Furthermore, Guangdong’s report on the disease had a security designation, which
prevented Hong Kong health officials from being able to obtain information and prepare. Given
its status as an economic trading and financial hub, it became a “major international transit route
for SARS” (Huang 2004). Despite its relatively small population, Hong Kong had over a fourth of
the reported cases within China (World Health Organizaiton 2003).126 In total, the disease spread
to 30 countries (World Health Organizaiton 2003). The health crisis lasted through July of 2003,
when the Tung administration wanted to have the final vote on the Article 23 Bill.
Considering the outbreak was exacerbated by security legislation that prevented timely
exchanges of important public health information, many Western governments began to change
their attitude toward the Article 23 legislation. The draft bill made unauthorized disclosures about
national security illegal. Furthermore, as of early June, reporters still could not utilize an “in the
public interest” defense when publishing unauthorized information regarding Mainland-Hong
Kong relations (SCMP July 6th 2003).
Grassroots forces were more effective in connecting and persuading foreign governments
of their cause in the wake of SARS. In June of 2003, the non-governmental organization Freedom
House funded a group of grassroots organizers to come to both New York and Washington, D.C
(SCMP May 30th, 2003). The cohort met with the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, congressional
representatives, and top aides to President Bush (SCMP June 9th, 2003). After meeting with the
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Hong Kong delegation, officials warned that the U.S. was concerned and that implementation of
the bill should not result in any restrictions on freedoms and liberties.
While the Tung administration was initially able to thwart grassroots entreaties through
concessions, the interests of Western officials changed by the summer of 2003. After China’s
secrecy laws led to belated warnings regarding SARs, Western governments began to view Hong
Kong’s more liberal information environment as critical to their own security and safety.
Therefore, grassroots forces’ meetings with Western government officials in June of 2003
proved more fruitful, resulting in statements that advocated for the scrapping of the bill entirely.
Grassroots Level: Continued Unity
Grassroots organizations remained cohesive in their efforts during the second stage of the
Anti-Article 23 Movement. Unity among grassroots forces could be seen in their navigation of
conflict. Coalition members disagreed on attacking the administration; professional organizations
and religious organizations feared that those attacks would irreparably harm relationships with the
government that might be needed in the future.127 To ensure participation and accommodate these
organizations, the CHRF agreed to not be include calls for Tung Chee Hwa to step down in the
marches they were planning. They did, however, publicly assert that participants could join the
July 1st March to express broader anti-government sentiment (SCMP June 10th 2003). CHRF also
stoked more generalized anti-government sentiment through a postcard campaign satirizing the
government’s attempts to encourage tourism following the SARS outbreak (SCMP June 20th,
2003).128
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Heightened cohesion among grassroots forces allowed them to plan and execute actions
through the CRHF coordinating platform further out from the event’s date. Grassroots
organizations decided in May to host a series of protests and actions that would culminate in a
“final showdown” protest on July 1st, the anniversary of the Handover (SCMP May 20th , 2003).
They therefore had nearly a month and a half to mobilize 100,000 people SCMP May 20th, 2003).
Approximately 500,000 people participated in the July 1st March, making it the largest
demonstration Hong Kong had seen since 1989.
Limited Cooptation and the Continued Threat of Coercion
The Chief Executive did not attempt to offer significant inducements to factions of the
grassroots coalition. The coercive elements in the Article 23 proposals remained and continued to
affect all members of the grassroots coalition in the legislation tabled by the Tung administration.
As of June, the Article 23 legislation still contained clauses which would allow associations with
connections to Mainland organizations deemed security threats by the PRC authorities to be
banned. The Tung administration also insisted that provisions for warrantless searches in cases of
suspected violation of national security legislation remain (South China Morning Post July 6th,
2003).
Where they had offered a concession, it was not enough to erase the threat of coercion. The
Tung administration had moderated the charges of seditious publications. However, journalists
still believed they were vulnerable to censure under the amendments to the Official Secrets
Ordinance (SCMP July 6th, 2003).
As opposed to offering concessions to particular groups, the Tung administration tried to
convince the public that the Article 23 proposals were in line with other common law jurisdictions.
For example, a spokesman for the Tung administration reasoned that the charges of sedition in the
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bill were “based on the well-established common law concept of incitement. This is in line with
the 1977 UK Law Commission's recommendations” ( The Government of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region 2003c). Similarly, during a press conference on June 20th, the Secretary of
Security insisted on June 20th, 2003, that the Tung administration would not add a “public interest”
defense against indictment under the Official Secrets Ordinance. She explained that “we have
surveyed the statutes of common law jurisdictions and we have not found any such public interest
defense.”129
The Chief Executive chose not to make significant concessions to factions of the
grassroots coalition through the beginning of July 2003. Instead, the administration tried to
assuage public concern by arguing the bill was in line with Western common law statutes. In
the absence of concessions that could co-opt members of the grassroots coalition, the threat
of coercion kept grassroots forces unified.
Elite Level: The Integrationist Coalition’s Solidarity Fractures
During the second stage of the Anti-Article 23 Movement, the absence of cohesion within
the integrationist coalition made it impossible for the Chief Executive to continue codifying the
bill in the face of grassroots pressure. Fragmentation within the coalition began after the July 1st
March of 2003. The Chief Executive was unable to remedy dissent within his coalition through
the Executive Council. A member of the Executive Council and the leader of the Liberal Party,
James Tien, appealed to the PRC authorities in Beijing. Following this meeting, the Liberal Party
refused to support the Article 23 legislation, depriving the Tung administration of the votes that
they needed to pass the bill.
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Members of the integrationist coalition began to waver under the strain of the massive
mobilization during the July 1st March. Thirteen legislators told the South China Morning Post that
the huge turnout impacted how they would vote, including most of the members from the Liberal
Party (SCMP July 4th, 2003). The majority of the Breakfast Group, an integrationist association
of functional constituency representatives, also claimed they needed to consult their constituencies
before affirming that they would still vote for the bill. One member of the Breakfast Group outright
refused to support the bill moving forward (SCMP July 4th, 2003).
The Chief Executive was unable to utilize Executive Council meetings to work out a plan
among the integrationist coalition. The Chief Executive held emergency meetings with members
of the Executive Council on July 2nd and July 3rd in an effort to strategize a response to grassroots
forces. The Legislative Council was set to vote on the bill on July 9th, and CHRF had threatened
to launch further protests if the legislation was not withdrawn (SCMP July 4th, 2003). Despite these
meetings, Executive Councilor and Liberal Party Chair James Tien, along with the legislator from
the banking functional constituency, decided to go to Beijing themselves to directly talk to central
government authorities in the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office about the crisis (SCMP July
5th, 2003).
The Liberal Party leader believed he had the blessing of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs
Office in asking for the bill to be delayed. Tien urged the Tung administration to suspend the bill
(SCMP July 8th, 2003). The Chief Executive initially responded with plans to move forward with
the July 9th reading of the bill. Tien then quit the Executive Council and announced he could not
support the legislation (SCMP July 9th, 2003). The rest of the Liberal Party followed suit and
rejected the bill as well. Without the Liberal Party, the government did not have sufficient votes
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for the bill to pass in the Legislative Council. Tung was forced to suspend the bill and then abandon
it completely by the fall.
The Failure of the POA System and the Role of China
The integrationist coalition fractured following the July 1st March both because of the
inadequacies of the Executive Council in its capacity as a platform for resolving elite disputes and
the ambiguity local elite’s reliance on the PRC apparatus had created. While more factions were
included in the Executive Council, the routines within the institution had not changed, making it
difficult for the Chief Executive to use the institution to handle the contemporary crisis. Moreover,
inclusion in the Executive Council did not fully resolve the electoral pressures integrationist parties
face. At the same time, the PRC leadership’s role in backing the Chief Executive and resolving
elite tensions created ambiguity around who was the final authority, leading to the defection of the
Liberal Party leader.
While the Chief Executive planned to use ExCo to coordinate among the integrationist
coalition, the formal procedures within the institution had not been adjusted to allow for proactive
problem-solving and dispute resolution. A former member of the ExCo recounted that meetings
“only go through policy papers that are put forward by the bureaus.”130 The Executive Council
therefore could not easily serve as a mechanism for coordinating public outreach in the face of
resistance to policies. While members of the government’s integrationist coalition of business
elites, political parties, labor unions, and political officials guessed that the march might have
significant turnout, the issue was not discussed in ExCo before July 1st. An interviewee explained,
There were a lot of rumors going around that lots of people would go to the streets on July
the 1st. The government simply-…a rational person would think, the people at the top
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should get together and sort of work out how to prepare for that. And if, indeed a big
number of people march in the streets, how should the government respond. I was in the
ExCo, we didn’t spend one minute talking about that. Everybody knew, I mean in our heart,
we knew that something big was going to happen.”

Moreover, while more factions were included in the Executive Council, the coordinating
platform also failed to resolve the disparate interests between integrationist parties forced to
compete to retain elected offices. One interviewee explained that the primary reason why support
among functional constituency seats for the bill waned was the concern about upcoming popular
elections.131 The District Council Elections were coming up in the fall of 2003. More importantly,
the Legislative Council would change in 2004. The Election Committee constituency seats were
being disbanded, meaning that now half, as opposed to a third, of the legislature seats would be
chosen by popular election. Members of both Pan-Democratic Camp parties and integrationist
parties both believed that in 2008 Hong Kong would have popular elections for the entirety of the
Legislative Council. 132
They [were] trying to take into consideration the efforts the people expressed, so James
Tien resigned from ExCo, because as an ExCo member your allied with the government
position, so that means you have to go along with the bill…According to the Basic Law,
the legislature will go to full election. So, they think, going to direct elections is
unavoidable. And actually, their main power is in the functional constituency, even now.
So, if you have to face the public, how can you support the bill?133
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That fall, the Liberal Party was one of the few integrationist parties that won more seats in the
District Council. The following year, the party also picked up another two seats in the
Legislative Council, further proving that their stand against the Tung administration had been
popular among voters.
Finally, the PRC leadership’s role in ordaining the development of the POA system and their
expanded authority under the system created ambiguity about the final source of authority within
the integrationist coalition. This ambiguity led members of integrationist coalition to seek out the
PRC leadership following disagreements among the different Hong Kong factions about how to
respond to grassroots forces. While the PRC leadership supported Tung and wanted him to enact
the legislation, the two levels of authority created confusion; Tien had misinterpreted the Hong
Kong and Macau Affairs Office’ response and decided to use it to act against the CE.
Since the structure of the Executive Council did not change with the initiation of the POA
system, it proved difficult to utilize the institution to both anticipate and mediate crisis situations.
The format did not allow integrationist coalition members to share their concerns about possible
mobilization on July 1st. Moreover, the institution could not address integrationist parties’
divergent interests arising from electoral pressures. Since the PRC leadership had resolved
previous conflicts and had been instrumental to the creation of the POA system, members of the
integrationist coalition turned to them when they disagreed with the Chief Executive. The
ambiguity around the final authority in policy creation led to the Liberal Party’s defection and
withdrawal of the legislation.
Interactions Between Resources:
As with the first stage of the Anti-Article 23 Movement, changes in the resources available
to both the CE and the grassroots forces interacted in a way that further solidified the grassroots
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forces’ position during the second stage of the movement. Pressure from Western countries
contributed to declining cohesion within the integrationist coalition. Moreover, grassroots forces’
solidarity once again amplified their ability to garner support from Western officials.
Western denouncements contributed the breakdown in elite cohesion the summer of 2003.
As discussed earlier in the chapter, the banking sector functional constituency representative had
expressed support for grassroots’ call for a white paper in December of 2002 after discussions with
foreign bankers. Members of the banking sector once again expressed concerns about the
legislation, leading the legislator to once again move away from the Chief Executive’s position.
In June, the banking functional constituency representative reported that a “number” of foreign
investors expressed concerns to him about the Article 23 legislation (SCMP June 27th, 2003).
Following the July 1st March, he stated that he would not agree to support the bill until he had
consulted with members of the banking sector (SCMP July 3rd, 2003). He then accompanied James
Tien to Beijing in an attempt to overrule the Tung administration following the July 1st March.
The continued solidarity among grassroots forces continued to strengthen their ability to
connect with Western government officials and elicit support. The coalition visiting Western
countries grew in the spring of 2003 to encompass Pan-Democratic Camp lawmakers, human
rights activists, labor unions, and journalist associations (SCMP May 30th, 2003). The diversity
of the coalition expanded their ability to network in Western countries and added gravitas to their
claims regarding the problems with the Article 23 legislation.
Interactions between the relatively high level of grassroots resources during the second
stage of the movement both compounded their strength and weakened the Chief Executive’s
position in the second stage of the Anti-Article 23 Movement. Grassroots forces’ ability to foment
Western outcry against the legislation put pressure on certain members of the integrationist camp
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to defect. Their capacity to garner Western official’s support was further increased by their own
internal cohesion, further bolstering their position vis-à-vis the Chief Executive.
In comparing the two stages of the Anti-Article 23 Movement, grassroots forces
demonstrated similar levels of strength at crucial junctures of both movements, despite some
fluctuation in their ability to garner international support. The key difference during the Legislative
Council’s examination of the bill was the inability of the Chief Executive’s coalition to remain
unified in the face of grassroots pressure. The integrationist coalition fractured following the July
1st March, leading to the Article 23 legislation to first be paused and then completely withdrawn.
The defections within the integrationist camp were in part due to the failure of the
Executive Council under the POA system reforms to facilitate mediation and crisis resolution
among elite. The PRC authorities previous role in settling elite disputes also created ambiguity
around the final source of authority within Hong Kong policymaking circles, leading the Liberal
Party to seek out PRC officials to override the CE. Some integrationist forces were also influenced
by the international outcry grassroots forces were able to generate, particularly legislators who
represented economic sectors reliant on foreign investment.

Comparing Rival Explanations of Movement Success
Three potential factors may have facilitated grassroots triumph in stopping the Article 23
legislation, high levels of economic grievance, anti-Mainland sentiment, and the media’s framing
of the issue. While the Hong Kong population expressed more faith in the PRC leadership than
they did the Tung administration during the movement, there are indications that economic
grievance and media narratives contributed to mobilization in this case. The high degree of
mobilization would not have been possible, however, without the coordinating platforms
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grassroots forces where able to develop through increased unity. Moreover, the Tung
administration felt pressure because of international outcry and elite defection, which ultimately
forced the Chief Executive to withdraw the legislation.
The Article 23 Movement took place during an economic downturn, with the July 1st
March following the SARs outbreak in Hong Kong. Activists interviewed for this project did
highlight that the concerns for the economy definitely influenced mobilization during the AntiArticle 23 protests.134 Hong Kong had been in an economic slump before the SARS outbreak in
April of 2003. In his annual policy address back in January, Tung had indicated that the budget
deficit would hit 70 billion HKD by March of that year (SCMP January 9th, 2003). When the SARS
crisis struck, the tourism industry, as well as restaurants and other shopping establishments were
hit very hard, compounding the crisis (SCMP July 2nd, 2003). One prominent organizer summed
up the situation,
They think the government is incapable, and some people came out because they think
that their livelihood was affected… some people were fired, the stock market dropped, the
economy goes down, so their livelihood was affected.135

Interviewees insisted, however, that in the Anti-Article 23 Movement, the mobilization
was not a result of anti-Mainland sentiment. In a survey conducted in June of 2003, University of
Hong Kong’s Public Opinion Program (HKPOP) found that while only 32% of participants trusted
the Hong Kong Government, 40% trusted the Chinese central government (PORI 2020f; 2020g).
Seventy-nine percent of respondents were confident about China’s future (PORI 2020b). One nongovernmental organization leader stated that
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in the first few years after the Handover, you know, people suddenly feel kind of relaxed.
Because there was a period of high intensity, where people suspected that their existing
freedoms would be taken away, like whether we still have pro-democracy parties like the
DP, the Democratic Party. But then we found that well, Beijing let us alone… people
started to feel relaxed.136

Grassroots organization leaders often appealed to the PRC leadership and contrasted their
behavior with that of the Tung administration. For instance, a member of the Article 23 Concern
Group and former Pan-Democratic Camp legislator wrote an opinion piece in the South China
Morning Post to greet the PRC Premier, Wen Jiabao on his visit to Hong Kong for the Handover.
She contrasted Tung’s refusal to take responsibility for policy mistakes with Wen, who
acknowledged “China's inadequate response to SARS. His no-fudging attitude made it easier to
conduct dialogue on future collaborations… Mr. Wen is likely to have a warm reception wherever
he goes in this city. We appreciate him coming and we appreciate his willingness to reach out to
us” (SCMP June 30th, 2003).
There was, however, trepidation regarding the PRC’s regime. While one Article 23
Concern Group leader insisted the demonstration was not about the central government, she
admitted there was ingrained fear among the population:
If you go back to see why a Joint Declaration was there, it was because of a very deepseeded local fear of the Communists. And the movements in the Cultural Revolution, the
movements in the 50s, a lot of [Hong Kong people] had families who suffered in those…
and we were reading about Mainland laws, anti-revolution laws, theft of state secrets, you
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can get locked up and nobody knows… All of this Mainland regime, which we were very
afraid of. Now it seems to them, that Article 23 is going to build a bridge to allow this
Mainland regime to be exercised in Hong Kong. The idea, that a Mainland system can use
Article 23, to um, suppress Hong Kong people, to charge them, and arrest them, was a very
primeval fear.137

Wong (2015) and Chan (2005) have both highlighted the importance of the media in
encouraging participation in the July 1st March during the Anti-Article 23 Movement. Some
activists did highlight the media’s role in framing and inciting participation in the July 1st March,
due to their portrayal of government actions. 138 For instance, according to one legislator, the
Secretary of Security, Regina Ip was “The face that launched the 500,000”, because during both
the public consultation and the legislative process, she was “rude” and “aggressive.” 139 The
legislator highlighted an incident in which she had shouted at Democratic Party Legislator James
To, that he was “too emotional, not following the rules, and was impolite” and so “I don’t answer
you”, in a Legislative Council hearing (SCMP June 26th , 2003). While that incident was oft
repeated in media archives, what is rarely mentioned is that Ip made this comment after To
had asked "Do you think you are a con artist?" during the hearing (SCMP June 26th , 2003).
This chapter contends that while the media framing and economic downturns may have
played a role in facilitating mobilization in the Anti-Article 23 Movement, what is of vital
importance is the creation of unifying institutions to plan long-term strategic activities. Through
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the CHRF, organizers were able to set dates for protests over a month in advance, which allowed
advertisement in the media for a considerable period of time.
Foreign government support also put pressure on the integrationist coalition and increased
mobilization for grassroots activities. The Tung administration relied on trade relations with the
West, particularly the United States, following the 1997 Financial Crisis, which mandated that the
government perform autonomy from the central government. International outcry therefore
affected the economic prospects of the region, which were particularly precarious in 2003 after the
SARS virus.
Moreover, given the structure of the Legislative Council and the dominance of the
integrationist coalition in the functional constituency seats, the Tung administration had the votes
to pass the legislation through July 1st of 2003. Without the increased friction in the integrationist
coalition and the defection of Liberal Party leader James Tien, the legislation would have passed.
The mechanism of the CE and integrationist coalition to appeal to the PRC authorities to solve
intra-elite disputes is critical because it adds ambiguity over the final authority in crisis situations.
In this case, the Liberal Party leader thought he had the blessing of the PRC authorities to request
the suspension of the bill.

Conclusion

In the Anti-Article 23 Movement, grassroots forces were able to exert significant pressure
through support from Western government officials and high levels of unity within their coalition,
while the Tung administration’s coalition was weakened by elite tension and defection. While the
integrationist coalition was able to preserve its cohesion after the former Chief Secretary’s
defection during the public consultation, fragmentation within the integrationist camp occurred
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following the July 1st March, causing the Chief Executive to eventually withdraw the Article 23
legislation.
The levels of support from Western officials, grassroots unity, and the integrationist
coalition’s cohesion during the Anti-Article 23 movement correspond to certain factors. Two
factors influenced changes in Western government officials’ backing of grassroots forces, the
degree to which grassroots forces sought linkages with Western government officials and the
domestic interests of those officials. Consistently throughout the movement, grassroots forces
actively sought to cultivate linkages to Western government officials, making multiple trips to
Western countries. In this case, however, the second factor was clearly more necessary to provoke
international outcry. While Western governments supported grassroots’ requests for a white bill
and extended public consultation in 2002, they became more amenable to the Hong Kong
government once clauses about foreign nationals and extra-territoriality diminished. Western
governments’ defense of grassroots forces became more strident only after SARS, when it became
clear that China’s secrecy laws affected the public health of their own constituencies.
The Tung administration’s choice of coercive or cooptative policies influenced the level of
cohesion among grassroots forces. Grassroots forces all believed that the Article 23 legislation
would increase coercion against their organizations, through their linkages to Mainland
organizations, the expansion of warrantless searches, or through the sedition and state’s secret
clauses in the legislation. The threat of coercion incentivized solidarity, leading to them to create
a collaboration platform, the Civil Human Rights Front. Even after significant grassroots
mobilization in December of 2002, the Tung administration did not try to coopt fragments of the
grassroots coalition through changes in the legislation, instead trying to turn mass sentiment
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against the movement. The continued threat the legislation presented allowed the grassroots
coalition to remain unified through the July 1st March.
Changes in the integrationist coalition’s unity resulted primarily from the coalition’s
relationship to the PRC apparatus. The integrationist camp’s established reliance on PRC officials
to resolve elite disputes had iterative impacts that could also jeopardize the relationships between
factions within the coalition. The Chief Executive and business factions became resentful of the
civil service, many of whom had served since before the Handover and therefore could not be
incentivized through Mainland connections. In order for the CE to gain more control over the civil
service, a key leader from the civil service had to be expelled from the coalition, leading to her
defection to the grassroots’ alliance. The CE relied on the backing from the PRC leadership to
accomplish this task and set up the new POA system. While the changes to the Executive Council
under the POA system helped smooth intra-elite relations in the short-run, it deepened ambiguity
regarding the hierarchy of authority and provided incentives to the integrationist elite to appeal to
the PRC leadership. This dynamic culminated in a leader of the Liberal Party using PRC authorities
as an excuse to rescind support for Article 23 legislation.
Additionally, in this case, the level of resources available to the Chief Executive and the
grassroots forces interacted to empower the position of grassroots forces in both stages. Anson
Chan’s defection helped grassroots forces court Western authorities since she had already
developed relationships with many international officials as the former Chief Secretary. Mounting
pressure from Western powers also led integrationist legislators representing the sectors of the
economy most reliant on international investment to push back against the CE’s plan to implement
Article 23. Moreover, the high degree of unity among grassroots forces made it easier to garner
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Western support. A broader array of grassroots forces visited Western countries, expanding the
policy networks the coalition had access to and amplifying their message.
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Chapter 5
Grassroots’ Disappointment in the Umbrella Movement

What causes a grassroots movement to fail, despite extremely high levels of mobilization?
During the Umbrella Movement, a 79-day occupation occurred in the fall and winter of 2014.
Protesters occupied three parts of Hong Kong, including the area around the local Government
Complex on Hong Kong Island. Grassroots forces mobilized to pressure the Chief Executive (CE)
to implement legislation regarding the structure of elections for the executive branch. They wanted
the Hong Kong leadership to prevent the PRC apparatus from controlling who could be a candidate
in future CE elections. Ultimately, however, grassroots forces failed to influence the CE’s
behavior; his administration pursued policies in 2015 that would have amplified the PRC’s power
over who could contest elections. Why did grassroots forces fail to influence the Chief Executive?
The interactions that took place between grassroots forces and the CE from January of 2013
and June of 2015 over electoral reform offers an opportunity to explore what conditions limit
grassroots forces’ ability to press their advantage when they achieve high levels of mobilization.
The occupation was not the only point at which grassroots forces were able to mobilize large-scale
participation during the Umbrella Movement. Three months prior, grassroots forces mobilized
nearly 800,000 people to participate in a “Civic Referendum” on electoral reform proposals
(HKPOP 2014). This action also failed to influence the CE’s behavior. Through comparing two
stages of movement activity where mobilization failed, we can examine the factors I propose
contribute to the relative strength or weakness of grassroots force vis-à-vis the Chief Executive.

217

Within this case, I find that grassroots forces struggled to maintain solidarity and amass
support from Western government officials during their interactions with the Leung administration
over reforms of the CE elections between 2013-2015. The dearth of these resources kept them
from capitalizing on unprecedented levels of mobilization in the post-colonial era. Moreover, the
Chief Executive’s integrationist coalition was able to remain cohesive throughout most of this
period as well, helping them resist grassroots pressure.
Patterns of cooptation and coercion led to the overall limitations on grassroots unity. The
lack of cohesion among grassroots forces can be attributed to a critical juncture where a prominent
political party within the coalition appeared to be coopted by the local government. This incident
created fissures both among Pan-Democratic Camp political parties and between generations of
activists. Grassroots forces were only able to overcome these divisions when faced with an increase
of government coercion.
Grassroots forces were unable to elicit Western government support because of two
factors. Western government officials were more interested in protecting their relationship with
Hong Kong’s parent state of China. Additionally, grassroots forces both choice to, and were
prevented from, cultivating connections to Western government officials.
Finally, the Chief Executive’s coalition was able to coalesce when the PRC authorities
stepped in to arbitrate between the factions. At the same time, PRC officials’ actions in mediating
between different factions of the local integrationist camp could deepen the friction within the
coalition, leading elite to publicly break with the Chief Executive. PRC authorities had to directly
intervene in order to uphold the unity among the integrationist camp.
The chapter starts by explaining how the PRC leadership sought to consolidate both their
and the Chief Executive’s control over the electoral reform process prior to 2013, as well the
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limitations of their efforts. I then compare the two stages of interactions between grassroots forces
and the Chief Executive during the Umbrella Movement. In both stages, this chapter demonstrates
how the similar pattern of grassroots disunity, inadequate Western government support, and elite
cohesion made it difficult to pressure the Hong Kong government, even when mobilization was
high and the local authorities were prepared to make concessions. This analysis also accounts for
the factors that weakened grassroots’ access to internal unity and Western governmental support
and strengthened the cohesion of the CE’s coalition. The chapter then concludes by establishing
why changes in anti-Mainland sentiment, grievance, and media structure provide fewer satisfying
answers to the puzzle than the theory presented in this chapter.

The 2013 Context
Over the course of the 2000s, the PRC leadership sought to increase both its power and
that of the Chief Executive over any attempts at political reform of the Hong Kong government
apparatus in an effort to disempower grassroots forces. PRC officials increased their ability to
police both the initiation and the conclusion of political reform. They also attempted to reiforce
the insulation of the CE from other governing bodies by insisting Hong Kong maintain an
executive-led system and more pro-actively assisting in coordinating the integrationist coalition.
Grassroots forces, however, still were in a position to effect political reform because they had
enough seats in the legislature to veto legislation.
Chief Executive Tung’s failure to implement Article 23 because of grassroots mobilization
motivated PRC authorities to take a more active approach to overseeing Hong Kong’s governance
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(So 2011; Fong 2017).140 PRC leadership sought to ensure that future episodes where the Chief
Executive was unable to enact desired legislation would not reoccur. They therefore increased their
influence over the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council by empowering the National
People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) to play a larger role amending the structure of
both legislative and executive institutions.
As discussed in chapter 3, the NPCSC had the power of final interpretation of the Basic
Law, Hong Kong’s mini-constitution. The NPCSC used this ability to established firm control over
both the initiation and the conclusion of political reform in the region. Annex I and Annex II of
the Basic Law both stated that changes to the selection of the Chief Executive and the Legislative
Council would be made “with the endorsement of a two-thirds majority of all the members of the
Legislative Council and the consent of the Chief Executive.” In the original wording of the Basic
Law, the NPCSC could explicitly disprove of the changes upon submission by the Chief Executive,
but the body was not mentioned in the initiation or formation of changes to the selection process.
In the spring of 2004, the NPCSC interpreted Annex I and Annex II to mean that any change in
the political structure would have to be initiated by the Chief Executive sending a formal request
to the NPCSC and could only be carried forward with their approval. The NPCSC therefore
established firm control over both the initiation and the conclusion of political reform in the
region.141
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Article 23 of the Basic Law required the Hong Kong government to enact national security legislation after the
Handover to PRC sovereignty. While the Chief Executive tried to implement the legislation in 2003, he was forced
to withdraw the legislation. For more on how the grassroots Anti-Article 23 Movement stopped the implementation
of this national security legislation, see chapter 4.
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The Chief Executive and its integrationist coalition, for its part, upheld the PRC
administration’s expanded role in Hong Kong’s governance. The Tung Administration’s
Constitutional Development Task Force affirmed the PRC’s ability to approve the initiation of
changes in the political system in their second report:
All powers exercised by the HKSAR [Hong Kong Special Administrative Region] are
derived by way of authorization by the Central Authorities. There is no ‘residual powers’
for the HKSAR…. The Central Authorities have constitutional powers and responsibilities
to oversee and determine constitutional development in the HKSAR in order to ensure the
implementation of the basic policies of the state (2004, 30).142

At the same time, however, the PRC leadership sought to boost the autonomy of the Chief
Executive from other governing bodies in Hong Kong. Analysis of archival documents between
2004 and 2015 reveals that PRC authorities supported the autonomy of the Chief Executive
through advocating for an “executive-led” system in the region. PRC officials declared that
“neither legislative-led government nor separation of power among executive, legislative, and
judicial branches is consistent with the principle of executive-led government” (SCMP March 13,
2004). The NPCSC ruling on methods for electing the Chief Executive in 2004 also mandated that
any future changes to Hong Kong’s political system had to enhance the “effective operation” of
executive-led government.143
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To ensure that Hong Kong’s government remained executive-led, the Central Government
Liaison Office, the successor to the Xinhua News Agency, also became the Chinese Communist
Party’s “second governing team” in the region (Fong 2017). 144 The Liaison Office regularly
lobbied politicians to ensure that the local administration had enough votes to pass legislation.
Elected legislators in both the Legislative Council and the District Council from the integrationist
camp were expected to have regular lunch or dinner meetings with the heads of the local branches
of the Liaison Office. 145 The Liaison Office also raised money for the integrationist camp’s
elections and facilitated negotiations regarding who ran for which geographic seat to ensure that
the maximum number of candidates could win in the Legislative and District Councils and
ameliorate conflict between integrationist parties due to elections. 146 This office also met
frequently with government department leaders (SCMP April 27 2013).
By 2013, grassroots forces had the ability to affect the trajectory of constitutional changes
through the Legislative Council (LegCo), despite the PRC authorities efforts to insulate the Chief
Executive. According to the Basic Law, changes in the political structure of Hong Kong require
the acquiescence of two thirds of the LegCo representatives. The Pan-Democratic Camp political
parties were able to gain four more seats in the LegCo, giving them 27 out of 70 seats. They
therefore were in a position to veto political reform bills that did not meet their expectations.
By 2013, PRC authorities had strived to ensure their ability and the Chief Executive’s ability
to control the outcomes of any political reform to Hong Kong’s system. NPCSC had made itself
the gatekeeper of both the initiation and conclusion of electoral reform. PRC authorities
emphasized that Hong Kong should remain executive-led and rendered more assistance through
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the Liaison Office. Yet the Chief Executive had to contend with political parties associated with
grassroots forces, since they could veto any reform package under consideration in LegCo.

The Case: The Umbrella Movement, January of 2013 through June of 2015
The Leung administration sought to enact universal suffrage elections for future Chief
Executives that would allow PRC authorities to exert significant control over the nomination
process. They wanted to create a nominating committee with a structure similar to that of the
Election Committee, to which integrationist factions had disproportionate access. In the first stage
of the movement, grassroots forces sought to influence the wording of the Leung Administration’s
report to showcase public demand for elections without a screening process. In the second stage,
the grassroots forces tried to get the Leung administration to reject the parameters for electoral
reform set out by the NPCSC on August 31st. They wanted the Chief Executive to either restart
the electoral reform process or table a bill in the Legislative Council that had a more pluralistic
nominating committee.
During the movement, grassroots forces tried and failed to remain united and elicit Western
support during both the public consultation and the 79-day occupation. They were unsuccessful at
changing the Leung administration’s actions at either stage of the movement. Moreover, the
integrationist coalition was able to maintain at least a moderate level of unity for the majority of
both stages of the movement, insulating the Chief Executive from grassroots’ pressure. While the
Chief Executive faced tensions within their coalition during the first month of the occupation, they
were able to regain their unity by the following month. Table 5.1 showcases the relatively low
level of resources that empower grassroots forces and the higher level of the resources that bolster
the Chief Executive’s position.
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Table 5. 1: Variation in Grassroots’ and the Chief Executive’s Resources
During the 2013 to 2015 Umbrella Movement
Stage of the
Umbrella
Movement

Stage 1: January
2013- August 2014

Stage 2: August
2014- June 2015

Support from
Western
Government
Officials

Unity
Within
Grassroots
Coalition

Unity
Within
CE’s
Coalition

Grassroots’
Success or
Failure in
Affecting CE
Behavior

Low

Moderate

High

Failure

Moderate

Low

Moderate

Failure

The Policy Issue: Election Reform for the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council
In 2013, the current Chief Executive, Leung Chun-ying (also known as CY Leung) began
to initiate the formal process for amending how the future leader of the executive branch would be
chosen in 2017. During the Umbrella Movement, grassroots forces contended with both the Leung
administration and PRC authorities over the degree of control the PRC leadership would have
regarding candidates for the Chief Executive position. The PRC leadership had allowed universal
suffrage elections but wanted to install an institution that could screen out candidates they
disapproved of. Grassroots forces tried to compel the Leung administration to propose legislation
that would grant local Hong Kong residents more power over choosing future CE candidates
instead.
In 2007, the NPCSC announced that Hong Kong could pass legislation for universal
suffrage elections for the Chief Executive in 2017 and the Legislative Council in 2020. Hong
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Kong’s contemporary political structure mandated that the Chief Executive be chosen by an
electoral college called the Election Committee. By 2012, the Election Committee had a total of
1200 members. During the same period, only half of the Legislative Council was chosen through
popular elections; the other half was elected through functional constituencies.
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The

development of universal suffrage elections would therefore mark a notable expansion of masslevel Hong Kong residential control over both branches of government.
The PRC leadership still wanted to retain their influence over the region’s administration,
however, and sought to impose constraints on the format of future elections. They endeavored to
implement a screening mechanism that ensured only members of the integrationist camp would be
able to run in universal suffrage elections. In meetings with members of the Legislative Council,
Mainland officials advocated for a screening process for the Chief Executive to sift “the fine grains
from the coarse grains,” only allowing individuals who “love China and love Hong Kong” to be
elected (SCMP July 17 2013).
To create a screening mechanism for vetting CE candidates, the NPCSC indicated that
candidates for universal suffrage elections should be chosen by a committee similar to the
contemporary Election Committee. 148 Under the Basic Law, when Hong Kong implemented
universal suffrage elections, the candidates had to be chosen by a nominating committee. A
nominating committee modeled on the 1200-person electoral college would be able to act as a
screening mechanism for PRC authorities because its structure was dominated by Beijing-friendly
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business elite. The Election Committee had four equal sectors, one of which was devoted to
representatives of industrial, commercial, and financial sectors in Hong Kong. The other three
sectors were the professions; labor, social services, religious, and other sectors; and the political
sector (Fong 2015). The representatives of this first sector were chosen predominantly through
corporate electors, meaning specific corporations and business associations. Therefore a relatively
small group of business leaders controlled a quarter of the 1200 votes for the Chief Executive
position (Fong 2015). Integrationist business elite were also represented in the political sector,
since LegCo functional constituency representatives were automatically electors on the Election
Committee.
The structure of the nominating committee therefore had implications for the local
government’s autonomy from PRC authorities. If the nominating committee were based on the
Election Committee, it would assure PRC leadership’s ability to influence which candidates could
compete for the Chief Executive position. If the nominating committee was more pluralistic and
had broader societal representation, the local population would have more control over which
candidates could compete for the Chief Executive position.
PRC leadership sought to enhance their control over who could compete for the CE
position by demanding that the nominating committee should choose candidates as “a whole”
(SCMP March 26th 2013a; March 26th 2013b). This proscription meant that the majority of
nominating committee members must agree to a person’s candidacy. Under the contemporary
system, grassroots forces had a degree of representation on the Election Committee. They were
able to obtain seats associated with professions such as the legal and educational sectors, religious
organizations, and Legislative Council representatives (Fong 2015). While they never had a
plurality of seats on the committee, they did have enough to nominate candidates to the Chief
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Executive position. 149 Requiring a plurality of the members to nominate potential candidates
would make it virtually impossible for opposition candidates associated with grassroots forces to
participate in universal suffrage elections.
The primary over-riding issue at stake was the degree to which PRC officials and their
local integrationist interlocutors could limit who was nominated for Chief Executive. Grassroots
forces therefore sought to limit the PRC apparatus’ influence on the nomination process by
pressuring the CE to propose a nominating committee that was representative of the population.
They also wanted the nominating committee to require a relatively low threshold of support for
candidates to compete in universal suffrage elections. Lastly, grassroots forces tried to compel the
CE and the PRC authorities to allow alternative paths to candidacy outside of the nominating
committee, including party nomination and civil nomination. Some grassroots organizations
pushed the Leung Administration to just have civil nomination for the Chief Executive, despite
the wording of the Basic Law.
There was, however, a second issue at stake in initial public consultations for electoral
reform that did not become the focal point of interactions between grassroots forces and the Leung
administration from 2013 through 2015: the composition of the Legislative Council for the 2016
elections. With the NPCSC condoning universal suffrage for the Legislative Council in 2020, the
Chief Executive considered the possibility of increasing the pluralism of the 2016 Legislative
Council to scaffold the electoral changes over time. The Leung administration broached the issue
during the 2013-2014 public consultation, but the NPCSC’s decided on August 31st, 2014, that
there should be no change to the composition of the Legislative Council. NPCSC reasoned that
keeping the Legislative Council’s contemporary structure was “consistent with the principle of
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gradual and orderly progress” and helped “the various sectors of the Hong Kong community to
focus on their efforts on addressing the issues concerning universal suffrage for selecting the Chief
Executive.”150
While grassroots forces proposed plans for the Legislative Council elections of 2016 that
ranged from a gradual increase in pluralism to full universal suffrage for all seats, my archival and
interview research indicates the focal point of their efforts in 2013 to 2015 was the electoral reform
of the Chief Executive elections.151 This concentration was due to the fact that electoral reform for
the Chief Executive had to occur before there could be universal suffrage for the Legislative
Council. Moreover, the reform of the elections for the executive branch were more permanent,
while that of the LegCo would only last for one term.

Stage 1: The Public Consultation Process for Electoral Reform, January 2013 through
July of 2014
While the PRC authorities had increased their control over the process of political reform
in Hong Kong, the Chief Executive had to send a report to the NPCSC in order to initiate changes
to the elections for future CEs. During the public consultations, grassroots forces sought to
pressure the Leung Administration to create a report that emphasized the public’s demand for
competitive universal suffrage elections through enervation of the nominating committee required
by the NPCSC’s 2007 decision. Grassroots forces were largely unsuccessful in shaping either the
public consultation final report or the Chief Executive’s report to the NPCSC.
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The Local Government’s Implementation of Autonomy in Response to Grassroots Forces
The Chief Executive made few changes in their reports on electoral reforms to PRC
officials as a result of interactions with grassroots forces. The Leung Administration sent two
reports to the NPCSC, a report from the Task Force on Constitutional Development on the results
of the public consultation and a report from CY Leung on whether changes in the election
procedures for the election of the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council needed to be made.
These documents upheld the PRC leadership’s mandate that future CE elections be overseen by
PRC authorities, that the nomination committee be dominated by integrationist forces, and that the
nomination committee be the only means to candidacy in competitive elections.
The grassroots coalition had hoped to compel the Leung Administration to report that the
majority of Hong Kong residents did not want the PRC leadership to be able to screen CE
candidates through a nominating committee. In their reports however, the Leung Administration
claimed that the “mainstream” opinion was that candidates should be screened through a
nominating committee to ensure they would not oppose the central government. The public
consultation report echoed the language of the NPCSC, declaring that the public wanted a CE that
“loved the country and loved Hong Kong.”152
Moreover, in his report to the NPCSC, Leung advocated that the nominating committees
should also be based on the current Election Committee. He claimed that this arrangement would
promote balanced participation among societal actors.153 If the nomination committee were based
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on the Election Committee, it would ensure the continued domination of integrationist forces in
picking the primary contestants for the CE position.
The Leung Administration’s report also did not urge the NPCSC to allow public
nomination. Instead, the CE claimed that there was popular consensus around the future
nominating committee having the sole right to nominate candidates. 154

While the Chief

Executive’s task force mentioned public nomination briefly, they dismissed it as being outside of
the realm of the Basic Law and the NPCSC 2007 decision.155

Grassroots and the Chief Executive’s Resources During the Public Consultation
During the public consultation, grassroots coalition had difficulty maintaining unity within
coordinating platforms and lacked support from Western government officials, critical junctures,
preventing them from exerting concerted pressure on the Leung Administration. Grassroots forces
faced internal struggles because of mistrust created by electoral competition and the perception
that the Pan-Democratic Camp political parties had been coopted by both the local and PRC
government leadership. Western government officials were de-incentivized to weigh-in on
electoral reforms in Hong Kong because of the attenuation of connections with the grassroots
coalition. Moreover, these officials had an economic interest in maintaining a positive relationship
with the region’s parent state, the PRC. The clashes among grassroots forces also led to changes
in the leadership of the coalition; these changes contributed to the dearth of linkage between Hong
Kong activists and Western government officials during the public consultation.
Grassroots forces were also unsuccessful because the integrationist coalition continued to
defend the Leung Administration’s policies, despite simmering tensions between two prominent
154
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factions within the camp. While fights over leadership had led to quarrels in the integrationist
camp, the PRC leadership had played a key role in determining the outcome and reconciling
factions. The PRC officials made it clear to integrationist coalition members that where conflicts
arose, all factions should endeavor to support the CE. While some integrationist factions criticized
the character of the Leung Administration, no parties criticized the actual contents of the CE’s
proposals.
The Grassroots Level: Faltering Unity
Grassroots forces had difficulty maintaining unity in 2013 and 2014, affecting their ability
to sustain pressure on the Chief Executive during the public consultation. While the grassroots
forces created two coordinating platforms in order to create cohesive actions, both platforms dealt
with defections, limiting their overall success. The faltering of these two coordinating platforms
limited grassroots’ pressure on the Leung Administration because it both meant there was no clear
baseline for what electoral reforms grassroots forces would and would not accept and made it
difficult to negotiate with the Leung Administration. When grassroots forces were able to act
cohesively, however, they were able to achieve high levels of mobilization, temporarily bolstering
their position vis-à-vis the Chief Executive.
Repeated disputes and defection of members within the coordinating platforms grassroots
coalitions formed for the public consultation made it difficult to center their framing around an
exact baseline for electoral reform. One of the two attempted coordinating platforms was the
Alliance for True Democracy, which aimed to create a proposal for both the next Chief Executive
election and the LegCo election that all of the Pan-Democratic Camp parties could agree to. When
the coordinating body started meeting in February of 2013, it contained all 27 legislators in LegCo,
and all of the Pan-Democratic Camp political parties.
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In the end, the Alliance for True Democracy could not coalesce around a single proposal
despite starting months before the public consultation. Within two months of its initiation, one of
the key leaders of People Power decided to defect from both the Alliance for True Democracy and
leave the political party (SCMP May 21st 2013).156 When the Alliance finally settled on proposal
in the fall of 2013, it was rejected by both moderate and radical political party members. The
Alliance’s final proposal entailed three forms of nomination for universal suffrage elections of the
Chief Executive: a candidate could be nominated by 1% of the electorate, by a political party with
directly elected seats in LegCo, or through the nominating committee. One of the founders of Civic
Party denounced the plan and created his own that did not have public nomination SCMP
December 30th 2013). Two of the more radical political parties, League of Social Democrats and
People Power, both created their own proposals as well (The Center for Comparative and Public
Law 2013).
The other coordinating platform, Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP) also faced
defections while trying to coalesce grassroots factions around an electoral reform proposal. OCLP
rallied supporters in early 2013 by suggesting that if the Hong Kong government and the Mainland
government failed to produce legislation that ensured competitive elections for the Chief
Executive, grassroots forces should launch a non-violent civil disobedience campaign. Through
their networks, OCLP was able to gain the support of both Pan-Democrat political parties, unions,
social workers, non-governmental organizations, student groups, and religious groups; a much
broader coalition than the Alliance for True Democracy was meant to obtain.157 Moreover, they
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were able to gain the support of some prominent business leaders in the community and the
leadership of NextMedia Limited, the largest listed media company in Hong Kong. 158
OCLP employed a lengthy process involving multiple rounds of deliberation and voting to
cultivate and ensure the cooperation of its diverse coalition. All groups were allowed to submit
proposals for electoral reform to OCLP. The proposals would then be evaluated and approved by
a team of international experts on whether or not they produced competitive elections based on
international standards. Previous participants in OCLP’s Deliberation Days would then choose the
top three proposals, which would finally be voted on by the public in a “Civil Referendum.” OCLP
would present the winning proposal to the Hong Kong government during the public consultation
period for electoral reform.159 Through this process, it endorsed a series of proposals for the Chief
Executive election.
As with the Alliance for True Democracy, direct conflicts broke out among grassroots
factions when participants voted on the three proposals that would appear in the Civil Referendum
in May of 2014. The proposal created by the two student groups, Scholarism and Hong Kong
Federation of Students (HKFS), garnered the most votes, followed by the Alliance for True
Democracy and People’ Power’s proposals. All three of these electoral reform proposals contained
public nomination ( SCMP May 10th 2014). Moderate members of the grassroots coalition publicly
decried the results of the OCLP Deliberation Days as too radical, undermining the resulting
proposals. They argued it was giving the people of Hong Kong no choice but to confront the PRC
authorities if they voted for any of the proposals, since there was no option without public
nomination (SCMP May 10th 2014).160 Both the NPCSC’s decision and the Basic Law required
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that the nominating committee be the main pathway to candidacy in universal suffrage elections,
rather than public nomination. Moderate legislators proceeded to publicly compare OCLP’s
process to the political screening the grassroots forces were ostensibly fighting against. They also
compared the Deliberation Day process to the current 1200-person committee which elected the
Chief Executive, since only 2500 people had voted on the proposals (SCMP May 10th 2014).
Breakdowns in unity within the coordinating platforms also hurt grassroots forces’ ability
to negotiate with the Leung Administration during the public consultation. OCLP had publicly
stated on numerous occasions that no civil disobedience would occur until the local government
and the PRC government responded to their actions by unveiling the reform package. While
originally, OCLP had planned on launching a civil disobedience campaign on July 1st of 2014, the
Leung administration had delayed the public consultation and launched it later than expected.
Therefore, the OCLP leadership did not want to launch any action until they had heard from both
the Leung Administration and the PRC authorities. 161 Student groups and non-governmental
organizations decided to ignore OCLP’s desire to hold off on civil disobedience and called for a
sit-in at the annual July 1st March.162
While the action was very popular and gained a lot of media success, the clear display of
lack of unity hurt OCLP in negotiating with the Leung administration in July.163 The fact that civil
disobedience happened outside of the parameters that OCLP had articulated supported the
integrationist coalition’s belief that OCLP could not control the grassroots coalition members. The
inability of OCLP to police other grassroots factions dampened the Leung Administration’s desire
to negotiate with them. When members of the Leung administration finally met with OCLP, they
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were hostile, accused them of being radicals, and refused to look at any of their reports on the
referendum or the Deliberation Days.164 The Task Force for Constitutional Development did not
mention OCLP, its activities, or its campaign once in the entirety of its 107-page report.165
There were periods, however, where grassroots forces were able to marshall unity within
their coalition. During these episodes, they were able to achieve high levels of mobilization for
grassroots actions. The clearest example of this dynamic is the OCLP’s Civil Referendum, which
occurred in late June of 2014. During the Civil Referendum, the Hong Kong population could vote
on which of the Deliberation Day proposals the coordinating platform would present to the Leung
Administration. In the week and a half leading up to the referendum, grassroot forces were able to
come together to support the action. Moderate actors among the grassroots coalition whole
heartedly campaigned for the Civil Referendum despite their discomfort with the Deliberation
Days. For instance, a Civic Party legislator that had previously denounced the Third Deliberation
Day as “unrepresentative screening” a month before publicly urged citizens to participate in the
run up to the Civil Referendum (SCMP June 23rd 2014b).
The unity among grassroots forces helped to ensure that mobilization was beyond the
expectations of OCLP. The leadership had been hoping for a minimum of 10,000 participants in
the referendum, but in the end over 792,808 people participated. 166 While participants were
relatively split over whether to endorse the Alliance for True Democracy’s Proposal or the
Student’s Proposal, 87.8 percent of participants voted for LegCo to veto any proposal that did not
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meet international standards (HKPOP 2014).167 In comparison, only 222,990 had voted in the civil
referendum on the race for the Chief Executive just two years earlier in 2012 (HKPOP 2012).
Moments of unity during this period, however, were often short-lived. For instance, the
grassroots coalition had been divided throughout most of May over the outcome of the Third
Deliberation. While they were able to remain united for the better part of June, cohesion among
grassroots forces broke down within less than a week of the Civil Referendum, when student
organizations decided to organize the sit-in during the July 1st March.
The divisions between grassroots forces limited their influence on the Chief Executive’s
public consultation and report to the PRC government. Grassroots forces attempts to create
consensus around particular formulations for political reforms through coordinating platforms
failed, making it difficult for them to create a baseline for reform in negotiations with the Leung
Administration. Breakdowns in the coordinating platforms also limited opportunities for
bargaining with the Leung Administration more generally, since the Chief Executive did not
believe OCLP could control all factions of the grassroots coalition. During periods that the
grassroots coalition could maintain their unity, they experienced greater success in mobilizing the
public to participate in grassroots actions.
Electoral Interests, Cooptation, and Coercion
In the early 2010s, electoral competition and perceived cooptation by the Chief Executive’s
administration facilitated an incident that sowed mistrust among the grassroots coalition for years.
Concern over declining Legislative Council seats led a prominent political party to collaborate
with the Chief Executive over other Pan-Democratic Camp parties regarding electoral reform. This
incident led to friction among political parties and to divisions between generations of activists
167
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that contributed to the failure of coordinating platforms during the public consultation. Grassroots
forces were only able to overcome their disagreements when faced with what they interpreted as
an increase in coercion on the part of both the Leung Administration and the PRC leadership.
Electoral competition made some of the Pan-Democratic Camp political parties vulnerable
to cooptation. Among the Pan-Democratic Camp, the Democratic Party had been the “flagship”
party in the early 2000s, occupying more seats than any of the other pro-democracy political party.
Following the Anti-Article 23 Movement in 2003, moderate and more radical political parties
proliferated, making it more difficult for the Democratic Party to obtain seats in the LegCo.
Lawyers who took part in the Article 23 Concern Group ran for the LegCo the following year in
2004 and then formed the Civic Party in 2006. Former members of the Democratic Party joined
forces with long time activists to create another more progressive, radical party, the League of
Social Democrats (LSD) the same year. The 2004 and the 2008 elections saw the Democratic Party
lose over a third of its seats in the Legislative Council. In 2003, the party had thirteen seats, but
only eight after 2008.
The decline in the Democratic Party’s electoral success led to a controversial incident that
fundamentally split loyalties within the grassroots coalition for years. In 2010, the Democratic
Party chose to negotiate with the Chief Executive at the time, Donald Tsang, and the PRC’s Liaison
Office, rather than back a direct action organized by other Pan-Democratic Camp parties.168 The
Tsang administration wanted to pass an electoral package that would modestly increase
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pluralism. 169 LSD suggested that Pan-Democratic Camp politicians in LegCo step down from
office, since that would lead to a by-election to fill those positions. They hoped that a large number
of voters in the by-election could act as a pseudo-referendum and show the public’s support for
universal suffrage for both the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council over the more
incremental package. 170 The Democratic Party not only changed their mind about supporting
LSD’s plan, but also decided to negotiate with the Chief Executive and the Liaison Office without
consulting the rest of the Pan-Democratic Camp. 171 They publicly offered to support the local
government’s legislation proposal if small changes were made to the package.172173
Many grassroots organizations viewed the Democratic Party as coopted and tainted from
its deal with the Chief Executive and the Liaison Office. The perception of cooptation was
heightened by the change in the civil service’s treatment of Democratic Party legislators and
District Council members. One Democratic Party District Councilor reported that prior to the 2010
deal, coordinating with government departments was mired by bureaucratic red tape; the civil
service was “remote and quite passive.” After the deal, however, “They would be a little bit more
active to make contact with you to see anything that you might need help with in the community,
‘anything you need help with we can relate it to the relevant department and help to get the things
done.’”174 The bolstered willingness of the bureaucracy to help District Councilors was important,
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since many politicians and political activists viewed these positions as depending on the ability to
provide services rather than the political leanings of the electorate.175176
Moreover, many members of the grassroots coalition blamed the failure of the planned byelection action on the Democratic Party.177 In the end, only five legislators from LSD and Civic
Party, one from each geographical constituency, followed through on LSD’s plan to resign and rerun for office.178 The voter turnout was only 17% of registered voters.179 It was a third of the
turnout in the 2008 LegCo elections and did not persuade the Tsang administration to change any
of its plans.180181
The perception that the Democratic Party had been coopted and betrayed the grassroots
coalition created deep resentment that compounded fractionalization among grassroots forces.182
Political parties broke down and differences between generations of activists increased. A group
of younger Democratic Party members broke away and formed the Neo Democrats. Two
prominent members of LSD left and formed their own party, People Power, because they felt LSD
was not being critical enough of the Democratic Party.183 The previous merger between the twelveyear-old party Frontier and the Democratic Party was also shaken, with former members reforming the party in September of 2010 and subsequently aligning with People Power in the 2012
LegCo race (SCMP May 22nd 2013).
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There were fissures between generations of activists as well. Many of the grassroots
members and organizations of the Right of Abode and the Anti-Article 23 Movements had been
involved in politics since before 1989. These more seasoned activists were motivated by the
Tiananmen Square Protests that occurred in Hong Kong during that time, leading them to favor
both a focus on Chinese democratization and moderate tactics.184
Newer generations of activists were put off by the moderation of veteran activists,
believing it had led to the Democratic Party’s embrace of the 2010 electoral reform package. The
newer generation of activists identified the origins of their activism with movements to preserve
historical sites and towns in the late 2000s and early 2010s. 185 They focused more on direct,
“radical” action rather than seeking change through formal institutional structures. One activist
who was a student union leader during the public consultation described how the approach of
younger generations of activists differed from those who had participated in the grassroots
movements of the 1980s and 1990s:
The nature of those networks is usually young people, people in those networks who are
not affiliated with…professional political parties. The only political party that was
frequently involved in disruptive tactics was LSD. You get one radical wing that was
participating in the Parliament, but most were not participating in the Parliament. They
were social workers, they were post-80s activists who participated in the Star Ferry
protests, the heritage preservation movement of 2006 and 2008, and another group which
is students, which are 18 to 22 who are in the university, who were mostly affiliated with
student bodies, like student unions and student press.186
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This younger collection of activists gained recognition through their use of disruptive
tactics, such as occupations, in the media. Their increasing notoriety convinced them that they
could push the older, more moderate Pan-Democratic Camp politicians to embrace direct actions.
A former student activists explained their reasoning:
Political parties were critical and reluctant to facilitate in any disruptive action. Sometimes
they were even speaking against the use of disruptive actions during the campaign, but
because non-political groups gain more legitimacy and popularity from people’s
movements, the political party had to respond by participating in street action.187

The divisions between Pan-Democratic Camp political parties and between generations of
activists that arose from 2010 electoral reform package incident plagued the grassroots coalition
throughout the 2013-2014 public consultation period. The Alliance for True Democracy found it
impossible to balance the interests of more radical and more moderate political parties while
forming their proposal for electoral reform, resulting in a plethora of different Pan-Democratic
Camp proposals during the public consultation. Within the OCLP coordinating platform, younger
activist networks distrusted the leadership of the OCLP because of their connections to the
Democratic Party and veteran activist circles.188 An activist with the Hong Kong Federation of
Students summed up his colleagues misgivings:
Students and NGOS felt like Benny and Kin-man were very cooperative with the PanDemocrats. And it felt like Benny and Kin-man and his allies had a blueprint on what the
political package should be, and that would be the idea proposed by the [Pan-Democratic
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Camp parties]… It seemed like it was well crafted to the Pan-Dems. Again, this nurtured
some mistrust between students, NGOs, and Benny.189

This mistrust led student activists to ignore the OCLP leadership’s insistence that the civil
disobedience camp should not occur until after the Chief Executive and the PRC leadership had
responded to their proposals and organize the sit-in on July 1st of 2014.
Grassroots forces were only able to overcome their difference and unify when faced with
what they perceived to be increased coercion during the public consultation. Three incidences led
to this perception. The first was that the Leung Administration denied the OCLP the right to
register as a company and collect donations through said company. The denial came a year after
OCLP made the initial request (SCMP May 12th 2014).
The second incident was that the State Council of the People’s Republic of China issued a
white paper that was interpreted and critiqued by legal elements of grassroots circles as
constraining and intimidating the judiciary. In the paper, the State Council insisted that all who
held positions of power in Hong Kong should be patriotic, including judges.
Under the policy of “one country, two systems,” all those who administrate Hong Kong,
including the chief executive, principal officials, members of the Executive Council and
Legislative Council, judges of the courts at different levels and other judicial personnel,
have on their shoulders the responsibility of correctly understanding and implementing the
Basic Law, of safeguarding the country’s sovereignty, security and development interests,
and of ensuring the long-term prosperity and stability of Hong Kong.190
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The Bar Association immediately saw this section as threatening the independence of the judiciary
and intimidating judges, contending in a press release that “Any erroneous public categorization
of Judges and judicial officers as ‘administrators’ or official exhortation for them to carry out any
political mission or task will send out the wrong message” (The Hong Kong Bar Association
2014).
Finally, grassroots perception of rising coercion was also heightened by a series of
cyberattacks on the Public Opinion Program of the University of Hong Kong (HKPOP) and Next
Media within three days of the white paper, right before the Civil Referendum was about to start.191
OCLP had paid HKPOP to conduct the referendum, and the program had built a website for preregistration and an app so that the population could not only vote in person at one of the sites set
up around the city, but online as well.192 Over 10 billion denial of service (DDOS) attacks were
launched against HKPOP’s website and app for the Civil Referendum. Both HKPOP and Next
Media’s news organization, Apple Daily, were taken offline for over twelve hours because of the
attack. Around 40% of the DDOS strikes could be traced back to IP addresses of Mainland firms
(SCMP June 23rd 2014).
This constellation of events created incentives for grassroots organizations to unify and
support OCLP’s referendum. For instance, a Civic Party legislator had revealed on the radio the
day before the white paper that he was unsure if he would even vote in the OCLP Civil
Referendum. He had previously denounced the Third Deliberation Day as “unrepresentative
screening.” He publicly stood up for OCLP, however, after they were denied the ability to form a
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company to collect donations, and then decided to support the Civil Referendum following the
white paper and DDOS attacks (SCMP June 23rd 2014).
Electoral concerns led the Democratic Party to negotiate with both the Chief Executive and
the PRC authorities on electoral reforms in the 2010s. This incident was interpreted as cooptation
by the grassroots coalition and prompted both increased party fracturing and distrust between more
seasoned and newer activists. The friction between political parties contributed to their difficulty
achieving consensus on a single electoral reform proposal. The mistrust between generations of
activists led student groups to trigger civil disobedience tactics before OCLP’s leadership
condoned it. Despite these tensions, grassroots forces were able to come together at least
temporarily in the face of what they viewed as coercive policies. Following the denial of OCLP’s
status as a company, the State Council’s White Paper, and DDOS attacks on multiple organizations
associated with grassroots forces, the coalition was able to unify and mobilize participation in the
Civic Referendum.
The Grassroots Level: Low Levels of Western Government Support
During the public consultation process, Western governments made few statements backing
grassroots objectives, limiting their ability to place pressure on the Chief Executive. While the
United States and British governments publicly espoused support for “genuine” universal suffrage
from January of 2013 through the summer of 2014, they did not mention the specific institutional
structures grassroots forces hoped to implement (SCMP September 26th 2013; May 31st 2014; June
18th 2014; June 19th 2014). Archival records reveal that Western governments did not advocate for
public nomination, public participation in the nominating committee, or alternative pathways to
participate in competitive elections outside of the nominating committee.
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Moreover, in certain cases during 2013, Western government officials resisted making
statements of support for grassroots forces entirely and voiced approval for the Leung
Administration’s tactics. The US consul general in Hong Kong attempted to demur from
involvement in the discussions of political reform by stating that the United States did “not take a
position for or against any particular formulation on how genuine universal suffrage was achieved”
(SCMP September 26th 2013). The annual State Department’s Human Rights Report on China did
not even mention the initiation of the reforms for the Chief Executive and Legislative Council
elections. 193 The British consul lauded Chief Executive Leung as demonstrating “good”
commitment in his approach to universal suffrage (SCMP July 4th, 2013).
Western government officials continued to resist commenting on proposals for political
reform through 2014. While the U.S. government restarted annual reports to Congress on Hong
Kong’s political development, it refused to comment on the State Council’s White Paper or its
implication for the rule of law (SCMP April 15th 2014; June 19th 2014). Similarly, the British
Government did not bring up political reform in Hong Kong during meetings with the PRC
leadership in June of 2014, despite the 30th anniversary of the Sino-British Joint Declaration
(SCMP June 18 2014; June 19th 2014). The Prime Minister even refused to meet with grassroots
activists who visited in July of 2014 (SCMP July 24th 2014).
Western Interests in China and Declining Linkages
The relative reticence of Western government officials to demonstrate support for
grassroots forces can be explained by two factors, the desire of Western officials to maintain a
positive economic relationship with the PRC and declining connections between Western officials

193

United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, China (Includes Tibet, Hong
Kong, and Macau) 2013 Human Rights Report (Washington D.C. 2014).
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/04/09/China.pdf

245

and Hong Kong grassroots networks. The PRC leadership were much more strident in their censure
of foreign efforts to support grassroots objectives through 2013 and 2014. Their actions raised the
costs of supporting grassroots forces for Western government officials, who were concerned about
benefitting economically from their relationship with China. Moreover, grassroots forces did not
expend as much energy cultivating linkages with Western government officials, limiting their
ability to influence their statements on Hong Kong’s political reforms.
By the early 2010s, the PRC leadership decided to become more proactive about
discouraging international support for grassroots mobilization in Hong Kong. The Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) viewed Western support for Hong Kong activists as a threat to their
authority and the territorial integrity of the country. In an internal Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
communique, officials described democracy promotion efforts by international actors as an
“attempt to undermine the current leadership and the socialism with Chinese characteristics of
governance… Western anti-China forces” aimed to “squeeze the party out of leadership” (Chen
and Kinzelbach 2015; 402-403). A member of the Politburo Standing Committee reportedly
instructed central government officials responsible for Hong Kong affairs that they “must fight
‘foreign interests’” in Hong Kong, because “‘International political forces and anti-Communist
Party international organizations’ are deeply involved in transforming Hong Kong into an antiCommunist Party and anti-China region and making Hong Kong a battlefield of international
political power.’”( SCMP September 25th 2014).
In the summer of 2013, archives indicate that PRC officials regularly rebuked Western
government officials for even mild statements about the electoral reform process in Hong Kong.
One of the most serious examples was after the outgoing US Consul General made a speech to the
American Chamber of Commerce where he advised that Hong Kong needed to “stay true to its
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spirit” when pursuing universal suffrage. The Office of the Commissioner of the Foreign Ministry
in Hong Kong publicly complained that it had “in the past lodged multiple ‘solemn
representations’ to the United States, requesting that it refrain from violating the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, which forbids diplomats from interfering in the internal affairs
of host states” and that further comments would damage the stability of US-Sino ties (SCMP May
17 2013). There were similar responses to the British government’s support for competitive
elections in Hong Kong. In September of 2013, the British Foreign Office Minister published an
opinion piece in the South China Morning Post on September 13th of 2013, emphasizing the
importance of genuine choice and promising Britain’s support during the political reform process.
The publicity officer of the PRC’s Liaison Office accused the British of making “trouble whenever
they withdraw from a colony” (SCMP September 25th 2013).
Moreover, by the summer of 2014, PRC officials had escalated their statements against the
United States government even without significant action on American officials’ part. Following
the June 2014 Civil Referendum organized by OCLP, PRC authorities blamed its success on the
United States. While the U.S. government had not been involved, an American tech firm,
CloudFlare, had been hired by HKPOP to defend the referendum from cyber threats and had fought
off the DDOS attacks (SCMP June 24th 2014). The PRC state-run media outlet, Global Times,
accused the United States of “trying to take advantage of this chance to push for the forces of Hong
Kong separatism and to bring China trouble” (SCMP June 26th 2014).
Western government officials did not want to jeopardize their economic and diplomatic ties
to the PRC because of the political reform process in Hong Kong. There had been cases where
Western governments had previously lost economic and diplomatic ties with China due to
perceived interference in other regions. In 2012, the British Prime Minister had met with the
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Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, leading Chinese officials to cancel bilateral meetings with
Britain (SCMP June 18th 2014). The Chinese Communist Party leadership also informed British
officials that they would not meet with them if they came for bilateral talks in April of 2013
(SCMP November 30th 2013). The leadership even canceled talks again in April of 2014 over a
human rights report written by the British Foreign Office (SCMP June 15th 2014).
Western government officials therefore took Chinese statements regarding Hong Kong
seriously in 2013 and 2014 and limited their comments on the public consultation regarding
political reform. For example, following warnings from the Foreign Ministry Commissioner in
late August of 2013, the new US consul general announced that the US did not support Occupy
Central, or any political group or movement (SCMP September 26th 2013). The United Kingdom
remained silent on the white paper, since the Chinese Premier was coming to London the week of
June 16th to discuss a trade deal worth over 14 billion British pounds (South China Morning Post
June 18 2014; June 19th 2014).
Grassroots forces did not court linkage to Western government officials as actively during the
public consultation on political reform as they had during the Anti-Article 23 Movement. 194
Between 2013 through the summer of 2014, grassroots forces only took two trips to Western
countries in a period of eighteen months to discuss political reform of the CE elections. They took
one to the United States and Canada in April of 2014 and the other to Britain in June of the same
year (SCMP April 15 2014; July 24th 2014). During the Anti-Article 23 Movement, grassroots
force visited North American and Europe at least five times to meet with Western government
officials.
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Grassroots organizations, particularly those who were associated with civil society
organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were hesitant to accept funding or
networking with foreign organizations. United States Congressional reports on democratic
developments in Hong Kong indicated that Hong Kong NGOs were reluctant to accept U.S.
funding “as it may stigmatize the organization in the eyes of the Chinese government and draw
unwanted attention from both the Chinese and Hong Kong governments” (Martin 2011, 11).195
The Alliance for True Democracy’s convenor publicly demurred from cultivating ties to foreign
leaders in April of 2014 “for fear that it may become an excuse for the [integrationist camp] to
attack us during the constitutional reform's consultation period” (SCMP April 21st 2014).
Interviewees involved in the OCLP leadership made little effort to foster ties to foreign
officials or international non-governmental organizations in 2013 or 2014.
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The only

international involvement they wanted were experts to ensure that the proposals they were voting
on in the Third Deliberation Day met international standards for competitive elections.197 They
even actively quelled efforts to reach out to international actors in the late summer of 2014. An
American expatriate volunteer reported that he had taken it upon himself to post on Twitter in
English on behalf of OCLP without asking the leadership in 2014. When the leadership found out,
he was ordered to desist.198
From 2013 through the summer of 2014, Western governments’ prioritization of their
relationship with the PRC and grassroots diminished efforts connect with Western government
officials led Western governments to be relatively quiet on the reforms to the CE and LegCo
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elections. Chinese authorities had decided to respond vehemently to any perceived statements or
connections to grassroots actors regarding the political reform. Western countries therefore
weakened statements toward Hong Kong following PRC officials’ initial reproaches, for fear of
losing economic and diplomatic ties to China. Moreover, grassroots organizations were more
anxious about the consequence of pursuing linkages with Western organizations and officials and
therefore limited visits to Western countries.
Elite Level: Unity within the Integrationist Camp
The Chief Executive and the integrationist coalition maintained unity on the issue of
electoral reform, despite numerous personal and policy tensions. Integrationist factions submitted
proposals that supported the Leung administration’s planned policies. Economic elite also publicly
criticized grassroots forces, bolstering the local government’s narratives regarding their plans to
launch a civil disobedience campaign.
During the public consultation period, the Chief Executive had a fractious relationship with
pro-business factions in the LegCo. The Liberal Party, an integrationist party, had a particularly
thorny relationship with the Leung Administration. By 2013, the Liberal Party began to vote more
with the Pan-Democratic Camp, crossing the aisle to vote in favor of their motions 40% of the
time, a full 23% more than other integrationist parties such as DAB (SCMP July 22nd 2014). One
of the leaders of the Liberal Party, James Tien, frequently criticized the leadership of the Chief
Executive. During a session in LegCo in July of 2014, Tien openly asked Leung to consider
resigning since “the government could not operate under his leadership” (SCMP December 10th
2014).199
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250

Yet the Liberal Party and other integrationist factions did not challenge the Leung
Administration’s policy proposals for electoral reform. The proposals they submitted to the Chief
Executive’s task force aligned with the ones the Leung administration laid out in the consultation
document, calling for a nominating committee based on the contemporary Election Committee
(SCMP April 15th 2014). There were only two minor differences in their rhetoric: the Liberal Party
did not echo the Chief Executive’s and PRC leadership’s insistence on ensuring that candidates
“loved China, loved Hong Kong” and they urged the Leung Administration to conduct further
electoral reform after the 2017 package.200
Business and property tycoons in Hong Kong also publicly warned against the damage that
Occupy Central could cause, supporting the Leung administration’s assessment of the grassroots
coalition. A prominent business leader who was also on the Standing Committee of the Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Congress (CPPCC), lamented in June of 2014 that “The young
generation could sacrifice their future over the next 30 years to join an illegal movement to fight
for something that they will not achieve. Is it worth it? I think it is not” (SCMP June 10th, 2014).
Another chairman of a leading property development company admonished that the Occupy
Central civil disobedience campaign could “have a very negative impact on Hong Kong” and
damage the region’s reputation as an international financial center (SCMP October 30th 2014).
The integrationist coalition remained largely supportive of the Leung administration’s
efforts regarding electoral reform despite tensions regarding other policy areas. Political parties
submitted proposals that supported the Chief Executive’s objectives of creating a nominating
committee similar to that of the contemporary Election Committee. Moreover, economic elite
denounced grassroots forces’ efforts to initiate a civil disobedience campaign.
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The Role of China
The PRC authorities’ central role in handling conflicts between Hong Kong elite had
contradictory iterative effects on the integrationist camp. On the one hand, PRC officials were able
to resolve disputes between the Coalition and avoid major crises over leadership within the
integrationist camp. Yet their approach facilitated the development of two entrenched factions that
persisted through CY Leung’s tenure as Chief Executive. If the rival factions received direct
instructions from PRC authorities, they coalesced during this period, but if they did not, then
disagreements emerged. This dynamic explains why the pro-business faction of the integrationist
coalition, which included the Liberal Party and prominent property developers, acted cohesively
with the Leung administration on political reform while undermining his leadership in other
domains during the public consultation.
The PRC leadership played a crucial role in managing disputes within the integrationist
camp over the Chief Executive election of 2012. The conditions of the CE election could have
produced extraordinary tension within the integrationist coalition because it was the first one to
have competition between elite factions since the Handover. There was a relatively low threshold
for nominating candidates in the Election Committee and at least five integrationist figures that
voiced an interest in running in the fall of 2011 and spring of 2012 (SCMP February 28th 2012). If
too many integrationist figures ran, the Election Committee could not make an immediate decision.
There was a high threshold for winning the election; at least half of the committee had to support
the nominee. If no candidate could get half of the Election Committee’s 1,200 votes in the first or
second ballot, then the Election Committee must nominate and then hold a new election 46 days
later (SCMP February 28th 2012).
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Central government authorities therefore played a role in structuring the competition and
cleavages within the 2012 Chief Executive Election. PRC leadership urged the three members and
former members of the Legislative Council that had voiced an interest in running for the Chief
Executive position to drop out of the race (SCMP February 28th 2012). The only two candidates
who were allowed to run were Henry Tang, a former member of the Liberal Party, who was
currently serving as Chief Secretary under Donald Tsang, and CY Leung, who had been both a
member, and then the Convenor, of the Executive Council since 1997. Tang had the support of the
Liberal Party and of prominent business leaders and property tycoons, while Leung was
championed by the DAB, the labor union FTU, and former supporters of Tung Chee Hwa (SCMP
February 24th 2012).
The competition between the two sides led Tang to reveal information that the PRC viewed
as dangerous to the overall stability of the integrationist coalition, prompting the leadership to
intervene for a second time during the electoral process. In a debate, Tung accused Leung of having
suggested the use of riot police and tear gas on the Anti-Article 23 Movement protesters in an
Executive Council meeting in 2003 (SCMP March 17th 2012).201 This accusation was a violation
of the rules of the Executive Council; all meetings were confidential.202 A source within the PRC
government stated that “We think even Henry Tang himself understands that he has gone beyond
what is acceptable. This could set up a dangerous precedent and undermine the governance [of
future administrations]” (SCMP March 20th 2012). PRC officials, including President Xi Jinping,
met with prominent supporters of Tang to convince them to vote for Leung instead. (SCMP 20th
2012; March 21st 2012). CY Leung won a landslide victory over Tang (South China Morning Post
April 9th 2012).
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The PRC leadership was able to resolve the electoral dispute, but the CE election alienated
Tung’s supporters, including prominent property developers and the Liberal Party. Liberal Party
leaders and Legislative Council members refused to come to reconciliatory events (SCMP April
9th 2012). Furthermore, two of the functional constituency representatives that had supported Tang
backed a vote of no-confidence against CY Leung (SCMP October 17th 2013). The head of the
Liberal Party, James Tien, even publicly stated that Leung was the “wrong choice” for the Chief
Executive position and that he had very little support among the integrationist coalition in Hong
Kong (SCMP August 26th, 2013).
The row over the 2012 CE election also demonstrated, however, that the direct involvement
of PRC officials led to changes in behavior among integrationist elite. This dynamic continued in
during the public consultation, where PRC leadership held several meetings with integrationist
leaders to convey the necessity of a screening mechanism for CE candidates (SCMP March 26
2013b; November 26 2013). For instance, a member of the NPCSC met with 40 integrationist
LegCo members in Shenzhen in March of 2013 and warned that
If a person who confronts the central government becomes the chief executive, it can be
expected that the tension between the two governments will be heightened, the close
connection between Hong Kong and the mainland will be damaged, and that Hong Kong
society will be torn apart (SCMP March 26th 2013b).

Therefore, former supporters of Tang still acted cohesively with the Chief Executive during the
public consultation. Where the PRC did not signal their policy preferences, pro-business factions
broke with the Leung administration. The integrationist camp’s reliance on PRC authorities to
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resolve internal disputes allowed for the resolution of crises, but often at the expense of longterm cohesion.
In 2012, the PRC administration was able to both limit the competition in the CE election
to a manageable number and rally the majority of the integrationist camp around a winner. At the
same time, however, the PRC leadership’s machinations shaped the cleavages within the
integrationist elite that resulted from the election. The PRC leadership’s actions also alienated
Tang’s pro-business LegCo and property developer supporters, increasing the hostility with the
Leung faction. PRC leadership could still incentivize cohesion within the integrationist camp
through direct meetings during the public consultation, but without their direct intervention, the
Leung administration had difficulty garnering support among this faction.
Over all, grassroots forces were unable to compel the Leung administration into changing
the report they sent to the NPCSC to emphasize public desire for universal suffrage elections
without political screening. Their coalition was in a weak position because they lacked internal
unity and support from Western government officials. Without internal unity, it became hard for
the grassroots coalition to create a baseline for an electoral reform package or negotiate with the
Chief Executive. The Leung administration also did not feel any pressure from Western officials
regarding their choice of policies; in some cases, Western governments even voiced relative
support for their activities.
During the public consultation, Western officials were less willing to convey public support
for grassroots’ goals because of both increased censure from the PRC authorities and the decrease
in connection to grassroots organizations. Western governments wanted to maintain their ties to
China, and therefore were willing to remain relatively quiet on, or even support, the Leung
administration’s policy proposals on future CE elections. Grassroots organizations took few trips
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to meet with Western officials and worried about the impact of foreign assistance on their
donations as well.
Unity among grassroots forces had been harmed prior to the public consultation by the
legacy of a 2010 incident where the Democratic Party secretly negotiated a political reform
package with the Chief Executive and the PRC leadership. The fallout from this incident led to
political party breakdown and divisions between veteran and newer activists. While grassroots
forces tried to set up coordinating platforms to collaborate on political reform, they were
ineffective and faced multiple defections.
Grassroots forces were able to briefly unify to support the Civil Referendum in June of
2014, due to the perception of increased coercion by both the Hong Kong and Mainland authorities.
This unity did not last, however. Without further repression from either the Hong Kong or
Mainland government, student activists decided to go against the leadership of OCLP on July 1st
and launch a civil disobedience action.
The Leung administration also benefited from cohesion among the integrationist coalition,
despite friction in over other policy areas. While past PRC efforts to mediate intra-elite conflicts
deepened certain factional disputes, their involvement fostered cooperation. When PRC authorities
made direct statements to integrationist elite, they were likely to unify with the Leung
administration, even if their faction contested the Chief Executive’s policies in other areas.

Stage 2: The Legislative Process Following the NPCSC Decision, September of 2014
through July of 2015
On August 31st of 2014, the NPCSC laid out parameters for the changes to the Chief Executive
election that would have increased the central government’s ability to choose candidates for the
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Chief Executive, while also allowing one-person one-vote among their chosen candidates. They
ordered the Hong Kong government to create legislation that fashioned a nominating committee
based on the contemporary Election Committee for the 2012 Chief Executive, which was to be the
sole path to candidacy in universal suffrage elections. The new nominating committee would only
be allowed to approve of two or three candidates and more than half of the members of the
nominating committee had to endorse the candidate to be eligible for universal suffrage
elections.203
Grassroots forces sought to pressure the Hong Kong government to 1) either reinitiate the
political reform process by sending another report to the NPCSC; 2) weaken the strength of
nominating committee in the legislation the local government tabled in the LegCo; or finally, 3)
extract promises that there would be future changes to the Chief Executive elections with a time
table for those further reforms. The primary way this pressure manifested itself was through the
79-day occupation surrounding the Hong Kong Legislative Council, known as the Umbrella
Movement. As with the first stage of the movement, grassroots forces were unable to extract any
concessions out of the Leung administration.

The Local Government’s Implementation of Autonomy in Response to Grassroots Forces
During the Public Consultation
The Leung administration did not change their policy proposals following the Umbrella
Movement, but they also could not implement the electoral reform package either. In accordance
with the NPCSC’s August 31st decision, the institutional changes the Leung administration
proposed made it impossible for anyone outside of the integrationist camp to compete in universal
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suffrage elections for the Chief Executive position. The nominating committee would be based on
the integrationist-dominated Election Committee and candidates would need the support of 50%
or more members. This configuration also ensured that PRC authorities had a high degree of
control over who the nominees for Chief Executive would be in the future. 204
The Chief Executive’s administration did briefly enter into negotiations with grassroots forces
a few weeks into the Umbrella Movement and offered minor concessions. Through intermediaries,
they proposed sending a follow-up report to the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, but they
refused to send a report to the NPCSC regarding local demand for universal suffrage. The Leung
administration also suggested that there were some openings to make the 2017 reform package
more pluralistic, though they would not contradict the NPCSC’s August 31 decision. Additionally,
they suggested amenability to discuss further reform that could be implemented for the 2022 CE
election.205 While the Leung administration did send a follow-up report to the Hong Kong and
Macau Affairs Office, nothing came of their other offers to grassroots forces.
Grassroots were able, however, to vote the Leung administration’s policy down in the
Legislative Council. The electoral reform package was voted down 28 to 8, preventing
implementation of the bill. This development meant that the status quo was maintained; PanDemocratic Camp politicians could run for the Chief Executive position, but only a relatively
small, integrationist-dominated Election Committee of 1200 could vote for on the outcome.
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Grassroots and the Chief Executive’s Resources Following the NPCSC’s Decision

Grassroots forces were inhibited in their capacity to pressure the Leung administration
because of their limited cohesion and their inability to elicit support from Western government
organizations. The integrationist coalition dealt with factional disputes that empowered grassroots
forces briefly. However, intra-elite conflicts were resolved within a month, enabling the Chief
Executive to avoid granting concessions in this stage of the movement. By the end of the
movement, grassroots forces were not able to get the local government to make significant
concessions in the legislation or restart the political reform process through another report to the
central government. They were able, however, to vote down the Hong Kong government’s political
reform proposal.
Key factors affected the variation in grassroots unity, Western governmental support, and
the integrationist camp’s cohesion during this period. The anticipation and experience of
indiscriminate coercion temporarily strengthened grassroots’ unity, but more targeted coercion and
lingering mistrust between veteran and newer activists’ deepened disunity among movement
participants. Western governments were more inclined to resist involvement in the Umbrella
Movement because of their interests in preserving their relationship with China and the lack of
connection to grassroots circles. Finally, the factions that developed during the Chief Executive
election of 2012 continued to plague the integrationist coalition, but the PRC leadership was able
to mediate between factions and resolve disputes temporarily.
Grassroots Level: Low Levels of Solidarity Among the Grassroots Coalition
Grassroots forces were unable to act cohesively for the majority of the Umbrella
Movement. Student activists wrested control over grassroots direct action and launched an
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occupation of three parts of the city in response to the August 31st NPCSC decision. In the early
weeks of the occupation, they were able to coalesce and create a coordinating platform, the Five
Way Platform, which helped bring the Leung administration to the bargaining table. Yet the
coordination through the Five Way Platform quickly broke down, limiting grassroots forces’
ability to strategize, control protester activity, and satisfactorily conclude negotiations with the
Leung administration.
Collaboration between grassroots forces nearly broke down during the initiation of OCLP’s
planned occupation that was to take place on October 1st, National Day. OCLP intended the nonviolent occupation of Hong Kong’s primary business and shopping district to last only over the
holiday weekend, limiting the disruptive impact of the action. The student groups, HKFS and
Scholarism, decided to hold a student strike and teach-in the week before the occupation was
scheduled to build up momentum toward OCLP’s occupation.206 At the end of the student strike,
on the night of September 26th, they decided to launch a civil disobedience action without
consulting the OCLP leadership or most of the Pan-Democratic Parties. They broke into “Civic
Square” at the Government Complex, an area where, in the past, activists had come to petition the
government, and launch a sit-in. Student activists were supported by members of LSD and some
members of civil society organizations.207
The student organizations wrenched control from the OCLP leadership over the direction
of the grassroots mobilization. The leadership of OCLP tried to resolve the situation by coming
down to the protest and announced a premature start to Occupy Central in the early hours of
September 28th. The HKFS and Scholarism, however, indicated that they only wanted OCLP to
give them their supplies and assistance. Some of their followers began to leave, concerned that
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participating in the action meant having to turn themselves in to face arrest.208 OCLP therefore
decided to back down and turn over leadership of the action to the HKFS and Scholarism.
Moreover, the Leung administration recognized HKFS as the leader of the movement, further
isolating OCLP from power within the movement structure.
The student-initiated sit-in became an occupation that lasted 79 days, from the end of
September through December of 2014. There were three main occupation sites. Two were on Hong
Kong Island, one was in Admiralty, surrounding the Government Complex, while the other was in
Causeway Bay. There was one occupation site in Kowloon, in the Mongkok shopping district.
Grassroots forces were able to maintain a certain level of cohesion in the first few weeks
of the protests in spite of the upheaval within the structure of the coalition. Grassroots forces were
able to set up the “Five-Way Platform”, which was to act as a coordinating space for movement,
facilitating information-sharing and deciding strategic action for the movement.209 The Five Way
Platform contained leadership from political parties, OCLP, HKFS and Scholarism, nongovernmental organizations, and labor unions.
This cohesion helped to bring the Hong Kong government to the bargain table. In early
October, the Leung administration agreed to negotiations with grassroots forces, some of which
were to take place in public on television. HKFS collaborated with associates of OCLP and the
Democratic Party in the negotiations and in preparation for a public debate regarding the
importance of competitive elections and universal suffrage. 210 Through intermediaries, they
offered moderate concessions including a discussion about future reforms for the CE elections for
2022.211
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Collaboration once again broke down toward late October, less than a month after the
initiation of the occupation. The Five Way Platform became ineffective because member
organizations refused to follow through on actions negotiated during meetings. HKFS could not
get all of its leadership to agree to decisions made in the Five Way Platform.212 OCLP leadership
also bucked the decisions of the Five-Way Platform in certain instanced. They wanted to launch a
second referendum regarding how the movement should proceed toward the end of October,
asking participants if they wanted to stop the occupation. Student groups and political parties
feared that this action would not be successful, because they did not know all of the participants at
the occupation sites, and worried about sabotage of the vote. OCLP insisted on announcing the
proposal over the objections of the Five Way Platform, leading to further confusion among
participants.213
The failure to develop a successful means of collaboration among grassroots forces during
the occupation made it difficult to strategize protest actions, control participants in the movement,
and to manage negotiations with the Leung administration. In terms of strategy, grassroots forces
could also not agree as to whether or not to escalate the movement further to pressure the Chief
Executive. Veteran activists, particularly political parties, OCLP, and the labor unions, advocated
for the movement to remain non-violent. They believed it demonstrated to the public the protesters’
respect for rule of law and their willingness to sacrifice.214 Younger and newer factions of the
grassroots coalition, including student groups, bucked against this strategy, believing that the
movement needed to escalate since the Leung administration had not made significant
concessions.215
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The lack of a clear strategy led the occupation to continue even after mobilization had
dwindled and public support had turned against the occupation. After the first few weeks, there
were, at most, a hundred to a couple hundred protesters sleeping in and defending the occupation
sites in Admiralty, Causeway Bay, and Tsim Tsa Tsui on a given night. One interviewee who had
visited the Admiralty site on multiple occasions stated that there was often “probably no more than
seventy five or eighty people there.” 216 By November, a HKPOP survey found that 70% of
respondents wanted grassroots forces to end the occupation (Chung et al. 2014).
Efforts to remobilize the public also failed due to disagreements over strategy. In late
November, some factions of the protesters, including members of HKFS, attempted to occupy
further territory around the Government Complex. They were not supported by the political parties
or OCLP, most of whom wanted to end the occupation. The relatively small group of participants
made it easy for the police to overwhelm and use heavy amounts of force against protesters in late
November. This event resulted in no public pressure on the Leung administration and only served
to deepen resentment between protest factions.217
The disunity within the grassroots coalition also made it difficult to control protester
actions. As the occupation dragged on, new protester factions arose that had limited connections
to previously established organizations. “Barricade” units formed in Admiralty to protect the
encampment. The leaders of these units were not on the Five-Way Platform and had little respect
for its leadership, outside of the student groups.218 In Mongkok, “localist” groups, collectives that
were specifically protective of Hong Kong identity and held anti-Mainland sentiment, grew
stronger by virtue of their presence in the encampment.219 HKFS felt that they could not control
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either the newer associations of protesters that had formed with the initiation of the occupation nor
the emerging localist factions.220 Even in the early part of the movement, HKFS was resoundingly
rebuffed when it attempted to get the Mongkok protesters to close their encampment and join the
Admiralty protest instead.221
Moreover, efforts to bargain with the Leung administration were stymied by the growing
fissures. HKFS leadership promised not to be too publicly critical of the Leung administration’s
position prior to the televised debate between student activists and representatives of the Leung
Administration in October of 2014. Intermediaries wanted HKFS to leave room for further
negotiations.222 The Leung administration offered about 75% of what it had privately, stating that
they could only have changes for 2022, not the 2017 package. They had, however, also assured
the activists that they wanted future meetings, indicating further concessions. Following the
debates, the students became very critical of the government, leading to an end of negotiations:
[The Chief Secretary for Administration] called and asked what is happening, do they still
want to talk. And I said I don’t know. That afternoon we call the students and asked, “Do
you want to talk?” And they said no. And I told [The Chief Secretary] I’m sorry, they don’t
want to talk. And I tried to persuade them and then I criticized them, ‘you didn’t deliver
your promise of a mixed response. How could you have done this?...You have to correct
it, because you failed to deliver your promise.” And then [they] said, okay, we’ll write a
press statement….And then the next day, they draft out their ten points. The first nine points
repeated their very strongly worded criticism (laughs). And I gave up.223
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Interviews with HKFS leadership indicated that the organization was divided on pursuing public
talks with the government. They therefore could not pursue further engagement. Since the FiveWay Platform could not be used to create consensus around bargaining with the Leung
administration, and HKFS could not agree amongst themselves as to how to proceed, negotiations
between the Hong Kong government and the protesters broke down within the first month of the
movement and never resumed.
Most of the Umbrella Movement was characterized by divisions between grassroots
factions, with only a punctuated moment of unity in the early weeks of the occupation. Even the
beginning of the movement involved a major struggle over the leadership of the grassroots
coalition. When grassroots forces were able to maintain unity and work through the Five Way
Platform, they were able to initiate negotiations with the Leung administration. Without cohesion,
grassroots forces struggled to strategize future actions, control new participants, and successfully
bargain with the Chief Executive, limiting their overall success in influencing the Leung
administration’s behavior.
The Role of Repression
The distrust between veteran grassroots actors and newer activists continued to haunt
dynamics within the coalition. Through the fall of 2014, student groups still mistrusted OCLP as
being too moderate and aligned with the interests of the Pan-Democratic Camp political parties
like the Democratic Party. 224 These misgivings influenced their decision to launch the Civic
Square sit-in and take control over the occupation. As one interviewee who worked with the
student groups put it, “They hijacked [OCLP’s] whole movement… I would say that the young
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people did things… deliberately… They were competing amongst themselves, but they both
wanted to derail Occupy.”225
Yet grassroots forces were able to collaborate for the first few weeks of the Umbrella
Movement through the Five-Way Platform due to the Leung administration’s repressive tactics.
The morning of September 27th, riot police came to clear out the protesters in Civic Square. They
used pepper spray without warning and beat students who were trying to protect activists
conducting the sit-in. They arrested a handful of the student leaders.226 OCLP felt they had to
support student activists because they believed the police force would act violently toward them
and did not want to see the students harmed.227 One of the leaders was worried that the initial
police response indicated that this protest could turn into another Tiananmen Square.228 Another
interviewee described the first few days as “very tense. So tense that people thought that the PLA
would move into Hong Kong. That the PLA would fire real bullets into the crowds.”229
Protesters faced coercion over the first three weeks of the occupation. The police used an
unprecedented amount of tear gas against protesters on September 28th, 87 cannisters’ more than
had been utilized in any protest in the region since the Handover.230 Toward the end of the first
week of the occupation, counter-protesters, some of whom were members of the local triads Wo
Sin Wo and Sun Yee On, attacked participants in the occupation at both the Causeway Bay and
Mongkok sites two nights in a row (SCMP October 13th 2014). While the police were not directly
involved in the attacks, they did not use banners to warn the assailants to stop and were accused
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of standing by while protesters were beaten (SCMP October 5th 2014). Videos also surfaced of
seven plain-clothed police officers beating a social worker and member of the Civic Party in the
third week of the protests (SCMP October 16th 2014).
The top leadership of the PRC, however, forced the Chief Executive to limit violence
against the protesters after the initial tear gas attack.231 CY Leung’s administration allowed the
occupation to continue. They relied on private citizen injunctions against the protests to eventually
lead to their dismantlement, rather than forcefully removing protesters (SCMP November 29th
2014).232233
The fact that the violence of the first few weeks was viewed as affecting the majority of
the grassroots forces was important to incentivizing solidarity among grassroots forces. Veteran
protesters first feared a “Tiananmen Square” crackdown, leading them to unify with student groups
in spite of the upstaging of the original OCLP-planned action on October 1st. When the police used
tear gas on September 28th and counter-protesters attacked protesters in Mongkok in October,
political parties across the spectrum, young activists, and veteran activists were all affected.234
There still were some clashes between police and activists that occurred in the latter half
of the protests, such as the incident in late November where protesters were beaten by police after
trying to secure additional territory for their occupation.235 One protester in Admiralty stated that
police officers would continually “aim for your head” when hitting activists with a baton despite
regulations, forcing some protesters to get plastic helmets as a precaution. 236 The majority of
participants, however, did not encounter this violence after mid-October. Only factions such as the
231

Interview 10, 22, 28
The encampment at Mongkok was not dismantled by court order until November 25th. The Admiralty site lasted
until December 11th and the Causeway Bay site until December 15th.
233
Interviews 10 and 28
234
Interviews 10 and 27
235
Interviews 9, 22, 27, 32, 37
236
Interview 9
232

267

“barricade units” that occupied the Admiralty territory overnight and the protesters at the Mongkok
sites had experiences where police used batons and pepper spray.237 While the police allowed the
protest sites to remain active until they received court injunctions, they sought to prevent further
escalation. 238 The older, veteran activists from the moderate Pan-Democratic Camp parties,
unions, and religious organizations did not participate in these actions and therefore had few
confrontations with the police.
Without fears of indiscriminate coercion, solidarity among protesters decreased. Veteran
activists did view younger activists’ interactions with police as unfair, but they also believed they
were avoidable.239 They also reasoned that clashes with police hurt the public perception of the
movement.240 These activists therefore more staunchly advocated non-violence and ending the
occupation, despite students and other factions wanting to escalate it.
The generational rifts that resulted from the 2010 electoral reform episode continued to
affect the grassroots coalitional structure, as younger activists mistrusted and fought for leadership
of movement activities. When the majority of grassroots forces either feared an increase in
coercion or faced repressive police actions, however, they were more incentivized to collaborate
in spite of these differences. When coercion was more targeted and only affected segments of the
grassroots coalition, however, it did not deep cohesion, but rather increased disputes around
strategies among grassroots forces.
Grassroots Level: Low Levels of Western Government Officials’ Support
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Grassroots forces were not able to harness pressure from Western government officials to
change the Leung Administration’s legislation on political reform during or after the Umbrella
Movement. When Western government officials did defend grassroots forces, 1) the officials
involved were lower-ranking, 2) statements were often limited to their right to protest, and 3) the
statements largely did not coincide with the window where grassroots forces were able to bring
the Leung administration to the bargaining table. In some cases, Western government officials
made statements that even admonished protesters and lauded the Leung administration. These
conditions limited the incentives for either the Chief Executive or the PRC leadership to reconsider
their policy approach to reforming CE elections.
Statements in support of grassroots officials often came from Western legislative bodies,
but they were primarily addressing their executive branches, rather than the Leung administration
or PRC officials. For instance, a member of the European Parliament criticized the European
Council for being “far too quiet” (Gough 2018,104). Both Democratic and Republican
Congressional representatives in the United States urged the Obama administration to pressure the
PRC government on Hong Kong. There was also bi-partisan support for the Hong Kong Human
Rights and Democracy Act in 2014 and 2015, though there were too few votes to get the bill out
of committee (SCMP October 11th 2014; January 20th 2015). These statements did not have a
significant effect on the activities of the Western government executives, who remained relatively
quiet and vague in the press on the activities of grassroots forces in Hong Kong for the majority
of the Umbrella Movement.
Most of the support grassroots forces received from Western governments was in defense
of their right to protest, rather than their rights to free and fair elections without PRC screening.
For instance, Britain emphasized that it was important for Hong Kong to preserve the “right to

269

demonstrate,” but “encouraged all parties to engage constructively” in the upcoming second round
of public consultations the Leung administration was planning. The US Consulate likewise
supported “the city’s well-established traditions of freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of
expression and press,” but urged “all sides to refrain from actions that would further escalate
tensions,” insisting that it “did not take sides” (SCMP September 30th 2014). Foreign officials and
international business leaders also privately warned against political persecutions of grassroots
forces. One interviewee explained in 2016 that:
The one thing that Hong Kong cannot have, and the business community is very, very
secure about this…is political dissidents in jail. They know this… We had one of the top
bankers in the world tell CY this in New York. One of the five largest banks in New York,
two of the CEOs, during a private lunch, CY told him this. A big Hong Kong tycoon…
They said “look, I can do business in a lot of countries, and if you guys want to mess it up,
I can’t do it. We’re not going to be able to do it. You’re going to change everything.”241

These warnings may have contributed to the clamp down on widespread violence against protesters
but did not convey a need for the Leung administration to change their stance on electoral reform.
When Western governments did make slightly stronger statements championing grassroots
efforts, it was after the grassroots forces’ solidarity had diminished. For instance, on November
13th, President Obama affirmed that “We are going to consistently speak out on the right of people
to express themselves and encourage that the elections that take place in Hong Kong are
transparent and fair and reflective of the opinions of people there” at the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation leaders’ summit in Beijing (SCMP November 13th 2014). This statement came after
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the Five Way Platform had fallen apart and efforts at negotiation with the Leung administration
had failed.
Western government officials also made statements that were more supportive of the Leung
administration and the PRC authorities’ narratives as opposed to those of grassroots forces. In
November of 2014, the state secretary of Germany’s Federal Foreign Office obliquely admonished
protesters, that “people should ‘recognize and accept the legal and political limits,’ respect the rule
of law and make compromises on political reforms” (SCMP November 16th 2014). In midDecember, the British chairman of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee issued a
statement even more supportive of the PRC authorities:
As far as I can see, China is complying with the pledge in the Joint Declaration. They may
not match how we see democracy over here [in Britain]. But my personal view is that it is
difficult to point the finger at the Chinese government saying they are breaching the Joint
Declaration” (SCMP December 18th 2014).

Grassroots forces could not elicit significant Western government backing to change the
CE’s policies regarding electoral reform. While lower level officials within Western countries’
legislatures advocated on Hong Kong’s behalf, it did not result in the leadership backing grassroots
forces’ agenda. Where Western governments did pressure the CE and the PRC authorities, they
often restricted their remarks to activists’ rights to protest, or their statements came after grassroots
forces’ unity had diminished. Moreover, in some cases, grassroots forces made statements that
actually supported the Leung administration and the PRC authorities over grassroots forces.
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Domestic Interests in China and Declining Linkage
Neither Western government’s domestic interests or the degree of linkages between
grassroots forces and Western government officials facilitated the development of international
support during the Umbrella Movement. The PRC administration continued pushback against
Western officials’ involvement in the electoral reform of the CE elections. Western powers desired
cooperation with China for both security and economic reasons, thereby limiting their interest in
promoting Hong Kong grassroots’ aims. The linkages between grassroots forces and Western
officials remained attenuated, both because grassroots forces did not seek out those connections
until 2015 and because PRC officials and the Leung administration took active steps to keep the
parties apart.
PRC authorities steadfastly rebuffed any commentary from Western officials following the
NPCSC’s August 31st decision. For instance, following a meeting between the U.S. National
Security Advisor and the PRC leadership in Beijing, the spokesperson from the Foreign Ministry
reiterated that the PRC would “absolutely not tolerate” external interference in the city’s foreign
affairs (SCMP September 13th 2014). In October, the US Congressional-Executive Commission
on China issued a report which opined that “Beijing’s actions to restrict democracy in Hong Kong
‘raised concerns about the future of the fragile freedoms and rule of law that distinguish Hong
Kong from mainland China.’” In response, the CCP newspaper, People’s Daily, published a front
page commentary entitled “Why the US never gets bored with color revolutions,” in which it
accused members of the National Endowment for Democracy of meeting with OCLP (SCMP
October 11th 2014).
Moreover, both the PRC and the Leung administration tried to both discourage
international statements and delegitimize the grassroots coalition by blaming the movement on
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foreign forces. Pro-Mainland Chinese media outlets also accused the Hong Kong-America Center,
which was run by a former US diplomat -turned academic, of giving smart phones to protesters
occupying in Admiralty.242 Chief Executive CY Leung also made unsubstantiated insinuations of
larger conspiracies, “[Because] Hong Kong, [is] a Chinese city and a highly open city, [there has]
always been foreign forces [operating]. And it is my responsibility to have an understanding and
awareness of foreign forces involved in movements or activities in Hong Kong” (SCMP November
13th 2014).
For their part, Western governments needed to maintain a good relationship with China for
both their military and economic security in 2014, and therefore tread carefully considering the
PRC officials’ signaling regarding Hong Kong political reform. The United States wanted China’s
cooperation in fighting the Islamic State in the summer and fall of 2014 (SCMP September 13th
2014). Two of the most powerful countries in the European Union, France and Germany, both
negotiated their quotas for China’s renminbi foreign institutional investor scheme the summer of
2014 as well. This scheme allowed their companies to invest in Shanghai and Shenzhen (SCMP
July 28th 2014).
The Leung administration and PRC officials also sought to limit the connections between
grassroots forces and foreign officials during the Umbrella Movement. When a British member of
Parliament tried to visit Hong Kong on the way to Shanghai, he was denied entry to both cities for
fear that he would meet with protesters (SCMP November 26th, 2014). The Chinese government
also banned a delegation of British politicians from coming to Hong Kong to conduct a review of
whether or not China had lived up to the promises of the Joint Declaration and meet with members
of the grassroots coalition participating in the protest. The Chinese ambassador to Britain justified
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these actions on the grounds that the parliamentarians’ visit would “give the illusion of external
support and ‘pour oil over fire’” (SCMP December 9th 2014).
Grassroots forces also did not endeavor to increase their international linkages until after
the Umbrella Movement was over.243 While Hong Kong diaspora organized events in solidarity
with the grassroots coalition and there were Western expatriates and citizens that were
participating in the movement, there were few efforts to ask solidarity campaigns or the local
participants to contact foreign officials on the Umbrella Movement’s behalf (SCMP October 2
2014). 244 None of the primary groups responsible for the organization of the protests, HKFS,
Scholarism, or OCLP, had significant linkages to foreign officials at the time. There was also a
fear of reinforcing the government’s narratives regarding the movement. 245 Moreover, HKFS and
Scholarism were weary of the organizations that had cultivated significant international linkages,
such as moderate legislators and political parties in the Pan-Democratic Camp. Energies within
the movement instead focused on cultivating relations with foreign press and publicizing the
Umbrella Movement, as well as making connections to movements in other regions of the Chinese
periphery, rather than direct appeals to foreign leaders. 246
Both Western governments’ interests in maintaining their relationship with the PRC and
the dearth of linkages between grassroots forces and Western government officials contributed to
the relatively low level of backing grassroots forces received from Western governments. The
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PRC administration actively tried to signal that it would not tolerate any interference during the
Leung administration’s implementation of electoral reform. Western government officials mostly
heeded the PRC’s warnings because of their security and economic interests in cooperation with
China. The PRC leadership and the Chief Executive also endeavored to keep Western government
officials from directly meeting with grassroots forces. Grassroots forces focused on building
relationships with Western media and movements in the Chinese periphery over connections with
Western government officials.
Elite Level: Fluctuating Cohesion
Cohesion within the integrationist coalition vacillated over the course of the Umbrella
Movement and the subsequent legislative process for the electoral reform package. The Leung
administration had difficulty corralling pro-business factions of the integrationist camp; the Chief
Executive faced resistance from both economic elite and the pro-business Liberal Party. Hong
Kong tycoons gave money to support the grassroots’ occupation campaign and prominent
economic elite resisted making statements supporting the Chief Executive in October during the
movement. Business factions rallied behind the Chief Executive by December of 2014, helping
the administration resist making any changes to the bill. They were unable, however, to coordinate
actions against the Pan-Democratic Camp’s veto of the Leung administration’s political reform
package.
Local economic elite associated with the integrationist camp did not publicly condone the
Umbrella Movement, but some did support the occupation financially. Interviewees associated
with the grassroots organizations participating in the Umbrella Movement reported that prominent
members of the local business community had asked how best to donate to the movement.247
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Chinese tycoons always play this game, they always want to be able to say if there is a big
change in the weather a couple of years from now… ‘Oh, I supported them, I gave them
money.’... But also, there were some younger Hedge fund guys…I remember I had two
guys who wanted to meet in a garage… They were so scared, but they wanted to give
money, they wanted to give a couple hundred thousand dollars.248

The same interviewee proceeded to describe numerous incidences where individual or groups of
business people donated to the Umbrella Movement by leaving money in the boxes that were set
up along the perimeter of the occupation site.249
According to interviewees, grassroots forces were never short of funds for the occupation.
At one point in time, they were turning away money. They were more worried about the
money being misused, and the ICAC trying to do something about the money…250 I had
two million dollars from other people. Actually more than that, about 2.8 million [HKD}.
For everything from- people donating money- fifty thousand a year, two hundred thousand
a year… Look it’s Hong Kong, guys don’t give less than 10,000 [HKD] dollars.251

These funds ensured that protesters were able to buy food, water, medical supplies, tents, and other
supplies as needed, making the occupation easier to maintain.
While business and property tycoons did not explicitly approve of the occupation, some
did issue ambiguous statements that on occasion contradicted the Leung administration’s
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narratives. In mid-October, one of the wealthiest tycoons in the city urged grassroots forces to
return home, but also expressed sympathy for them.
My young friends: your parents, family members, all Hong Kong people and the central
government are concerned about your well-being. You have successfully conveyed your
messages and we have heard them. I urge all of you not to let today's fervor turn into
tomorrow's regret. I sincerely call on you to return to the side of your families (SCMP
October 16th 2014).

The chairman of another major Hong Kong corporation publicly contradicted Leung
administration’s assessment of the economic impact of the protests. He rebutted their declaration
that “overseas investors had expressed doubts over Hong Kong’s business environment,”
contending that investors have “No hesitation about continuing investments in Hong Kong… What
has happened will not last forever. Hong Kong’s success is built on the rule of law, which is well
respected by everyone in the city. Recent events will not affect what’s in people’s hearts and
minds” (SCMP October 24th 2014).
The Liberal Party’s chairman, James Tien, completely broke with the integrationist camp
a month into the occupation. A month into the protests, Tien called on CY Leung to resign from
being Chief Executive. He blamed the occupation on Leung and argued that he could “hardly
govern effectively” (SCMP October 30th, 2014).
Within days of Tien’s statement, however, business tycoons began to rally around the
Leung administration and formally denounce the occupation. One business leader uploaded a
statement to his corporation’s website, insisting that “he had been opposing any activities which
undermined Hong Kong’s stability and prosperity.” He claimed to be “heartbroken about the recent
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turmoil arising from” the Umbrella Movement (South China Morning Post October 30th 2014).
By December of 2014, the Liberal Party had formally reunited with the integrationist camp as
well (SCMP December 10th 2014).
Cohesion within the integrationist coalition faltered, however, when the Legislative
Council finally voted on the Leung administration’s reform package in June of 2015. The
integrationist camp knew that the Pan-Democratic Camp would veto the legislation, but they
wanted to at least delay their action by keeping them from achieving quorum through a walkout.
Because the Liberal Party representatives and two other functional constituency legislators who
had been a part of Tang’s faction stayed behind, however, there was a sufficient number of
legislators for quorum. As a result, the electoral reform package was voted down 28 to 8, an
embarrassing loss for the integrationist camp, since it gave the appearance that the bill was
unpopular (SCMP June 18th 2014).
Pro-business factions varied in their support of the integrationist coalition from September
of 2014 through June of 2015. Some business elite contributed monetarily to the occupation and
resisted making outright denunciations of grassroots forces. One pro-business integrationist
legislator criticized the Chief Executive and called for his resignation. The integrationist coalition
was able to reach a new accord in November and December of 2014 that helped the Chief
Executive avoid concessions to grassroots forces. Yet this newfound cohesion did not lead to
coordinated action during the vote on Leung’s political reform package.
The Role of China and Economic Interests
The iterative impact of the PRC leadership’s position as arbiter among the integrationist
coalition both facilitated and inhibited unity within elite circles during this stage of movement
activity. The divisions PRC leadership helped to establish during the Chief Executive election
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flared during this period, facilitating pro-business’ circles harmful actions to the Leung
administration’s agenda. Yet PRC officials were also able to re-constitute the integrationist
coalition through direct intervention during the Umbrella Movement, which helped the Chief
Executive whether the grassroots coalition’s occupation. Business elite were also motivated to
recommit to the integrationist camp because the occupation began to take a toll on their economic
interests.
The factional dynamic that developed through the PRC leadership’s handling of the 2012
Chief Executive election played a role in the tensions among integrationist elite in October of 2014
and during the vote on political reform in June of 2015. Most of the members of the integrationist
camp who did not act in concert with the Leung administration during the Umbrella Movement
had been part of the faction that supported Henry Tang in the 2012 Chief Executive election. Tang
had received backing from his former party, the Liberal Party, and many of the property tycoons
supported his candidacy. All three of the integrationist legislators that helped the Pan-Democratic
Camp achieve quorum had voted for Tang.
In a similar pattern to the public consultation, the PRC leadership’s direct intervention was
once again able to resolve tensions temporarily within the integrationist camp in November of
2014. The Standing Committee of the CPPCC removed Tien (SCMP October 30th, 2014). He also
stepped down as chair of the Liberal Party. The Chinese state English-Language media outlet,
Xinhua, ran a story accusing property and business tycoons of being “reluctant to take sides amid
Occupy turmoil” signaling their need to back the Leung administration (SCMP November 1st,
2014). Some members of the business community responded the very next day (SCMP October
30th, 2014).
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At the same time, property developers were also motivated to back the Leung
administration because of growing economic pressure. More and more retailers began to ask for
rent-relief in the key business districts of Hong Kong due to the ongoing occupation. After over a
month of the occupation, the Italian Chamber of Commerce was reporting that they had suffered
double-digit declines. Some smaller retailers found their sales plummeted by 50% (SCMP
November 10th , 2014). The main concern for most of the major property developers was whether
retailors and hotels would be able to recoup their losses during the Christmas and New Year
season. Since the protesters could not agree on the parameters around ending the occupation,
business tycoons could not be sure how the occupation would affect that season (SCMP November
10th, 2014).
The PRC leadership continued to act the primary mediator between integrationist factions,
but the outcomes of its efforts varied. One consequence of its past behavior was that the friction
between the factions that had supported Leung and Tang in the Chief Executive election of 2012
continued to haunt intra-elite dynamics. The main tensions within the coalition came from the probusiness elite that had supported Tang. At the same time, PRC officials were successfully able to
force the same factions back toward defending the Leung administration. Business leaders,
however, were not only motivated by the PRC leadership; the economic costs of the occupation
and the uncertainty regarding its finish created more incentives to denounce grassroots forces.
Interactions Between Factors:
Relevant factors within this stage of movement activity interacted negatively to further
enervate grassroots forces and empower the Chief Executive’s forces during this phase of the
movement. The proscriptions in Western government statements contributed to lower levels of
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grassroots unity. The lack of solidarity among participants in the movement helped bolster the
cohesion among the integrationist coalition.
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, Western government officials primarily promoted
protesters right’s to protest, rather than focusing on the content of the legislation. They tried to
prevent coercion against grassroots forces. In the absence of indiscriminate violence against
protesters, however, old tensions between veteran and newer factions of the grassroots coalition
emerged and the Five Way Platform floundered.
In the absence of a cohesion and a functional collaboration platform, grassroots forces
could not decide on a clear timeline for ending the occupation. The lack of a clear timeline spurred
business elite to participate more whole-heartedly in integrationist efforts to support the Chief
Executive. They became increasingly concerned that the occupation would not end in time for
them to make up some of their economic losses from movement activity in the Christmas season.
Grassroots forces were unable to change the Chief Executive’s behavior during this stage
of the movement. The Leung administration followed the guidelines set forth by the NPCSC
August 31st decision and did not attempt to reinitiate reforms. The political reform package they
sent to the LegCo would have made it impossible for opposition candidates to participate in the
CE universal suffrage elections and would have given the PRC authorities significant control over
candidate selection.
After the start of the Umbrella Movement occupation, grassroots forces had a brief period
where their coalition was able to act more cohesively than the Chief Executive’s integrationist
coalition. Grassroots forces were able to act more strategically and negotiate with the Leung
administration during the first few weeks of protests. They also accumulated higher levels of
supplies due to the friction in the integrationist camp.
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Yet grassroots forces were unable to garner high levels of Western support during the first
few weeks of the protests, limiting their overall capacity to influence the Leung administration.
Western officials mostly defended the right of grassroot activists to protest, which contributed to
the loss of unity within the coalition as the Leung administration switched from implementing
indiscriminate to discriminate violence. Western officials did not mobilize on grassroots’ behalf
because of their domestic interests in preserving their relationship with the PRC, which actively
sought to discourage involvement in the Umbrella Movement. PRC officials and the Leung
administration also sought to limit connections to Western government officials.
The Leung administration was able to re-establish their coalition and ward off grassroots
pressure through assistance from PRC authorities and the changing economic interests of the
business elite. While the PRC authorities’ previous machinations had contributed to the creation
of two entrenched factions within the integrationist camp, they were able to compel pro-business
factions to support the Chief Executive by November of 2014. Moreover, grassroots’ inability to
reach consensus on when to end the occupation created anxieties for property developers, who
wanted to ensure they could recoup their losses in the Christmas and New Year’s season.

Comparing Rival Explanations of Movement Success
In this case, none of the patterns in the alternative factors closely correspond to the variation
in the Chief Executive’s actions in the wake of grassroots pressure from during the 2013 to 2015
period. Relatively high levels of Anti-Mainland sentiment may have corresponded to massive
mobilization at key points in the movement, but it cannot explain grassroots’ overall failure. The
relatively moderate level of economic grievances, on the other hand, should have corresponded to
lower levels of mobilization. Finally, while there is evidence that changes in the media structure
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did contribute to divisions between grassroots forces, this factor cannot seem to explain the
relatively rapid fluctuations in willingness to unify among grassroots forces.
Anti-Mainland sentiment had grown in the years leading up to the Umbrella Movement.
As graph 5.1 illustrates, prior to 2008, polls of Hong Kong citizens showed a relatively steady and
even distribution of public identification with both “Hongkonger” and “Chinese” identities. By
2009, however, the number of people who identified as a Hongkonger began to rise, while those
that saw themselves as Chinese started to fall (PORI 2020c). As graph 5.2 demonstrates, negative
views about Mainlanders had also risen by about 10 percent between 2005 and 2015 (PORI 2020d).
By 2012, the Leung administration felt the need to commit to policy initiatives designed to slow
the tide of Mainland immigration. For instance, in his first policy address, Leung promised “zero
beds” for Mainland mothers who gave birth in Hong Kong in the hopes of conferring Hong Kong
permanent residency to their children (SCMP January 23rd, 2013).
Even if the anti-Mainland sentiment had been mounting among the public, and therefore
could help to explain the high level of mobilization at key intervals, it does not explain why the
movement failed to influence the Chief Executive’s policy implementation. The lack of unity
within the grassroots coalition better explains the failure of the movement. Organizations could
not reach consensus on long-term decisions such as when to end the occupation. Discord also kept
grassroots organizations from effectively bargaining with the Leung administration.
The level of economic grievance between 2013-2015 was ambiguous. As graph 5.3
illustrates, dissatisfaction with Hong Kong’s development was at its highest point since 2004, with
nearly 50% dissatisfied (PORI 2020e). At the same time, graph 5.4 reveals that the number of
people who thought the government should prioritize the economy above other issues was only
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Graph 5.1: Changing Ethnic Identification Among Hong
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10%. Moreover, graph 5.3 demonstrates that even while the negative assessment of the local
government’s handling of the economy had grown significantly since 2005, the percentage of the
population surveyed that still positively assessed the Leung administration’s economic policies
was higher than in 2004. All public opinion survey data points to a situation in which satisfaction
with Hong Kong’s economic prospects had diminished, but concerns were less severe than in 2003.
Yet mobilization in both the Civil Referendum of June 2014 and during the first few weeks
of the Umbrella Movement was much higher than during the Anti-Article 23 campaign. This
juxtaposition is striking considering that public distress concerning the economy in 2003 was much
more profound. The relatively lower levels of economic grievance suggests that it may not be as
significant a factor in this case. Moreover, mobilization did not ultimately lead to success in this
case.
The final alternative factor that could have influenced the success or failure of grassroots
forces to influence the Hong Kong government’s policy implementation is changes in the media
structure. Wong (2015) has argued that in Hong Kong, the presence of a free capitalist press gives
radical factions an advantage in elections: they receive more press coverage than moderate
candidates. This alienates moderate, middle class voters from pro-democratic grassroots political
circles while also ensuring that radical factions get more of the “protest votes” within the
Legislative Council Elections (Wong 2015). These dynamics gradually helped empower newer,
more radical actors within the grassroots coalition, making it more difficult to coalesce during the
2013 to 2015 electoral reform.
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Graph 5.3: Public Opinion on the Local Government's
Economic Performance
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Graph 5.4: Public Opinion on Hong Kong's Development and the Need to
Prioritize the Economy 2004-2015
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Many of the newer and more radical groups were able to attract members through social
media in the early 2010s. This could have strengthened their overall position within grassroots
circles, contributing to the difficulties in forming unified strategies. For instance, one student
activist described how radical organizations were able to capitalize off of the development of
online platforms:
[ LSD and People Power], they were among the first political groups to master the social
media platform to make their case. Because in 2010, the media was still largely controlled
by mainstream media, and mainstream media comes to parliamentary politics, they would
still have the conventional democrats or the pro-establishment be their guest, be their
speaker or the interpreter of what is going is going on. But with the emergence of online
media, People Power, LSD, and some other radical groups, they gain a platform which is
exclusive for themselves. And it was really attractive for young people like us, for activists
like us. Because we received a completely different viewpoint. Like political reform. Like
anti-capitalism. Like why should we use disruptive tactic… So our imagination of
disruptive protest, and our knowledge of disruptive protest is from online media.252

The student group Scholarism also was able to mobilize students on Facebook, through the
secondary school groups that existed online at the time.253 Having higher levels of support and
more electoral offices, these groups had fewer incentives to negotiate with the more moderate
contingents, such as the Pan-Democratic Camp political parties.
It is important to note, however, that despite differences in ideology and competition for
public support, both moderate and radical organizations exhibited varied willingness to coordinate

252
253

Interview 56
Interview 63

287

activities within a relatively compressed time-frame that out-paced the changes in media structure.
Their behavior changed with the level of repression. Moderate actors were more willing to make
concessions to radical actors following the State Council’s White Paper and DDOS attacks in the
Civil Referendum. They were also willing to turn over leadership to the Hong Kong Federation of
Students when they feared a Tiananmen-style crackdown with the initiation of the Umbrella
Movement. Radical parties, the Pan-Democratic Camp, and student groups all initially committed
to the Five-Way Platform in the early part of the Umbrella Movement, when faced with
indiscriminate coercive measures by the police and the triad in Mongkok.
This case clearly demonstrates that the alternative factors, which seemed to play a role in
facilitating mass mobilization across the cases, are less compelling in explaining why grassroots
forces were not able to achieve concessions from the Hong Kong government between 2013-2015.
Even if increased Anti-Mainland sentiment contributed to higher levels of mobilization, it does
not contribute to our understanding of why the movement ultimately failed to affect the Chief
Executive’s actions. The relatively moderate levels of economic grievance should have coincided
with less mobilization during the Umbrella Movement. The media structure, particularly the
development of online media, strengthened new and more radical organizations within the
grassroots coalition, which could have decreased incentives to collaborate with more moderate
forces. Yet the change in media structure still doesn’t explain the variation in willingness to
collaborate and make concessions among grassroots coalition members.

Conclusion

This chapter establishes how the grassroots forces failed to change the Leung
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administration’s behavior during the movement for reform of the CE elections between 2013-2015
despite high levels of mobilization. During the first stage, the public consultation, grassroots forces
could not make the Chief Executive emphasize public desire for CE elections without a political
screening mechanism that empowered the PRC apparatus. In the second stage, grassroots forces
also failed to force the Chief Executive to push back against the NPCSC August 31st decision by
either restarting the electoral reform process or tabling a bill with a representative nominating
committee.
Grassroots forces could not sustain the internal solidarity needed to harness mobilization
in this period. While organizations were able to build coordinating platforms, they proved hard to
sustain during the movement. Discord within the coalition prevented effective messaging around
acceptable electoral reform packages, strategic planning of direct actions, and negotiations with
the Leung administration.
Friction within the grassroots coalition was a product of grievances arising from the
Democratic Party’s decision to secretly negotiate with the CE and PRC authorities on an electoral
reform bill in 2010. Their decision was motivated in part by the fierce electoral competition within
the Pan-Democratic Camp for LegCo seats. The Democratic Party’s actions were perceived as
evidence of cooptation, leading to increasing fissures between political parties and distrust between
veteran and newer, younger activists.
There were temporary shifts toward unity among grassroots forces, such as the Civic
Referendum and the early weeks of the Umbrella Movement. Episodes of repression facilitated
cohesion within the grassroots coalition. The difference between the two stages analyzed in the
case study is that during the second stage, the type of repression mattered. Indiscriminate violence
led to cohesion. Targeted violence that affected a minority of the protesters could actually deepen
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the schism within the grassroots coalition.
Grassroots forces’ could also not utilize pressure from Western government officials to
affect the Leung administration’s behavior. While some Western government officials issued
defenses of the grassroots coalition, their comments were often restricted to the coalition’s right to
protest, rather than urging the Chief Executive to pursue a more pluralistic reform package. During
both stages of the movement, there were also incidences where Western governments supported
the Leung administration and the PRC government.
The relatively limited level of Western support for grassroots forces was a product of two
factors, Western governments’ desire to preserve their relationship with the PRC for their own
domestic interests and limited connections between grassroots actors and Western government
officials. In the 2010s, PRC authorities demonstrated a willingness to stop trade and bilateral
agreements if foreign powers interfered with the Chinese periphery. Western government officials
needed the relationship with China to navigate both their domestic security and economic
concerns. Western governments therefore reacted to the PRC’s warnings regarding interference
during both stages of the movement by exhibiting little support for grassroots’ objectives. Hong
Kong activists also made fewer trips to Western countries from 2013-2015 and took steps to limit
their connections with Western organizations. This behavior attenuated connections between
grassroots forces and Western government officials.
The Chief Executive was able to rely on cohesion within the integrationist coalition at key
points of the 2013 to 2015 period. The integrationist coalition supported the Leung
administration’s advocacy for a nominating committee based on the Election Committee and
denounced grassroots plans to launch a civil disobedience movement during the public
consultation. Elite cohesion floundered following the initiation of the Umbrella Movement, but
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the integrationist coalition was able to recoalesce by November 2014.
When elite cohesion broke down, factions of the integrationist camp weakened the Leung
administration’s position. Business elite gave monetary support to the grassroots occupation,
which ensured that activists did not run out of supplies. Property developers and corporate heads
resisted outright denouncing the Umbrella Movement occupation and contradicted government
narratives. Finally, a leader of the Liberal Party demanded CY Leung’s resignation.
The fluctuations in the unity within the CE’s coalition were facilitated by the iterative
impacts of the PRC administration’s role in acting as the arbiter within the integrationist coalition.
In 2010, PRC authorities sought to maintain the cohesion within the integrationist coalition during
the 2012 CE election. Their efforts influenced the factional makeup of the integrationist camp,
however, contributing to division between the new Chief Executive’s faction and a pro-business
coalition that included the Liberal Party and prominent property developers. They also alienated
the latter faction through efforts to ensure the loss of Leung’s rival. The alienation led to repeated
challenges to Leung’s policies over the course of his period in office.
While the PRC authorities could arbitrate between the factions and smooth over
differences, they could only do so through direct engagement with integrationist factions. When
the PRC leadership directly met with integrationist elite during the public consultation unity was
maintained. Business elite fell in line during the Umbrella Movement once the PRC leadership
actively pressured them to support the Chief Executive.
Moreover, in this case, relevant factors negatively interacted, further disempowering the
grassroots coalition. Western government officials often focused on Umbrella Movement activists’
right to continue protesting without repression. Ironically, the decline in repression then
aggravated the tensions within the grassroots coalition, enervating their ability to bargain with the
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Leung administration. Likewise, the lack of unity within the grassroots coalition during the
Umbrella Movement led business elite to return to the integrationist fold, since they could not
anticipate the end of the protests or its effect on their bottom line.
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Chapter 6:
Grassroots Success in the Anti-Extradition Movement

When can relatively weak grassroots movements pressure a regional government to
withdraw an integrationist policy? The task would appear particularly daunting when both the
regional government and the central government are resolutely in favor of the legislation. Are there
key factors that can empower grassroots activism, helping these forces overcome what can seem
like a Herculean effort?
The Anti-Extradition Movement that took place in Hong Kong in 2019 provides a
compelling case to explore the factors I propose strengthen the hand of grassroots forces while
enervating the ability of the local government to resist challenges. Prior to the movement,
grassroots forces were drained through repression by both Hong Kong and PRC authorities and
internal fractionalization, seemingly in a weak position to advance autonomy from central
government institutions. Yet ultimately, they were able to launch a movement that was sustained
for several months and force the Chief Executive to withdraw legislation that would have allowed
citizens to be extradited to Mainland China for trial.
Within this case, grassroots forces’ efforts were strengthened by both international support
from foreign officials and unity within their coalition. The Chief Executive’s ability to resist
demands from grassroots forces was diminished because of the decline in unity among
integrationist elite. The combination of the bolstered grassroots resources and the diminishment of
the Chief Executive’s resources led to the complete withdrawal of the bill.
Grassroots forces were able to overcome past divisions and unify because of the perception
among grassroots actors that the Lam administration was escalating the level of coercion in the
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territory. Activists feared that the amendment of the extradition legislation would result in harsher
penalties for their coalition. The Hong Kong police force also used a high degree of force to control
and disperse crowds during Anti-Extradition Movement. Finally, the perception that altercations
with the Lam administration had resulted in losses of protesters’ lives also contributed to the sense
that the Hong Kong government’s level of coercion had intensified.
Grassroots forces were able to access higher degrees of international support from Western
officials because they progressively sought more international linkages and the extradition
legislation affected foreign officials’ domestic interests. Activists and opposition politicians
cultivated international linkages by making repeated trips to other countries to meet with both
foreign politicians and Hong Kong diaspora. They also deepened these connections by conducting
movement activities explicitly aimed at foreign audiences. Western government officials were
more willing to respond to their entreaties because the changes in the extradition legislation would
allow foreigners in Hong Kong to be extradited to China, without a formal extradition treaty
between foreign governments and the PRC.
The Hong Kong Chief Executive lacked the elite-level resource of unity within her own
coalition because of continued reliance on the PRC authorities to resolve Hong-Kong intra-elite
disputes. While the Chief Executive was able to utilize the PRC authorities to overcome dissent
from some factions, the PRC officials’ efforts alienated other parties within the integrationist
coalition. Moreover, the past pattern of relying on the PRC leadership incentivized actions that
provoked further coalition fragmentation because elite focused more on the PRC governmental
responses rather than communicating with, and bargaining with, each other.
This chapter begins by providing the context prior to the Anti-Extradition Movement,
elucidating the position of the Hong Kong government, the PRC government, and grassroots
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forces. This section highlights the weakness of grassroots forces position vis-à-vis the local and
central government, demonstrating why their eventual success in this case is so remarkable. I then
present the case of the Anti-Extradition Movement, detailing changes in the Chief Executive’s
reactions to grassroots pressure and demonstrating how the levels of grassroots unity, Western
government pressure, and elite fragmentation contributed to those responses. This analysis also
provides evidence of the key factors that bolstered the internal solidarity and Western official’s
support that increased grassroots’ bargaining power as well as the factors that contributed to the
elite fragmentation that made the Hong Kong Chief Executive vulnerable. The final section of the
chapter compares the explanatory power of my theory with that of other potential factors, including
anti-Mainland nationalism, economic grievances, and changes in media structure.

2019 Context
In the prelude to the Anti-Extradition Movement, PRC government officials and the Hong
Kong Chief Executive were firmly moving forward with integrationist policies, and grassroots
forces had seemingly few means of stopping them. Both the PRC government and the Chief
Executive sought to expand Hong Kong’s collaboration with surrounding Mainland cities and
amplify patriotism among the local population. The PRC officials also inserted themselves more
forcefully into Hong Kong policy making. Grassroots forces had a more difficult time using the
formal institutional apparatuses afforded to them, such as Legislative Council (LegCo), to stop
policies advancing integrationist goals because of increased repression by both PRC and Hong
Kong government institutions.
The PRC leadership continued to integrate Hong Kong into Mainland after the Umbrella
Movement. In 2017, the PRC facilitated the development of the Guangzhou-Macau-Hong Kong
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Greater Bay Area, which sought to deepen Hong Kong’s connectivity with the Macau Special
Administrative Region along with nine other Chinese cities. One of the goals was to increase
“person-to-person” exchanges among the cities, encouraging Hong Kong residents to study, work,
and live in one of the other Chinese cities in the Greater Bay Area.254
Furthermore, PRC officials more directly asserted themselves into Hong Kong’s
governance as well, fearing increased anti-Mainland sentiment and instability in the territory.255
For example, the PRC institution in charge of interpreting Hong Kong’s Basic Law, the National
People’s Congress Standing Committee (the NPCSC), issued an interpretation without the Chief
Executive directly requesting it for the first time in 2016.256 The NPCSC made this interpretation
in order to cull incoming activists who had just been elected to LegCo that had espoused antiChinese sentiment while taking their oath of office.257 The NPCSC also added a new law to Annex
III of the Basic Law that forbade inappropriate conduct or misuse of the national anthem.258
For their part, both of the Chief Executives that administered Hong Kong between 2015
and 2019, CY Leung and Carrie Lam Yuet-ngor, also actively pursued further integration into
Mainland China. 259 Both Chief Executives facilitated infrastructure projects that advanced the
Greater Bay Area Project, which increased Hong Kong’s connectivity and trade with Macau and

254

“Framework Agreement on Deepening Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Cooperation in the Development of the
Greater Bay Area.” conclusion date: July 1st, 2017, Greater Bay Area Website,
https://www.bayarea.gov.hk/filemanager/en/share/pdf/Framework_Agreement.pdf.
255
The increased concerns about instability in Hong Kong were due not only to the Umbrella Movement, but the
Fish Ball Riots that occurred in February of 2016. For more on the Fish Ball Riots and their effect on PRC policy
toward Hong Kong, see Kwong (2016).
256
See Chapter 3, pages 143-146 for the procedure for the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal asking for an NPCSC
Interpretation, and how the Chief Executive was able to gain the authority to ask for interpretations as well.
257
The NPCSC was of Article 104, which held that the Hong Kong leadership had to “swear to uphold the Basic
Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China and swear allegiance to the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China.” Their reinterpretation applied
retroactively, providing grounds for expelling six opposition legislators who had added words to their oaths.
258
The Chief Executive was able to write their own interpretation of the legislation, where punishments would not
be as severe as in Mainland Hong Kong (SCMP November 5th 2017).
259
Two of the most prominent of these projects were the Hong Kong-Macau-Zhuhai Bridge and the GuangzhouShenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link.
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eleven other Chinese cities in the surrounding area, in the hopes of creating an informationtechnology and financial regional hub. Under the Lam administration, the government also
pursued policies to promote patriotic identification with the PRC, such as making Chinese history
compulsory for secondary students and banning the Hong Kong Nationalist Party (SCMP October
25th 2017) .
By 2019, grassroots forces’ ability to protect Hong Kong’s autonomy from central
government institutions had been enervated because of their decreasing access to institutional
channels of power. Incidents of activists being barred from running from public office rose.260
Moreover, six legislators that had been elected in 2016 were expelled from the Legislative
Council.261 The grassroots forces in the legislature therefore lost their ability to veto changes to
Hong Kong’s political structure. 262 Finally, once the six opposition figures had been forcibly
removed from the LegCo, integrationist legislators also changed the rules of the Council to deprive
the opposition of the ability to utilize filibuster tactics to delay bills they opposed.
As a result of these developments, grassroots forces found themselves unable to fight off
changes in the city’s autonomy in 2018. One such was the “Co-location Scheme,” where Mainland
Chinese law applied in the Hong Kong terminus of a high-speed railway to Mainland China.263
Under the “co-location scheme,” the PRC government would have territorial jurisdiction over a

260

Between 2016 and 2018, the Hong Kong Electoral Affairs Commission barred ten activists from running for
elected office under the justification that they could not uphold their oath to uphold the Basic Law and “One
Country-Two Systems” (Fong 2020)
261
Through a re-interpretation of the Basic Law, two legislators were removed in the fall of 2016 for failure to
properly take their oaths to serve in the Legislative Council. The following summer, the Lam Administration used
the NPCSC interpretation to expel another four legislators who had added words to their oaths.
262
Under Annex I and Annex II of the Basic Law, all changes to the political structure of Hong Kong require twothirds of the Legislative Council’s consent. Since by 2016 the Legislative Council was made up of 70
representatives, grassroots forces needed 24 representatives on Council to veto changes to the political structure of
Hong Kong.
263
Under the “co-location scheme,” the PRC government would have territorial jurisdiction over a portion of the
Hong Kong terminus in Western Kowloon in order to conduct immigration control and custom checks (Chan 2018)
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portion of the Hong Kong terminus in Western Kowloon in order to conduct immigration control
and custom checks (Chan 2018).
The conditions leading up to the Anti-Extradition Movement seemed ideal for passing
integrationist legislation. PRC officials and the Chief Executive largely agreed on, and
collaborated toward, integrationist policies. Meanwhile, repressive measures had decreased
grassroots forces access to formal institutions, making it near impossible for them to block
legislation.

The Case: The Anti-Extradition Movement

The Anti-Extradition Movement represents a case where the Hong Kong Chief Executive
initiated legislation that was desirable to both her administration and PRC officials, but was
ultimately unsuccessful in enacting the policy due to grassroots pressure. The policy changes
would have made it possible for the Chief Executive to initiate extradition proceedings with
territories Hong Kong did not have a formal bilateral treaty with on a case-by-case basis, including
Mainland China, Macau, and Taiwan. The Chief Executive demonstrated remarkable persistence
in pursuing this legislation, and had the firm backing of the PRC leadership, making the
administration’s capitulation all-the-more remarkable.

The Policy Issue
In early 2019, the Lam administration initiated a legislative process to introduce changes
to two ordinances pertaining to extradition and cooperation in criminal cases with other
jurisdictions. The Chief Executive justified this bill as both the only tenable solution to a high-
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profile murder case and as a necessary measure to close loopholes in the existing system. The
controversy surrounding the bill lay in the fact that it would allow extradition to Mainland China
for trial on a case by case basis. Grassroots forces argued amending the legislation would damage
Hong Kong’s autonomy from central government institutions because it would limit both the
independence of the judiciary and protections of Hong Kong permanent residents’ individual
liberties.
Following the Handover from British to Chinese rule in 1997, Hong Kong legislation under
the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance (FOO) did not allow the extradition of suspected offenders to
other parts of the PRC, including the Macau Special Administrative Region and Taiwan.264 Mutual
legal assistance in criminal matters under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters
(MLACMO) was also restricted between Hong Kong and other parts of the PRC.265 Mainland and
Hong Kong collaboration on criminal matters only took the form of “court-to-court letters of
request” for the examination of witnesses and documents (Financial Action Task Force 2011).
The lack of a proper extradition treaty did present security and economic constraints for
both the PRC and Hong Kong Special Administrative Region governments. An integrationist
Executive Council Member and political party leader with long-standing ties to PRC authorities
explained that
I guess one of the main reasons why [Chief Executive Lam] thinks that we should go ahead
with this piece of legislation is because…it is true that quite a number of criminals have

264

While the governments of Taiwan and the PRC both agree that there is only one China, the PRC does not
acknowledge the government in Taipei, Taiwan, as legitimate, and claims that the CCP leadership is the true
sovereign authority in the region.
265
The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal
Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019, CB(3)510/18-19, tabled in the Legislative
Council on March 29th, 2019, https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr18-19/english/bills/b201903291.pdf
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fled from the Mainland to Hong Kong. They have committed crimes on the Mainland, and
they came over, and they have become our residents here. The governments on either side
of the border cannot do anything.266

Offenders from the Mainland could escape to Hong Kong, weakening the PRC authorities’ ability
to impose costs on criminal activity. The Lam administration also publicly worried that Hong Kong
would be a “haven for fugitive criminals.”267 Additionally, an interviewee in the financial services
field in Hong Kong indicated that PRC citizens used Hong Kong as a base to launder money from
illegal dealings in the Mainland.268 The Lam administration therefore had an incentive to solve this
issue.
Hong Kong did have bi-lateral treaties on extradition agreements with twenty jurisdictions,
including the United States and a number of Western countries. The region also had agreements
with thirty-two countries regarding mutual legal assistance. If there was an extradition request
outside of these jurisdictions, the Chief Executive would have to table the request for extradition
with the Legislative Council.269
The basis for changing these procedures, according to the Lam administration, was a 2018
murder of a Hong Kong citizen in Taiwan. A Hong Kong man traveled to Taiwan with his pregnant
girlfriend, killed her, and then fled back to Hong Kong. The Taiwan authorities requested that the
suspect be extradited back to their territory for trial. The Lam administration asserted that they had
“no legal way” to extradite the suspect to Taiwan because they did not have a bilateral extradition
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Interview 60
My archival research of government press statements indicates that this was a repeated point made by the Lam
administration made between February 2019 and June of 2019. For an example of this rhetoric, see The Government
of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, “Transcript of remarks by CS and S for S” May 25th, 2019,
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201905/25/P2019052500474.htm
268
Interview 26
269
The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Fugitive Offenders
267
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treaty with the PRC and the MLACMO explicitly did not apply to other parts of China, including
Taiwan. 270 They argued that this case showcased a “loophole” in Hong Kong’s criminal
ordinances.
The Chief Executive sought to change the regulations around case-by-case extradition
requests within the region. First, the new case-by-case procedure would have universal application
to every country Hong Kong did not have an extradition treaty with, including Mainland China,
Macau, and Taiwan. Secondly, the procedure would be changed so that the Chief Executive could
initiate the extradition proceedings without having to consult with the Legislative Council.271 The
last change was that the geographical restrictions around the MLACMO would be lifted, which
would allow the ordinance to apply to Mainland China, Macau, and Taiwan. In changing this
aspect of the ordinance, PRC authorities could ask the Hong Kong government to confiscate or
restrain property derived from serious criminal activities (The Government of the Special
Administrative Region of Hong Kong 2019b).
Grassroots forces immediately sought to have the legislation withdrawn or substantially
amended. They feared that this bill would lead to further integration into the PRC and declining
autonomy of the judiciary from the PRC system. One Pan-Democratic Camp politician’s analysis
was “It is the law that provides the power, explicitly, to the central government… If the central
government asks the HKSAR [Hong Kong Special Administrative Region] government to turn in
somebody, can the HKSAR government reject the request?”272 They pressured the Chief Executive
to come up with a solution that was tailored to the Taiwan case, particularly since the Taiwan
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The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Fugitive Offenders
Instead, the Chief Executive argued for a three step process. The Chief Executive would make an initial
determination regarding the extradition case without public disclosure. The proceedings would then go to the court,
where the judge would determine if there were grounds and enough safeguards to protect the person’s rights under
the Basic Law. Finally, the Chief Executive would have the final say in whether the person was extradited or not.
272
Interview 78
271
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government made it clear that the proposed changes to the FOO and MLACMO would not be
acceptable.273274

Local Government’s Response to Grassroots Pressure
The Hong Kong Chief Executive, Carrie Lam, eventually withdrew the legislation, but only
with great reluctance after multiple attempts to save the bill. The Chief Executive sought to ensure
the bill’s enactment through bypassing normal procedures for both the public consultation and the
Legislative Council. When she finally suspended the bill, the Chief Executive tried to leave a
possibility that it could be revived at a later point.
To ensure the passing of the legislation, the Chief Executive circumvented normal policymaking procedures in initiating the law-making process. Instead of holding a full public
consultation, the Lam administration only accepted views on the legislation for two and a half
week (The Government of the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong 2019a).275 Likewise,
when Pan-Democratic legislators used committee tactics to delay the bill’s passing, the Lam
administration sidestepped the normal legislative procedure. The administration initiated a full
Legislative Council debate on the bill without it being vetted first by a sub-committee (The
Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 2019e).276
273

The Security Bureau, “LCQ3: Proposed amendments to Fugitive Offenders Ordinance and Mutual Legal
Assistance in Criminal Matters Ordinance,” March 27th, 2019,
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201903/27/P2019032700641.htm
274
For example, the Pan-Democrats suggested that the administration could add “sunset clauses” to the amendments
of the FOO and the MLACMO. A sunset clause would allow the changes to be made specifically for the handling of
the Taiwan murder case, but then those changes would be nullified for future extradition quandaries (The
Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 2019f).
275
The Hong Kong Chief Executive contended that there was a limited time-frame for extraditing the suspect back
to Taiwan. While the suspected killer had plead guilty to money laundering and was serving out his sentence in a
Hong Kong prison, he could be released as early as October of 2019, after which he could flee the territory (The
Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Press Release Archives May 22nd 2019)
276
The Pan-Democrats were able to keep a formal bill committee from forming by preventing the committee from
choosing a leader from April through May of 2019 (The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region 2019e).
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The Lam administration did show some willingness to accede to public pressure by making
a few concessions on the details of the legislation in March and April. Following public
commentary on the bill, the majority of white collar crimes were eliminated as extraditable
offenses.277 The Lam administration also raised the standards for extradition to offenses that were
punishable by three or more years in prison.278 By late May, the Lam administration made two
further modest concessions: the Hong Kong government would only accept requests from the
PRC’s highest court, the Supreme People’s Court and they would add additional safeguards
through ad hoc legislation in the future (SCMP June 2nd 2019).
While the Chief Executive did withdraw the legislation, the process unfolded over a three
month time-span. On June 15th, the Chief Executive declared that “the Council will halt its work
in relation to the bill until our work in communication, explanation, and listening to opinions is
complete” (The Government of the Hong Kong Administrative Region 2019d). Lam’s
announcement seemed to indicate that she hoped to resume the bill at a later date following a more
extensive public consultation on the legislation. Yet by June 27th, a member of her administration
publicly declared that “if at the end of this LegCo… term the bill cannot continue to be scrutinized,
we will accept that reality.”279 In other words, they were willing for the bill to expire with the end
of the current term of the Legislative Council the following summer. That assurance did not mean,
however, that they would withdraw the legislation entirely, leaving an opening for the passing of
the bill. A few weeks later, the Chief Executive announced that it would not restart the legislative
process for the bill, declaring that “the bill is dead.” (The Government of the Hong Kong Special
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People would no longer be extradited from Hong Kong for tax violations, theft of intellectual property rights,
securities and future trading, or environmental pollution, among others. The crimes of fraud, and money laundering
were still included in the bill (SCMP March 29th 2019).
278
The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Fugitive Offenders.
279
The Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, “Transcript of remarks by S for S and CP at
media session,” June 27th, 2019, https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201906/27/P2019062700703.htm.
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Administrative Region 2019g). It was only on September 4th that the Chief Executive formerly
withdrew the changes to the FOO and the MLACMO from the Legislative Council.
The Chief Executive’s extraordinary defense of the amendments to the FOO and the
MLACMO, as well as her very gradual withdrawal of the legislation, indicates the extent to which
the policy was truly desired by the administration and only reluctantly withdrawn. The Lam
administration exhibited determination to thwart public pressure by subverting normal procedures
around both the public consultation and the Legislative Council. Therefore, the factors that
contributed to the change in policy had to be severe to force the Chief Executive to withdraw the
legislation.

Grassroots and the Chief Executive’s Resources During the Anti-Extradition Movement
Three factors contributed to the relative strength of grassroots forces vis-à-vis the Chief
Executive. Two of the factors affected the degree to which the grassroots forces were empowered,
while the other affected the Chief Executive’s vulnerability to pressure. Grassroots forces were
able to maintain high levels of internal solidarity and amass intense support from Western
government officials, which strengthened their ability to compel the Lam administration to
withdraw the bill. The Chief Executive was more vulnerable to challenges from grassroots forces
because of the fissures within the integrationist coalition. As Table 6.1 illustrates, resources that
empowered the grassroots forces were at relatively high levels, while the Lam administration had
relatively low levels of the cohesion within their coalition with which to insulate them from mass
pressure.
The intensity of the resources that empowered grassroots forces over the Lam
administration corresponds to certain factors. Perceptions regarding the Lam administration’s
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Table 6. 1: Variation in Grassroots’ and the Chief Executive’s Resources
During the 2019 Anti-Extradition Movement

The AntiExtradition
Movement

February
through
September of
2019

Unity Within
Grassroots
Coalition

Support from
Western
Government
Officials

Unity Within
CE’s
Coalition

Grassroots’
Success or
Failure in
Affecting CE
Behavior

High

High

Low

Success

increasingly coercive tactics, and the dire consequences for protesters, facilitated grassroots forces’
unity. Grassroots forces were also able to obtain backing from Western foreign officials through
both actively pursuing connections to foreign officials and because the policy area involved
affected constituents from Western countries. Finally, the cohesion within the Chief Executive’s
integrationist coalition was limited by the effects of the PRC’s position as a third-party arbiter
among local elite.
Grassroots Level: High Internal Solidarity
Grassroots forces were able to build and maintain high levels of unity throughout the AntiExtradition movement, enabling them to exert pressure on the Lam administration successfully.
Prior to the Anti-Extradition movement, grassroots forces had been split into two factions, limiting
their success in efforts to compel the Chief Executive on issues of autonomy from PRC institutions.
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During this movement, however, grassroots forces expressed greater willingness to collaborate
among the factions. Collaboration allowed for sustained levels of high mobilization and flexibility
in changing strategies over a period of months, which contributed to the movement’s success.
Prior to the Chief Executive’s introduction of the changes to the FOO and the MLACMO,
pro-democracy grassroots forces had been fragmented for a sustained period-of-time. Grassroots
forces that had participated in the Umbrella Movement had split into two distinct groups.280 The
Pan-Democratic coalition continued to prioritize gradual democratic reforms within Hong Kong.
They also championed democracy promotion in Mainland China to preserve Hong Kong’s
liberties. These groups were primarily older organizations, including parties, professional
associations, and religious organizations281 They believed in only using non-violent tactics. The
Localists emphasized protection of local culture and the territory’s autonomy from Mainland
China, often referring to China as a colonizing force. They were comprised of newer organizations,
including political parties, student groups, and community organizations. Localists promoted the
use of more radical tactics, including strategic violence, against what they viewed as oppressive
police forces.282283
There were multiple grievances between the Pan-Democrats and the Localists factions.
Some Pan-Democrat politicians were suspicious that Localists were either funded by, or directly
working for, the CCP.284 Localists resented the Pan-Democrats for not fighting harder when their
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candidates got barred from running for office. 285286 One interviewee remarked, “Many people
[were] frustrated, the internal conflict was very frequent, every person was pointing to different
factions.”287
In 2018, the year prior to the Anti-Extradition Movement, tensions among grassroots forces
led to poor outcomes in efforts to protect the Hong Kong government’s autonomy from central
government authorities. For instance, when more candidates were disqualified from standing in
the February 2018 by-elections by the Hong Kong Election Affairs Commission for seemingly
exhibiting pro-separatists stances, the Pan-Democrats had a rally in which only one of the affected
candidates got to speak. Localist candidates that were also affected did not take part.288 The march
Pan-Democrats held in protest of the disqualifications only garnered several hundred participants
(Hong Kong Free Press February 12th 2018).289 Many Localists decided not to join in the march or
the by-election, as part of a “scorched earth” strategy to delegitimize both the Hong Kong
government and the Pan-Democrats.290 The Lam administration did not rescind its decision and
continued to disqualify candidates in the next by-election in October of 2018.291
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By June of 2019, during the Anti-Extradition Movement, the Pan-Democrats and the
Localists were working much more cohesively in their challenge against the Chief Executive. One
Pan-Democrat explained that
It is a new start for us- at least we have some mutual understanding. And in the past, the
relationship between us was so tense… We have a slogan: we have to be united. Not to
differentiate. Or, we have to stay together to fight. And so the relationship became better
right now.292

The Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF) was able to act as a coordinating platform among
grassroots organizations and call for a march on June 9th, the Sunday before the Legislative Council
would resume work toward passing the extradition bill. 293 Both Localists and Pan-Democrats
mobilized for the June 9th event, furthering cohesion among grassroots forces. As one Localist
protester described it, “Maybe on June 7th or June 8th, when you can see that both the Pan-Democrat
and the Localist camp people are calling for this rally, we start to feel a union, or a possibility of
unitedness. And that is what causes us to come out.”294
The cohesion among grassroots protesters grew over the course of June and July 2019. By
the June 16th march, the protesters settled on a unified “Five Demands” that they insisted the
government carry out before the protests would stop. These demands included 1) withdrawing the
amendment to the FOO and MLACMO; 2) an independent inquiry into police conduct during the
protests; 3) for the Lam administration to not label the June 12th protest as a riot; 4) amnesty for
protesters; and 5) the resignation of Carrie Lam.295 The demands changed at the beginning of July
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from requesting that Carrie Lam step down, to universal suffrage elections for both the Chief
Executive and the Legislative Council.
Protesters often expressed unity through messaging and dress as well. At protest events,
speakers would use the proverb of “two brothers climbing a mountain.” Like brothers who take
different routes to climb the mountain, protesters may have different strategies, but they ultimately
shared the same goal.296 Following June 12, protesters used what they called a “black bloc” tactic,
wearing all black and face masks, because it both created a sense of uniformity and “protected
everyone’s identity” from the police and future prosecution.297
High solidarity among grassroots forces was also exhibited through tactics to help
protesters get home safely and anonymously after clashes with police forces. Older members of
the movement would either distribute or leave bags of cloths for protesters to change into in the
subway stations, so that they were not wearing black on their way back home. Supporters also
handed out or left money on top of the kiosks for subway tickets so that citizens could pay for oneway tickets home, making it more difficult for police to verify their presence at protest events.298299
Finally, unity was maintained through making decisions on online platforms rather than
relying on an in-person coordinating platform. Protesters used online platforms such as LIHKG
and the app Telegram to pick out new strategies and to make decisions about the details of
strategy.300
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We have something like a voting system. On LIHKG, we can give likes or dislikes. We
can push up the posts when we think the action is good or the reaction is favorable. And
on Telegram, we have a point system. So this can be a very rapid way to show the consensus
of people.301

Unity among the protesters allowed for high and sustained mobilization throughout the
summer of 2019. An estimated million Hong Kongers took part in the June 9th march, prior to the
second reading of the bill. The following Sunday, an estimated two million Hong Kongers took
part in another march (Hong Kong Free Press June 17th 2019). 302 Throughout June and July,
protesters were able to plan multiple protests every week with tens of thousands to hundreds of
thousands of participants.303 Grassroots forces also were able to crowdfund close to 3 million USD
on LIHKG between June and August for three international media campaigns against both the
changes to the FOO and MLACMO as well as police violence (SCMP August 13th 2019).
Moreover, grassroots forces were able to innovate new tactics when the government tried
to crackdown on protests. For instance, toward the end of July, the police began to not allow
protests.304 Grassroots forces decided to hold sit-ins in the airport to “warn” international travelers
about the danger of the Hong Kong police, since it was legal to congregate in the arrival halls so
long as they didn’t block passengers leaving the building.305
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The contrast between the level of unity and the outcomes of mobilization in 2018 and 2019
clearly indicates that unity played a role in the success of the Anti-Extradition Movement.
Fragmentation between Localists and Pan-Democrats among grassroots forces limited their ability
to mobilize in 2018. The lack of mobilization meant there was very little pressure on the Hong
Kong Chief Executive’s actions regarding autonomy. In the Anti-Extradition Movement, both
sides felt the need to act cohesively, creating unified demands and online platforms to adjudicate
between opposing strategies. This cooperation allowed movement participants to sustain high
levels of mobilization and shift between protest tactics as needed. The resulting mobilization
created pressure on the Chief Executive to withdraw the legislation.
Perceptions of Increasing Coercion
The reason why grassroots forces were able to unify after years of internal strife was because
of the perception that the Lam administration was increasing the level of coercion within the
territory. Grassroots forces believed the changes to the FOO and the MLACMO would allow an
upsurge of coercion against political dissidents. Moreover, police reacted with heavy uses of force
to movement activity. The concern about injuries and fatalities among movement participants led
factions to overlook key differences in movement strategy and stay unified despite increased
radicalization within the movement.
Grassroots forces believed that the implementation of this bill would result in extradition
to China for dissident activities.306 Activists and politicians claimed that the PRC authorities had
a history of charging dissidents with committing crimes unrelated to their political activities. One
politician interviewee stated that “It is so easy for Mainland to fabricate any kind of evidence… In
China, when they try to fabricate [a charge against] you, they can find some way.”307 For instance,
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in 2015, one of the owners of a bookshop in Hong Kong that published materials on PRC politics
was arrested for allegedly drunk driving in Mainland China over a decade earlier (Hong Kong Free
Press February 14th 2019). One protester described the connection between fear of future coercion
and increased unity among grassroots forces as follows:
There’s more protests in solidarity from older generations. There’s been mother’s marches,
you know, elderly marches, things like that. It’s because… the Umbrella Movement was
about universal suffrage, which is an abstract concept, so people feel like it doesn’t affect
them. It’s too foreign for them to see how it affects their immediate life… But this law...
affects their immediate situation, their immediate reality.308

The idea that the bill would lead to coercion against the PRC’s political enemies in the
territory was reinforced after the Taiwan government responded negatively to the proposal. The
Taiwanese Legislative Council passed a motion in March of 2019 that they would only accept an
extradition agreement applicable to cases solely between Hong Kong and Taiwan. Therefore the
change in the bill would not actually solve the problem of extraditing the 2018 murder suspect, as
the Hong Kong Chief Executive claimed.309 Despite this development, the Lam administration
continued to use the Taiwan case to justify their claims through June of 2019. The continuation of
these assertions made grassroots forces suspect a hidden agenda directed at eventual retribution
against dissidents.310
The escalation of police tactics in response to protests also incentivized unity among
grassroots forces. A major galvanizing incident occurred on June 12th, when tens of thousands
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surrounded the Legislative Council complex to protest the changes to the FOO and the MLACMO.
There was a contingent of a couple hundred protesters who tried to storm the Legislative Council
and attacked the police, leading the police to try to disperse the entirety of the crowd through the
use of tear gas, rubber bullets, batons, and bean bag rounds (Purbrick 2019). Eighty-one people
received injuries that required treatment at a hospital, including journalists (Purbrick 2019;
Amnesty International 2019). Images of police attacking peaceful protesters fleeing the scene
circulated on social media and were broadcast by local news sites (Amnesty International 2019).
Some of the police force officers were wearing masks and did not have their badges on, making it
impossible to file a complaint against their actions (Amnesty International 2019).311 The Police
Commissioner and the Chief Executive referred to the protest as a “clear and organized riot,” which
meant that the tens of thousands of participants could receive up to 10 years in prison under the
Public Ordinance (Purbrick 2019; Amnesty International 2019).
Outrage at police violence therefore became a major rallying point among grassroots
factions. In their surveys of Anti-Extradition Movement protesters on July 1st 2019, Lee et al found
that 86% of respondents said that police violence was a “very important reason” for their joining
the protest (2019, 16). By mid-August, concerns regarding police violence overtook withdrawing
the bill as the most important reason protesters joined direct actions ( Lee et al. 2019).
Throughout July and August, police and extralegal violence during protests contributed to
unity amongst grassroots forces despite events that would otherwise have led to grassroots
fragmentation. For instance, on the night of July 21st, protesters marched on Hong Kong Island,
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defacing roads with graffiti.312 They then proceeded to deface the Liaison Office, surround the
local police headquarters, and chant “Reclaim Hong Kong, Revolution in Our Age.”313 Prior to the
movement, it would have been considered too divisive for most grassroots protesters.
That same night, however, men associated with the local triad in Yuen Long, attacked
protesters, journalists, politicians, and bystanders with sticks and pipes. It took 39 minutes for the
police to respond to the attack despite hundreds of calls. The police left without making any arrests,
which allowed for the assailants to return and attack MTR passengers again after midnight
(Purbrick 2019). The reporting of these events led many to believe that the police had been
cooperating with the triad (Purbrick).314 Due to the Yuen Long attacks, protesters completely
ignored their differences over the escalation of movement activities and slogans.
[July 21st] was all out anarchy. There was literal black bloc, they were dressed just like
Anti-Fa in America, and they were throwing things at the police...There were people
burning things. And the graffiti was saying “Revolution” as well. But because of the thing
that happened in Yuen Long, it took the focus away.315

Moreover, following the June 12th march, there were a series of suicides that were blamed
on the Lam administration that strengthened the bonds between more moderate, peaceful protesters
and more radical protesters willing to use violence. The day that Chief Executive Carrie Lam
announced the suspension of the bill, June 15th, a man climbed the scaffolding of a mall near the
government headquarters in a yellow rain jacket with a protest sign. Emergency services tried to
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rescue him, but he fell to his death. Between June 15th and July 3rd, another three women committed
suicide in protest of the extradition legislation. Protesters blamed these deaths on the government.
The day after the first death, protesters carried images of yellow rain jackets and built a shrine to
the deceased man with slogans such as “He did not intend to do it. He was pushed by the
government.”316 During protests on June 21st, activists held a funeral service for the suicide victim,
burning incense and leaving flowers and placards in response to his death, as shown in image 6.1.

Photo 6.1. Protest Funeral. Photo taken on June 22nd in Admiralty, on Hong Kong Island. At a protest the previous
day, participants held a funeral service for the first person who committed suicide as part of an act of protest within
the movement. Photo taken by author.
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The images of the people who committed suicide permeated movement activities
throughout the course of June and July. One of the grassroots organizations, Demosisto, posted
advertisements for the July 1st March throughout Hong Kong Island, Kowloon, and the New
Territories, featuring the first suicide victim’s yellow rain jacket. The advertisement asserted
“Ideas don’t die.” The advertisement is pictured in Image 6.2. The yellow rain jacket of the first
suicide victim also appeared on protest “Lennon Walls.” Throughout the movement, grassroots
forces put protest advertisements, post-it notes with encouragements for activists, and artwork in
public spaces around the city. Image 6.3 is from a Lennon Wall out on Cheung Chau Island, a
remote part of Hong Kong that could only be accessed by ferry and had relatively few residents.
The yellow rain jacket imagery pictured in the Lennon Wall indicates just how pervasive symbols
regarding the suicide was.

Photo 6.2. Adverting for July 1st March. Image taken on June 30th in Kowloon, Hong Kong. Grassroots organizers
used images of the yellow raincoat the first suicide victim had worn in their advertising for the annual July 1st prodemocracy demonstration. Photo taken by author.
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During June and July, some activists would also dress up in the yellow rain jacket. The
suicide victim had dressed in the yellow rain jacket himself in order to harken back to a photo
taken on June 12th of a lone man in a similar rain jacket facing off against dozens of police officers
who were spraying him with hoses from two different angles (Everington 2019). Protesters would
also wear yellow raincoats during movement actions designed to draw attention to police use of
violence. In one such incident, some protesters wore yellow rain jackets during a sit-in at the airport
in July, as pictured in image 6.4.

Photo 6.3. The Yellow Jacket on the Lennon Wall. Image taken on July 10th, on Cheung Chau Island, Hong Kong.
"Lennon Walls" with protest slogans often featured pictures of the first suicide victim's yellow raincoat. Photo taken
by author.
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Photo 6.4. Yellow Jacket at the Hong Kong International Airport. Image taken on July 26th at Hong Kong
International Airport in Lantau Island, Hong Kong. During the sit-in at the airport, a protester dressed as the first
suicide victim in a yellow raincoat. Photo taken by author.

The fear of further suicides or loss of life at the hands of the police influenced the way that
protesters reacted to differences in strategy.317 Protesters remained unified even when activists
initiated violent strategies without prior sanction from coordinating channels like LIHKG or
Telegram. For instance, on July 1st, the anniversary of the Handover from British to Chinese
sovereignty, a small group of protesters attempted to storm the Legislative Council building.
Prominent Pan-Democratic legislators attempted to stop them, physically standing between the
protesters and the Legislative Council entrance. Some of the protesters pushed the legislators aside,
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resulting in minor injuries, before breaking the glass doors to the Legislative Council.318 After
several hours hammering at the glass, this small group of protesters lay siege to the Legislative
Council, spraying graffiti about the death of Hong Kong’s autonomy and breaking property.319
These actions had not been authorized through widespread votes on Telegram or LIHKG.320
Yet, more moderate protesters genuinely feared for the lives of the people who had
participated in this protest. The following Friday, July 5th, a group of mothers organized a rally
entitled “Lives versus Glass,” encouraging understanding for the protesters who had vandalized
the Legislative Council building.321 As one protester put it,
In late June, many people had committed suicide. We clearly knew that more of them are
planning to do so…I have some connection with those that entered the LegCo Complex. It
impressed me a lot that they have already written their final words and put them inside a
backpack, so if they were killed by the police, you can just open the letter. It impressed me
a lot because they were ready to die. So if they were ready to die, of course they need
something to express their anger. So they just… I prefer they break things than commit
suicide.322

The perception that the bill would increase coercion led to new unity between grassroots
forces. Across the political spectrum, members of the grassroots coalition felt that they could be
extradited to the Mainland because of dissident behavior against the PRC. Incidences where
protesters could have faced more internal conflict coincided with further violence attributed to the
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government’s integrationist coalition, such as the June 12th protest and the July 21st Yuen Long
attack. While the level of fatalities was low, the suicides that happened after June 12th made
activists blame the Hong Kong government for their deaths and consequently, they became more
willing to accept extreme actions to preserve fellow participants’ lives. Thus unity within the
movement was maintained despite differences over whether radical tactics should be used.
International Level: Support from Foreign Government Officials
Throughout the Anti-Extradition Movement, Western government officials demonstrated
a high degree of support for grassroots forces,’ aiding their efforts to pressure the Hong Kong
Chief Executive to withdraw the extradition legislation. Multiple Western leaders spoke out
against the substance of the bill, some even calling for its withdrawal. In contrast to previous
cases, foreign officials embraced other grassroots’ demands that arose during the movement. Most
strikingly, certain countries took unprecedented regulatory and legal measures against the Hong
Kong government, adding to the public pressure the Hong Kong Chief Executive faced to
withdraw the bill.
Major Western powers expressed clear and vocal opposition to the substance of the
legislation, pressuring the Lam administration to change aspects of the bill. Initially, European
Union (EU) officials and representatives of EU member states met with the Chief Executive in
May to demand amendments to the bill. They wanted the judiciary to also take human rights
standards into account in extradition cases (SCMP May 25th 2019; May 26th 2019). The United
Kingdom and Canada issued a joint statement declaring that
There is a risk the proposals could impact negatively on the rights and freedoms set down
in the Sino-British Joint Declaration. It is vital that extradition arrangements… fully respect
Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy... We believe that the Hong Kong Government
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should allow time to give proper consideration of all alternative options and safeguards
(Foreign and Common Wealth Office of the United Kingdom 2019a).

The American State Department echoed British and Canadian concerns regarding the legislation
in June. They affirmed that the U.S. shared
The concerns of many in Hong Kong that the lack of procedural protections in the proposed
amendments could undermine Hong Kong’s autonomy and negatively impact the
territory’s longstanding protections of human rights, fundamental freedoms, and
democratic values (Ortagus 2019).

Some foreign officials even called for the complete withdrawal of the bill. In July, the
European Parliament adopted a resolution calling on the Lam administration to formally withdraw
the changes to the FOO and the MLACMO (SCMP July 19th, 2019). The United States’
Congressional Executive Commission on China also wrote a letter to Carrie Lam asking for the
bill to be withdrawn.323
Additionally, international officials attempted to protect grassroots forces from state
coercion during the Anti-Extradition Movement. Both the UK Foreign Secretary and the European
Parliament echoed protester demands for an independent inquiry into police conduct during
altercations with protesters in June and July (The Foreign and Common Wealth Office of the
United Kingdom 2019b).324 The European Union also called on the Hong Kong government to
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“immediately drop all charges against peaceful protesters and all those detained for peaceful
exercise of their freedom of expression in the build-up to the protests.”325
To demonstrate their resolve, Europe, the United Kingdom, and the United States proposed
policy measures to counter the Hong Kong government. For instance, the United Kingdom’s
Foreign Secretary announced that their government would not issue further export licenses for
crowd control equipment to Hong Kong unless they were satisfied that “concerns raised on human
rights and fundamental freedoms have been thoroughly addressed” (The Foreign and Common
Wealth Office of the United Kingdom 2019b). The American Speaker of the House warned that if
the extradition legislation passed, Congress would have no choice but to reassess the US-Hong
Kong Policy Act of 1992 that provided Hong Kong with special trading privileges.326 Moreover,
she threatened to pass the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Bill, aimed at punishing
Hong Kong and PRC officials responsible for “suppressing fundamental freedoms” in the region
(SCMP June 13th, 2019).
Overall, Western foreign officials’ support for grassroots’ goals and activities were high.
They disputed specific aspects of the legislation, some even calling for its removal. They pressured
the Hong Kong government to adopt other grassroots goals, such as an independent inquiry into
police violence during the protests. Finally, foreign officials in certain countries threatened or
enacted legislation and regulatory measures designed to punish the Hong Kong government for
their handling of the extradition legislation. All of these activities constituted a high level of
pressure on the Lam administration from international actors to withdrawal of the legislation.
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International Linkage and the Policy Consequences for Foreign Citizens in the Bill
Two factors bolstered foreign officials’ support for grassroots’ goals and activist safety
during the Anti-Extradition Movement. First, grassroots forces made concerted efforts to reach out
to foreign policymakers. They took regular trips to foreign countries and held protests specifically
geared toward the international community. Second, the legislation had consequences for Western
governments’ foreign policy and the economic interests of their constituencies. The changes to the
FOO and MLACMO would have meant that their citizens and businesses could face the possibility
of extradition to, and asset confiscation from, Mainland China while operating in Hong Kong.
Starting in 2015, some grassroots forces in Hong Kong made a concerted effort to meet
with and build connections to Western government officials.327 Key leaders of grassroots forces
during the Umbrella Movement, including former leaders from Occupy Central with Love and
Peace (OCLP), the Hong Kong Federation of Students, and the secondary school group
Scholarism, met with Canadian, British, and US politicians, in 2015.328329 Prior to 2015, these
organizations did not actively court Western government audiences. As showcased in chapter 5,
OCLP even shut down an attempt by a volunteer to reach out to the international community.330
Former OCLP leadership began reaching out to the international actors around the first year
anniversary of the initiation of the 79-day occupation, visiting Washington DC with a former
member of the Democratic Party and Scholarism (Hong Kong Free Press September 23rd 2015).

327

Interviews 42 and 58
For more on the leadership of the Umbrella Movement, including Occupy Central with Love and Peace (OCLP),
Hong Kong Federation of Students, and Scholarism, see chapter 5, pages # through #).
329
Not all of these meetings took place abroad. Members of Civic Party, Hong Kong Federation of Students, and
Scholarism met with Canadian politicians to provide evidence on Hong Kong’s situation. For instance see
Parliament of Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development,
Situation in Hong Kong, 41st. Parl., 2nd sess. 2015. https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/412/FAAE/meeting-58/evidence. Members of Scholarism, OCLP, the Democratic Party, and other members of the
grassroots coalition met with the American Speaker of the House and a Congressional delegation in Hong Kong
(Hong Kong Free Press November 5th 2015)
330
Interview 58. See chapter 5, page 249.
328

323

Grassroots forces traveled to meet with politicians and Chinese diaspora in these three
countries multiple times every year after, through 2019.331 The Democratic Party also set up an
International Affairs Committee designed to organize liaisons with foreign government officials
(SCMP February 8th 2019). Activists also sought to build stronger connections with Taiwanese
politicians, observing elections in January of 2016 and meeting with politicians in September of
2017 (Canada-Hong Kong Link 2016; Chan 2017).332 Some grassroots forces also sought to create
more connections to Japan, Australia, and the EU as well.
Efforts to connect with foreign political officials were bolstered by the development of
international advocacy groups in Anglosphere countries. The Canada-Hong Kong Link and
NY4HK both grew out of activism in the Umbrella Movement, developed by Hong Kong diaspora
(Canada-Hong Kong Link 2020; NY4HK 2020).333 Hong Kong Watch was set up in 2017 by a
British activist and member of the Conservative Party Human Rights Commission (Hong Kong
Watch 2020). This British activist had met with several Hong Kong grassroots activists that had
participated in the Umbrella Movement between fall of 2015 and 2017 (Rogers 2020).334 All three
of these organizations helped grassroots activists arrange meetings with Canadian, American,
British, and EU politicians after the Umbrella Movement. For instance, Hong Kong Watch
facilitated a seminar in which the former leader of OCLP spoke to the European Parliament in
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These visits were established through in-depth examination of NY4HK’s, Canada-Hong Kong Link, and Hong
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Taiwanese activists from the Sunflower Movement were connected to student activists prior to the Umbrella
Movement. For more on the linkage between these groups, see Ho (2019).
333
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2018. It also arranged meetings and briefings between a former Pan-Democrat politician and
members of the British and Canadian government in 2019 (Hong Kong Watch 2020).
Grassroots forces made several trips abroad to meet with foreign officials in the spring and
summer of 2019 regarding changes to extradition legislation. For example, grassroots politicians,
activists, business leaders, and union members made four trips to New York and Washington D.C.
between March and August of 2019. During these meetings, they testified before Congress, met
with the Secretary of State, members of the National Security Council, and the Vice President of
the United States (SCMP March 23rd 2019; May 17th 2019;Hong Kong Free Press March 27th
2019; July 10th 2019).335 Activists and politicians also visited Europe; in May of 2019. A member
of the LegCo and a former civil servant associated with grassroots forces met with the VicePresident of the parliament and the Director of Foreign Policy in the Office of the President in
Germany as well (Hong Kong Free Press 2019).
During protests in the summer, grassroots forces also held actions directed at international
government officials. Whereas grassroots forces primarily focused on making trips to Western
countries to meet with government officials, direct actions were aimed a broader range of foreign
government actors. For example, the G-20 Summit was taking place in Japan on June 28th and
June 29th. On Wednesday June 26th, over a thousand protesters led a “marathon” march to all 19
of the foreign consulates in Hong Kong. They handed letters to officials regarding demands that
the extradition bill be officially withdrawn.336 Later that evening, Civil Human Rights Front led a
rally aimed at convincing the G20 leadership to not only speak out against the bill, but to urge the
PRC government to respect Hong Kong’s autonomy and deliver universal suffrage. Speeches were
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made in English, Japanese, Arabic, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Mandarin, German, Italian, and
Korean. After each speech, the crowd chanted, “Free Hong Kong, Democracy Now” in each of
these languages after the speech.337 Finally, protesters crowdfunded and paid for front page space
in British, American, Canadian, European, German, Korean, Australian, and Japanese newspapers
calling on foreign officials to “Stand with Hong Kong at the G20” (Hong Kong Free Press June
25th 2019; Hong Kong Free Press June 28th 2019). The advertisements in the New York Times
and the Guardian urged the readers to pressure their governments to take action:
The upcoming G20 Summit will be a key opportunity for the world to bring our demands
to the table. We implore you to deliver our concerns to your governments. Please stand
with us in safeguarding Hong Kong’s freedoms and autonomy against China’s oppression
(SCMP August 26th 2019; Hong Kong Free Press June 28th 2019).

Grassroots forces’ increasing international linkage to foreign officials through both direct
contact and activist appeals resulted in positive changes in the number and the quality of statements
by foreign officials. In early April of 2019, the U.S. Congressional Executive Commission had
initially released a statement urging the Hong Kong government to “ensure protections for all of
Hong Kong’s residents and take into account the concerns” of stakeholders before voting on the
bill (US Congressional Executive Commission on China 2019a). Shortly after Hong Kong
grassroots forces testified before the Commission, they sent a letter to Carrie Lam, calling on the
Chief Executive to withdraw the amendments from consideration. 338 Moreover, following the
protests aimed at the G20, Japan’s Prime Minister directly spoke to Xi Jinping about Hong Kong,
pointing out “the importance of [maintaining] a free and open and prosperous Hong Kong under
337
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the one country, two systems formula with the recent extradition bill situation in mind” (SCMP
June 28th 2019).
The quality and quantity of Western government officials’ statements was also affected by
the fact that the legislation affected the security and the economic interests of their citizens. The
policies would have allowed rendition of not only Hong Kong residents, but also foreigners living,
working, or merely passing through, Hong Kong (The Hong Kong Bar Association 2019). An
analyst for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission warned that the bill could
Allow Beijing to pressure the Hong Kong government to extradite U.S. citizens under false
pretenses… The recent spike in arbitrary detentions of U.S., Canadian, and other foreign
citizens in China on questionable charges with a lack of access to a fair trial and due process
highlight the risk the new law could pose to U.S. citizens (Meick 2019).

Statements from the European Union, Canada, and Britain echoed fears for their citizens either
living in, or passing through, Hong Kong (SCMP 16th 2019; Hunt and Freeland 2019).
Not only could the changes in the FOO and MLACMO lead to extradition of foreign
citizens to Mainland, China, it also was viewed as dangerous to international economic interests.
The changes to the MLACMO would allow processing of asset restraint or recovery requests from
PRC authorities (The Government of the Special Administrative Region of Hong 2019b).
International chambers of commerce worried the changes in the bill would also lead to political
reprisals for economic activity conducted on the Mainland. In a letter to the Hong Kong Secretary
for Security, the American Chamber of Commerce insisted that the “Mainland legal system is often
abused to criminalize what are essentially commercial disputes between foreign and local business
interests” (SCMP March 6th 2019).
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The timing of the bill also raised suspicions that foreign nationals in Hong Kong would be
targeted if the new legislation was passed. The Hong Kong Chief Executive proposed these
changes to allow extradition from Hong Kong to the Mainland in the wake of a conflict over an
extradition case involving a Chinese national. In December of 2018, Canada detained the Chinese
company Huawei’s senior executive for extradition proceedings to the United States.339 The PRC
leadership responded by detaining two Canadians and giving the death penalty to another Canadian
national. The PRC’s Foreign Ministry had promised further action if the case against the Huawei
executive was not dropped (SCMP January 23rd 2019).
Western foreign officials’ interests, however, did not always coincide with advancing
grassroots forces’ goals. For instance, the American Trump administration had been involved in a
trade dispute with China since July of the previous year and was hoping to make progress on
bilateral trade negotiations at the G-20 Summit at the end of June 2019. While the Speaker of the
House promised policy reprisals if the Chief Executive re-initiated proceedings to change the
extradition laws, the President of the United States remained relatively quiet before meeting with
President Xi Jinping at the G-20 (SCMP June 19th 2019). The President promised Xi Jinping during
the G-20 Summit that they would tone down remarks on Hong Kong in exchange for the revival
of trade talks. The US consul general was also ordered to remove critical remarks about China
from his July 2nd speech at the Asian Financial Hub (Sevastopulo and Wong 2019). By August,
however, trade negotiations stalled. The US President responded by linking a successful end to the
trade dispute to Hong Kong, tweeting “Of course, China wants to make a deal. Let them work
humanely with Hong Kong first!” (SCMP August 19th 2019).
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Both grassroots’ efforts to form linkages with foreign officials and the policy implications
of the changes to the FOO and MLACMO for Western countries played a role in eliciting the
strong responses from Western governments during the Anti-Extradition Movement. Following
the Umbrella Movement, activists spent years cultivating relationships with Western government
officials, particularly in anglosphere countries. They were aided by new international advocacy
groups led predominantly by Hong Kong diaspora. Grassroots’ movement activities often
addressed the international community as well. Foreign officials’ interests largely aligned with
grassroots actors during this movement, as Western governments feared their citizens could be
targeted for extradition or confiscation of assets. The Huawei extradition case deepened these fears
for the United States and Canadian policymakers. As the exploration of the Trump
Administration’s changing response to the Anti-Extradition Movement indicates, however, some
officials’ support varied over the summer of 2019, based on their economic interests in China. On
the whole, however, the threat of the legislation led Western officials to promote grassroots’
objectives during the movement.
Elite Level: Fragmentation and Defection Among the Integrationist Coalition
While the protestors benefited from unity in messaging and activity, the Hong Kong
political elite seeking further integration with China suffered fragmentation, which undermined
Chief Executive Carrie Lam’s ability to push through the legislation. Over the course of the AntiExtradition Movement, there were repeated incidences of friction within the integrationist camp
that impeded the Chief Executive’s ability to mount a unified defense against grassroots’ pressure.
Two of the primary public challenges to the Chief Executive’s agenda came from representatives
of the business community and members of the civil service. Both expressed support for elements
of grassroots forces’ agenda at different points in the Anti-Extradition Movement. Yet even the
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police force, largely aligned with the Lam administration, rebuffed even minor efforts by the
administration to adjust the level of force used against protesters. Their intransigence not only hurt
Lam’s public image, but made it difficult to appease civil servants, who championed curbing the
police’s use of force, thereby exacerbating the discord in the integrationist camp.
Multiple representatives of business interests within the integrationist camp voiced public
concern over the content of the changes to the FOO and the MLACMO, demanding concessions
from the Chief Executive. Interviewees identified business leaders as the strongest opponents of
the bill outside of the opposition.340 Within the Legislative Council, members of the Business and
Professionals Alliance for Hong Kong (BPA), a voting bloc of 8 legislators, argued that the
legislation should be amended so that white collar crimes were not extraditable offenses. Three of
these BPA legislators expressed their disapproval to PRC officials.341 An independent legislator in
LegCo, and member of the National People’s Congress, urged Carrie Lam to scrap the bill and
create legislation to tackle the problem of Taiwan on a one-off basis (SCMP May 3rd 2019). The
Chief Executive also dealt with public criticism of the bill from the Liberal Party as well as from
local chambers of commerce (SCMP May 3rd 2019; March 29th 2019; May 19th 2019).342343
There was variation in the degree to which the business community supported the Chief
Executive’s attempt to enact the changes to the extradition legislation. Business leaders began to
rally around the bill in late May, as the Lam administration prepared for a full Legislative Council
vote on the legislation. The Liberal Party even wrote a letter of support for the bill after a march
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on June 9th, where an estimated million people attended (SCMP July 8th 2019). Yet, the increased
unity with business interests in the integrationist camp broke down following the Chief Executive’s
decision to suspend the bill. Despite near daily protests in June and July, many business elites did
not actively voice public support for the Chief Executive (SCMP July 21st 2019). Some businesses
had even let their employees take days off to participate in the early protests (SCMP August 22nd
2019).
Coalition unity shifted again by mid-August, with business elite within Hong Kong
demonstrating public support for the Chief Executive. Prominent organizations associated with
property tycoons issued strong condemnations of the protest activities, deploring the way
“escalating violent behavior and vandalization” has eroded “the city’s core values” (SCMP August
22nd 2019). Major banks took full page advertisements out calling for a restoration of order (South
China Morning Post August 22nd 2019). Property tycoons and other business leaders also joined
a integrationist, pro-Mainland rally on August 18th (SCMP August 18th 2019).
Yet, as business factions within the integrationist coalition returned to the fold in August,
a group of civil servants went even farther in breaking with the Chief Executive by facilitating and
participating in grassroots activities. High-ranking members of the civil service issued publicized
letters urging the Hong Kong Chief Executive to withdraw the FOO and MLACMO legislation
and hold an independent inquiry into police actions in late July.344 At the beginning of August they
escalated actions by holding a rally advocating the same two demands.345 Around 40,000 people
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participated in the rally (SCMP August 3rd 2019).346 They also participated in the August 5th citywide strike in support of the protesters’ “Five Demands” (SCMP August 2nd 2019).
Civil servants’ participation in grassroots activities was extremely unusual because their
occupation demanded “political neutrality.” The Civil Service Code required civil servants to be
loyal to the Chief Executive in power, giving impartial advice on policies (The Government of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 2019c).347 While civil servants were free to exercise
their rights to free speech, they could not do so in their capacity as civil servants (SCMP August
5th 2019). When civil servants organized the petitions, rallies, and strikes, they highlighted their
positions as civil servants, using phrases like “Political neutrality does not equal lacking a
conscience” (SCMP August 3rd 2019).
As a result, the Lam administration publicly worried the defection of members of the civil
service made it impossible for the integrationist camp to appear united in their policy stance. The
Hong Kong government issued a statement, pleading that their actions “seriously affect the
Government's effective operation and implementation of policies and the delivery of services to
the public” (The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Press 2019c). The
Chief Secretary openly worried that the public would get the “wrong impression” that there was “
a split in views within the government, or confrontations” (SCMP August 5th 2019).
The Lam administration even received pushback from the police, a faction that ostensibly
supported their goals in handling the extradition legislation. The Chief Executive could do little to
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constrain or correct any misapplications of force by the police. One example of this dynamic was
the aftermath of the Yuen Long incident on July 21st. A few days after the event, the Chief
Secretary apologized, stating “There is a discrepancy between what the police did and what the
public expected. I am absolutely willing to apologize to the public for our handling of the incident”
(Hong Kong Free Press July 26th 2019). Multiple police force unions responded by criticizing the
Chief Secretary. One statement said, “Your words have completely written off our efforts in
maintaining law and order over the past few months” (SCMP July 27th 2019). He further
threatened that the Lam administration could oversee protests themselves if they did not agree with
police methods. Another police union leader urged the Chief Secretary to consider stepping down
(SCMP July 27th 2019). Police officers began echoing calls for the secretary’s resignation on
social media (Lum 2019).
The police intransigence exacerbated civil servants’ actions against the Lam
Administration. The civil servants that directly took part in grassroots’ activities were galled by
incidences of police violence against protesters. For instance, 350 civil servants launched another
petition aimed at the Chief Executive after some police officers had shot pepper balls at close range
and discharged tear gas in enclosed spaces within the subway system. ”We have lost count of the
number of ‘crimes against humanity’ Hong Kong police committed and we feel ashamed to call
them colleagues… If the government refuses to make any concession, it will disappoint civil
servants and leave little room for dialogue” (SCMP August 16th 2019). The Lam administration
was unable to reconcile these two sectors in the integrationist camp.
Within the Anti-Extradition Movement, there was clearly very limited unity among the
integrationist coalition, inhibiting the Lam Administration’s ability to coordinate the camp against
grassroots pressure. Two major factions within the integrationist coalition challenged the Lam
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administration during the movement, with one, the civil servants, outright participating in protest
activities. Even a faction that resolutely supported the Lam administration, the police, refused to
moderate their activities in the wake of public outcry and censure from the administration.
The Role of China
The Chief Executive’s continued reliance on the PRC authorities to resolve disputes within
the integrationist camp produced challenges and defection within elite circles during the AntiExtradition Movement. The PRC authorities did, in some ways, contribute to solving conflicts
between integrationist factions. Their methods for resolving clashes, however, often involved
championing one side over the other, limiting the options for appeasing the losing side. Moreover,
PRC officials’ previous attempts at dispute resolution within the coalition had iterative effects on
Hong Kong elite calculations and behavior during the Anti-Extradition Movement. The resultant
perceptions and actions exacerbated intra-elite conflict on the whole, rather than diminishing it.
In the case of the Anti-Extradition Movement, PRC officials did play a crucial role in
restoring unity after periods of upheaval in the integrationist coalition. While the bill was making
its way through the legislative process, the PRC’s Liaison Office organized a group of
integrationist supporters to create a pro-bill alliance. They also met with over 200 Hong Kong
delegates to national governing bodies, such as the National People’s Congress (NPC), to garner
support for the bill (SCMP June 29th 2019; May 17th 2019).348 When the Lam administration
continued to receive criticism or silence from factions of the integrationist camp through late July,
PRC leadership ordered 500 Hong Kong political and business leaders to meet about the AntiExtradition Movement in Shenzhen, China. They mandated that elite rally behind the Chief
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Executive and threatened to deploy the state’s military force, the People’s Liberation Army, if they
did not help her (SCMP August 8th 2019).
Despite their efforts, PRC officials exacerbated certain facets of intra-elite conflict through
taking sides in these disputes. In defending one side, the complaints of the losing side were not
sufficiently addressed, making it more difficult to resolve the underlying problem. The PRC
leadership’s decision to support certain factions over others in the Anti-Extradition Movement had
a direct impact on both police intransigence and civil servant defection.
The timing of PRC officials’ statements of support for the police undermined the Lam
administration’s ability to temper their actions. A few days after the Chief Secretary’s apology for
the failure of the police force to meet public expectations during the Yuen Long attack in late July,
PRC officials held their first televised press conference since the beginning of the protests in early
June. They praised the police force as having fearlessly stuck to their posts and fulfilled their duties
“against all odds.” They did not address the criticism by the police force regarding the Chief
Secretary (SCMP July 30th 2019). The PRC’s response indicated that the Lam administration had
to champion police performance during the protests and that they could not question their tactics.
The Lam administration did not publicly question police decisions during the movement after July
2019.
Yet the Lam administration’s silence on police outcry, reinforced by PRC officials’
signals, made it impossible for the Chief Executive to pacify disgruntled civil servants. As
previously mentioned, the major impetus for civil servants’ participation in grassroots activities
was police violence. After 350 civil servants sent a second petition to the Chief Executive, the
Secretary for the Civil Service warned that the administration would follow up on any “violation
of regulations” committed by civil service officials engaging in protest activities. In response, civil
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servants used the fact that the Lam administration had not rebuked police petitions and public posts
against the government to justify their behavior. They claimed that the Secretary was not enforcing
regulations “fairly and squarely” (SCMP August 16th 2019).
Moreover, previous episodes of PRC intervention in intra-elite conflict affected Hong
Kong elite behavior in a manner that also facilitated factionalism in the integrationist camp. The
continued role of PRC institutions meant that 1) Hong Kong elite viewed the changes to the FOO
and MLACMO as more negotiable; 2) the Chief Executive did not believe they needed to
communicate with other members of the integrationist camp; and 3) factions doubted the ability
of the Chief Executive to push back against the interests of the PRC leadership she was dependent
on. These dynamics are particularly important for assessing the actions of business elite during the
Anti-Extradition Protests.
First, the pattern of PRC-intervention led elite actors to view legislation requested by the
PRC officials as mandated, but initiatives of the Chief Executive as potentially negotiable. The
Lam administration repeatedly indicated that changes to the FOO and MLACMO had not been
requested by the PRC leadership.349 While the leadership had informed the Lam administration
that they would eventually like to formalize extradition arrangements with the HKSAR, there had
not been a timetable or a specific request made by the PRC government (SCMP June 29th 2019).
350
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reported that there were “no ‘instructions’ or ‘reminders’ to support the bill from [PRC] officials”
(SCMP June 29th 2019). This knowledge led financial and property developer elite and
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representatives of the business sector to feel comfortable publicly asserting their problems with
bill. As mentioned in the previous section, some business representatives directly complained
about the bill to PRC authorities in Beijing.
Since PRC officials championed executive-led government in Hong Kong, the Chief
Executive did not feel it was necessary to consult with members of the integrationist camp before
major decisions.351 The Chief Executive did not inform all members of the integrationist camp
about the bill prior to publicly announcing the public consultation in February. Furthermore, she
did not inform members of the integrationist camp when she decided to suspend the legislation on
June 15th, only seeking the PRC leadership’s blessing instead (SCMP June 16th 2019).
Lam’s decision not to inform the integrationist camp before suspending the bill created
frustration among elected officials. They worried about losing seats in the upcoming District
Council elections that fall, as the integrationist camp had lost seats after the Anti-Article 23 protests
in 2003 (SCMP June 16th 2019; June 20th 2019).352353 Since many elected officials had spent time
and political capital convincing constituents to support the bill, they did not feel they were given
the time to come up with a response to public inquiries before Lam made her announcement on
June 15th. A member of the integrationist party BPA confessed that “Whether it was the
announcement on June 9th… or the decision to suspend the bill on June 15, I think that, even for
us who supported the bill, it was very abrupt. So all supporters of the bill were very angry. It’s like
driving a train- you need some buffering time [before suspending it]” (SCMP June 25th 2019).
The risk of losing subsequent elections was particularly high for pro-business parties such
as the Liberal Party and the BPA. Since multiple professional organizations and business leaders
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had come out against the bill, they were most likely to face a backlash in November for not heeding
those constituents.354 The resulting frustration within the integrationist camp limited pro-business
parties’ support for the government following the suspension of the bill, as protests continued
through June and July of 2019.
Finally, the increased power of PRC officials as the arbiters among integrationist forces
led a number of the business elite to doubt the Lam administration’s ability to block extradition
requests from the central government authorities. The Lam administration relied on the support of
the PRC authorities to even pass legislation. Many former Mainland residents believed that the
Lam administration would be unable to fight requests based on issues such as President Xi
Jinping’s anti-corruption policies.355 One interviewee from the integrationist coalition explained
that
Those who were most riled were actually business people who had come from the
Mainland. They were Mainlanders who had got rich in the first years of the opening up of
China. They amassed large sums of wealth and then they became Hong Kong residents….
But even after moving to Hong Kong, they have very close connections on the Mainland.
And they believe that China, or the current government in Beijing, wanted them because
[the officers they had close relationships with] are now in trouble. So they [were in danger]
of getting in trouble. So they believe they were the targets of this legislation.356
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Moreover, many business elite did not believe the Lam administration could protect them because
they were guilty under Mainland law. The same interviewee explained, “All of us are doing
business in Mainland. And many of us have done something naughty in the past. We don’t know
when, you know, we will be sent back for trial for what we did.”357
Both PRC official’s contemporary and previous efforts to act as an arbiter within the camp
had consequences that increased the overall factionalism among the integrationist elite during the
Anti-Extradition Movement. While PRC officials had some success at resolving disputes within
the camp, they also made it more difficult to address the claims of civil servants, who wanted the
police force reigned in. Furthermore, the established pattern of PRC intervention led business elite
to believe they could challenge this bill, since it was not sponsored by the central authorities in
Beijing. This pattern also influenced the Chief Executive to reduce timely communication with the
broader integrationist coalition, which hurt their electoral prospects following the bill’s
suspension. Lastly, given the Chief Executive’s reliance on the PRC government’s endorsement,
business elite did not believe that she would be able to resist extradition requests against them.
Interactions Between Factors
In the Anti-Extradition Movement, the relevant factors interacted in a way that positively
augmented the grassroots forces’ position. Grassroots solidarity enabled more effective outreach
to the international community, which enhanced the support grassroots forces received from
Western government officials. The fact that grassroots forces actively pursued international
linkages and foreign officials responded to their entreaties made the PRC authorities feel it was
more critical to intervene in the integrationist coalition. Intra-elite conflict and the PRC officials’
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intervention in defense of the police had an effect on the level of violence within the protests,
which further intensified grassroots’ unity.
The solidarity among grassroots forces helped them commit and carry out a strategy aimed
at enhancing Western support for their agenda in the Anti-Extradition protests. A wide-array of
organizations were able to collaborate in order to launch solidarity protests in other countries
throughout the movement. For instance, organizations like Canada-Hong Link and NY4HK
collaborated with activists and politicians in Hong Kong to organize solidarity marches for June
9th, the same day as Civil Human Rights Front’s march on Hong Kong Island. The NY4HK march
used the same exact signs and imagery as protesters in the march in Hong Kong on June 9th.358
There were around 29 rallies in the US, Australia, Europe, Japan, Canada, and Taiwan on June 9th
(Hong Kong Free Press June 10th 2019).
Another example of this dynamic can be observed in the organization of a protest in New
York on August 17th, 2019. Members of the Pan-Democratic Camp party, Civic Party, and former
members of the Hong Kong Federation of Students (HKFS) came to New York that week to meet
with diaspora organizations like NY4HK. They collaborated with NY4HK on a march from
Chinatown in Manhattan across the Brooklyn Bridge to Brooklyn. 359 What is noteworthy about
this protest is that one of the main cleavages during the Umbrella Movement was between veteran
activists associated with the Pan-Democratic Camp, and newer activists, who organized through
platforms like HKFS. Both veteran and younger protesters were able to work cohesively within
this movement to boost the effectiveness of solidarity campaigns within the grassroots’ movement.
Grassroots commitment to obtaining Western government official’s support impacted elite
fragmentation as well, because it affected PRC officials’ urgency in responding to intra-elite
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disputes within Hong Kong. PRC officials worried about the tensions in Hong Kong being
exploited by the United States, since the two countries were embroiled in a trade dispute. Between
March and September of 2019, grassroots activists made five trips to the United States, often
meeting with high-level government official. Over the course of the summer, PRC officials came
to see the US as undermining their national sovereignty through its statements and conduct toward
the Anti-Extradition Movement (South China Morning Post August 7th 2019). Between May and
July, PRC spokesmen occasionally characterized the United States’ statements and actions in
regard to the extradition legislation as “foreign intervention” (SCMP May 13th 2019; July 10th
2019). Their rhetoric escalated further by August; they referred to the protests as an attempted
“color revolution” and accused the US of funding and supporting protesters (SCMP August 1st
2019).360
PRC authorities therefore were partially compelled to mediate between the integrationist
factions and shore up support for the Lam administration because of interactions between Hong
Kong grassroots forces and Western government officials. The PRC’s Liaison Office only
contacted members of the integrationist camp to form a pro-bill alliance after grassroots forces
went to the United States in April and met with the Vice President (SCMP June 29th 2019). The
PRC leadership’s efforts in August to force business interests within the integrationist coalition to
demonstrate their support for the Chief Executive also featured repeated allusions to concerns of
a color revolution and foreign interference (SCMP August 8th 2019a;2019b).
Additionally, the inability of the Lam administration to temper police actions contributed
to the high solidarity among protesters. As previously stated, surveys of protesters indicated that
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Their claims were based on photographs of Caucasian persons at the protests as well as a few protesters who held
up American flags at the protests. The US Secretary of State also called the protests “appropriate,” which further
aggravated the PRC leadership (SCMP August 1st, 2019).
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by the beginning of August, police violence was a more important issue than the formal withdrawal
of the bill (Lee et al 2019). Protesters faced conflicts regarding the use of violent strategy, but
incidents such as Yuen Long fostered a desire to maintain unity even in the face of radical actions.
Even minor attempts by the Lam administration to deal with the police’s inability to protect
commuters at Yuen Long were met with resistance from the police, who were in turn backed by
PRC officials. These circumstances made it difficult for the administration to deal with one of the
core factors that facilitated cohesion among grassroots forces.
In this case, there was a kind of virtuous cycle in which the relevant factors enhanced one
another. The high levels of grassroots cohesion helped the coalition organize solidarity marches
across a number of countries utilizing unified messaging, which resulted in bolstered Western
government officials’ support. Grassroots forces’ pursuit and successful acquirement of Western
support during the Anti-Extradition Movement helped mobilize PRC officials to intervene in the
integrationist elite’s conflict, which in turn, could stimulate further tension in the camp. At the
same time, the lack of unity in defense of the Chief Executive, and the PRC leadership’s role as
arbiter in the integrationist coalition, made it difficult for the Lam administration to taper police
violence. The continuing perception that police were not being held accountable for conduct
toward protesters fortified grassroots forces’ solidarity.

Comparing Rival Explanations of Movement Success
In previous accountings of grassroots movement dynamics within the Hong Kong context,
analysis have highlighted the role of anti-Mainland nationalism, economic grievance, and
changing media structures to explaining outcomes. Yet these factors do not offer as satisfying an
account of how grassroots forces were able to pressure the Chief Executive into withdrawing the
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changes to extradition legislation. While anti-Mainland sentiment continued to steadily increase
in Hong Kong, more nationalistic groups could not mobilize prior to the extradition legislation. It
was only the threat of future coercion that led these groups to be more success in mobilizing.
Unequal economic opportunities continued to frustrate Hong Kong residents, but during the AntiExtradition Movement, public opinion polling suggests that residents were considerably less
concerned about these issues. Finally, while the changing media structure did offer tools to
grassroots activists to settle disputes between factions, it is important to note that the media’s tenor
toward the protests were affected by their own concerns about coercion by the Hong Kong and
PRC governments.
One alternative factor that could be conjectured to have influenced grassroots’ success is
the increasing Anti-Mainland sentiment and ethnic nationalism within Hong Kong. The
scholarship on the region has emphasized the development of Localism, which following the
Umbrella Movement, incorporated nation-building, self-determination, and right-wing populist
components (Kwong 2016; Kaeding 2017; Fong 2017; Veg 2017; Yuen and Chung 2018).
Residents of the Hong Kong SAR, particularly those under 30, continued to progressively reject
Chinese identification. The Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute (PORI) reported that
between 2015 and 2019, Chinese identification fell from 13% to 6.9% among respondents aged 29
and younger. Even among those older than 30, Chinese identification fell from 39.6% to 26.3%
(PORI 2020b). PORI polling surveys also indicate an uptick in anti-Mainland sentiment after the
Umbrella Movement. Only 24% of Hong Kong respondents reported negative feelings toward
Mainland Chinese people in 2015. By July of 2019, however, 34% admitted to having negative
feelings toward Mainland Chinese people, an increase of 10 percent (PORI 2020c).
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Anti-Mainland nationalist symbols and slogans did permeate several actions during the
Anti-Extradition movement. For instance, on June 21st, protesters hung a large banner that said
“Hong Kong is not China” on a bridge leading to the Legislative Council Complex. 361 Some
protests were also aimed against perceived incursions by Mainland tourists. On July 13th, tens of
thousands participated in a protest in the New Territories called “Reclaim Sheung Shui,” which
not only protested against the extradition bill, but the effect of parallel traders coming from the
Mainland on local businesses.362 Protesters graffitied stores they knew to be owned by parallel
traders.363
Despite the growth of anti-Mainland sentiment and nationalist symbols and targets in the
Anti-Extradition Movement, localists could not mobilize support for public actions in the
immediate period leading up to the movement. 364 As one Localist activist put it, “Before the
extradition bill, there has already been a lot of controversial bills too. Maybe even more
controversial than this. But we couldn’t make a movement.”365 Another Localist activist described
the difference between trying to mobilize in 2018 and 2019:
We tried to promote this message, “the [PRC] government is trying to burn out our reserves”
[through infrastructure projects like the Hong Kong-Macau-Zhuhai Bridge]… But we find
out Hong Kongers don’t really care about financial reserves… Hong Kongers were not
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Participant Observation conducted on June 21st in Admiralty and Wan Chai, in Hong Kong Island.
Participant Observation conducted on July 13th in Sheung Shui, New Territories .
363
Protesters were concerned that the majority of shops served the needs of Mainland tourists rather than the local
community. They accused these tourists of coming to Hong Kong and buying goods in bulk that they could then
resell in Mainland China. This activity raised the price of everyday consumer goods and made it difficult for small
businesses to compete with major corporate chains in the New Territories, according to Localists (SCMP July 13th
2019)
364
For instance, in 2018, the Legislative Council passed the co-location scheme for the Western Kowloon Terminus,
which allowed Mainland law to apply within a portion of Hong Kong. The Chief Executive also banned the Hong
Kong National Party and refused to renew the visa of a reporter who allowed the leader of that party to speak at the
Foreign Correspondent’s Club.
365
Interview 76
362
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concerned until the extradition law, because this is a safety issue. And this is what Hong
Kongers are concerned about.366
This quote demonstrates that the threat of coercion played a far more important role in rallying
support for Localist objectives than anti-Mainland sentiment in and of itself.
Another possible factor that enabled the movement’s success is economic grievance, which
could have added to the mobilization and unity among movement participants. Property prices in
Hong Kong continued to climb after the 2008 Financial Crisis through 2018, making it more
difficult for poor and middle class residents to purchase property (Wong and Wan 2018). The
average home in Hong Kong costs around 1.28 million USD. Nearly half of the city’s apartments
have monthly rents of 2,550 USD which is 122% of the average monthly income of Hong Kong
residents (La 2020). Moreover, according to Hong Kong regulations, in order to purchase an
apartment, buyers have to be able to pay 40% of the property’s value up front (Ngai 2020). Wong
and Wan (2018) found that while homeowners were supportive of the status quo in Hong Kong,
those who did not own property were more likely to support Localist activists in the 2016
Legislative Council elections, suggesting that economic grievance could play a role in contentious
political activity.
Lee et al (2019) claim that the Lam administration’s failure to properly address economic
and social issues such as the housing crisis contributed to mobilization in the Anti-Extradition
Movement. The Hong Kong government has yet to return to building public housing at the rate it
did prior to the 1997 Financial Crisis (La 2020). Starting in 2017, the Chief Executive announced
an ambitious plan to spend around 80 million USD to build artificial islands that could house 1.1
million people (Ngai 2020; Keegan 2019). Work on these islands would not start until 2025,
366

Interview 61
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however, and residents would not be able to move into the housing until 2032 (Keegan 2019).
There was therefore little relief for current residents in need of housing.
Public opinion polling data suggests that economic concerns were not a major factor in mobilizing
participation in the Anti-Extradition Movement. As indicated in Graph 6.1, between 2010 and
2018, PORI found that respondents were consistently and significantly more worried about
“livelihood issues” rather than “political issues.” Yet in 2019, surveys indicated similar levels of
concern over both “livelihood issues” and “political issues” (PORI 2020f). Concern about
livelihood issues dropped by 25%, indicating that the political features of the changes in the FOO
and the MLACMO, were more important than long-standing grievances such as the housing
shortage to mobilization.

Graph 6.1: Changes in Public Concern Regarding Economic and
Political Issues in Hong Kong
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Source: Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute (PORI) (2020f)
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The final factor that could provide a possible explanation for grassroots success in the AntiExtradition Movement is the changing media structure; mobilization was influenced by the growth
of online platforms for information and networking. Surveys of protesters by Lee et al revealed
that 93.8% of participants received news about the protests from online news outlets (2019). While
mainstream news outlets were influenced by either the Hong Kong government or the PRC central
government, online media outlets were not as thoroughly regulated or policed (Lee et al 2019).
Not only could the growth of online media have affected Hong Kong residents’ attitudes
toward the Anti-Extradition bill, but it also allowed for dissemination of grassroots strategies and
communication through platforms such as Facebook, LIHKG, and Telegram.367 Lee et al remarked
on online media outlets’ capacity for coordination as a reason for the high level of mobilization in
the Anti-Extradition movement (2019). The majority of respondents described themselves as
“self-mobilized,” coming to protests with friends and family, rather than mobilized by local
grassroots organizations.
Certainly online media platforms gave grassroots forces a mechanism for navigating
conflicts over strategy, but the platforms available to grassroots forces were the same as those
available dating back to 2016. Lee et al (2019) alludes to this point, arguing that digital media
became a central platform for mobilizing and coordinating protests by the 2010s. If that was the
case, it seems unclear as to why mobilization would have been so limited during the
disqualification of activists seeking elected office in 2018 or the debate over giving the PRC
jurisdiction over a portion of the high speed rail terminus in 2017 and 2018.
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LIHKG is an online forum that is popular in Hong Kong. Telegram is a personal messaging application with endto-end encryption. See pages 310-311 of this chapter for more about the usage of these platforms in the AntiExtradition Movement.
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What is evident is that perceptions of coercion increased both online and mainstream
media’s involvement with grassroots’ Anti-Extradition Movement activities, affecting public
discourse about the movement. Media organizations were afraid that the extradition legislation
would lead to reprisals against reporters for unfavorable coverage toward Mainland authorities. In
a statement before the US Congressional Executive Committee on China in May of 2019, a former
chair of the Hong Kong Journalist Association (HKJA) explained that
Chinese government officials are notorious for making up offences to stop media from
reporting. The legal changes will mean Hong Kong can no longer be a “safe harbour” for
reporters covering sensitive news in Mainland China because the proposed amendment
allows the Chinese government to request the return of the targeted reporters.368.

Police violence against members of the press also led media groups to speak out against
the Lam administration and the police; they even took part in mobilization activities which favored
grassroots efforts. For instance, during the police clearance of protesters attempting to stop the
reading of the extradition legislation on June 12th, the Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA)
found 17 cases where the police had either intimidated or physically assaulted reporters. The HKJA
publicly accused the police of injuring reporters by shooting tear gas at close range, attacking them
with batons, and pushing them with riot shields (Hong Kong Journalists Association 2019b).
Ongoing incidents with police led press groups to also organize a more formal silent march on July
14th, because “the personal safety of journalists [were] being threatened” (Hong Kong Journalists
Association 2019c). Journalists marched from the Legislative Council Complex in Admiralty to
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U.S. Congress, Congressional Executive Commission on China, Hong Kong’s Future In the Balance, Eroding
Autonomy and Challenges to Human Rights, 116th Cong., https://www.cecc.gov/events/hearings/hong-kong’sfuture-in-the-balance-eroding-autonomy-and-challenges-to-human-rights.
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the Police Headquarters in Wan Chai, displaying their press credentials as they went by the
headquarters.369
Since members of the press were repeatedly injured in encounters with the police while
covering protests within the Anti-Extradition Movement, their coverage and activities ended up
giving weight to grassroots accounts in the media over that of the police and the Lam
administration. For the most part, protesters were careful to avoid injuring the press, leading
organizations like HKJA to focus less on the role of protester violence within the Anti-Extradition
Movement. The HKJA did issue one public statement on August 14th condemning grassroots
actions, after protesters at the Hong Kong International Airport tied up and physically assaulted a
member of the Mainland Chinese press. The wording of the statement, however, partially absolved
protesters of some of the blame by admonishing Mainland journalists to “clearly show their press
cards when they cover large-scale demonstrations and rallies in Hong Kong” (Hong Kong
Journalist Association 2019a).
Examining three rival explanations of grassroots success underscores the importance of
upsurges in coercion in the Anti-Extradition Movement case. Despite increases in anti-Mainland
nationalism, nationalistic groups such as the Localists were only able to elicit participation in their
activities when Hong Kong residents perceived a piece of legislation as affecting their safety.
Concern regarding longstanding economic grievances such as housing inequality fell during the
Anti-Extradition movement. The changing media structure did present opportunities for grassroots
forces to diffuse tension by coordinating activities online. More importantly, however, members
of both online and mainstream media organizations believed the extradition would negatively
affect them. Reporters also experienced police violence while covering movement activities.
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Participant Observation June 14th, 2019 in Admiralty and Wanchai, Hogn Kong Island.
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Media outlets perceptions of increasing coercion by the police, the Lam administration, and the
PRC leadership led to a media environment that was more favorable to grassroots narratives during
the Anti-Extradition movement.

Conclusion

Despite grassroots’ forces enervation in the period leading up to the Anti-Extradition
Movement, they were empowered by backing from Western foreign officials and internal unity,
whereas the Chief Executive was hampered by factionalism within her integrationist coalition.
Grassroots forces were able to build high levels of solidarity, which helped them sustain high
mobilization for several months and change protest strategies in response to government attempts
to curtail protests. Western governments not only made strong statements against the contents of
the bill but were willing to make actual foreign policy changes toward Hong Kong because of the
Anti-Extradition Movement. The Lam administration lacked the same cohesion within the
integrationist camp and had to fend off challenges from business elite, civil servants, and the police
force.
Grassroots forces’ cohesion during the Anti-Extradition Movement was forged through
their shared perception that the Hong Kong government and the PRC government were
increasingly coercive. Both Localist and Pan-Democratic factions feared that the changes in FOO
and the MLACMO would have dire consequences for dissidents. The police attempts to clear
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protests also used more severe levels of force. While there were few casualties in the protests,
grassroots forces blamed protester suicides on the Hong Kong government as well. The fear and
anger over state violence, as well as the anxiety about protesters’ deaths, helped grassroots forces
overcome divisions in strategy throughout the summer of 2019.
Western government officials’ forceful statements and actions were products of grassroots
activists’ fervent efforts to build international linkages and the policy consequences for foreign
citizens operating in Hong Kong. Following the Umbrella Movement, grassroots forces made
yearly visits to Western countries to meet with officials. Rallies, marches, newspaper
advertisements and sit-ins also explicitly addressed international leaders and urged foreigners to
contact their government on Hong Kong residents’ behalf. At the same time, Western officials
worried that the legislation would create a “backdoor” through which the PRC could extradite
persons and confiscate property in Hong Kong without a formal bilateral agreement.
The Chief Executive, on the other hand, faced challenges to the contents of the legislation
as well as the handling of the protests from members of the integrationist coalition because of the
continued reliance on PRC officials to act as third-party arbiters. The PRC leadership’s mediated
between factions by choosing one over the other, which on occasion did not resolve the underlying
dispute. A faction of civil servants were alienated from the integrationist coalition and took part in
grassroots activities because of the PRC’s official stance on police violence. Moreover, past
incidences where PRC officials’ dealt with internal disputes within the integrationist camp
incentivized behavior in the contemporary movement that deepened schisms among elite. Business
elite believed that they could challenge the legislation, since it wasn’t initiated by PRC officials.
The Chief Executive consulted PRC officials rather than all members of the integrationist camp,
which harmed the latter’s electoral prospects for the fall elections. Members of the integrationist
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camp also doubted the Chief Executive’s ability to resist PRC extradition requests that could prove
unfavorable to their interests.
In this case, these factors interacted to further improve the position of grassroots forces
while damaging the position of the Lam administration. Newfound solidarity among grassroots
activists allowed them to plan and execute solidarity protests in a number of countries that
contained unified messaging, bolstering their ability to effectively elicit Western support.
Grassroots’ ability to garner international favor affected the PRC leadership’s evaluation of the
protests, who became concerned that Western countries such as the US was using Hong Kong
activists instrumentally. These evaluations led them to deepen their role as an arbiter in the
integrationist camp, which had an adverse effect on cohesion among factions such as the civil
service. The Lam administration’s inability to reign in police tactics aggravated grassroots forces,
fortifying their unity despite the increasingly violent tactics of some participants.
Examination of rival explanations only reinforces the importance of coercion in particular
to explaining this case. Localists, who advocated for nation-building and self-determination, were
only able to gain broader traction in 2019 because of the perception that the extradition bill was a
threat to public safety. Public opinion polling suggests that the importance of economic grievances
actually declined in favor of political concerns during the Anti-Extradition Movement. Finally,
press concerns for how both the extradition legislation would affect their well-being and their
experiences of violence during police clearings, led them to often support grassroots’ account of
protest activities, bolstering the image of grassroots forces.
In this analysis, I only focused on the events that led up to the Lam administration’s
withdrawal of the extradition legislation at the beginning of September 2019. This dissertation
concentrates on grassroots forces’ ability to affect the local government’s implementation of
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autonomy from the central government, so the withdrawal of the bill is the relevant change in
implementation of policy. I will discuss the continuation of protests after the bill’s withdrawal and
the implications of the PRC leadership’s response in the concluding chapter.
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Chapter 7:
Conclusion

What conditions empower grassroots forces to change the local government’s
implementation of autonomy from central government institutions? Within this study, we have
examined four cases where grassroots forces attempted to keep the Chief Executive from giving
policy authority over to the PRC government. I compare and contrast pairs of grassroots’ success
and failure within the early Handover Period with that of two contrasting cases from the 2010s.
The Right of Abode Movement from 1997 through 1999 was unable to protect local judicial
autonomy and authority over immigration policy. However, in the Anti-Article 23 Movement,
grassroots forces were able to achieve a more stunning victory and keep the Chief Executive from
implementing the Basic Law-mandated national security legislation. Grassroots forces were not
successful in obtaining concessions from the Chief Executive during the 2013-2015 Umbrella
Movement, when the CE sought to reform elections for the Chief Executive that contained political
screenings. They were, however, able to force the next Chief Executive to withdrawal a policy that
would have allowed extradition to Mainland China. What explains the divergent outcomes in these
cases?

A Relational Typology of Autonomy

As evidenced within these four episodes of Hong Kong autonomy promotion by grassroots
forces, local governments not only face demands from central governing authorities. They have to
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contend with a plethora of actors at multiple levels of governance, mass publics, local elite, central
authorities, and international elite. To more accurately observe the demands that influence local
governments behaviors under conditions of federalism, I have developed a relational typology of
autonomy. I delineate between the local government’s autonomy from subnational institutions,
from central government institutions, and from international government institutions.
This framing of autonomy allows me to examine the interplay between levels of
governance that both influence the power of grassroots actors and local governments. The central
governing authorities can play a key role in the management of tensions between the local
executive and subnational elites. In a similar dynamic, grassroots forces attempt to employ
international authorities to help them bargain with local government authorities. These
international authorities, however, will take their foreign policy goals toward the national
government into account before interfering with local government authorities.
This framing also allows me to demonstrate that an increase in autonomy from one set of
actors may, in fact, entail a decline in autonomy from another set of actors. Grassroots movements
sought to bind the Chief Executive to the promises laid out for pluralism in the region in the SinoBritish Joint Declaration and the Basic Law through increasing the oversight of Western
governments over the territory. During the

Anti-Extradition Movement grassroots forces

supported efforts like the United States’ plan to impose policy consequences should the Chief
Executive go through with plans to allow extradition to China. Both the PRC officials and the
Chief Executive sought to insulate the executive branch from subnational pressures in the
Legislative Council and the Court of Final Appeals through enhancing the central government’s
ability to step in. For instance, in the Right of Abode Movement, the Chief Executive sought to
override the Court of Final Appeal’s 1999 decision by asking for an interpretation of the National
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People’s Standing Committee of the People’s Republic of China (NPCSC). Similarly, with the
changes to the FOO and MLACMO during the Anti-Extradition Movement were designed to
ensure the Chief Executive did not need the Legislative Council’s permission to extradite
offenders.

Resources Arising from Interactions Across Different Levels of Governance

Within the four episodes in which grassroots forces tried to influence the local
government’s implementation of autonomy policy in Hong Kong, a clear pattern of resource
distribution emerges that influences their success or failure. Grassroots forces are in their best
position to challenge local government authorities when they have both internal unity and Western
government supporters. The local government’s ability to withstand mass pressure is weakest
when their elite coalition is fragmented.
The vital resources that determine both grassroots strength and local government’s
vulnerability are a product of interactions between levels of governance. Changes in grassroots
unity is dependent on the repressive or cooptative strategies employed by both the local and central
government authorities. Grassroots’ ability to access Western government officials’ support is not
only a product of their efforts to build relationships with these actors, but the domestic interests’
of the officials themselves. These interests are often tied to the Western government’s policy
toward the parent state, not just the local government. Finally, the local government’s ability to
keep their coalition cohesive is affected by the role the central authorities play in arbitrating
between local elite factions.
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The Importance of Grassroots Unity Across the Cases
In both of the episodes where grassroots forces were effective in changing the Chief
Executive’s behavior, there were high levels of unity within their coalitions. In the Anti-Article
23 Movement, solidarity can be observed through the development of the Civil Human Rights
Front (CHRF), which served as a coordinating platform for over 50 different human rights,
democracy, political party, religious, civil society, and professional organizations. CHRF
remained active and unified throughout the entirety of the movement.
High levels of cohesion was expressed differently, but no less powerfully during the AntiExtradition Movement. In interviews, grassroot forces affirmed high levels of solidarity.
Expressions, such as “two brothers climbing a mountain,” were also common. Protesters used
“black bloc” tactics, wearing similar attire during protests. Finally, grassroots forces also stayed
united after controversial, more radical actions, such as the storming of the Legislative Council
building on July 1st of 2019 and the attack on the PRC’s Liaison Office on July 21st of 2019.
In the episodes where grassroots forces failed to influence the local government’s policy
implementation, grassroots forces were frequently more fragmented. During the Right of Abode
Movement, parties from the Pan-Democratic Camp retreated from issuing strong support for
grassroots organizations more directly involved with right of abode claimants in May of 1999
following the Tung Administration’s declaration that the Court of Final Appeals’ verdict would
create an avalanche of immigration from the Mainland. During the Umbrella Movement,
grassroots forces faced difficulties maintaining coordinating platforms, such as the Five-Way
Platform that was developed for the 79-day occupation in the fall of 2014.
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Yet in both these episodes, grassroots forces were able to achieve more when they were
able to maintain their coalition. In the immediate aftermath of the Court of Final Appeal’s verdict
striking down the Chief Executive’s changes to the Immigration Ordinance, grassroots forces were
able to act more cohesively. In response to grassroots actions, the Chief Executive only asked the
Court of Final Appeal for a clarification in February of 1999, rather than a full withdrawal of the
bill. Similarly, in the Umbrella Movement, the Chief Executive sought out negotiations with the
protesters conducting the occupation in early October, when the grassroots coalition was more
unified and the Five Way Platform was more functional.
Internal solidarity among grassroots forces amplified their ability to influence the local
government’s implementation of autonomy from central government institutions. Unity within the
grassroots coalition was crucial to empowering them to pressure the local government in three key
ways, 1) it helped create cohesive messaging in interactions with local government officials and
foreign audiences; 2) it enabled grassroots forces to strategize more effectively; and 3) it facilitated
engagement in negotiations with local government officials. In the absence of grassroots solidarity,
grassroots forces often had contradictory messaging, difficulties in carrying out strategies
effectively, and were divided in carrying out attempts at negotiations.
Cohesion helps grassroots forces unify their messaging, strengthening their ability to
create baselines for negotiations with the local government more effectively. In the AntiExtradition Movement, protesters were able to coalesce around five demands. These demands
persisted from mid-June through the extradition bill’s withdrawal in September with few changes.
By contrast, during the Umbrella Movement, grassroots forces found it challenging to reach
consensus on a political reform proposal for the electoral reform for the executive branch. Shortly
after the Alliance for True Democracy announced their proposal, they faced defection by both

358

moderate and more radical political party members. Similarly in the Right of Abode Movement,
political parties’ pushback against the Tung administration suggested that under a more democratic
government, not as many Mainland immigrants would be allowed. This narrative hurt right of
abode claimants who were arguing that all people with a Hong Kong resident parent should be
made citizens.
Grassroots solidarity also bolstered movement strategy through both facilitating advanced
planning and making it easier for grassroots forces to change tactics. In the Anti-Article 23
Campaign, the CHRF was able to plan both the December 15th, 2002 and July 1st marches over a
month in advance. The advanced planning helped boost popular mobilization. CHRF anticipated
that they would have around 5000 thousand participants in the December 15th march, and was able
to mobilize 50,000. Likewise, they aimed to mobilize 100,000 for July 1st; the turnout ended up
being over 500,000 participants.
Moreover, during the Anti-Extradition Movement, grassroots forces were able to adjust the
local government’s strategies and change tactics. Through online platforms such as Telegram and
LIHKG, grassroots forces were able to vote on new strategies and pursue them in a relatively short
time-frame. When the police force started to stop public processions, grassroots forces started
holding sit-ins within the Airport. In the Umbrella Movement, however, discord paralyzed
grassroots forces by late October and made it impossible to build on early mobilization
achievements. The coalition could not agree on a timeline for ending the occupation nor if the
action should be escalated. The occupation therefore limped along through December, long after
it had lost popular support and the number of participants had dwindled.
Finally, internal unity helps grassroots forces engage in bargaining processes with the local
government. Fragmentation within the grassroots coalition weakened their ability to bargain after
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achieving high levels of mobilization both during the Civil Referendum in June and the initiation
of the occupation in September. Leung’s coalition did not view OCLP as being able to speak for
grassroots forces after student groups decided to engage in civil disobedience without their
sanction. Moreover, while high levels of mobilization had brought the Leung administration to the
table in October of 2014, the Hong Kong Federation of Students inability to agree whether or not
to continue negotiations with the local government ended any possibility of even modest
concessions. without high levels, the local government is often able to divide and conquer
grassroots forces.
Support from Western Government Officials
Bunce and Wolchik (2010) and Levitsky and Way (2010) argue that international linkages
can have an effect on regime formation, and even force the government to make concessions to
grassroots actors (Bunce and Wolchik 2010; Levitsky and Way 2010). Contrary to these authors,
however, this work asserts that variation in statements and pressure specifically issued by Western
government officials contributes the most to changes in the local government’s decision-making.
Just as the successful grassroots movements had high levels of grassroots solidarity, they
also benefited from significant international outcry from Western government officials. Western
government officials not only championed the rights of grassroots forces to freedom of expression
but called for the legislation in question to be withdrawn. By June of 2003 during the Anti-Article
23 Movement, many Western governments, including the US, Britain, Canada, the European
Union and Australia demanded that the Chief Executive withdraw the legislation.
Western government outcry was even more forceful in the Anti-Extradition Movement.
Western governments not only called for the legislation’s removal but threatened and implemented
changes in policy toward Hong Kong during the movement. Congressional leadership threatened
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to rescind the special trade privileges within US-Hong Kong Policy Act if the Chief Executive did
not withdraw the bill. The British government decided that it would not issue further export
licenses for crowd control equipment because of the police force’s conduct toward protesters.
In the Right of Abode Movement and the Umbrella Movement, Western officials’
statements were considerably more tepid and there were not credible threats of policy changes. In
1999, during the Right of Abode Movement, the Chief Executive decided to ask the National
People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) for an interpretation of the Basic Law to
overturn the Court of Final Appeal’s decision. While grassroots forces had hoped for assistance
from Western officials, the US government indicated that they were not going to challenge the
Hong Kong administration; they would wait and see if the behavior became a pattern instead.
Britain also refrained from making any statement until after the NPCSC had made their
interpretation of the Basic Law, overturning the majority of the Court of Final Appeal’s decision.
However, we can observe that the period where grassroots forces had international backing,
they were more successful at constraining the Chief Executive’s policy responses. When the Court
of Final Appeal first made their decision in January of 1999, both Britain and the United States
defended the judiciary’s autonomy and warned both the Chief Executive and the PRC leadership
not to interfere. In response, that February the CE only requested that the Court of Final Appeal
only reaffirm the role of the NPCSC as having the power to make a final interpretation of the Basic
Law, rather than trying to over-ride the decision immediately.
In the Umbrella Movement, Western support for grassroots’ actions were much lower.
Western countries remained relatively quiet during the public consultation on electoral reform.
During the occupation in September to December of 2014, the majority of statements asserted the
rights of grassroots forces to protest, rather than insisting on changes in the electoral reform itself.
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Some countries, voiced support for the Chief Executive. For instance, Germany criticized
grassroots behavior during the occupation and Britain affirmed that the PRC leadership was
carrying out the electoral reforms in accordance with the Sino-British Joint Declaration.
Backing from Western government officials is crucial to grassroots success because it both
amplifies grassroots messages and puts pressure on the local government. In the Anti-Article 23
Movement, international warnings regarding the dangers of the legislation were issued right before
the Civil Human Rights Front’s July 1st March. Local newspapers put the White House’s
condemnation of the Article 23 legislation on the front cover prior to the march. Western
denouncements therefore helped provide legitimacy to grassroots claims, furthering mobilization
for the July 1st March.
More importantly, these cases demonstrated that the Chief Executive and their
integrationist coalition relied on connections to Western countries for key goods and services. The
prospect of losing access to these goods and services can change the local government and their
elite supporters’ calculus. During the Anti-Extradition Movement, United States legislators were
not only threatening Hong Kong’s special trading privileges within the United States, but also
imposition of sanctions on individuals who committed human rights violations. Even in the
Umbrella Movement case, economic elite in Hong Kong made it clear to the Chief Executive that
cracking down on the occupation would limit their access to Western markets.
Elite Fragmentation:
Just as grassroots forces were able to exert greater pressure when they were able to preserve
the unity of their coalition, the Chief Executive could withstand mass challenges better when their
coalition was coalesced. When the Chief Executive’s coalition fragmented, they were more
vulnerable and likely to have to make concessions to grassroots forces on implementing autonomy
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from central government institutions. In both the Anti-Article 23 Movement and the AntiExtradition Movement, there were defections from the Chief Executive’s coalition. Following the
July 1st March in 2003, several integrationist legislators balked from supporting the Article 23
national security legislation. The Liberal Party leader quit the Executive Council over the bill and
the rest of his party refused to vote for it, leaving the Chief Executive no choice but to withdraw
the legislation. During the Anti-Extradition Legislation, the Chief Executive faced challenges from
pro-business factions of the integrationist coalition and a segment of the administration’s civil
servants. The latter group not only publicly rebuked the Lam Administration but also organized
and took part in grassroots direct action in late July and August of 2019.
Even during the Right of Abode Movement and the Umbrella Movement there were some
factionalism, but the integrationist coalition was able to maintain a higher degree of cohesion.
During the Right of Abode Movement, when a Liberal Party leader tried to defect from the party
over the Chief Executive’s decision to ask the NPCSC for an interpretation of the Basic Law, he
rejoined his party within a week. In the Umbrella Movement, the integrationist coalition had deep
factional divisions throughout the public consultation, but they remained relatively unified in their
support of the Leung Administration’s proposals. While there were no public defections in support
of grassroots’ policy goals during the occupation, the integrationist coalition only became vocally
supportive of the Chief Executive in November of 2014.
As was the case with the grassroots resources, even short periods of elite fragmentation
could momentarily boost grassroots forces’ position vis-à-vis the Chief Executive. Following the
CFA’s decision in January of 1999 in the Right of Abode Movement, discordant statements both
among political parties and delegates to Mainland institutions made it difficult for the integrationist
coalition to coalesce around a strategy for defending the Chief Executive’s amendment to the
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Immigration Amendment. During the Umbrella Movement, in the early stage of the occupation,
business elite contributed surreptitiously contributed money thereby helping grassroots forces
sustain pressure on the Leung Administration.
Elite fragmentation makes the local government more vulnerable to grassroots pressure for
three reasons. The local government often needs elite support in order implement changes in
autonomy policy, depending on the institutional structure of the regime. In all four of these
movements, the Chief Executive had to enact policy through tabling a bill in the Legislative
Council. Within the Right of Abode Movement, the Chief Executive was able to pass his desired
changes to the Immigration Ordinance in a matter of days. By contrast, in the Anti-Article 23
Movement, the Chief Executive was forced to withdraw the bill because he did not have enough
votes from the integrationist coalition.
Elite cohesion also bolsters the local government’s message among the public, in the same
way that solidarity and Western support does for grassroots forces. In the Umbrella Movement, in
the first few weeks of the occupation in October, prominent business elite were relatively quiet
and contradicted the Chief Executive’s narratives about the effect of deleterious effects of
grassroots actions on the city’s economy. This dynamic was intensified during the Anti-Extradition
Movement; not only were prominent business elite unwilling to render public support following
the bill’s suspension in June, but civil servants actively condemned the Lam administration’s
handling of policing, weakening the legitimacy of the local government’s tactics.
Finally, elite defection provides crucial resources to grassroots forces that can amplify their
ability to challenge the government. During the Umbrella Movement, business elite associated
with the integrationist coalition provided monetary support to the occupation. In the AntiExtradition Movement, civil servants actually participated in grassroots activities, contributing not
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only to mobilization but to the power of grassroots’ narratives regarding the local government’s
policy failures.
Cooptation, Coercion and Grassroots Unity
One way my analysis contributes to a strategic interactive perspective of contentious
politics by tracing out how engagements between grassroots forces and their challenges affects the
intensity of alliances within the grassroots coalition. Recent scholarship has pointed to the form of
repression as either strengthening or weakening the organization of societal forces seeking to
counter government action (Boudreau 2004; Davenport 2015; Blaydes 2018). Through examining
these four case studies, we can observe ways in which the specific strategies of the local and central
governments affected the organization of grassroots forces. The case studies reveal that while
cooptation can have a profound effect on grassroots cohesion, episodes of coercion can rather
quickly build solidarity among grassroots forces. In order for the unity among grassroots forces to
be enduring, the threat of coercion must be both collective and ongoing. Targeted repression can
lead even lead to increased divisions, rather than solidifying grassroots forces.
Where the local government used cooptation strategies, grassroots forces were easily
divided. During the Right of Abode Movement, the Tung administration granted select right of
abode claimants the ability to stay in Hong Kong, leading to fissures among the parent associations
who were involved in court cases pushing for a more expansive definition of Hong Kong
citizenship. The Tung administration was able to mitigate court challenges through getting rid of
the strongest cases among right of abode claimants.
Electoral interest could also lead to cooptation and incentivize divergence among the
grassroots coalition. For instance, the Democratic Party’s increasingly tenuous position as the
flagship party among the Pan-Democratic Camp led them to negotiate with the Chief Executive
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and the Liaison Office on electoral reform in 2010 over joining the League of Social Democrats
and Civic Party’s by-election action. This incident sparked accusations that the party had been
coopted and let to fissures within political parties and between veteran and newer generations of
activist.
Moreover, cooptation strategies also created resentments between the factions that could
inhibit cohesive action for years. The fragmentation caused by the Democratic Party’s pact with
the Tsang administration and the Liaison office haunted the Umbrella Movement four years later.
Political parties could not coalesce in the coordinating platform of The Alliance for True
Democracy and student groups mistrusted the leadership of OCLP due to their connections to the
Democratic Party and other veteran organizations.
However, as the Anti-Article 23 Movement, the Umbrella Movement, and the AntiExtradition Movement all demonstrate, grassroots forces could achieve high levels of solidarity,
at least temporarily, in a relatively short period of time, if they faced the threat of coercion. For
instance, the student groups Scholarism and HKFS seized control of leading occupation from
OCLP in September of 2014. Yet the coalition was able to unite following the local government’s
use of tear gas on September 28th.
Actual violence against protesters and repressive actions did intensify unity, but it did not
have a long-lasting an effect. Once the coercion diminished, or became more targeted, solidarity
often faded. For example, during the Umbrella Movement, grassroots forces were able to coalesce
in both June and September and October of 2014 because of changes in coercion. In June,
grassroots rallied around OCLP’s Civil Referendum after the PRC leadership released a white
paper calling on judges to act as patriotic administrators and there were massive DDOS attacks on
the referendum’s website. During the initiation stage of the occupation, tear gassing of protesters
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on September 28th, and attacks by counter protesters in early October enabled grassroots forces to
coalesce through the Five-Way Platform. However, following the Civil Referendum, solidarity
broke down in a little more than a week, when student groups organized a civil disobedience action
at the annual July 1st March despite OLCP’s pleas against it. Once violence against protesters
declined in mid-October, unity among grassroots forces began to fade, leaving the Five Way
Platform completely dysfunctional by late October.
Comparison across all four movements reveal that for coercion to intensify unity over a
longer period of time, the threat of repression had to be ongoing. The two episodes that exhibited
the most intense cohesion, the Anti-Article 23 Movement and the Anti-Extradition Movement,
involved fighting legislation that promised future coercion, which helped them maintain unity until
the legislation was withdrawn. In the Anti-Article 23 Movement, many grassroots organizations,
including religious, human rights, and pro-democracy groups, had connections to Mainland
Chinese organizations and feared the new security legislation would lead to their being disbanded.
Moreover, professional organizations, including teachers unions, journalist associations, and legal
groups, all worried that their jobs made them vulnerable to future prosecution for either disclosing
state secrets and sedition. The law also provided for warrantless searches during investigations
into whether the national security legislation had been violated. Similarly, in the Anti-Extradition
Movement, grassroots forces were concerned that officials in the PRC would concoct charges and
extradite Hong Kong dissidents. They feared that they would not receive adequate legal protection
and be subject to harsh sentencing because of their opposition to both the Chief Executive’s
administration and the PRC leadership. The police also continued to use tear gas and higher levels
of force from June through September of 2019, when the bill was withdrawn, which also increased
grassroots’ perception that the threat of coercion was ongoing.
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Furthermore, in addition to an ongoing threat, coercion had to be viewed as affecting the
entirety of the coalition. I therefore find support for Blaydes (2018) assessment that repression that
is indiscriminate and can harm the collective produces more solidarity within groups. As indicated
in my above discussion of the content of both Anti-Article 23 Movement and the Anti-Extradition
Movement, grassroots forces all believed the changes in autonomy the local government was
planning to make would lead to future repression for all of the coalition. Moreover, in the AntiExtradition Protests of 2019, police and counter-protester violence was often indiscriminate. As
explored in chapter 6, the police chose to clear the entire protest of tens of thousands at the
Legislative Council through tear gas, bean bag rounds, and batons, on June 12th , rather than
targeting the few hundred protesters who were trying to enter the Legislative Council building. In
Yuen long, counter-protesters attacked random commuters coming off of the train, rather than just
targeting protesters.
More targeted repression could actually create further rifts among the grassroots coalition.
While the Leung Administration did not employ tear gas after September 28th, some grassroots
forces continued to have encounters with police violence over the course of the 79-day occupation.
While the police did not try and stop the overall occupation, they did use brutal tactics to clear
occupiers if they expanded the protest sites. Most veteran protest groups did not take part in these
actions. The fact that only some protesters experienced violence while others did not sharpened
disagreements among participants. Protester who experienced the repressive police tactics wanted
to escalate movement actions, while veteran activists did not.
Linkage, Interests, and Western Support
In addition to my claim that the support of Western government officials is one of the more
vital sources of international linkage for grassroots forces, my dissertation also offers insight as to
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what factors facilitates Western official support. Grassroots forces are more likely to garner
support among Western officials when they actively cultivate linkages with those officials and
challenging the Chief Executive is in the Western officials’ domestic interest. For grassroots forces
to cultivate connections to Western government officials, they often have to travel to Western
countries and obtain meetings with officials. Grassroots interest in maintaining relationships have
varied over time. Additionally, Western officials take the degree to which the policies affect their
domestic constituents and their relationship to China into account before making public statements
criticizing the Chief Executive. The salience of the Chinese relationship in shaping the degree to
which Western officials make statements favoring the Hong Kong grassroots’ forces goals has
only grown as China has sought to punish states that interfere with what it sees as the internal
affairs of the country.
Connections between grassroots forces and Western governments fluctuated throughout
the post-colonial period. Prior to the Handover, grassroots forces had strong relationships in
Western countries and were able to obtain high level meetings with government officials, including
the Vice President of the United States. By the early 2010s, the connections between grassroots
forces and Western government officials were severely attenuated. Between 2013 and 2015 during
the Umbrella Movement, grassroots forces only took two trips abroad, one to the United States.
Many of the most prominent organizations during the Umbrella Movement, including the two
coordinating platforms Alliance for True Democracy and OCLP, actively avoided reaching out to
international actors and Western government officials. Following the Umbrella Movement,
however, grassroots forces made a concerted effort to make regular visits to Western countries and
meet with officials. They also explicitly addressed Western audiences during protest activities as
well.
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Changes in grassroots cultivation of ties to Western government officials correspond to
variation in the quality and quantity of statements. Grassroots forces made more trips to Western
countries to meet with officials during the Anti-Article 23 Movement and the Anti-Extradition
Movement. The Anti-Extradition protest also features protests, rallies, and media campaigns
designed to generate good will among international audiences. Both of these movements and
received more dogged support in both of these episodes. In the Right of Abode Movement and
the Umbrella Movement, few trips were made, and the quantity and quality of states were limited.
Traveling to Western countries and meeting with Western officials gave grassroots forces
the opportunity to contradict the Chief Executive’s narratives about the policy in question. During
both the Right of Abode Movement and the Anti-Article 23 Movement, the Tung administration
sent officials to explain both the need for the NPCSC interpretation and the Article 23 legislation
to Western countries. Grassroots forces did not travel to Western countries to defend the Court of
Final Appeal from a possible NPCSC interpretation, which contributed to their inability to garner
Western support. Grassroots forces did make multiple trips to counter the Chief Executive’s
narratives regarding the national security legislation and were ultimately successful eliciting public
support both in the fall of 2002 and the spring of 2003.
However, building up relationships with Western government officials was not enough;
Western officials’ domestic interests played a profound role in whether they challenged the Chief
Executive’s policies on autonomy. Western government officials were more likely to challenge
the Chief Executive’s policies when the legislation affected their domestic constituents and foreign
policy goals. During Article 23 the public consultation in 2002, Western officials spoke out
because the Tung administration’s proposals on secession, sedition, and treason legislation were
applicable to foreign nationals who were Hong Kong permanent residents. After Tung
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administration exempted foreign nationals from most clauses, many Western officials stopped the
critiquing the Chief Executive’s implementation of Article 23 and would not acquiesce to
grassroots entreaties during meetings. However, with the SARS outbreak during the spring of
2003, Western officials began to see keeping Hong Kong’s information ecosystem relatively open
as important for their own citizens’ health.
Often Western countries’ decision to publicly pressure the Chief Executive was tied to the
state of their relationship with the PRC. In the Right of Abode Movement, the Tung
Administration’s decision to seek a NPCSC decision occurred within days of the 1999 NATO
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. This incident forced US officials to focus on
mending its relationship with China, since domestic organizations like the American Chamber of
Commerce were pressuring the Clinton administration to finish negotiating a deal for China’s entry
into the World Trade Organization (WTO). Similarly, the Trump administration briefly decided to
remain relatively quiet on the Anti-Extradition Movement protests in June and July because of
ongoing negotiations to end the US-Sino Trade War. However, by August, the Trump
administration began to support the grassroots movement as trade talks stalled.
The Chinese relationship became an increasingly important factor in whether or not
Western countries supported grassroots forces’ policy agenda in the 2010s because the PRC put
more effort into raising the costs of allying with opposition groups within China. The PRC
authorities both had canceled bilateral meetings and trade negotiations with Britain over a meeting
with the Dalai Lama and public statements on the country’s human rights practices. During the
Umbrella Movement, also PRC authorities refused British legislators entry into China and Hong
Kong in November of 2014. The PRC leadership also try to discourage support for grassroots
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activities, particularly by US officials, in the Umbrella Movement and the Anti-Extradition
Movement by accusing countries of “foreign interference.”
Hong Kong’s Reliance on the Central Government and Intra-Elite Unity
The relationship between the local Chief Executive and his coalition was shaped by the
role of the central government’s position as arbiter. The local executive could not have their own
political party nor formally affiliate with the parent state’s Chinese Communist Party. Attempts to
create a coordinating platform were thwarted by both colonial legacies and Chinese commitment
to having an institutionally fractured coalition for the Chief Executive. The result was a dynamic
where both the HK government and members of their coalition appealed to Beijing rather than
working through local institutions to resolve conflicts and crises.
In some cases, PRC authorities were able to mitigate conflicts between Hong Kong elite
factions. For instance, in the 2012 elections, they helped hold the coalition together and rally
around the administration of CY Leung. During the Umbrella Movement, following a Liberal
Party’s declaration that Leung should step down, the PRC authorities stepped to ensure he was
demoted and to pressure the rest of the integrationist camp to rally around the Chief Executive.
This dynamic helped the Chief Executive withstand pressure from grassroots forces conducting
the occupation.
However, this dynamic had the iterative impact of both exacerbating tension in responding
to grassroots activities, and in some cases, leading to elite defection. One reason for this quandary
was that reliance on the Chief Executive created ambiguities around which actor was the final
authority. In the Right of Abode movement, following the CFA’s decision, the local government’s
need to wait for discussions with central government authorities led to discordant statements both
among political parties and delegates to Mainland institutions, which was embarrassing and costly

372

to the former. In the Anti-Article 23 Movement, the PRC authorities wanted to support the Chief
Executive, but Tien’s interactions with them led him to both resign from the Executive Council
and to encourage the Liberal Party to refuse to support Article 23 legislation.
Since the Chief Executive could rely on the backing of the PRC authorities, they also did
not coordinate with the integrationist camp before making decisions. This dynamic put
integrationist political parties in the position of making statements that often did not align with the
Chief Executive’s position. During the Right of Abode Movement, the DAB argued that the local
and central governments would never interfere with the Court of Final Appeal’s decision in
February, only to have the CE turn around and do just that a few months later. In the AntiExtradition Movement, both the Liberal Party and the BPA rallied around the changes to the FOO
and the MLACMO after the June 9th March in which a million people demonstrated and were not
informed that the CE had decided to suspend the legislation until after the fact.
Discordant statements were harmful because it highlighted the awkward position
integrationist parties were in: they supported the government but could not form the government.
These parties faced electoral pressures that the Chief Executive did not face; the CE’s power would
not be affected by the growing power of the DAB versus that of the BPA or the Liberal Party. The
absence of a subnational coordinating institution therefore led parties to defect due to electoral
pressures.
The role of the PRC apparatus as arbiter also limited buy-in among integrationist elite. As
Svolik (2012) and Brownlee (2007) point out, a local coordinating institution creates an incentive
to cooperate because it allows elite to lose in one round but believe that they can win in another.
In the Hong Kong case, however, the PRC apparatus’ support was clearly behind the Chief
Executive, over all other integrationist interests. Political parties were never going to have access
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to the Chief Executive position, because the CPP did not want to empower the Legislative Council
apparatus. They actively barred political party representatives from the Legislative Council from
running in the 2012 election. This dynamic limited the ability of the Chief Executive to ameliorate
factional disputes over the long term, as it became increasingly clear that parties like the Liberal
Party were never going to have access to power.
In conjunction with this point, the Chief Executive’s reliance on the central government
also made it clear to members of the integrationist coalition that there were circumstances where
the CE could not protect them from PRC authorities. In the Anti-Extradition Movement, probusiness factions were worried that if the Supreme People’s Court issued a warrant for their
previous commercial dealings, the CE could do nothing to stop them without damaging her own
access to power. Mainland-born business elite were particularly concerned about this possibility.

Interactions between Resources:
Many works in contentious politics have emphasized the importance of unity in conducting
mass mobilization (Sing 2004; Tilly 2004; Lust-okar 2004; Mcfaul 2005; Cavatorta 2009; V.
Bunce and Wolchik 2011). As explored earlier in this chapter, unity can increase the effectiveness
of messaging and strategies and improve grassroots actors’ ability to bargain with local
government officials. One key finding from this dissertation is that grassroots’ internal solidarity
can also amplify their ability to achieve high levels of Western government backing as well. During
the Anti-Extradition Movement, cohesion among grassroots forces allowed them to collaborate
and coordinate solidarity marches in Western countries throughout the summer of 2019. On June
9th alone, they were able to amplify the international attention on the Civil Human Rights Front
march by organizing 29 rallies across Europe, North America, East Asia, and Australia. Moreover,
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grassroots forces came together to raise money for international media campaigns that explicitly
called on citizens of G-20 countries to pressure their representatives to support Hong Kong.
However, another insight this dissertation offers is that the type of pressure Western
governments place on governments is important. Levitsky and Way ( 2010) contend that Western
linkage can be helpful to opposition movements because it increases the costs of repressing
mobilization. In the Umbrella Movement, Western government statements championed grassroots
forces’ right to protest but were far less vocal on their desire to for elections for the Chief Executive
without political screening. The Chief Executive limited coercion against grassroots forces in
response, but in the absence of coercion old mistrust between grassroots factions re-emerged and
the occupiers ability to negotiate faded. Statements that only support grassroots’ ability to protest,
and not their policy agenda, may actually hurt their chances at affecting government policy since
it limits their cohesion. In both the Anti-Article 23 Movement and the

Anti-Extradition

Movement, Western government officials called for the withdrawal of the legislation in question,
which ultimately resulted in the Chief Executive being forced to change their policy
implementation.
Finally, the degree to which grassroots forces reached out to Western governments affected
how actively the PRC authorities intervened in the integrationist coalition. The PRC authorities
tried to take a hands off approach to the passing of the FOO and the MLACMO legislation during
the Anti-Extradition Movement. They only stepped in after grassroots forces made trips to the
United States in April of 2019. Their involvement grew as grassroots forces continued to make
trips to Western countries and even launch movement events directly targeting foreign
governments, PRC officials feared that the United States would use the crisis to press their
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advantage in the trade war. Their efforts, however, further damaged the integrationist coalition, as
civil servants grew more resentful of how the police were handling protesters.

Alternative Explanations:

In each of the empirical chapters, I have examined three possible alternative factors that
could have influenced patterns of grassroots factors success or failure in affecting the local
government’s policy implementation of autonomy. This dissertation contributes to understanding
how nationalist dynamics within protests can arise out of coercive activities, rather than ethnic
sentiment in and of itself. Furthermore, I demonstrate that economic grievance does not play a
role in the variation in grassroots success or failure over time in the Hong Kong case. While media
structure did influence coalitional dynamics over the course of the Hong Kong autonomy
movements, the better explanation for the variation in outcomes is still the distribution of the
resources of grassroots internal unity, Western government officials’ support, and elite
fragmentation.
The Role of Nationalism in Variation of Autonomy Movement Success in Hong Kong
This study’s discussion of the burgeoning localist movement in Hong Kong contributes to
our understanding of changes in nationalist sentiment within Hong Kong. With the growth in the
power of nationalist groups and claims in the Hong Kong context, it is reasonable to assume that
rising nationalist sentiment bolstered the sustained mobilization that led to grassroots pressure.
While anti-Mainland sentiment existed in Hong Kong before the Handover, the variation in
nationalist sentiment does not fit the pattern of success and failure across the four cases of
autonomy promotion. Many Hong Kong residents actually viewed the PRC administration as being
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more effective than the Hong Kong government in the early 2000s. Prior to the July 1st March,
members of the grassroots coalition actually praised the PRC leadership for their handling of the
SARS outbreak, contrasting it with that of the Tung Administration.
Moreover, changes in anti-Mainland sentiment may correspond to mobilization, but not to
actual success in pressuring the local government. Anti-Mainland sentiment grew considerably
after 2008, yet despite this increase, the Umbrella Movement was unsuccessful. The reason why
the Umbrella Movement was not successful after high mobilization in the Civil Referendum and
the occupation was the lack of unity made it impossible to bargain with the government.
Moreover, localist activists could not organize and mobilize successfully without the
presence of government coercion. In the Anti-Extradition Movement, the leadership of Localist
nationalist groups within Hong Kong were disempowered by 2018, and other grassroots forces,
such as the Pan-Democratic Camp, openly criticized their activities. Localist interviewees
expressed that they could not gain any momentum among the population regarding nationalist
claims such as the PRC leadership drained the local governments’ resources. The critical juncture
came on June 12th, 2019, when the police used higher levels of force on thousands of protesters
and threatened increased sentencing for protest activities.
Economic Grievances
Another possible factor that could have influenced grassroots success or failure in
influencing the local government’s implementation of autonomy from central government
institutions is economic grievances. Both the Right of Abode Movement and the Anti-Article 23
Movement took place during severe economic challenges. The Right of Abode Movement took
place during the Asian Financial Crisis. This economic downturn could have made the Chief
Executive’s arguments about crumbling social institutions as a result of a massive wave of
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immigration all the more dire. Moreover, the Anti-Article 23 Movement’s July 1st March followed
SARS; many blamed the Tung administration for the struggling economy that resulted from the
crisis, and some participated to show their displeasure with the CE, rather than the legislation per
se.
However, economic grievance cannot explain the divergence between the outcomes in the
Umbrella Movement and the Anti-Extradition Movement. In both periods, there were similar
levels of dissatisfaction among the population with the state of the economy. In both cases,
according to the University of Hong Kong Public Opinion Program (HKPOP), while people were
unhappy about the economy, the did not prioritize fixing the issue. In 2015, nearly dissatisfaction
with Hong Kong’s development was at its highest point since 2004, with nearly 50% dissatisfied,
but the number of people who thought the government should prioritize the economy above other
issues was only 10%. In 2019, public opinion polls indicate concern about livelihood issues
dropped by 25%, indicating that the success of the Anti-Extradition Movement was tied more to
political concerns than economic ones (Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute 2020c).
Changing Media Structure
Within the study of Hong Kong social movements, scholars have long asserted the role of
changing media structures in explaining outcomes (Chan 2005; Wong 2015; Lee et al. 2019).
Media is thought to have played a role in both mobilization (Chan 2005; Chan ad Lee 2015; Lee
et al. 2019) and the increasing radicalization and discord within the grassroots coalition. The
development of online media and coordinating social media platforms are theorized to have made
it easy for participants to “self-mobilize” (Chan 2005; Lee et al 2019). Online media is not as
conscribed as television media, where the Hong Kong government can control licensing.
Moreover, social media forums and apps such as telegram allows for quick transmission about
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protest activities. These authors argue that grassroots civil society organizations and political
parties are relatively small and that public opinion data of participants demonstrates that they came
to the protests with friends and family rather than with organizations.
However, there was both high mobilization at certain points in the Umbrella Movement
and the Anti-Extradition protests. As highlighted earlier, the problem for the Umbrella Movement
was that it could not harness and sustain mobilization over time. This problem was due to an
inability among participants to agree on a strategy, rather than the media structure. Moreover, the
same technology existed in both periods, so at the very least, changing media structure cannot
explain variation in success in autonomy promotion in the short term.
Wong (2015) blames the lack of unity and increased radicalization within the movement
on the media structure. He claims that the media covers more outlandish candidates to increase
sales, and this alienates middle class Hong Kong voters. The resulting tensions over electoral
outcomes divides the coalition (2015). During my interviews, I found evidence that younger,
newer protesters in the Umbrella Movement, like HKFS and Scholarism, were exposed to more
radical political parties in the 2010s.
Once again, however, the dynamic Wong describes doesn’t account for variation within a
relatively compressed period of time. In the Umbrella Movement, there was collaboration during
the Public Consultation in June, only for collaboration to fall apart in July. Similarly in September,
within a period of a few days the grassroots coalition experienced a seismic shift in the dethroning
of OCLP in favor of HKFS and scholarship, but then were still able to unify initially and create
the Five Way Platform. These changes are better explained by the presence or absence of coercion.
In both cases, declining unity coincided with the end of a threat, such as the failure of the DDOS
attack or CY Leung’s decision to not clear the protests by force in October.
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Implications for the Future of Hong Kong’s Grassroots Forces
The imposition of National Security Law must be viewed as an attempt by the PRC
authorities to defend the Hong Kong government from actors on multiple fronts. The PRC is trying
to resolve the perpetual problem of the integrationist elite coalition by becoming even more
involved in managing intra-elite disputes. The new PRC National Security Office that can step in
and prosecute at its own discretion, therefore completely bypassing subnational institutions that
could slow its efforts. Yet they still remain committed to not allowing the Chinese Communist
Party to be formally organized in the city, they won’t give the CE to have her own political party,
and no other coordinating platform for the elite coalition has been proposed. According to the
analysis within my research, their strategies may result in further fragmentation and defection
within the Hong Kong elite over time.
The Chief Executive’s administration’s vulnerability does not mean that grassroots
challenges of the National Security Law will be successful. The PRC leadership is attacking the
factors articulated in this dissertation that provided grassroots forces the resources with which to
launch a successful attack. Through the mandate against colluding with foreign powers, grassroots
forces will not be able to cultivate the linkages that allow them to access support from Western
powers at key intervals. While coercion has usually produced unity in the past, now the
consequences are so severe, with possible life sentences for violations of the National Security
Law, that many within the grassroots coalition are forced to seek refuge in the US, Canada, Europe,
or Taiwan. In the absence of grassroots’ access to Western support or cohesion, their ability to
affect the local government’s implementation of autonomy are greatly conscribed.
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Appendix: Interviews

Number

Position/Status

Date

Interview 1

Umbrella Participant/Expat

June 10th, 2016

Interview 2

American Academic

June 12th, 2016

Interview 3

Democratic Development Network and Occupy
Hong Kong with Love and Peace Organizer (1/2)

June 16th, 2016

Interview 4

Umbrella Movement Participant

June 16th, 2016

Interview 5

Occupy Hong Kong with Love and Peace
Organizer (1/2)

June 21st, 2016

Interview 6

People Power Movement Legislator

June 22nd, 2016

Interview 7

Hong Kong Professor/Submitter of Proposals
During the Electoral Reform Period of 2013-2015

June 22nd, 2016

Interview 8

Member of the Article 23 Concern Group,
Umbrella Movement Participant, Expat (1/2)

June 24th, 2016

Interview 9

Umbrella Movement Participant

June 25th, 2016

Interview 10

Former Legislator and Member of the Democratic
Party (1/2)

June 27th, 2016

Interview 11

Umbrella Movement Participant

June 28th, 2016

Interview 12

University of Hong Kong Public Opinion
Programme Employee

June 28th, 2016

Interview 13

Umbrella Movement Participant/District Council
Candidate (1/2)

June 30th, 2016

Interview 14

Democratic Party Legislative Council Member

June 30th, 2016

Interview 15

Pan-Democratic Camp Functional Constituency
Legislative Councilor (1/2)

June 30th, 2016
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Number

Position/Status

Date

Interview 16

Journalist

July 2nd, 2016

Interview 17

Umbrella Movement Participant/District Council
Candidate (2/2)

July 3rd, 2016

Interview 18

US Expatriate Umbrella Movement and Fishball
Riot Participant

July 3rd, 2016

Interview 19

Civic Passion Member (1/3)

July 5th, 2016

Interview 20

Umbrella Movement and Fishball Riot Participant

July 6th, 2016

Interview /21

Scholarism Member

July 7th, 2016

Interview 22

Civic Party Legislative Council Member

July 7th, 2016

Interview 23

Intern to Democratic Party/Umbrella Movement
Participant

July 8th, 2016

Interview 24

HK Professor/Leader of Scholarly Petitions

July 8th, 2016

Interview 25

Umbrella Movement Participant

July 10th 2016

Interview 26

Civil Society Group Organizer and Media
Personality

July 11th, 2016

Interview 27

Democratic Party Legislative Council Member 2

July 12th, 2016

Interview 16

Journalist

July 2nd, 2016

Interview 17

Umbrella Movement Participant/District Council
Candidate (2/2)

July 3rd, 2016

Interview 18

US Expatriate Umbrella Movement and Fishball
Riot Participant

July 3rd, 2016

Interview 28

Media Employee, Expat

July 13th, 2016

Interview 29

Youngspiration Member

July 14th, 2016

Interview 30

Former Hong Kong Federation of Students Leader

July 14th , 2016

382

Number

Position/Status

Date

Interview 31

Former civil servant and Member of the Tung
Administration (1/2)

July 15th, 2016

Interview 32

Umbrella Movement Participant

July 15th 2016

Interview 33

Expat District Council Member

July 15th, 2016

Interview 34

Hong Kong Professor/Writer for Passion-Times

July 16th, 2016

Interview 35

Hong Kong Academic

July 18th 2016

Interview 36

Former Hong Kong Federation of Students Leader
2

July 18th, 2016

Interview 37

Hong Kong Professor/Mediator between ProBeijing/Pro-Democratic Factions

July 18th, 2016

Interview 38

League of Social Democrats Politician and Activist
2 Interview 1

February 1st, 2018

Interview 39

Socialist Action Group Member

February 5th, 2018

Interview 40

League of Social Democrats Politician and Activist
2 Interview 2

February 12th, 2018

Interview 41

League of Social Democrats Politician and Activist
1

February 26th, 2018

Interview 31

Former civil servant and Member of the Tung
Administration (1/2)

July 15th, 2016

Interview 42

Occupy Hong Kong with Love and Peace
Organizer (2/2)

March 9th, 2018

Interview 43

League of Social Democrats Activist (2/3)

March 12th, 2018

Interview 44

Member of Article 23 Concern Group, Participant
in Umbrella Movement, and ExPat 2/2

March 16th, 2018

Interview 45

Representative of Hong Kong Justice and Peace
Commission/Civil Human Rights Front

March 23rd, 2018

Interview 46

Member of Democratic Development Network,
Occupy Hong Kong with Love and Peace (2/2)

March 28th , 2018

Interview 47

Law Professor/Article 23 Concern
Group/Speaker/Pro-Dem Activist

April 16th, 2018
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Number

Position/Status

Date

Interview 48

Third Interview with League of Social Democrats
Activist

April 20th, 2018

Interview 49

Reporter and member of Hong Kong Journalists
Association

May 2nd, 2018

Interview 50

Pan-Democratic Camp Functional Constituency
Legislative Councilor (2/2)

May 17th, 2018

Interview 51

Democratic Party Member, District Councilor,
Power for Democracy

May 19th, 2018

Interview 52

Former Legislator and member of the Democratic
Party (2/2)

July 25th, 2018

Interview 48

Third Interview with League of Social Democrats
Activist

April 20th, 2018

Interview 53

Former member of the Tung Administration and
Tsang Administration, member of the civil service

November 14th,
2018

Interview 54

Former Democratic Party Member and former
Executive Council Member

November 15th,
2018

Interview 55

Former Pro-Beijing Legislator

November 25th,
2018

Interview 56

Civil Human Rights Front/Student Activist

November 28th,
2018

Interview 57

Former civil servant under both the Tung and
Tsang Administration

December 7th, 2018

Activist, Member of the Press and OHKLP

December 10th,
2018

Interview 59

Former Legislator and Department Head

December 12th,
2018

Interview 60

Former civil servant and member of the Tung
Administration (2/2)

December 14th,
2018

Interview 61

League of Social Democrats Politician and Activist
3

December 14th,
2018

Interview 62

Former ExCo Member

December 15th,
2018

Interview 63

Activist during the Anti-Patriotic Education
Campaign

December 18th,
2018

Interview 64

Barrister, member of Article 23 Concern Group,
and member of Civic Party

December 20th,
2018

Interview 58
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Number

Position/Status

Date

Interview 65

Scholarism/Demosisto Activist

January 16th, 2019

Interview 66

Youngspiration Member (2/2)

July 15th, 2019

Interview 67

NPC Delegate, Liberal Party Leader

July 22nd, 2019

interview 68

Interview with Anti-Extradition Law Protester

July 28th, 2019

Interview 69

Former Civic Passion Member (2/3)

August 1st, 2019

Interview 70

Hong Kong National Party Representative

August 1st, 2019

Interview 71

Democratic Party Legislative Council Member 3

August 2nd, 2019

Interview 72

Former Legislator and Democratic Alliance for the
Betterment of Hong Kong Party Leader

August 5th, 2019

Interview 73

Member of the Hong Kong Journalists Association

August 5th, 2019

Interview 74

NPC Delegate, Pro-Beijing Legislator

August 6th, 2019

8Interview 75

Former Civic Passion Member (3/3)

August 6th, 2019

Interview 76

Localist Leader

August 7th, 2019

Interview 77

Democratic Party Legislative Council Member 5

August 7th, 2019

Interview 78

Democratic Party Legislative Council Member 4

August 8th, 2019

Interview 79

NGO employee and activist

August 9th, 2019

Interview 80

Independent Pro-Democratic Legislative Councilor

August 11th, 2019

Interview 81

Civil Human Rights Front Spokesman

August 13th, 2019
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